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I. UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS (ARTICLE 21.21 & THE DTPA)
A. WHO CAN SUE AND WHO CAN BE SUED
1. Standing to Sue
OME of the cases discussed in this section deny "standing" to sue
under article 21.21 to so-called "third parties," i.e. those not a party to
an insurance contract. Use of the words "standing" and "third
party," however, are of doubtful application to a statutory cause of action.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals had the following to say about "stand-
ing" in a DTPA suit:
In order for any person to maintain a suit it is necessary that they have
standing to litigate the matters in issue. Standing consists of some inter-
est peculiar to the person individually and not as a member of the gen-
eral public. This general rule of standing applies in all cases absent a
statutory exception to the contrary. The DTPA provides us with just
an exception. 1
The San Antonio court then noted that "[i]n Riverside National Bank v.
Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. 1980), the court ruled that it is the statu-
tory definition of consumer that delineates the class of persons that may
maintain a private cause of action." 2
Since both the DTPA and article 21.21's private damage remedies were
passed as part of the same legislation in 1973, since the two statutes are
clearly in pari materia by virtue of their express cross references to each
other, since article 21.21 expressly provides that "any person" who is dam-
aged may sue and article 21.21 defines "person" to include any person or
entity and which, unlike the definition of "consumer," does not require the
actual or prospective purchase of anything, you would think it pretty clear
that anyone and everyone injured by another's engaging in unfair practices in
the business of insurance can sue under the statute.
But as some of the article 21.21 cases discussed below show, plaintiffs
damaged by unfair claims settlement practices have been pitched out of
* B.A., University of Texas at Austin; J.D., University of Texas at Austin, School of
Law. Partner, Longley & Maxwell, L.L.P., Austin, Texas.
** B.A., Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois; J.D., University of Texas at Austin, School
of Law. Associate, Longley & Maxwell, L.L.P., Austin, Texas.
1. Government Employees Credit Union v. Fuji Photo Film, 712 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.).
2. Id. at 213.
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court even though they are within the statutory definition of "the class of
person that may maintain a private cause of action" and even though they
have suffered damage distinct from that suffered by the general public.
Clearly, these decisions are not explained by traditional "standing" analysis.
The term "third party" is also suspect. The question is "third party" to
what? Obviously, some of the cases discussed below testify that it is good
advocacy to distance the plaintiff as far as possible from whatever agreement
the wrongful acts or practices are being performed under, and "third party"
is a good start. From there it won't be long before the plaintiff becomes a
total "stranger" to the whole transaction and should be run out of town on a
rail. The question is not whether use of the term "third party" makes good
advocacy, but whether its use is intellectually defensible when dealing with a
statutory cause of action that does not require that the plaintiff have a con-
tract with the defendant. The source of the plaintiff's rights in an article
21.21 case derive from the statute itself, not from the law of contract. In-
deed, it was the inadequacies of the common law of contract and fraud that
led to the passage of article 21.21 and the DTPA in the first place.3
Section 16 of article 21.21 grants a cause of action to "any person who has
sustained actual damages as a result of another's engaging in" conduct pro-
hibited in section 4 of article 21.21, the rules and regulations adopted by the
State Board of Insurance, or section 17.46 of the DTPA. 4 Section 2, in turn,
defines "person" as any 5 individual, corporation, association, partnership,
reciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds insurer, fraternal benefit society,
and any other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance, including
agent, brokers, adjusters, and life insurance counselors. 6 Inexplicably, even
though the only statutory limitation placed on a person's standing to sue
under article 21.21 is that such person must have sustained actual damages
as a result of the other person's illegal conduct, some courts, as will be seen
below, have required that the "person" also be an insured or beneficiary.
Not all courts, however, engage in such judicial legislation, but instead apply
the statute as written. For example, in Maccabees Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. McNiel,7 the court allowed a person to maintain an action under arti-
cle 21.21 even though he was neither an insured nor a beneficiary of an in-
surance policy.
In Maccabees the Dallas County Hospital District (DCHD) sought to ob-
tain group life insurance coverage for its employees through Maccabees.
Whyburn, a Maccabees group sales representative, told DCHD that he had
authority to bind coverage as a representative of Maccabees, and that cover-
3. See Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1981).
4. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
5. Texas courts have always interpreted the term "any" found in statutes as "equivalent
to and ha[ving] the force of 'every' and 'all'." Hime v. City of Galveston, 268 S.W.2d 543, 545
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e); accord Branham v. Minear, 199 S.W.2d 841,
846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1947, writ refd n.r.e.); Doherty v. King, 183 S.W.2d 1004,
1007 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1944, writ dism'd).
6. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
7. 836 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
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age would be in force upon payment of $15,000. DCHD paid the $15,000
and Whyburn completed an application for DCHD on which he wrote: "All
actively not at work will be insured and the non-active waiver clause will be
waived."
About a month and a half after DCHD paid the $15,000, Maccabees sent
a letter to DCHD declining the application because lists of inactive employ-
ees were incomplete and did not indicate the reasons for inactive status.
Prior to this, Vivien McNiel, an active employee of the hospital gift shop,
died. Her beneficiary, Tom McNiel, presented DCHD with a claim for
$37,900. Maccabees did not pay because no policy had been issued by Mac-
cabees. McNiel then demanded payment from DCHD and Maccabees. Af-
ter a bench trial, a judgment was rendered against Maccabees and in favor of
McNiel under article 21.21. Maccabees argued to the court of appeals that
McNiel could not recover under article 21.21 because there was no privity
between the parties as no insurance policy had ever been issued. The court
disagreed, holding that "article 21.21, § 16 allows recovery by 'any person
who has sustained actual damages' without imposing a requirement that the
claimant be a policyholder." 8
The court in Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co. v. Littles9 also refused to
require that the plaintiff be an insured or beneficiary before maintaining suit
under article 21.21. Leslie Littles sued Benefit Trust, the administrator of
his employer's health plan, for its failure to pay medical bills incurred for
treatment of second and third-degree burns he suffered. After a jury trial,
Littles obtained a judgment against Benefit Trust.
Benefit Trust argued on appeal that Littles had no standing to sue under
article 21.21 of the Insurance Code because he was not an intended third-
party beneficiary of the administration contract between Benefit Trust and
the City of Victoria, Littles' employer. The court held that there is a pre-
sumption against contracts creating the status of an intended third-party
beneficiary. Before such status could be established, Littles had to prove
that the contracting parties intended to create a third-party beneficiary and
that such intent was clearly spelled out in the contract.' 0 Upon reviewing
the administration contract, the court concluded that Littles was the in-
tended third-party beneficiary of the contract. I" Benefit Trust was given the
responsibility of evaluating and paying claims under the City's health plan.
The City did not participate in the handling of claims. The court concluded
that the contract was entered into for the benefit of the plan participants,
including Littles.
The court next held that even if Littles was not a third-party beneficiary,
he still had standing to sue under article 21.21 because of the close relation-
ship between Littles and Benefit Trust.' 2 This close relationship was created
8. Id. at 235.
9. No. 04-91-00673-CV, 1993 WL 437192 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Oct. 29, 1993, writ
dism'd).
10. Id., slip op. at 10-11.
11. Id., slip op. at 13.
12. Id., slip op. at 14.
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by virtue of Benefit Trust's exclusive control over payment of the claims.
According to the court, Littles was directly injured by Benefit Trust's refusal
to pay a portion of his medical bills and knew its actions would directly
affect Littles. 13
A third case deciding that a person suing under article 21.21 does not
need to be an insured is Transport Insurance Co. v. Faircloth. 14 Judith and
Marvin Kervin were killed when struck by a truck owned and operated by
Allied Van Lines. Transport Insurance Company insured the Allied truck.
At the time of the accident the daughter of Judith Kervin, Paula Faircloth,
was fifteen years old and was left an orphan. About one month later, a set-
tlement was entered into by and between Transport and Paula's court-ap-
pointed guardian, settling the claims of Paula for $250,000.
After Paula reached the age of majority, she filed suit against Transport,
the insurance adjuster, the guardian and others, alleging that the $250,000
settlement was grossly inadequate. Based on the jury's verdict, the trial
court entered judgment in favor of Paula under article 21.21 of the Insur-
ance Code.
Transport argued to the court of appeals that Paula lacked standing to
recover under article 21.21. The court held that Paula did not need to be an
insured in order to assert a cause of action under article 21.21, but only
needed to be a person who was injured by an act proscribed by article
21.21.15 Relying on § 16 of article 21.21, the court held that any person who
has sustained actual damages as the result of another engaging in any act or
practice declared to be unfair or deceptive in the rules or regulations of the
State Board of Insurance, § 17.46 of the DTPA, or in the Insurance Code
can maintain an action against the person or persons engaged in such acts or
practices. 16
The court concluded that Paula was entitled to recover under article 21.21
because she obtained findings that the defendants: (1) committed an unlisted
deceptive trade practice under DTPA § 17.46(a); (2) committed an unfair
claims settlement practice as defined in article 21.21-2 and 28 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 21.203; (3) committed deceptive trade practices listed in DTPA
§ 17.46(b); (4) engaged in a trade practice determined by law to be unfair or
deceptive (breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing); and (5) engaged
in fraud. According to the court, a common law fraud action can serve as
the foundation for a violation of DTPA § 17.46 and article 21.21, § 16.17
Another example of the court giving a literal reading to the definition of
"person" is International Trucking Co. v. Employers Casualty Co. 18 A truck
13. Id.
14. 861 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ requested).
15. Id. at 939.
16. Id. at 939-40.
17. Id. at 941.
18. No. 04-90-00012-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, July 8, 1992, n.w.h.). This case is
still on rehearing, most likely awaiting the supreme court's decision in Watson v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 828 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992), rev'd, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 408 (Jan. 12,
1994) which involves many of the same issues.
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owned by International Trucking Company was involved in a wreck with a
truck owned by Williams Drilling Company. International sued Williams
for negligence. International also sued the insurers for Williams, Employers
Casualty and Employers National, along with two claims adjusters, Page
and Veale, for misrepresentations and unreasonable denial of the claim.
The trial court granted the insurers and individuals summary judgment on
International's Insurance Code claims, and the parties proceeded to trial on
the DTPA claim. The court granted directed verdicts for Page and Veale,
but the jury found that the insurers had knowingly violated the DTPA and
caused damages to International. The trial court rendered judgment on the
verdict for treble damages against the insurers and rendered a take nothing
judgment in favor of Page and Veale. The court of appeals reversed the
summary judgment and rendered judgment for International on the article
21.21 claims. The court also affirmed the judgment on the DTPA claims.
The court first determined that International had standing to bring suit
under article 21.21 even though it may not have been a "consumer." The
only qualification required to bring suit under article 21.21 is that one must
be a "person."' 9 Since International was a corporation it met the definition
of "person" found in § 2 of article 21.21. Therefore, the court held that
International could maintain an action under article 21.21 for violations of
§ 17.46 of the DTPA without being a "consumer."' 20
Employers Casualty argued that a "person" under article 21.21 is limited
to an insured or a beneficiary of the policy, relying on Chaffin v. TransAmer-
ica Insurance Co.21 The court distinguished Chaffin since it did not involve
third-party beneficiaries, nor were there allegations that the insurer made
misrepresentations directly to the plaintiffs as Employers Casualty did in this
case. Instead the court relied on Watson v. Allstate Insurance Co. 22
Watson was involved in a car wreck with Townsley, who was insured by
Allstate. Without first getting a judgment against Townsley, or otherwise
establishing his legal responsibility for the wreck, Watson tried to sue All-
state directly. She alleged claims for breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, DTPA violations, and unfair insurance practices, and she
sought declaratory relief. The trial court granted summary judgment
against her on all claims. The court of appeals agreed that Watson, as a
potential third-party beneficiary under the automobile liability policy, did
not have any claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and
that she was not entitled to sue as a "consumer" under the DTPA. 23 How-
ever, the court held that Watson was entitled to sue under article 21.21, § 16
as a "person" injured by Allstate's alleged unfair insurance practices.24
Watson relied on the State Board of Insurance rule prohibiting unfair claim
19. International Trucking, slip op. at 6.
20. Id.
21. 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. 828 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992), rev'd, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 408 (Jan.
12, 1994).
23. 828 S.W.2d at 426-27.
24. Id. at 427-28.
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settlement practices, specifically, failing to attempt to effectuate a prompt,
fair, and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability has be-
come reasonably clear. 25 Thus, the court reversed and remanded for consid-
eration of Watson's claim under article 21.21.
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals with
respect to the DTPA and common law bad faith claims. The supreme court,
however, reversed the judgment as to the article 21.21 cause of action. The
court held that a third-party claimant lacks standing under article 21.21 to
directly sue the insurer of the tortfeasor for unfair claims settlement prac-
tices.26 The court noted that to have a private cause of action for unfair
claims settlement practices, such practices must be declared unfair or decep-
tive in § 4 of article 21.21, the rules or regulations adopted under article
21.21, or be defined as unlawful deceptive trade practices in DTPA
§ 17.46.27 The court first determined that § 4 of article 21.21 does not define
unfair claims settlement practices to be unfair or deceptive.28
The court then looked to the State Board of Insurance regulations to see if
they provided a private cause of action for unfair claims settlement practices.
The court noted that Board Order 18663, which was promulgated under
article 21.21, does not prohibit unfair claims settlement practices.29 Instead,
this regulation prohibits unfair or deceptive acts as defined by the provisions
of the Insurance Code or other regulations of the State Board of Insurance.
Even so, the court held that another regulation, namely Board Order 41454,
which does prohibit unfair claims settlement practices, cannot form the basis
of an article 21.21 action because this regulation was adopted pursuant to
article 21.21-2, not article 21.21.30 The court further concluded that the
prohibitions against unfair claims settlement practices in article 21.21-2 can-
not form the basis of an article 21.21 cause of action because there is no
private cause of action under article 21.21-2. 3 1 The court noted that the
Legislature recently refused to amend article 21.21-2 so as to provide a pri-
vate remedy. Next, the court concluded that only the practices defined in
DTPA § 17.46 are actionable under article 21.21, and unfair claims settle-
ment practices are not specifically mentioned.3 2
The court also held that Watson had no standing to sue on the automobile
liability policy as a third-party beneficiary.3 3 Watson argued that the court
in Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Childress34 held that an in-
jured person is an intended third-party beneficiary of an insurance policy
and is entitled to enforce the contract. The court held that, even so, this
does not give the third-party claimant the right to sue to enforce extra-con-
25. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.203(4) (West 1988).
26. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 408.
27. Id. at 409.
28. Id.
29. Id..
30. Id. at 410.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 411.
33. Id. at 411.
34. 650 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1990).
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tractual obligations under article 21.21. 35
While closing to "third-party" liability claimants the door to the unfair
claims settlement practice statute and regulation, the Watson majority stated
that "we are particularly mindful of the duties imposed on insurers as to
their insureds."'36 The opinion then cited, in addition to Arnold, page 136 of
the Vail 37 opinion, where the Vail court summarized its holdings. The Wat-
son majority also held that, "Vail remains the law as to claims for alleged
unfair claim settlement practices brought by insureds against their
insurers." 38
Justice Spector concurred in the judgment, stating, however, that "[o]nce
Kathleen Watson has obtained a judgment or settlement against the insured,
she is entitled to recover for any damages she has sustained as a result of
Allstate's unfair or unlawful acts or practices." 39
Justice Doggett, joined by Justice Gammage, dissented, stating that "[b]y
challenging the legitimacy of Vail v Texas Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 754
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988)... and implicitly adopting the regressive reasoning
of the previously rejected writings of Justices Gonzalez and Phillips. . . , the
majority has invited imminent attack on the most effective tool that Texas
consumers possess to ensure that they have not paid premiums only to be
subjected to abuse by their own insurers." 4° After reviewing the holdings in
Vail, the dissent took issue with the court's holding that the conduct de-
clared unlawful in article 21.21-2 was not actionable because that statute did
not grant a private remedy. The dissent, as did the Vail court, saw this as
presenting no impediment to an article 21.21 cause of action based on such
conduct because article 21.21 provides a cause of action for every practice
determined elsewhere in the Insurance Code to be unfair, something article
21.21-2 explicitly does.4'
The dissent also took issue with the majority's statement that Vail was
predicated upon the special relationship between the insurer and insured, the
justification for limiting a cause of action for unfair claims settlement prac-
tices to insureds.4 2 Justice Doggett pointed out that the Legislature could
have limited an article 21.21 cause of action to insureds or consumers, but
instead granted such right to any person. 43 Moreover, Vail's focus was not
on the common law duty, but was a case of statutory interpretation.
The dissent also criticized the majority's view that an insurer cannot owe
a duty of good faith to both its insured and a third-party claimant. Accord-
ing to Justice Doggett, an insurer would not have to compromise the duties
to its insured when attempting to settle third-party claims because it is in the
35. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 411.
36. Id.
37. Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
38. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 411.
39. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 173 (Spector, J., concurring).
40. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 173 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 174.




insured's best interests to arrive at a fair and equitable settlement of the
third-party claims."4
Curiously, the majority opinion that Ms. Watson lacked "standing" under
article 21.21 did not turn on the only "standing" question the statute asks:
Is the plaintiff a "person?" Article 21.21, § 16 vests a cause of action in
"[a]ny person who has sustained actual damages as a result of another's en-
gaging in" the unlawful conduct. Section 2 defines "person" very broadly to
include "any individual," which Ms. Watson clearly was. The court did not
mention the definition of "person" in § 2(a) at all. And of the language in
§ 16 granting the cause of action to "any person" the court had only the
following to say, "To be sure, art. 21.21, section 16 is worded as providing a
cause of action to 'any person.' However, for Watson to assert her cause of
action against Allstate for unfair claim settlement practices, she must do so
through the reasoning of Vail."'45 In other words, it was not her lack of
standing as a "person" that kept Ms. Watson from asserting her suit for
unfair claims settlement practices against Allstate. It was because she had
failed to "do so under the reasoning of Vail." Those familiar with Vail may
find this startling because the supreme court in that case expressly held that
both article 21.21-2 and Board Order 41454 (the statute and regulation
prohibiting unfair claims settlement practices) were actionable under article
21.21.
The Vail court recognized: (1) that article 21.21-2 does not itself have a
private cause of action; (2) that Board Order 41454 was issued under that
article, not article 21.21; and (3) that only regulations issued under article
21.21 are actionable. The prohibitions in article 21.21-2 and Board Order
41454 were still actionable under article 21.21, ruled the Vail court, because
Board Order 18663, which was issued under article 21.21, prohibits, inter
alia, "any: ... unfair or deceptive act or practice as defined by the provisions
of the Insurance Code or as defined by these sections and other rules and
regulations of the State Board of Insurance authorized by the Code."'46
Article 21.21-2 both defines certain settlement practices as "unfair" and is
one of "the provisions of the [Insurance] Code". Similarly, Board Order
41454 both defines such practices as "unfair" and is one of the "other rules
and regulations of the State Board of Insurance authorized by the Code."
Accordingly, held Vail, a violation of either the statute or the regulation is a
violation of Board Order 18663 and hence actionable under article 21.21. 47
Vail also held that an unfair claim settlement practice is prohibited as an
unlisted deceptive trade practice under DTPA § 17.46, violations of which
are expressly actionable under article 21.21, and that breach of the common
law duty of good faith and fair dealing recognized by the court in Arnold and
Aranda was also actionable because Board Order 18663 also prohibits unfair
44. Id. at 176.
45. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 411.
46. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.3(a) (West 1988).
47. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 134.
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practices "determined pursuant [to] law."'48
How then did Ms. Watson fail to assert her claim "under the reasoning of
Vail?" The supreme court answered this question with a reconstruction of
the reasoning of Vail to render article 21.21 unavailable to a tort victim who
has not yet received a judgment against the tortfeasor.
Plodding the same ground as the court in Vail, but without acknowledg-
ing that it was doing so, the Watson court "address[ed] each basis for art.
21.21 liability separately."'49 Though § 4 of article 21.21 was not a part of
the "reasoning in Vail" or a basis of Ms. Watson's unfair claims settlement
practices claim against Allstate, the court in Watson took this section on
first. The court stated that the list in § 4 "does not define unfair claim settle-
ment practices as an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of
insurance."' 50 The court "note[d] that unlike section 17.46 of the DTPA,
discussed below, section 4 of art. 21.21 does not use the phrase 'includes, but
is not limited to[,]' " that § 4 is an "exclusive list", and that, therefore,
"[u]nfair claim settlement practices are not actionable under art. 21.21, sec-
tion 16, by virtue of art. 21.21, section 4."51 Of course, there is no problem
with this portion of the court's opinion because nobody has ever argued that
the list in § 4 included unfair claims settlement practices.
The court next turned to the rules and regulations adopted under article
21.21. The court noted first that "Board Order 18663 does not declare un-
fair claim settlement practices to be an unfair or deceptive act or practice." '5 2
Again, this is true and no one ever said it did. Well, almost no one. Chief
Justice Phillips, dissenting from Vail's holding that Arnold and Aranda were
unfair trade practices adopted "pursuant by law" and thus incorporated by
Board Order 18663, conceded that there was a role for the court in defining
unfair practices prohibited by this regulation:
The court how holds "this court is empowered to determine whether
conduct constitutes an unfair or deceptive act." I agree with this state-
ment in principle, but find it inapposite to the case before us.
Undoubtedly, this court might be confronted with a case in which it
is called upon to determine whether a particular trade practice is "an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance" pursu-
ant to Board Order 18663, § 4(b). Having made such a determination,
the decision of this court could properly be relied upon by parties alleg-
ing a violation of Board Order 18663, § 4. Chitsey [which denied an
48. Id. at 135-36.
49. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 409.
50. Id. (emphasis by the court).
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis by the court). Technically, referring to Board Order 18663 is not accu-
rate, because that Order was supplanted with Board Order 41060 (which made only minor
editorial changes in Board Order 18663) on June 4, 1982. With the advent of the Texas Ad-
ministrative Code the regulations are no longer referred to as "Board Orders" and the
"Source" note following each regulation does not even mention the Board Order numbers.
For a discussion of the regulations issued under article 21.21, see D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL, &
J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 7.04 (2d ed. 1983 & 1993 Supp.) and Kincaid,
Actionable Conduct Under Insurance Board Regulations in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, AD-
VANCED DTPA/CONSUMER LAW COURSE (1990).
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Article 21.21 recovery for an alleged violation of Board Order 41454
because of no evidence of "frequency"] would not foreclose such a
result. 53
Thus, under the Phillips' view, the supreme court in Watson could have
determined that "not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and
equitable settlements of claims submitted in which liability has become rea-
sonably clear," is "an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business of
insurance" and thus actionable directly under Board Order 18663 without
any need to incorporate article 21.21-2 or Board Order 41454. We wonder
whatever happened to this idea!
The Watson majority stated that "... like art. 21.21 of the Insurance Code
[Board Order 18663] prohibits insurers from engaging in unfair or deceptive
acts or practices as defined elsewhere."154 This is absolutely correct, and just
what Vail concluded. Thus, one looks to Board Order 41454 and article
21.21-2, right? Having laid out the rug to the unfair claims settlement regu-
lation with its "defined elsewhere" language, the Watson majority abruptly
pulled it out from under Ms. Watson: "This court held in Vail," the Watson
majority said, "that an insured could not rely on Board Order 41454 because
the definition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices required that such acts
be committed with 'such frequency as to indicate a general business practice'
[and therefore] Vail precludes Watson's claims under Board Order 41454."' "'
The court recognized that the "frequency" requirement had been removed,
but after Ms. Watson's claim arose and thus of no help to her.
The court was wrong in its conclusion that Vail "precluded" reliance on
Board Order 41454. Vail did deny recovery under the regulation, but not
because an insured never could prove frequency, but because the insureds in
that case did not. The Vails proved the denial of only two claims, both
theirs. The supreme court held that "[a]n insurer's denial of two claims
made by a single insured does not constitute the 'frequency' required by the
definition of an unfair claims settlement practice in Board Order 41454."56
Vail was a jury trial and there was a failure of proof. Watson was a summary
judgment on the pleadings. Allstate offered no summary judgment evidence
that it did not commit unfair claims practices with "frequency." It is bed-
rock law that where, as in Watson, a summary judgment movant offers no
evidence, but instead attacks the pleadings as stating no cause of action,
those pleadings and inferences must be accepted as true. 5 7  Ms. Watson
alleged a violation of Board Order 41454 and the supreme court was obliged
to assume it was true, including the required "frequency."
Any hope that a future Ms. Watson with proof of "frequency" might be
able to rely on Board Order 41454 was extinguished, however, when the
court went further to state that "[i]n any event, Board Order 41454 was
53. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 140 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
54. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 409 (emphasis by the court).
55. Id. at 410.
56. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 135.
57. Trunkline LNG Co. v. Trane Thermal Co., 722 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1986, writ refd n.r.e.).
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adopted pursuant to art. 21.21-2, not art. 21.21 and, thus, cannot form the
basis of a claim under art. 21.21, section 16."158
This holding makes absolutely no sense. The court just finished saying on
the previous page that Board Order 18663, which was adopted under article
21.21, "prohibits insurers from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices as defined elsewhere." The "elsewhere" is, under the express language
of this regulation, "other rules and regulations of the State Board" and other
"provisions of the [Insurance] Code". To reach its conclusion, the Watson
court had to amend Board Order 18663 and disregard the holding in Vail
that the "rules and regulations" referred to include all those promulgated by
the Board, not just those promulgated under article 21.21. Clearly, if the
Board had desired the limitation engrafted onto this regulation by the court,
it would have done so itself. However, the Board, in the five years since Vail
was decided, never changed this regulation.
It is this holding in particular that indicates Justice Enoch's judicial phi-
losophy. As late as last October, a dissenting Justice Enoch criticized the
court for abrogating the family-member exclusion in automobile liability
policies, an exclusion that had been approved by the. State Board of Insur-
ance. "With the stroke of a pen," charged Justice Enoch, "the Court rips
the family member exclusion endorsement out of every automobile liability
insurance policy in this state."'5 9 Enoch argued that since "[tihe Legislature
amended the [Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility] Act in 1989 and
1991, after the family member exclusion was promulgated [by the Board of
Insurance], and failed to address the family member exclusion[,] . . . the
Texas Board of Insurance's promulgation of Endorsement 575 should be
given great deference." 6
Justice Enoch in Watson, however, gave the Insurance Board no defer-
ence. In Watson Justice Enoch did not even mention that the Insurance
Board filed two amicus curiae briefs in support of Kathleen Watson saying it
agreed with the holding in Vail, that it had always interpreted article 21.21
and its own regulations consistent with Ms. Watson's right to sue, and that
strong private enforcement of article 21.21 was crucial to the overall regula-
tory scheme. The Watson Justice Enoch apparently forgot the holdings of
the cases that the Johnson Justice Enoch cited for deferring to the Board.
One was Direlco, Inc. v. Bullock,61 which held that "[a]lthough not bound by
the agency construction, the court should give deference to the construction
of the agency administering the statute [and that] once the statute is given a
particular interpretation, a court is entitled to assume that the Legislature,
by failing to amend the statute, indicated its approval of the interpretation."
Vail was decided in 1988. The Legislature has met three times since then
and never amended article 21.21 (except to remove the McCarran-Ferguson
58. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 410.
59. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 75, 79-80 (Oct. 27,
1993) (Enoch, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 81.
61. 711 $.W.2d 360, 363 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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reference that Allstate argued precluded third-party claimants from using
article 21.21), though massively overhauling the Insurance Code in two of
those sessions and eliminating the "frequency" requirement from article
21.21-2. The State Board of Insurance has met countless times since 1988
and never amended Board Order 18663. It has amended Board Order 41454
to remove the "frequency" requirement, which, under the rulings in Chitsey
and Vail, hobbled its use by private litigants. If either the Legislature or the
Board disagreed with the holdings in Vail, they have shown no indication of
it.
Also, why did Chief Justice Phillips join in the majority opinion? In his
dissent in Vail, the Chief Justice, while disagreeing that the court's Arnold
and Aranda decisions were adopted "pursuant by law" as used in Board
Order 18663, had no problem with the incorporation of Board Order 41454.
Agreeing with the dissent of Justice Gonzalez, the Chief Justice "believe[d]
that Chitsey v. National Lloyds Insurance Co., 738 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1987),
forecloses a holding that Texas Farm's denial of the Vails' claim meets the
'frequency' requirements of both Board Order 41454 and Tex. Ins. Code,
art. 21.21-2.1162
Having jerked up the rug, the court then ripped the planks out of the
floor, stating that article 21.21-2, the unfair claims settlement practices stat-
ute, was likewise unavailable through Board Order 18663. Said the court:
We will not construe art. 21.21, section 16 to permit, indirectly, a third-
party claimant to sue an insurer for unfair claim settlement practices
through Board Order 18663 where she may not do so directly and
where the legislature has specifically refused to create such a cause of
action for unfair claim settlement practices under art. 21.21, section 16
and art. 21.21-2.63
Again, how does denying access to article 21.21-2 through Board Order
18663 square with the express language of the regulation incorporating prac-
tices declared unfair under other "provisions of the Code" and the Watson
court's acknowledgment that the regulation prohibits practices "as defined
elsewhere"? Contrary to the court's statement, it was not "construing", nor
was it being called upon to "construe", article 21.21. Rather, it was being
asked to enforce the plain language of the Board's regulation. Moreover, the
Watson court does not even mention that Vail expressly considered and re-
jected the "there is no express cause of action under article 21.21-2" argu-
ment. Said Vail: "The fact that article 21.21-2 itself does not confer a
private cause of action does not preclude the incorporation of definitions
contained in that article into rules and regulations promulgated by the State
Board of Insurance." 64 One would think an opinion which the Watson ma-
jority cites as the prime reason why Ms. Watson cannot recover would re-
ceive at least an honorable mention on this point.
Though closing the Board Order 18663's door to the unfair claim settle-
62. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 139 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
63. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 410.
64. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 134.
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ment statute and regulation, the Watson court did not close its door to Ar-
nold and Aranda. In fact, the majority simply does not mention Arnold and
Aranda in its discussion of Board Order 18663's incorporation of unfair
practices "defined elsewhere." In light of its unwillingness to recognize
Board Order 18663's incorporation of the unfair claims settlement statute
and regulation, as did Vail, the Watson majority's silence on the regulation's
incorporation of Arnold and Aranda, which Vail recognized, is most puz-
zling. This is especially so, because Chief Justice Phillips, who joins the ma-
jority in Watson, so vigorously dissented from this holding in Vail, "find[ing]
no basis whatsoever for the court's conclusion." Said the Chief Justice:
Moreover, our opinions in Arnold v. National County Mut. Ins. Co.,
725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) and Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1988), do not amount to a "deter-
mination by law" that good faith failure to settle a claim is "an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance." State Bd. of Ins.,
28 Tex. Admin. Code § 21.3(b) (July 22, 1982) [Board Order 18663,
§ 4b]. In Chitsey, this court wrote: "The words 'determined by law'
call for at least a state agency, if not legislative, determination and not
just a jury finding." 738 S.W.2d at 643. The court now holds "this
court is empowered to determine whether conduct constitutes an unfair
or deceptive act." I agree with this statement in principle, but find it
inapposite to the case before us.
Arnold and Aranda do no more than establish common law duties of
good faith and fair dealing. They are not determinations of what com-
prises a deceptive act or practice pursuant to Board Order 18663,
§ 4(b). By holding that they are, this court elevates a general common
law duty to a per se statutory violation subject to treble damages.65
The Watson court also concluded that unfair settlement practices were not
deceptive trade practices under DTPA § 17.46, the violations of which are
expressly actionable under article 21.21, by stating:
While section 17.46 may not be a complete list of unlawful deceptive
trade practices for purposes of asserting claims under the DTPA, art.
21.21 expressly makes actionable those acts or practices that, in fact,
are defined in section 17.46 as unlawful deceptive trade practices. Un-
fair claims settlement practices are not listed and, therefore, they are
not actionable under art. 21.21, section 16 of the Insurance Code. 66
The Watson court does not even mention that Vail held to the contrary.
Said the Vail court "Article 21.21, § 16 of the Insurance Code makes action-
able any violation of section 17.46 of the DTPA. Thus, section 16 of article
21.21 incorporates any unlisted practice that is determined to be false, mis-
leading, or deceptive."'67
Watson cited with approval Spradling v. Williams,68 an "unlisted" decep-
65. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 140 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
66. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 411.
67. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 135 (emphasis by the courts) (internal citations omitted).
68. 566 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex. 1978).
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tive trade practice case that was likewise cited with approval in Vail, and
expressly recognized that in Spradling "this Court held that section 17.46 is
not an exclusive list of deceptive acts or practices under the DTPA. ''69 Wat-
son attempts to avoid the effect of the breadth of section 17.46 by emphasiz-
ing what it perceives as the narrowness of § 16. Section 16, the Watson
court reminds us, makes actionable only those acts defined by section 17.46.
What Watson overlooks is that Spradling sets out the definition of "false,
deceptive, or misleading acts or practices" that are not listed in § 17.46(b).
Texas Pattern Jury Charges, Vol. 4, echoing the definition in Spradling, de-
fines "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" as follows: "False,
misleading, or deceptive act or practice means an act or series of acts that
have the tendency to deceive an average ordinary person, even though that
person may have been ignorant, unthinking, or gullible."'70
Again, why is Chief Justice Phillips joining with the majority on this part
of the Watson opinion? Chief Justice Phillips' quarrel with the "unlisted"
deceptive trade practice holding in Vail was that the plaintiffs did not get a
proper jury finding using the definition in Spradling. Said the Chief Justice:
To warrant recovery for an unlisted practice, there must be a finding
that the act occurred and that it was deceptive. Spradling v. Williams,
566 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex. 1978). To meet this requirement, the court
points to the jury's finding that Texas Farm intentionally failed to exer-
cise good faith in the settlement of the Vails' claim. This is simply not a
finding that Texas Farm's failure to exercise good faith was a deceptive
act. To obtain such a finding, the jury must have been properly in-
structed as to what a deceptive act is, and it must have found that the
act in question was deceptive. Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d at
564. In the absence of a finding that the failure to exercise good faith
was deceptive, there can be no violation of an unlisted trade practice.71
Again, Watson is not an appeal from a jury verdict. It is a dismissal on
the pleadings. Does not the Chief Justice still believe that a plaintiff is enti-
tled to submit Spradling under article 21.21 as he said in Vail?
While closing to "third-party" liability claimants the door to the unfair
claims settlement practice statute and regulation, the Watson majority stated
that "we are particularly mindful of the duties imposed on insurers as to
their insureds. ' ' 72 The opinion then cites, in addition to Arnold, page 136 of
the Vail opinion. On that page the Vail court summarized its holdings as
follows:
We hold that the Vails stated and proved a cause of action for unfair
claims settlement practices under section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA on
any of three alternative grounds: (1) by incorporating article 21.21, § 16
of the Insurance Code, section 4(a) of Board Order 18663, and the defi-
nition of an unfair claims settlement practice in article 21.21-2, § 2(d) of
the Insurance Code; (2) by incorporating article 21.21, § 16 of the In-
69. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 409, n.3.
70. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 102.15 (1990).
71. Vail, 745 S.W.2d at 140 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting),
72. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 411.
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surance Code, section 4(b) of Board Order 18663, and the determina-
tions made by this court in Arnold and Aranda; and (3) by
incorporating article 21.21, § 16 of the Insurance Code and section
17.46 of the DTPA.73
The Watson majority also flatly stated: Vail remains the law as to claims
for alleged unfair claim settlement practices brought by insureds against
their insurers.74 Thus the enigma. An opinion that so thoroughly rejects the
"reasoning of Vail" warmly embraces it.
The majority's attempt to limit and make unavailing the holding of Dairy-
land County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Childress 5 also rings hollow. In Chil-
dress the court held that an injured person is a third party beneficiary of an
automobile insurance policy and thus, is permitted to recover attorney's fees
in enforcing the policy. The court stated that: "There is no question in our
minds that the compulsory insurance requirement of the Texas motor vehi-
cle safety laws implies that all potential claimants for damages resulting
from automobile accidents are intended as beneficiaries of the statutorily re-
quired automobile liability coverage."'76
In National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Johnson,77 the court,
quoting this same passage from Childress, held that the public policy behind
the Texas Safety Responsibility Act is to protect all potential claimants from
damages resulting from automobile accidents. Thus, the court invalidated
the family-member exclusion in automobile policies because this would leave
some potential claimants unprotected by the mandatory insurance laws.
Watson argued, and the court of appeals held, in response to some courts
requiring a person to be an insured or beneficiary to have standing to sue
under article 21.21, that in light of Childress, she was an intended beneficiary
of the Allstate policy, and thus could bring a suit under article 21.21. This
argument seems to be lost on the Watson court as it found Childress inappli-
cable to this case. The reason perhaps is because the court refused to con-
sider the whether Ms. Watson was a "person" with standing to sue under
article 21.21.
As mentioned above, several courts have brushed aside the plain meaning
of article 21.21 and imposed a requirement that a "person" be an insured or
beneficiary before being able to maintain suit under this statute. These in-
clude Shelton Insurance Agency v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. ,78 Pineda
v. PMI Mortgage Insurance Co. ,79 CNA Insurance Co. v. Scheffey, 80 and In
re Burzynski.8'
In Shelton, Roberts, an insurance agent working for the Shelton Agency,
73. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 136.
74. Watson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 411.
75. 650 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1983).
76. Id. at 775.
77. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 75 (Oct. 27, 1993).
78. 848 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
79. 843 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992), writ denied per curiam, 851
S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1993).
80. 828 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
81. 989 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1993).
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sold a St. Paul policy to Frio Drilling Company insuring it against losses
resulting from oil well blowouts. After one of Frio's wells blew out and St.
Paul denied the claim, Frio sued Shelton Agency and St. Paul. St. Paul later
settled the claims with Frio, but did not settle the claims against the Shelton
Agency. St. Paul then hired an attorney to defend the Shelton Agency in the
Frio suit under an errors and omissions policy. This lawsuit was eventually
settled as well.
The Shelton Agency then sued St. Paul alleging that St. Paul was liable to
pay damages under either the blowout policy or the errors and omissions
policy because it wrongfully, and in bad faith, refused to timely pay either of
the claims. The Shelton Agency sought to recover the premiums that it
wrote off in settling the Frio suit plus commissions lost due to losing Frio as
a customer. The jury found that St. Paul denied Frio's claim with no reason-
able basis for the denial; failed to determine if there was a reasonable basis
for denying Frio's claim; and failed to exercise good faith in the investiga-
tion, processing, and denial of Frio's claim. The trial court, however,
granted judgment n.o.v. favorable to St. Paul, and ordered that the Shelton
Agency take nothing.
The court of appeals affirmed the take-nothing judgment on the article
21.21 claims. According to the court, a cause of action under article 21.21 is
available only to a "person" who is either an insured or intended beneficiary
of the policy.8 2 Because the Shelton Agency was neither, the court held that
it could not maintain an article 21.21 cause of action.8 3
In Pineda v. PMI Mortgage Insurance Co.8 4 Pineda executed a note paya-
ble to Houston First American Savings Association. The note was secured
by a deed of trust covering certain real property in Harris County. In addi-
tion to the monthly payment under the note, Pineda paid the bank premiums
on a mortgage insurance policy issued by PMI. This mortgage. insurance
policy insured the lender against loss of the mortgage loan to Pineda.
Pineda defaulted on the note and United Savings, the successor to Hous-
ton First American, foreclosed and purchased the property. After the fore-
closure sale, there was deficiency and a claim was made by United Savings to
PMI for payment on the mortgage insurance policy. This claim, which
amounted to $19,789.24, was paid to United Savings by PMI. PMI later
filed suit against Pineda to recover the amount it had paid under the mort-
gage insurance policy to United Savings. Pineda filed a counterclaim alleg-
ing various causes of action including violations of article 21.21 of the
Insurance Code. The trial court rendered a summary judgment in favor of
PMI and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court held that Pineda did not have standing to sue under article
21.21 because he was not an insured or a beneficiary of the mortgage insur-
82. Shelton, 848 S.W.2d at 744.
83. Id. (noting also that the Shelton Agency was not a "consumer" under the DTPA
because it did not seek or acquire the benefits of the Frio policy).
84. 843 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992), writ denied per curiam, 851
S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1993).
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ance policy.85 Even though Pineda paid the premiums for the mortgage in-
surance policy, the court held that this policy was purchased for the benefit
of the lender and not Pineda.8 6 Relying on Chaffin v. TransAmerica Insur-
ance Co. P1 the court held that Pineda did not come within the definition of a
"person" under article 21.21 because he was neither an insured nor a benefi-
ciary under the mortgage insurance policy.88
CNA Insurance Co. v. Scheffey 8 9 involved claims brought by Dr. Scheffey
against CNA for failing to promptly and fairly pay Scheffey for medical
treatment he gave to CNA insureds and that CNA disparaged Scheffey's
professional reputation by making false and misleading representations. The
DTPA claims were severed from the case so that only the article 21.21 and
the common law claims were tried. CNA appealed the judgment for approx-
imately $34 million rendered against it arguing that Scheffey did not have
standing to sue under article 21.21.
Relying solely on the statement in Chaffin 90 that there is no authority for
extending the meaning of "person" found in article 21.21 beyond insureds or
beneficiaries,9 ' the court held that Scheffey was not a "person" because he
was neither the insured nor beneficiary. 92
In deciding Burzynski,93 the Fifth Circuit also concluded that a "person"
must be an insured or beneficiary to maintain an action under article 21.21.94
Dr. Stanislaw Burzynski, the owner-operator of Burzynski Research Insti-
tute (BRI) sued Aetna Life Insurance Company alleging that during the
course of an underlying lawsuit, Aetna and its attorneys committed various
unfair practices in the business of insurance and fraudulent acts. BRI was
engaged in the business of treating terminally ill cancer patients with a non-
FDA approved treatment. BRI claimed the treatment was covered by its
patients' health insurance policies. However, in the mid- 19 80's, Aetna alleg-
edly began denying BRI patients' insurance claims to reduce its claims expo-
sure. Following the death of a patient, Burzynski intervened as plaintiff-
assignee in a suit against Aetna for the reimbursement of medical expenses.
The underlying suit eventually ended in a summary judgment for both sides.
Burzynski then brought this lawsuit alleging violations of article 21.21,
among other things. The district court dismissed the entire complaint on the
grounds that Texas law afforded an absolute privilege to communications
made in a court proceeding. Alternatively, the district court dismissed,
without prejudice, each cause of action under FED. R. Civ. P. § 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court rejected
Aetna's discovery privilege defense due to the possibility of Aetna's "ulte-
85. Id. at 673.
86. Id.
87. 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
88. Pineda, 843 S.W.2d at 673.
89. 828 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
90. 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
91. Id. at 731.
92. Scheffey, 828 S.W.2d at 791.
93. 989 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1993).
94. Id. at 740.
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rior, malicious motives," and remanded for the reassessment of each of
Burzynski's causes of action.95
On remand, the district court took no action on its prior dismissals with-
out prejudice, failed to call for answers by Aetna, and simply dismissed all of
Burzynski's causes of action. Burzynski petitioned for, and obtained, a writ
of mandamus to direct the district court to reinstate all claims and call for
answers thereto. The Fifth Circuit granted Burzynski's petition for rehear-
ing to examine the viability of each cause of action.
Burzynski brought suit under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, alleging
that Aetna violated DTPA § 17.46(b)(8), which prohibits disparaging the
goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representations
of facts. The court, reaffirming its holding in Warfield v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co.,96 held that only insureds or beneficiaries, those in contractual privity
with the insurer, have standing to sue under article 21.21. 9 7 Those without
contractual privity have standing only if they relied on the words or deeds of
the insurer.98 Because Burzynski was not an insured or beneficiary of an
Aetna policy, and did not rely on Aetna's false representations, the court
held that he had no standing under article 21.21. Thus, the court ordered
this claim dismissed with prejudice.
The Fifth Circuit's discussion of standing under article 21.21 shows how
far astray from the statute the courts have gone on this issue. Neither sec-
tion 16 nor section 2 of Article 21.21 limit "person" to "insureds," "benefi-
ciaries," those in contractual privity with the insurer, or those who rely upon
the insurer's words or deeds. 99 Yet the courts mentioned above have aban-
doned the statutory language in order to follow Chaffin v. TransAmerica
Insurance Co. 100 The court in Chaffin denied standing under article 21.21 to
a "person" stating that it could "find no authority for extending the con-
struction of 'person' beyond one who is either an insured or a beneficiary of
the policy."'' 1 Curiously, the court reached this conclusion immediately af-
ter quoting the broad definition of "person" in Section 2 of Article 21.21 of
the Texas Insurance Code.
The Fifth Circuit's discussion of "person" in this case shows why such an
interpretation of article 21.21 is so wrong. The court begins: "This is one of
those cases in which the apparent plain meaning of the statute provides little
guide to its meaning."'' 0 2 There is nothing apparent about the plain meaning
95. See Burzynski v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1992).
96. 904 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1990).
97. Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 741.
98. Id.
99. The legislature has shown itself entirely capable of using the words "policyholder" or
"insured" whenever it has intended a more limited concept than "person". See TEX. INS.
CODE art. 21.21 § 4(1) (prohibiting, inter alia, "making any misrepresentation to any policy-
holder insured') (emphasis added). "When the Legislature has carefully employed a term in
one section of a statute, and has excluded it in another, it should not be implied where ex-
cluded." Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1981) (rejecting implication of intent in
DTPA § 17.46(b)(5) because of presence of similar requirement in other sections of statute).
100. 731 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ refd n.r.e.).
101. Id. at 731.
102. In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 740.
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of the definition of person, it is plain and clear. So plain and clear that some
courts cannot believe it and feel compelled to severely restrict its meaning.
But in order to accomplish this end, the court must rewrite the statute.
The Fifth Circuit continues: "Despite this broad statutory language
which seems to give standing to "any person," under the proper interpreta-
tion, Burzynski and BRI do not have standing to bring an action under In-
surance Code Art. 21.21." 103 The court's initial impression of the statute is
correct, it does give standing to "any person." The only limitation imposed
by the statute is that the person must have sustained actual damages as a
result of another's engaging in conduct made actionable under § 16 of article
21.21. The court's desire to apply the "proper interpretation" to this clear
and unambiguous statute runs afoul of the well-established rule that when a
statute is not ambiguous, there is no need to resort to the rules of construc-
tion and the court must not construe the statute, but enforce it as written. 1 4
A person complaining about acts or practices that violate article 21.21 can
also bring an action under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. However, to
do so the person must meet the definition of "consumer", which is one who
seeks or acquires goods or services by purchase or lease.' 0 5 The court in 3Z
Corp. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 106 was faced with the issue of whether a
prospective purchaser of title insurance is "consumer" with standing to sue
under the DTPA. Several years after purchasing property, 3Z Corporation
discovered that the property was subject to two liens, neither of which had
been disclosed by the seller, title company or title insurer. In fact, 3Z Cor-
poration specifically asked about these liens and was told that they did not
affect the property being purchased.
3Z Corporation then brought suit against Stewart Title of Montgomery
County and Stewart Title Guaranty Company under various theories, in-
cluding violations of the DTPA and Insurance Code. Both defendants filed
motions for summary judgment, which were granted. The court of appeals
affirmed the judgment and award of attorney's fees as to Stewart Title Guar-
anty Company, but reversed the judgment as to Stewart Title of Montgom-
ery County and remanded for trial.
The court of appeals first discussed whether 3Z Corporation was a con-
sumer under the DTPA. 3Z Corporation argued that it was a consumer
because it was seeking to purchase a title policy. Stewart Title argued that
3Z Corporation was not a consumer because it did not purchase the title
policy within the life of the commitment. The court held that to be a con-
sumer, one must seek or acquire goods or services by purchase or lease. 107
The court held that "the term 'services' includes the purchase of insurance
policies and even though the transaction is not consummated, the prospec-
103. Id.
104. See RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1985),
and Cail v. Service Motors, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. 1983).
105. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
106. 851 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
107. Id. at 937.
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tive purchasers are considered consumers."' 08 Because there was a question
of fact as to whether 3Z Corporation intended to purchase a title policy or
was merely obtaining what it thought was a free title examination until such
time as the property could be sold, the court held that Stewart Title failed to
establish, as a matter of law, that 3Z Corporation was not a consumer.
2. Who Can Be Sued
In Great American Insurance Co. v. North Austin Municipal Utility District
No. 1 109 the court found that article 21.21 applies to commercial sureties.
The North Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 (MUD) advertised for
bids to construct a waste-water lift station. MUD requested that the bidders
provide alternative bids: one for a newly constructed dry well, and the other
for the refurbishment and relocation of the existing dry well. Underground
Utilities was awarded the contract for the refurbishment and relocation of
the existing lift station. Great American issued a performance bond on be-
half of Underground Utilities and in favor of MUD. The contract between
MUD and Underground Utilities provided for a one-year correction period
after MUD's acceptance of the project. This provision required Under-
ground Utilities to correct or replace any defective work. In connection with
Underground Utilities' obligation under this provision, Great American, as
surety, issued a one-year maintenance bond in favor of MUD.
Within the first year of MUD's acceptance of the project, one of the sides
of the dry well began to collapse. MUD concluded that the collapse resulted
because the sides of the dry well were not of sufficient thickness for the depth
of burial. MUD requested Underground Utilities to make repairs. Under-
ground Utilities refused, claiming (1) that it had performed all work in ac-
cordance with the plans and specifications; (2) that the engineer approved
the work; (3) that MUD accepted the work; and (4) that the subcontractor
who refurbished the well was liable under his manufacturer's warranty for
the deformity.
MUD then informed Great American that the dry well was suffering from
a structural deformity and that Underground Utilities refused to make re-
pairs. MUD demanded that Great American perform under the terms of its
maintenance bond. Great American responded that the structural defect
was the result of a design defect for which Underground Utilities was not
liable under the terms of the contract. Therefore, Great American refused to
perform under the maintenance bond.
MUD filed suit, asserting various claims against Underground Utilities,
the engineer, the subcontractor, and Great American. The jury found that
all four defendants were liable and that Great American had engaged in
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Great American appealed the judg-
ment against it, arguing that article 21.21 of the Insurance Code does not
apply to commercial sureties. Great American maintained that a commer-
108. Id.
109. 850 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ requested).
1246 [Vol. 47
INSURANCE LAW
cial surety is not engaged in the "business of insurance" for the purposes of
article 21.21. The court disagreed, 110 looking to article 1.14-1 of the Insur-
ance Code, which defines "the business of insurance" as including: "The
making of or proposing to make, as guarantor or surety, any contract of
guaranty or suretyship as a vocation and not merely incidental to any other
legitimate business activity of the guarantor or surety." 11I
Great American countered by asserting that the definition of the "business
of insurance" in article 1.14-1 should not apply to article 21.21 because
neither article refers to, or incorporates, the other's definitions. The court
held, however, that neither article excludes the definitions of the other and if
the legislature had intended to exclude sureties from article 21.21, it could
have done so, as was done in article 21.55 of the Insurance Code. 112
Great American next argued that the definition in article 1.14-1 should
not apply to article 21.21 because the purposes of the statutes are different.
According to Great American, article 1.14-1 defines the general business ac-
tivities that are subject to the overall jurisdiction for the State Board of In-
surance, while article 21.21 regulates specific activities relating to the
"business of insurance," which the legislature has deemed to be unfair or
deceptive. The court rejected this argument because it "would allow sureties
to be 'regulated' as entities engaged in the business of insurance, yet would
make it impossible to prohibit them from engaging in unfair or deceptive
practices while conducting this business."' 1 3
Great American also argued that federal case law should control the inter-
pretation of "business of insurance" found in article 21.21. The court held
that its analysis was not inconsistent, either with the purpose of the Insur-
ance Code as expressed in article 21.21 or with the intent of Congress, ex-
pressed in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 1 4
In Ayoub v. Baggett 115 Ayoub sued his insurer, Truck Insurance, and Bag-
gett, the employee responsible for the handling of his claim, under article
21.21 for the unreasonable delay in investigating and adjusting his claim.
Truck Insurance, a California corporation, removed the case to federal court
claiming that Baggett, a Texas citizen, was fraudulently joined as a defend-
ant in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The court noted that a remand
was required unless Baggett was included as a defendant without a plausible
legal basis.
Ayoub argued that because section 2 of article 21.21 includes in the class
of "persons" who can be sued insurance adjusters, he alleged a viable cause
of action against Baggett, the claims adjuster for Truck Insurance. The
court felt that article 21.21 is designed to regulate the business entities that
provide insurance, not the employees of those providers. 1 6 Thus, the court
110. Id. at 288.
111. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-1, § 2(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
112. Great American Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d at 289.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 820 F. Supp. 298 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
116. Id. at 299.
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concluded that Ayoub could not maintain an action under article 21.21
against Baggett for his conduct committed while adjusting Ayoub's
claims. 117
Here again, a court refuses to enforce the statutory language as written.
As mentioned above, section 16 of article 21.21 permits any person to sue
another person who engages in conduct prohibited by the statute. Section 2
of article 21.21 clearly and simply defines a "person" so as to include "any
individual, . . . and any other legal entity engaged in the business of insur-
ance, including ... adjusters ... ." This definition clearly shows that insur-
ance companies are not the only one that can be sued under article 21.21.
Moreover, prior to 1985, section 16 permitted suit to be brought against the
"company or companies" engaging in the wrongful conduct. The 1985
amendments to article 21.21 substituted the words "person or persons" for
"company or companies", clarifying the legislature's intent to subject insur-
ance company employees to the regulation of the statute.
If the statute wasn't clear enough, any uncertainty the court had could
have been dispelled by looking to the regulations promulgated under article
21.21 by the Department of Insurance. The purpose of these regulations is
as follows:
It is the purpose of these sections to further define and state the stan-
dards that are necessary to prohibit deceptive acts or deceptive practices
by insurers and insurance agents and other persons in their conduct of
the business of insurance or in connection therewith, whether done di-
rectly or indirectly, and irrespective of whether the person is acting as
insurer, principal, agent, employer, or employee, or in other capacity or
connection with such insurer.' 18
Thus, the court was simply wrong when it said there is nothing in article
21.21 to suggest "that private claims against individual employees are part of
the Texas scheme" of regulating insurance.' 19
In contrast to Ayoub is Transport Insurance Co. v. Faircloth,120 where the
court affirmed a judgment under article 21.21 against the insurer, its adjust-
ing company, the adjusting company's employee, an attorney, and a person
who had been appointed guardian over Faircloth when she was a minor.
Faircloth sued all these parties under article 21.21 for conduct that led to
her receiving a grossly inadequate settlement when she was 15 years old for
the death of her mother and step-father.
After concluding that Paula had standing to recover under article 21.21,
the court held that Paula was entitled to recover from Transport, the in-
surer, and the other defendants. The court, relying on the regulation quoted
117. Id. at 300. Compare Herman v. Millicovsky, 834 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Tex. 1993) where
a different judge from the Southern District remanded a case against an insurer and its ad-
juster, concluding that article 21.21 "arguably provides a cause of action against individuals,"
such as adjusters.
118. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.1 (West 1988) (emphasis added).
119. Ayoub, 820 F. Supp. at 300.
120. 861 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ requested).
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above, 121 held that because these other defendants were connected with
Transport, they were all prohibited from engaging in deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the business of insurance.122 Additionally, the court held that all
defendants were liable to Faircloth because the jury found that they had
joined in a civil conspiracy to defraud her. 123
B. PRE-SUIT NOTICE OF COMPLAINT
Article 21.21 provides that at least thirty days before a lawsuit is filed the
person seeking damages must give the alleged wrongdoer written notice of
the specific complaint including the amount of actual damages, expenses and
attorney's fees.' 24
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Price 125 Price sued State Farm under
the DTPA, article 21.21 and for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing as a result of State Farm's refusal to pay under Price's homeowners
policy for damage to his house. After the initial inspection of the damages, a
claims adjuster for State Farm told Price the claim would be paid because
the plumber determined the damage was caused by a plumbing break. State
Farm then had an engineer inspect the house. Based on this inspection,
State Farm determined the damage was caused by the settling of the house
over a period of years, and the claim was denied.
The jury found that the damage to the house was caused by accidental
discharge, breakage, or overflow of water from within a plumbing, heating,
or air conditioning system, and that State Farm engaged in unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in the business of insurance. The jury found actual
damages of $102,500 and the trial court awarded additional damages of
$205,000.
State Farm argued that Price did not give notice of his claims under the
DTPA and Insurance Code prior to filing suit. When Price filed suit he
alleged only a breach of contract action. Price then gave notice and waited
thirty days before amending in claims under the DTPA and Insurance
Code. 126 State Farm argued that this procedure subverted the purpose of
the notice requirements.
The court held that State Farm waived any complaint about notice be-
cause it did not file a plea in abatement until ten days before trial and
twenty-eight months after the DTPA and Insurance Code actions had been
filed.' 27 The court held that for a plea in abatement to be timely, it must be
121. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 21.1-3 (West 1988).
122. Faircloth, 861 S.W.2d at 940. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Carter, 855 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi), writ dism'd, 859 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1993); Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan,
822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
123. Faircloth, 861 S.W.2d at 941.
124. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(e) (Vernon Supp. 1993). The DTPA has an
almost identical provision, the only difference being the DTPA requires sixty days notice
rather than thirty. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
125. 845 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ dism'd by agr.).
126. At the time notice was given the DTPA also had a thirty day notice period. This was
changed to sixty days in 1989. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
127. Price, 845 S.W.2d at 432-33.
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filed while settlement and avoidance of litigation expense remain viable.
That is, when the answer is filed or soon thereafter.' 28
The court concluded that Price did nothing improper by filing suit for
breach of contract, sending notice, waiting the requisite time, and then ad-
ding the DTPA and Insurance Code causes of action. 129
The court's conclusion that State Farm had waived any complaint about
notice for failure to file a timely plea in abatement is based upon the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Hines v. Hash. 30 Hash, without ever filing a
plea in abatement, complained at trial that Hines had not given proper no-
tice of his claim under the DTPA. The court of appeals held that notice had
not been given and remanded for a new trial after the case had been abated
for sixty days. The supreme court reversed.
The court determined that if a DTPA suit is filed without first giving no-
tice and the defendant timely requests an abatement, the trial court must
abate the proceedings. 13' However, to be timely, the request for an abate-
ment must be made with the filing of the answer, or very soon thereafter.132
The court reasoned that an immediate request for an abatement must be
made since the purpose of the notice provision is to encourage settlement
and avoid litigation expense.' 33 Failure to make a timely request for abate-
ment waives all complaints about lack of notice.134
C. ACTIONABLE CONDUCT
Section 16 of article 21.21 makes actionable conduct prohibited by section
4 of article 21.21, conduct prohibited in the rules and regulations adopted by
the Department of Insurance, and conduct prohibited by section 17.46 of the
DTPA. 135
In First Title Co. of Waco v. Garrett 136 the court addressed the issue of
whether a title insurer made a misrepresentation actionable under the DTPA
when the title policy contained a representation that there were no restrictive
covenants on the property when there was one. Garrett contracted to
purchase nine acres from Jenkins and Dameron for use as an automobile
salvage yard. Jenkins and Dameron, however, did not tell Garrett that there
was a restrictive covenant on the property that prevented it from being used
as a salvage yard. First Title Company of Waco conducted a title search,
but failed to discover the restrictive covenant that was actually listed within
its files. Alamo Title Company issued a title commitment affirmatively rep-
resenting that no restrictive covenants appeared in the county deed records.
As a result, Garrett finalized the purchase and began to prepare the prop-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 433.
130. 843 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1992).




135. Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Tex. 1988).
136. 860 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1993).
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erty for use as an auto salvage yard. A neighboring landowner soon com-
plained and eventually obtained an injunction against Garrett. Garrett sued
Jenkins and Dameron for misrepresentations and eventually settled with
them. Garrett filed this lawsuit against First Title and Alamo Title alleging
negligence and violations of the DTPA. The jury found that the title compa-
nies were negligent and made misrepresentations. The court of appeals af-
firmed. 137 The supreme court affirmed as to liability for negligence and
DTPA violations.
The title companies argued that the contract entered into with Garrett
was one of indemnity, not of guaranty - so, any incorrect representation as
to the status of the property should subject them to liquidated damages
under insurance policy, not damages for misrepresentation under the
DTPA. The court disagreed holding that when a seller makes an affirmative
representation, the law imposes a duty to know whether that statement was
true. 3 8 In this case, the title commitment contained the representation that
there were no restrictive covenants in the county deed records. There was
also evidence that Garrett relied on this representation before deciding to
purchase the property.
The title companies also argued that a disclaimer in the title commitment
protected it from liability. The disclaimer read:
The policy to be issued pursuant to this commitment does not guarantee
that the insured property has adequate title to allow it to be used, sold,
transferred, leased, or mortgaged for any purpose intended by the pur-
chaser nor will it provide coverage for possible loss of opportunity or
economic expectation.' 39
The title companies argued that this disclaimer was similar to the one found
in Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Cheatham 40 to relieve a title company from
liability. That disclaimer provided that the policy was:
... to show the results of the Company's title search "upon which only
the Company may rely." None of the information contained herein, or
the absence of other information, constitutes a representation to any
party, other than the Company, as to the status of the title. 41
The court distinguished Cheatham because there was no evidence in that
case that the purchasers had even relied on the statements of the title re-
port.' 42 Moreover, the court held that when representations are made, a
consumer cannot waive DTPA protection.1 43
An identical result was reached in 3Z Corporation v. Stewart Title Guar-
anty Co. 44 In August 1984, Stewart Title of Montgomery County issued a
commitment for a policy of title insurance to 3Z Corporation covering Lots
137. First Title Co. of Waco v. Garrett, 802 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990), afl'd in
part, rev'd on other grounds, 860 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1993).
138. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d at 76.
139. Id.
140. 764 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
141. Id. at 320.
142. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d at 77.
143. Id. at 77.
144. 851 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
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one and 35 in a subdivision in Montgomery County. At that time, title was
vested in Anchor Financial Corporation and the commitment actually cov-
ered other lots in the subdivision. Certain exceptions were noted in the pol-
icy, including a vendor's lien in favor of Lambright, covering six lots in the
subdivision, including Lots one and 35. Also noted was a deed of trust in
favor of First City Bank that covered four lots, but did not include Lots one
and 35.
In September 1984, 3Z Corporation received a deed of conveyance to Lots
one and 35 from Anchor. The conveyance was expressly subject to a lien in
favor of First City, but in view of the policy of commitment reflecting that
the subject property was not covered by the lien, 3Z Corporation was not
concerned. The grantor had always represented that the subject property
was not affected by the Lambright vendor's lien.
Again, 3Z Corporation ordered a policy of title insurance for Lots one and
35 from Stewart Title of Montgomery County, and a policy of commitment
was issued on January 20, 1986. The list of exceptions did not include the
vendor's lien in favor of Lambright and the deed of trust in favor of First
City Bank. In August 1986, another policy of commitment for Lots one and
35 was issued and it read identical to the policy of commitment dated in
January 1986.
After receiving the January 1986 commitment, 3Z Corporation called
Stewart Title to make sure that the Lambright vendor's lien and the First
City Bank lien did not apply to the property. The president of 3Z Corpora-
tion spoke to Keller, an assistant vice-president at Stewart Title, who alleg-
edly told him that the policy of commitment was absolutely right and that
there were only three liens against lots, none of which were the Lambright or
First City Bank liens.
Near the end of 1989 or beginning of 1990, 3Z Corporation noticed that it
had not received any tax statements on the property. The tax collector in-
formed 3Z Corporation that the lots were no longer in the name of 3Z Cor-
poration, but in the name of a third-party. When 3Z Corporation called
Stewart Title, it was informed that First City Bank had foreclosed on their
lien covering the property and that it had been sold at a trustee sale.
3Z Corporation brought suit against Stewart Title of Montgomery County
and Stewart Title Guaranty Company under various theories, including vio-
lations of the DTPA and Insurance Code, common law fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation. Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment,
which were granted. The trial court held that 3Z Corporation's claims were
groundless and brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment and
awarded $1,500 as reasonable attorneys' fees to each defendant. The court
of appeals affirmed the judgment and award of attorney's fees as to Stewart
Title Guaranty Company, but reversed the judgment as to Stewart Title of
Montgomery County and remanded for trial.
Stewart Title argued that it had no duty to disclose the title defects to 3Z
Corporation The court held that while a title company does not owe a duty
to the insured to discover and disclose a title defect, it does have a duty to
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know if its representations are true.' 45 Therefore, a title insurer can be liable
under the DTPA for affirmatively misrepresenting that a title defect does not
exist. 146 Thus, the alleged misrepresentation that the property was not sub-
ject to the Lambright and First City liens was actionable under the DTPA.
The court held, however, that Stewart Title Guaranty Company could not
be liable for the misrepresentations of Stewart Title because the individual
making the statement was the agent of Stewart Title, not Stewart Title Guar-
anty. Because a title policy was never issued, Stewart Title Guaranty never
became an indemnitor. The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment in favor
of Stewart Title Guaranty.
In Lawyers Surety Corp. v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc. 147 the court addressed the
issue of whether the refusal to pay under a surety bond issued to a car dealer
for his bad checks was actionable under the Insurance Code and the DTPA.
Don Lancaster, the car dealer, posted a $25,000 bond before receiving a
dealer's license in accordance with statute. 48 This bond was issued by Law-
yers Surety. After the checks Lancaster wrote to purchase a number of used
cars from Royal Chevrolet were returned for insufficient funds, Royal Chev-
rolet sued him and recovered a judgment in excess of $25,000. Lawyers
Surety refused to pay the claim submitted by Royal Chevrolet claiming that
it was a surety only for Lancaster's bad bank drafts, not bad checks.
Royal Chevrolet then sued Lawyers Surety alleging violations of the
DTPA and the Insurance Code. At trial, the parties stipulated to $25,000 in
actual damages. The jury found in favor of Royal Chevrolet and the trial
court rendered judgment for Royal Chevrolet. The court of appeals
affirmed.
Lawyers Surety argued that no evidence supported the jury's findings that
it engaged in conduct prohibited by the DTPA and Insurance Code. The
evidence showed, however, that after Royal Chevrolet initially notified Law-
yers Surety that Lancaster purchased automobiles with bank drafts backed
by insufficient funds, Lawyers Surety replied that it would not consider the
claim until Royal Chevrolet obtained a judgment against Lancaster. Royal
Chevrolet reduced its action against Lancaster to judgment and demanded
that Lawyers Surety pay the bond. Lawyers Surety denied the claim assert-
ing that the bond covered only the failure to pay a bank draft and not a bad
check. Royal Chevrolet also provided evidence that Lawyers Surety liti-
gated this very issue in the past and that judgments were obtained against
Lawyers Surety that bank drafts include checks. The court found that this
evidence supported the jury's finding that Lawyers Surety failed to attempt
to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim when lia-
bility had become reasonably clear and that it had done so knowingly. 49
In St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Rakkar 150 Rakkar owned a rental house that
145. Id. at 937.
146. Id.
147. 847 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
148. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6686(a)(1-A)(vii) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
149. Lawyers Surety, 847 S.W.2d at 628-29.
150. 838 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
1994] 1253
SMU LAW REVIEW
was destroyed by fire. The fire started when Rakkar lit a hibachi on the
kitchen floor and then passed out. When he awoke, the cabinets were on
fire, and there was no water at the house. By the time a fire truck arrived,
the house was engulfed in flames. The next day St. Paul was notified of the
loss. Rakkar waited almost two months before receiving a proof of loss
form, which he timely filed with St. Paul. After much delay, St. Paul denied
his claim accusing him of intentionally setting the fire. Even so, St. Paul
promised to pay off the mortgage, but never did. Rakkar paid the mortgage
company himself and took an assignment from the mortgage company of its
rights to the insurance payment. When St. Paul learned that Rakkar had an
assignment from the mortgagee for the insurance proceeds, St. Paul still re-
fused to pay Rakkar.
St. Paul argued on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding treble
damages because Rakkar failed to establish entitlement to recovery under
article 21.21. The court rejected this argument, noting that the jury found
that St. Paul had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. As such
conduct amounts to a unfair or deceptive act, the court held that Rakkar
had prevailed under his article 21.21 cause of action. 151
In Transport Insurance Co. v. FairclothI52 Faircloth brought suit under
article 21.21 against Transport and others alleging unfair practices and fraud
committed in connection with their obtaining a settlement from her after the
death of her mother and her husband. Based on the jury's verdict, the trial
court entered judgment in favor of Paula.
The court of appeals concluded that Paula was entitled to recover under
article 21.21 because she obtained findings that the defendants committed an
unlisted deceptive trade practice under DTPA § 17.46(a); committed an un-
fair claims settlement practice as defined in article 21.21-2 and 28 TEx. AD-
MIN. CODE § 21.203; committed deceptive trade practices listed in DTPA
§ 17.46(b); engaged in a trade practice determined by law to be unfair or
deceptive (breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing).' 53 The court
also determined that a common law fraud action can serve as the foundation
for a violation of DTPA § 17.46 and article 21.21 § 16.154
In Commonwealth Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Downs 155 the jury found, inter
alia, that Commonwealth Lloyds committed violations of the DTPA and
article 21.21 of the Insurance Code in the manner in which it handled
Downs' claim for the death of five horses caused when the roof of his horse
arena collapsed due to a severe winter storm. Commonwealth argued that
the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that it violated the
Insurance Code and the DTPA. According to the court, these causes of
action focused on the conduct of Commonwealth during the procurement
phase of the policy.15 6 It was undisputed that Downs desired insurance cov-
151. Id. at 628. See Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 135.
152. 861 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ requested).
153. Id. at 940-41.
154. Id. at 941.
155. 853 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
156. Id. at 117.
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erage on his property that corresponded with the insurance clause in the
lease he had with his tenant. Downs testified that he provided Common-
wealth with a copy of the lease that required Downs to insure the building
against loss or damage by fire, explosion, or other hazards and contingencies.
The court found no evidence that Commonwealth engaged in any unfair or
deceptive act or practice because the insurance coverage that was provided
by Commonwealth satisfied the requirements of the lease. 157 Furthermore,
there was no evidence that Commonwealth made any representations to
Downs about the extent of the insurance coverage except that the coverage
provided satisfied the requirements of the lease. 158
The article 21.21 cause of action in Jerry v. Kentucky Central Insurance
Co. 159 was based on the alleged failure of the insurer to attempt to effectuate
settlement of the claim once liability became reasonably clear, conduct de-
fined to be an unfair claims settlement practice in both article 21.21-2160 and
the Department of Insurance regulations. 16 1 This conduct is actionable
under section 16 of article 21.21 as conduct declared unlawful by Board Or-
der 41060 through its incorporation of conduct defined as unfair or decep-
tive in other portions of the Insurance Code and other regulations. 162
The court found two reasons why the Jerrys could not recover under arti-
cle 21.21. First, the court held that the Jerrys did not introduce any evi-
dence of other claims and did not prove that Kentucky Central acted in
accordance with a general business practice. 163 Secondly, the court held
that since there was no breach and no liability under the contract, Kentucky
Central's liability never became reasonably clear, and it could not be accused
of an unfair failure to settle. 164
It is not clear from the court's opinion that the Jerrys were required to
prove "frequency" in order to establish Kentucky Central's liability under
article 21.21. The Jerrys had two options under article 21.21 for bringing an
action for Kentucky Central's failing to effectuate a settlement once liability
became reasonably clear, either as a violation of 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 21.3
or 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 21.203(4). The court does not mention the route
chosen by the Jerrys. If the Jerrys had gone through § 21.3, which incorpo-
rates violations of article 21.21-2, they would not have been required to
prove frequency. 165 However, if the Jerrys were alleging a violation of
§ 21.203(4), they would have had to prove frequency. 166
"Frequency," however, is no longer an element of proof under either of
these regulations nor under article 21.21-2. As of September 1, 1991, the
legislature deleted from article 21.21-2 the requirement to show that the in-
157. Id. at 118.
158. Id.
159. 836 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
160. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
161. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.203(4) (West 1988).
162. Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Tex. 1988).
163. Jerry, 836 S.W.2d at 816.
164. Id.
165. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 134.
166. Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. 1987).
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surer was committing unfair claim settlement practices with such frequency
as to indicate a general business practice. This same language was also de-
leted from 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 21.203 by the State Board of Insurance in
July 1992.
In Love of God Holiness Temple Church v. Union Standard Insurance
Co.1 67 the Love of God Holiness Temple Church sued Union Standard
under article 21.21 after it denied the church's claim for water damage to its
building. The trial court granted Union Standard's motion for instructed
verdict on the article 21.21 claim, and the jury found that the church's dam-
age was not caused by an event covered by the policy. The trial court, there-
fore, rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court of appeals affirmed.
The church argued that the trial court should not have granted Union
Standard's motion for instructed verdict on its claim under article 21.21.
The church alleged that Union Standard committed an unfair claim settle-
ment practice by compelling it to institute a suit to recover amounts due
under the policy by offering substantially less than the amount ultimately
recovered in the suit brought by the church. According to the court, when
an insurer has a reasonable basis for denying a claim, the insurer does not
violate any provision of article 21.21-2.168 Because the jury found there was
no coverage under the policy, the court held that the denial of the claim
could not have been an unfair claim practice.
The court made a grave mistake in stating that, "[a]s long as there exists a
reasonable basis for the insurer to deny the insured's claim, the insurer does
not violate any provision of Article 21.21-2." 169 Most of the conduct listed
in article 21.21-2 as unfair claims settlement practices are not dependent on
coverage. For example, article 21.21-2, § 2(b)(1) prohibits knowing misrep-
resentations of pertinent facts or policy provisions relating to coverages at
issue. Thus, if the insurer represents that a provision allows coverage for a
certain loss, but in fact coverage is excluded, there can be liability without
contractual coverage.
Additionally, a finding of coverage is not necessary to establish a violation
of article 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4), which prohibits refusing to pay a claim "in
which liability has become reasonably clear." If the Legislature intended to
require a finding of coverage, the language would have been supplanted with
"where it is proven that liability exists under a policy of insurance."
The court in McCracken v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 170 could find
no evidence of misrepresentations and thus granted a summary judgment in
favor of the insurer. While driving his stepfather's power boat, McCracken
accidentally ran over and killed his friend, Doug Swafford, who had been
water skiing behind the boat. Williams, the stepfather, had watercraft insur-
ance through State Farm and an umbrella policy through U.S. Fire. Follow-
ing the accident, the Swafford family filed a wrongful death and survival
167. 860 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ requested).
168. Id. at 182.
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. 802 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
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statute lawsuit against McCracken and Williams. However, U.S. Fire noti-
fied McCracken that he was not covered under Williams' umbrella policy
because he did not fit the policy's definition of an "insured."
United States Fire then filed a declaratory judgment action concerning
coverage under the policy. After a trial on the merits, the court found (1)
the umbrella policy's definition of "insured" to be ambiguous; and (2) Mc-
Cracken was an "insured" under the policy because such ambiguities must
be resolved in favor of recovery for the insured. The Swaffords eventually
agreed to a $550,000 settlement, $350,000 of which was paid by U.S. Fire.
McCracken then filed this lawsuit against U.S. Fire for violations of the In-
surance Code and DTPA, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. McCracken sought to recover past and pending attorney's fees as
well as damages for emotional distress.
United States Fire moved for summary judgment on McCracken's claim
of misrepresentation under the DTPA and Insurance Code. The court
granted this motion because it could find no evidence of a misrepresentation
of coverage. The evidence showed that United States Fire never represented
that McCracken would be covered because it was unaware of McCracken's
existence when the policy was sold. The court disregarded, as mere opinion
and conclusory, Williams' controverting affidavit stating that he believed,
and was led to believe, that the U.S. Fire policy expressly covered Mc-
Cracken and anyone else who operated the boat. 171
D. DAMAGES
1. Actual Damages
Article 21.21 provides that any plaintiff who prevails thereunder may ob-
tain his or her actual damages. 172 The DTPA also uses the term "actual
damages" and courts have construed this term to encompass all damages
caused by the unfair or deceptive act or practice to ensure that the injured
person is made whole. 173 Thus, the damages cannot be limited to a specific
measure of damages, but the court should allow the measure of damages
which affords the greatest recovery. 174
a. Mental Anguish
i. Is a "Knowing" Violation Required?
In Beaston v. State Farm Life Insurance Co. 175 Heaton, an agent with
State Farm, sold Terri and David Beaston graduated-premium whole life
policies. The monthly payment on David Beaston's policy, due on Decem-
ber 28, 1983, was not paid. The thirty-one-day grace period ran from De-
cember 28, 1983 to January 28, 1984. On January 31, 1984, David Beaston
171. Id. at 35.
172. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
173. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992).
174. Id.; Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466-67 (Tex. 1985).
175. 861 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ requested).
1994] 1257
SMU LAW REVIEW
was killed in a one-car accident. When Terri Beaston called on State Farm
to pay the life insurance policy benefits, State Farm refused, contending that
David Beaston's policy had lapsed on January 28, three days before his
death.
Terri Beaston filed suit against State Farm and Heaton asserting claims
for breach of contract, violations of article 21.21, and the DTPA. The jury
found that State Farm engaged in unfair or deceptive acts prohibited by arti-
cle 21.21 and that such conduct was a producing cause of damages to Terri
Beaston. However, the jury made no finding as to "knowing" conduct.
With respect to damages, the jury awarded $200,000 for Terri Beaston's
mental anguish. Unaware that the trial court had found coverage as a mater
of law, the jury did not award Terri Beaston the policy benefits as damages.
Based on an earlier instructed verdict, the trial court awarded the policy
benefits of $250,000. The court's judgment, however, did not include the
jury's mental anguish award. The court held that these damages were not
recoverable without a finding that the defendants acted "knowingly." Addi-
tionally, the trial court refused to treble Beaston's actual damages. The
court of appeals modified the judgment of the trial court, and as modified,
affirmed.
Beaston first argued that the judgment should have included the jury's
award of mental anguish damages because a finding of "knowing" conduct is
not essential to a recovery of such damages. The trial court refused to allow
these damages without proof of "knowing" conduct based on Luna v. North
Star Dodge Sales, Inc. 176 In Luna, the court held that mental anguish dam-
ages are recoverable under the DTPA when there is a showing that the de-
fendant acted "knowingly."' 177 This decision was reached at a time when the
law permitted recovery of mental anguish damages only when there was a
physical injury or physical manifestation of the mental anguish. As an ex-
ception to the physical-injury rule, the law recognized that mental anguish
was recoverable when there was proof of intentional, willful, or grossly negli-
gent conduct. The court in Luna held that "knowingly" was a mental state
that lay between gross negligence at the bottom, and intentional at the
top,178 therefore, mental anguish damages were recoverable where there was
a finding of "knowing" misconduct.
The physical-injury or physical-manifestation requirement, however, was
abolished several years after Luna in St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard.179
Following Garrard, the Austin Court of Appeals, on two occasions, ques-
tioned whether a finding of "knowing" misconduct was still a prerequisite
for recovering mental anguish damages under the Insurance Code.180 Addi-
176. 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984).
177. Id. at 117.
178. Id. at 118.
179. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
180. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gros, 818 S.W.2d 908, 915 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991,




tionally, in Milt Ferguson Motor Co. v. Zeretzke 18' the San Antonio Court of
Appeals expressly held that a finding of "knowingly" was not necessary to
recover mental anguish damages in a DTPA case in light of Garrard.
State Farm argued, however, that the supreme court has reverted back to
the Luna decision by virtue of its opinion in Boyles v. Kerr.182 In the Boyles
case, the Texas Supreme Court overruled the portion of Garrard authorizing
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Boyles
court, however, upheld and reaffirmed the Garrard decision that abolished
the physical-injury or physical-manifestation requirement for recovery of
mental anguish damages, but in dicta stated that mental anguish damages
may not be recovered under the DTPA absent proof of a willful or grossly
negligent violation.1 83 The Beaston court rejected this argument.
First, the court stated that Luna is controlling authority only for DTPA
claims. 1 84 Beaston, however, recovered under article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code. State Farm argued that there was no substantial difference between
the DTPA and the Insurance Code so as to justify a different result than that
found in Luna. The court disagreed. According to the court, while the
DTPA and article 21.21 are interrelated and have a common history, the
general scope and purpose of the statutes are very different.185 Generally,
violations of article 21.21 occur from conduct that is proscribed by statutes,
rules, and regulations of the State Board of Insurance. These proscriptions
involve the entire insurance industry. According to the court, insurance
companies and their personnel are presumed to know the legal parameters of
the rules of the Insurance Code, unlike businesses affected by the DTPA,
which are not regulated by any state agency. "Therefore, it is difficult for an
insurance company to argue that its violation of article 21.21 is just an 'inno-
cent mistake.' "186
Another reason that the court decided Luna was not applicable was that it
was decided prior to the supreme court's decision in Garrard, which abol-
ished the physical injury requirement.187 The court acknowledged that the
supreme court in Boyles v. Kerr held that mental anguish damages can no
longer be recovered for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but noted
that the supreme court made clear that its decision did not affect a claim-
ant's right to recover mental anguish damages caused by the defendant's
breach of some other legal duty.'18 8 In this case, the other legal duty was
established by article 21.21, which "forbids any person in the business of
insurance from engaging in unfair insurance practices."' 8 9
The court also noted that in Boyles v. Kerr the supreme court recognized
181. 827 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
182. 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
183. Id. at 598.
184. Beaston, 861 S.W.2d at 274.
185. Id.






that a special relationship between the parties may give rise to a duty, which,
if breached, would support mental anguish damages. 190 The court held that
because the relationship between the insurer and insured is a "special rela-
tionship" giving rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing, when that duty
is breached, mental anguish damages are recoverable without proof of
"knowing" conduct. 191
ii. What Is Compensable Mental Anguish?
Mental anguish has been defined by the courts as a "mental sensation of
pain resulting from such painful emotions as grief, severe disappointment,
wounded pride, shame, despair, and public humiliation."' 192 In Beaston,
State Farm argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding of mental anguish damages. The court disagreed in view of the evi-
dence that Terri Beaston experienced depression, was much upset, and had
been subjected to State Farm's attacks on her character and extensive in-
quiry into alleged marital difficulties and discord. The court held that
mental anguish damages are uniquely the province of jurors who are best
suited to determine, by reference to their own experiences, the degree to
which the plaintiff has suffered compensable mental anguish. 193 The court,
thus, did not disturb the jury's finding regarding mental anguish damages.
The court in Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co. v. Littles 194 was also asked
to review the evidence supporting the jury's finding of mental anguish dam-
ages. Like the Austin court in Beaston, the Littles court held that jurors are
best suited to determine, by reference to their own experience, whether and
to what extent the defendant's conduct caused compensable mental
anguish. 195 The evidence revealed that Benefit's failure to pay the medical
bills caused Littles embarrassment to the point that he did not have addi-
tional necessary treatment because Littles could not pay the bills, and Littles
knew Benefit would not pay them. This resulted in some scarring remaining
on his lip and neck that caused Littles to withdraw from his wife, son, and
friends and to feel insecure. The court held that this evidence was sufficient
to support the judgment for mental anguish damages. 196
b. Policy Benefits
In Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 197 the court held that
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Littles, No. 04-91-00653-CV, 1993 WL 437192 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio, Oct. 29, 1993, writ dism'd) (quoting GAB Business Serv., Inc. v. Moore,
829 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ)).
193. Beaston, 861 S.W.2d at 275-76. Interestingly, the court noted that the evidence of
mental anguish included that caused by the aggressive defense tactics used by State Farm
during the course of the litigation.
194. No. 04-91-00653-CV, 1993 WL 437192 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Oct. 29, 1993, writ
dism'd).
195. Id., slip op. at 29.
196. Id.
197. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
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the amount of the policy benefits wrongfully withheld are damages as a mat-
ter of law. Accordingly, Beaston argued that the jury's finding of $0 as pol-
icy benefits was immaterial and the trial court should have considered the
$250,000 policy benefits as actual damages subject to trebling under article
21.21. The court of appeals acknowledged that Vail did support Beaston's
position, but felt constrained by the jury's verdict and thus, refused to treble
the policy benefits.1 98 Unlike the Austin court, the Texarkana court fol-
lowed Vail on this issue in Davis v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co. 199 In Davis
the court held that, as a matter of law, the damages for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing are the amount of the benefits wrongly withheld
and entitled Davis to recover exemplary damages even though there was no
finding of any other element of actual damages. 200 Furthermore, the jury
did not need to be asked whether the insurer's conduct was a proximate
cause of damages in the amount of the benefits wrongly withheld. 20 1
2. Treble (or Additional) Damages
Article 21.21 provides that a person who prevails shall recover in addition
to his or her actual damages, two times the amount of the actual damages if
the trier of fact determines that the defendant "knowingly" committed the
acts complained. 20 2 "Knowingly" is defined as "actual awareness of the fal-
sity, unfairness, or deception of the act or practice made the basis for the
claim... 2o3 The award of additional damages is mandatory under article
21.21 upon a finding of a "knowing" violation. The DTPA also has a provi-
sion for additional damages which differs somewhat from article 21.21.
Under the DTPA, the first $1000 of actual damages are automatically
doubled as additional damages upon a showing of a violation of the stat-
ute. 2°4 A prevailing consumer is entitled to these mandatory additional
damages even in the absence of a "knowing" violation. If the conduct was
committed knowingly, the trier of fact has the discretion to award additional
damages not to exceed three times the amount of actual damages.205
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Price20 6 State Farm argued that the
procedure for assessing additional damages under article 21.21 was unconsti-
tutional because it provides for mandatory imposition of treble damages
against insurance companies for acts committed knowingly, whereas the
DTPA provides for discretionary treble damages against any other defend-
ant for the same type of conduct. State Farm contended that this differentia-
198. Beaston, 861 S.W.2d at 278.
199. 865 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ requested).
200. Id. at 236.
201. Id.; see 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGE PJC 110.18.
202. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
203. Id. at § 2(c).
204. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993). See also Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 842 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ
denied).
205. Id.
206. 845 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ dism'd by agr.).
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tion in the treatment of insurance companies, as compared to other
defendants, is a violation of due process and equal protection.
Price sued State Farm under the DTPA, article 21.21 and for breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing as a result of State Farm's refusal to
pay under his homeowners policy for damage to his house. After the initial
inspection of the damages, a claims adjuster for State Farm told Price the
claim would be paid because the plumber determined that the damage was
caused by a plumbing break. State Farm then had an engineer inspect the
house. Based on this inspection, State Farm determined that the damage
was caused by the settling of the house over a period of years, and the claim
was denied.
The jury found that the damage to the house was caused by accidental
discharge, breakage, or overflow of water from within a plumbing, heating,
or air conditioning system, and that State Farm engaged in unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in the business of insurance. The jury found actual
damages of $102,500 and the trial court awarded additional damages of
$205,000.
The court rejected State Farm's constitutional attack holding that State
Farm had not overcome the historical presumption of the validity of the
statutes. 20 7 The court held that whether the constitutional provisions of due
process and equal protection are offended depends on the subject on which a
statute operates and the character of rights affected by the statute.20 8 The
constitutional guarantees do not forbid the state from adjusting its legisla-
tion to differences and situations.
With respect to the DTPA, the court held that it was designed to protect
consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices and to
provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection. To
further these goals, the statute provides the possibility of treble damages in
order to deter violations of the act. The court held that the treble damage
provision of the DTPA does not violate due process.2°9
Turning to the Insurance Code, the court held that its purpose is to regu-
late trade practices in the business of insurance. The statute applies to any
individual or legal entity engaged in the business of insurance and, according
to the court, it applies equally to all so engaged. In providing for treble
damages for knowing conduct, the legislature proportioned damages in rela-
tion to the plaintiff's actual loss to deter the knowing commission of prohib-
ited acts or practices. The court, therefore, concluded that the damage
provision rationally relates to the interest of the state and does not violate
the constitutional inhibition of being so severe and oppressive as to be wholly
disproportionate to the prohibited acts or practices and unreasonable.210
The court concluded that the legislature addressed different subjects by
enacting the DTPA and Insurance Code. All those within the class regu-
207. Id. at 439.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 440.
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lated by the DTPA are treated alike, as are those within the class subject to
the Insurance Code. The court held, therefore, that "the fact that State
Farm's knowing violation of the Insurance Code subjected it to mandatory
treble damages, [was] no basis for saying the Code's damage provision [was]
a violation of due process and equal protection since the DTPA violators are
exposed only to discretionary treble damages."'21
This different treatment of additional damages between the two statutes is
also revealed in Lawyers Surety Corp. v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc.212 Don Lan-
caster, doing business as Lancaster Motors, purchased wholesale a number
of used cars from Royal Chevrolet. Lancaster paid for these cars by checks,
which were returned for insufficient funds. When Lancaster did not cover
the bad checks, Royal Chevrolet sued him and recovered a judgment in ex-
cess of $25,000.
In accordance with statute,21 3 Lancaster posted a $25,000 bond before
receiving a dealer's license. This bond was issued by Lawyers Surety. Law-
yers Surety refused to pay the claim submitted by Royal Chevrolet claiming
that it was a surety only for Lancaster's bad bank drafts, not bad checks.
Royal Chevrolet then sued Lawyers Surety alleging violations of the
DTPA and the Insurance Code. At trial, the parties stipulated to $25,000 in
actual damages. The jury found that Lawyers Surety engaged in one or
more deceptive acts or practices, that such acts were committed knowingly,
and that Lawyers Surety's failure to act fairly and in good faith amounted to
such an entire want of care as to indicate a conscious indifference to the
rights of Royal Chevrolet. The jury assessed $40,000 in exemplary damages.
The trial court extended judgment of the jury's verdict but, rather than
awarding the exemplary damages found by the jury, awarded $50,000 as
exemplary damages. The court of appeals affirmed.
One of the arguments made by Lawyers Surety was that the trial court
should have awarded $40,000 in additional damages rather than $50,000
since treble damages are not mandatory under the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. The court held that while treble damages are not mandatory under the
DTPA, the trial court may have awarded the mandatory additional damages
under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, therefore, the $50,000 in addi-
tional damages was proper. 21 4
As mentioned, the mental state needed to justify additional damages is
"knowing" conduct. In St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Rakkar 21 5 the court re-
versed the award of additional damages because the court found that while
the promises and representations of St. Paul were proven to be false, there
was no evidence that the people making the representations had actual
awareness that they were false. 2 16 The court thought that, at worst, St. Paul
was grossly negligent or reckless in its handling of Rakkar's claim. A find-
211. Id.
212. 847 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
213. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6686(a)(1-A)(vii) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
214. Lawyers Surety, 847 S.W.2d at 629.
215. 838 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
216. Id. at 629. See also William H. McGee & Co. v. Schick, 792 S.W.2d 513, 520-21 (Tex.
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ing of conscious indifference, however, was found to be sufficient to support
an award of additional damages in Allied General Agency, Inc. v. Moody.2 17
In light of the supreme court's holding in Luna 2 18 that "knowing" conduct
lies in between conscious indifference and intentional conduct, it would seem
that a finding of conscious indifference, or gross negligence, would not rise to
the level required for additional damages.
Whether a measure of recovery is actual damages impacts the amount of
additional damages recoverable under article 21.21 and the DTPA since
under both statutes additional damages are a multiple of actual damages. In
Beaston the trial court refused to consider prejudgment interest as actual
damages subject to trebling. The court of appeals, relying on its decisions in
Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats2 19 and Paramore v. Nehring,220 held that
prejudgment interest is an element of actual damages subject to trebling. 221
The San Antonio court, however, has taken issue with the Austin court's
position on this issue, holding that prejudgment interest is not subject to
trebling. The more recent of these cases is Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co.
v. Littles.222
Littles sued Benefit Trust after it refused to pay medical bills Littles in-
curred in connection with treatment for second and third-degree burns over
his face, head, and body. Benefit Trust was the company that wrote, admin-
istered, and partially funded the group insurance plan provided by Littles'
employer, the City of Victoria. After a jury trial, Leslie Littles obtained a
judgment against Benefit, which included the trebling of prejudgment inter-
est. The court of appeals found this to be error, based on the prohibition of
awarding prejudgment interest on punitive damages found in Vail v. Texas
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 223 The court felt that trebling prejudg-
ment interest was not permissible because this would yield the same amount
as awarding prejudgment interest on punitive damages. 224
The Austin court addressed this argument in Celtic Life, where the court
held that although the amount of damages is the same for trebling prejudg-
ment interest and applying prejudgment interest to punitive damages, the
processes are distinguishable.225 The focus is thus on the method not the
result. The court held that because prejudgment interest is an element of
actual damages as recognized at common law, it can be trebled even though
prejudgment interest does not accrue on punitive damages.
App.-Eastland 1990), writ dism'd, 843 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1992), where the court held that a
finding of gross negligence did not support an award of additional damages.
217. 788 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
218. 667 S.W.2d at 118.
219. 831 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
1259 (Sept. 10, 1993).
220. 792 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
221. Beaston, 861 S.W.2d at 278.
222. No. 04-91-00653-CV, 1993 WL 437192 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Oct. 29, 1993, writ
dism'd).
223. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
224. Littles, slip op. at 39.
225. Celtic Life, 831 S.W.2d at 599.
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The other case in which the San Antonio court refused to treble prejudg-
ment interest is in Southern Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Alfaro.226 With-
out any analysis, the court concluded in Alfaro that Vail prohibits the
trebling of prejudgment interest. 227
When the prejudgment interest issue is closely examined it is clear that the
Austin court is correct and the San Antonio court is wrong. Courts have
held that "actual damages" recoverable under the DTPA are those recover-
able at common law. 228 At common law, prejudgment interest is recover-
able as damages for the loss of use of money between the time of the injury
and the judgment. 229 This form of interest is commonly referred to as "in-
terest as damages" (as opposed to interest eo nominee) and is awarded at
common law to insure complete recovery for the detention of that which is
due on account of the injury inflicted. 230
Moreover, interest on indebtedness, which is not conceptually different
from prejudgment interest, is an element of actual damages recoverable
under the DTPA.231 Thus, if an insured borrows money to pay the medical
bills that an insurer refuses to pay, the insured would clearly be entitled to
recover the interest incurred on this debt. Furthermore, this interest would
be subject to trebling under the DTPA, which is exactly what happened in
Smith v. Baldwin 232 and Kold-Serve Corp. v. Ward.233
When a jury finds that the defendant has violated article 21.21 knowingly,
the trial court, following the mandate of the statute, is required to award, in
addition to actual damages, statutory punitive damages in an amount equal
to "two times the amount of actual damages."2 34 Because prejudgment in-
terest is an element of actual damages, the trial court, in calculating the
amount of statutory punitive damages, should multiply by two the amount
of prejudgment interest, just as it multiplies by two every other element of
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. The failure of the San Antonio
court to treble prejudgment interest sacrifices article 21.21's policy of deter-
rence by automatically reducing in all cases the amount of additional, or
punitive, damages assessed against knowing law violators.
Section 16(b)(1) of article 21.21 expressly grants to the prevailing plaintiff
the following recovery: "the amount of actual damages plus court costs and
reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees. If the trier of fact finds that the
defendant knowingly committed the acts complained of, the court shall
226. No. 4-91-470-CV, 1993 WL49785 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Feb. 26, 1993, writ
dism'd).
227. Id., slip op. at 16-17.
228. Brown v. American Transfer & Storage, Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
229. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. 1985).
230. Id. at 551-52.
231. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. 1992) (Phillips, C.J.,
concurring).
232. 611 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tex. 1980).
233. 736 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987), writ dism'd, 748 S.W.2d 227
(Tex. 1988).
234. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(b)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
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award, in addition, two times the amount of actual damages[.]' '23
Thus the same phrase, "the amount of actual damages," describes both
the award required to fully compensate the plaintiff for his losses and the
unit of measurement the court must use in calculating the amount of addi-
tional or punitive damages to be assessed against a knowing law violator.
The purpose of the additional damage award is not to compensate the plain-
tiff, but rather "to deter violations of the Insurance Code."'23 6
In removing the actual damage award of prejudgment interest from the
additional damage calculation in the instant case, the San Antonio court has
frustrated article 21.21's policy of deterrence. Mistakenly relying on the role
of prejudgment interest in compensating the plaintiff, the court has ignored
the role that prejudgment interest and all other elements of actual damages
play in accomplishing the goal of deterrence through the additional damage
calculation. The error in emphasis is plainly seen in the following excerpt
from the court's opinion.
The purpose of awarding prejudgment interest is to compensate the in-
jured plaintiff for lost use of money due as damages between the accrual
of the claim and the judgment. That objective is achieved when pre-
judgment interest is added to the amount of actual damages before they
are trebled. Thereafter, the measure of actual damages, without includ-
ing prejudgment interest, is trebled in accordance with article 21.21 to
punish the defendant for a knowing violation of the Insurance Code. 237
Obviously, eliminating the amount of prejudgment interest from the addi-
tional damage calculation does not threaten the goal of compensation. That
goal is, in the court's words, "sufficiently maintained" by a single award of
interest. But eliminating the prejudgment interest award from the additional
damage calculation clearly frustrates the policy of deterrence because it au-
tomatically reduces the amount of deterrence. Fear of frustrating article
21.21's policy of deterrence by reducing the amount of damages subject to
trebling was the reason the Supreme Court refused to permit that amount to
be reduced by a pretrial payment the plaintiff had received from a settling
defendant. 238 If the policy of deterrence prevents the amount of actual dam-
ages subject to trebling to be reduced by the portion of plaintiff's damages
for which he has been compensated, by what reason or logic can it be re-
duced by a portion of his damages - prejudgment interest - for which he
has not been compensated? The point is that compensation of the plaintiff is
not germane to the assessment of additional damages, the sole purpose of
which is deterrence, and that to fully achieve the policy of deterrence no
amount of actual damages should be excluded from the additional damage
calculation.
The foregoing argument is unaffected by the statement in Vail that
"[p]rejudgment interest may not be awarded on punitive damages. '239 As
235. Id.
236. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tex. 1991).
237. Littles, slip op. at 38-39 (citations omitted).
238. Stewart Title, 822 S.W.2d at 9.
239. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 137.
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authority for this proposition, the court in Vail cited its opinion in Cavnar v.
Quality Control Parking, Inc.24° In Cavnar a common law wrongful death
case, the court denied prejudgment interest on punitive damages because
such an award was not needed to fully compensate the plaintiff for his actual
losses. Said the court in Cavnar, "[Punitive damages] are assessed over and
above the amount of damages necessary to indemnify the plaintiff. The
plaintiff can thus be made whole even if prejudgment interest is not awarded
on punitive damages." 241
But the deterrence of wrongdoers, not the compensation of the plaintiff,
that is the objective of article 21.21's additional damage award. That the
plaintiff is "made whole" without the doubling of prejudgment interest as
part of the additional damage award is irrelevant. A statutory cause of ac-
tion establishes a precise mechanism, two times the amount of actual dam-
ages, for determining the amount of punitive damages. The court is not
being asked to award prejudgment interest on an amount of punitive dam-
ages that had otherwise already been determined. Instead the court is asked
to properly determine the amount of punitive damage in the first place by
adherence to the statutory formula the Legislature has so clearly and unam-
biguously provided.
Another issue presented in Littles was when to start the accrual of pre-
judgment interest. Benefit Trust argued that to be entitled to prejudgment
interest Littles had to establish precisely when each element of his damages
was incurred. The court looked to Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking,
Inc. 242 for assistance in resolving this issue. In Cavnar the court recognized
that in some cases it is very difficult to establish an exact time when each
element of damage occurred. 243 Thus, the court devised an equitable rule
that prejudgment interest would begin to accrue six months after the occur-
rence of the incident giving rise to the cause of action.244 The Littles court,
following Cavnar, thus held that the trial court was correct to start the ac-
crual of prejudgment interest six months from the date of the occurrence
giving rise to his cause of action, which the court determined was the day
Benefit transferred his claims to "large case management" because the claim
was approaching $50,000, the level at which Benefit would become liable
under the excess policy.245
In Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Thomas246 the insurer argued
that Thomas was not entitled to prejudgment interest because there was no
evidence establishing the date Thomas suffered his actual damages, including
mental anguish. The court held that while it was difficult to determine ex-
actly when the injuries occurred, as they were suffered intermittently, this
240. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
241. Id. at 556.
242. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
243. Id. at 555.
244. Id.
245. Littles, slip op. at 40.




was not fatal to a recovery of prejudgment interest. 247 Like the Littles court,
the Thomas court looked to Cavnar for assistance and held that prejudgment
interest should be calculated starting at six months after the cause of action
accrued. 248
Benefit Trust also argued that prejudgment interest should not have been
compounded daily as per Cavnar because the legislature abrogated Cavnar
when it amended article 5069-1.05 to allow for prejudgment interest com-
puted as simple interest. The court noted, however, that article 5069-1.05249
applies only to wrongful death, personal injury, and property damage250
cases. Thus, Cavnar, not the statute, determines how prejudgment interest
will be calculated in a cause of action under article 21.21.251
3. One-Satisfaction Rule
In First Title Co. of Waco v. Garrett 252 the court determined that when a
plaintiff suffers an indivisible injury, the nonsettling defendant is entitled to a
credit for settlements made with the other defendants. Garrett contracted to
purchase nine acres from Jenkins and Dameron for use as an automobile
salvage yard. Jenkins and Dameron, however, did not tell Garrett that there
was a restrictive covenant on the property that prevented use as a salvage
yard. First Title Company of Waco conducted a title search, but failed to
discover the restrictive covenant that was actually listed within its files.
Alamo Title Company issued a title commitment affirmatively representing
that no restrictive covenants appeared in the county deed records.
After Garrett purchased the property and began to prepare it for use as an
auto salvage yard a neighboring landowner complained and eventually ob-
tained an injunction against Garrett. Garrett then sued Jenkins and Dam-
eron for misrepresentations and received $69,000 in settlement of the claims.
Garrett filed this lawsuit against First Title and Alamo Title alleging negli-
gence and violations of the DTPA. The jury found that the title companies
were negligent and made misrepresentations. First Title and Alamo Title
requested the trial court to give them a credit for the $69,000 settlement
Garrett had received from Jenkins and Dameron. The trial court refused to
do so. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects
and held that the title companies were not entitled to a credit because they
247. Id.
248. Id. But see Thompson v. Trinity Universal Co. 708 S.W.2d 45, 48-49 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ refd n.r.e.), and Campion v. Hochheim Prairie Farm Mut. Ins.
Ass'n, 644 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the
courts held that prejudgment interest begins to accrue when the insurance company denies the
claim.
249. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
250. "Property damage" entails physical destruction of property and not economic loss.
Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, Inc. v. Five D's Publishing Co., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 894,
900 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ) (claims of conversion and unfair competition did not
involve property damage). Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Stephens, No. 11-92-197-CV (Tex. App.-
Eastland, Feb. 24, 1994, n.w.h.) (claim for damage to crops involves property damage).
251. Littles, slip op. at 41.
252. 860 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1993).
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had not established that Jenkins and Dameron were joint tortfeasors. 253
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed as to liability for negligence and
DTPA violations, but held that the title companies were entitled to a credit
for the settlement. The court, utilizing the one-satisfaction rule discussed in
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling,254 held that when a plaintiff suffers an
indivisible injury - one that was caused by distinct actors, but is so singular
in character as to make apportionment of fault impossible - the judgment
should be reduced by the amount of any settlements to prevent a double
recovery. 255 However, the party seeking the benefit of a settlement credit
has the burden of establishing that it is entitled to such reduction in the
amount of the judgment. 256 The court found it sufficient that the title com-
panies placed into the record the settlement agreement from the lawsuit in-
volving Jenkins and Dameron and the order of dismissal from that case
without an actual adjudication that Jenkins and Dameron were joint
tortfeasors. 257
E. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Any plaintiff who prevails in a suit brought under article 21.21, § 16 is
entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney's fees.2 58 The amount
of attorney's fees is a question of fact and must be a reasonable amount
under the particular circumstances of the case. Evidence that a contingent
fee is reasonable will support an award of attorney's fees under article
21.21.259
The question of attorney's fees can be submitted to the jury in two ways:
one question to be answered in dollars based upon testimony of the hours
worked and the hourly rate of the attorney, and the other question to be
answered as a percentage of the plaintiff's total recovery. 260 In State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Price261 the court approved of this alternative submis-
sion and held that the jury's answers as to a percentage and a dollar figure
were not conflicting since the jury was instructed to answer without consid-
ering which sum would actually be awarded by the court. According to the
court, "Reasonable attorney's fees may be evidenced by a dollar amount or
253. First Title Co. of Waco v. Garrett, 802 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990),
rev'd, 860 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1993).
254. 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991).
255. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d at 78.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 79.
258. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993). A person prevails
under article 21.21 if the jury finds that the defendant engaged in conduct actionable thereun-
der even though the jury does not award all the damages sought. Id. See Barnes v. Western
Alliance Ins. Co., 844 S.W.2d 264, 273 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ dism'd by agr.).
259. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. North Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 850 S.W.2d 285, 290
(Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ requested).
260. 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 110.15, 110.16
(1990).
261. 845 S.W.2d 427, 436 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ dism'd).
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by a percentage of the recovery. '"262 Moreover, if both alternatives are sub-
mitted this allows the plaintiff to elect the alternative providing for the great-
est relief that the verdict will support.
When the jury finds that the attorney's fees are a certain percentage of the
plaintiff's recovery, the court, in rendering judgment, should calculate the
fees as a percentage of the total recovery, including attorney's fees, instead of
just the damages. In Great American Insurance Co. v. North Austin Munici-
pal Utility District No. 1 263 the court held that the proper method of calcu-
lating attorney's fees that have been found to be a percentage of the recovery
is to first determine the total recovery so that after the attorney's fees are
subtracted therefrom the remaining sum equals the damages. Thus, if the
non-attorney fee recovery is $100,000 and the fees are forty percent (40%) of
the recovery then the $100,000 non-attorney fee recovery must be sixty per-
cent (60%) of the total recovery. Therefore, the total recovery is
$166,666,67, the attorney's fees are $66,666.67, and the plaintiff's net recov-
ery is $100,000.00.
Any other method of calculating attorney's fees, said the court, would
result in awarding the plaintiff either attorney's fees less than the percentage
found by the jury or damages less than those found by the jury. 264 For
example, if attorney's fees are calculated as forty percent (40%) of
$100,000.00, or $40,0000, the plaintiff's total recovery would be $140,000.00.
The plaintiff would then have to pay his attorney forty percent (40%) of
$140,000, causing him to use $16,000.00 of the awarded damages to pay for
attorney's fees. This would defeat the fee-shifting provision of article 21.21.
A similar result was reached in Barnes v. Western Alliance Insurance
Co. 265 although the recovery was for damages in the forms of fees to be paid
to an appraiser. Claiming that the roofs of two of his buildings were dam-
aged by hail, Barnes filed an insurance claim with Western. Barnes and
Western could not agree on the amount of the loss, so Barnes demanded that
an appraisal be made and an award given based on that appraisal pursuant
to terms of the insurance contract. Before initiating the appraisal process,
Barnes hired Softline Services to investigate and document his claims for
presentation to Western.
In accordance with the policy, Barnes and Western each appointed an
appraiser. The court then appointed an umpire to whom the appraisals were
262. Id.; see also Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Littles, No. 04-91-00673-CV, 1993 WL
437192, slip op. at 34 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Oct. 29, 1993, writ dism'd).
263. 850 S.W.2d 285, 291 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ requested). The Austin court
reaffirmed this method of calculating attorney's fees in Beaston v. State Farm Life Ins. Co.,
861 S.W.2d 268, 279 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ requested). Additionally, the San
Antonio court adopted this method in Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Littles, No. 04-91-00673-
CV, 1993 WL 437192, slip op. at 35-36 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Oct. 29, 1993, writ dism'd).
See also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Taff, 502 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). But see The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 671-72
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted on other grounds); Berry Prop. Mgm't., Inc. v.
Bliskey, 850 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ dism'd).
264. Great American Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d at 291.
265. 844 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ dism'd by agr.).
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to be submitted. The umpire and Barnes' appraiser signed an appraisal
award for more than $400,000 over the objection of Western's appraiser.
Barnes filed this suit after Western failed to pay or challenge the award,
alleging violations of the Insurance Code, Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The jury found that Barnes had suffered hail damage in the amount of
approximately $68,000 and that the appraisal award should be set aside be-
cause of fraud, accident, or mistake. The jury also found that Western had
knowingly violated the Insurance Code and the DTPA. The trial court en-
tered judgment for Barnes for treble damages, attorney's fees, and pre- and
postjudgment interest. The judgment also provided for Softline to recover
twenty percent (20%) of Barnes' actual damages and prejudgment interest.
Softline argued to the court of appeals that the trial court improperly lim-
ited its recovery to twenty percent (20%) of Barnes' actual damages and
prejudgment interest. The contract between Barnes and Softline provided
that Softline was to be paid an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the
gross amount recovered by Barnes from Western. Softline argued that gross
recovery meant the overall total amount Barnes was awarded, not just actual
damages and prejudgment interest. The court agreed and held that Softline
was entitled to recover twenty percent (20%) of the actual damages, treble
damages, attorney's fees, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest
awarded to Barnes.266
F. JURY QUESTIONS/INSTRUCTIONS
The issue addressed by the court in Spencer v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. of
America 267 was whether a jury question was immaterial or merely defective.
Charles and Sharon Spencer sued Eagle Star for delaying payment of bene-
fits owed under business interruption coverage. The Spencers suffered a fire
loss at their business on February 19, 1986, but Eagle Star did not uncondi-
tionally tender payment of the benefits until March 10, 1987.
The jury found in favor of the Spencers in response to the following Ques-
tion I(A): "[Was the] handling of the Spencers' claim for loss of earnings by
Eagle Star ... an, unfair practice in the business of insurance?" 268 "Unfair
practice" was defined as any act, or series of acts, that is arbitrary, without
justification, or takes advantage of a person to the extent that an unjust or
inequitable result is obtained.
The jury also found this conduct was a producing cause of damages to the
Spencers. The trial court granted Eagle Star's motion for judgment not
withstanding the verdict on the basis that Question I(A) "does not support a
judgment against the Defendant under our law," and rendered a take-noth-
ing judgment. The Spencers appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, hold-
266. Id. at 272.
267. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 519 (Feb. 9, 1994).
268. Id. at 520.
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ing that the question was immaterial and defective. 269 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The supreme court agreed with the lower courts that the question and
instruction were defective because the instruction did not specify the con-
duct made unlawful by the statutes and regulations. The court, citing Brown
v. American Transfer & Storage Co. ,270 held that, "When liability is asserted
based upon a provision of a statute or regulation, a jury charge should track
the language of the provision as closely as possible."'271 The court found the
instruction too broad and ill-defined as it allowed the jury to find an unfair
insurance practice based on action that took advantage of the Spencers and
resulted in an inequitable result.272
Even so, the court concluded that the question was not immaterial as it
submitted liability under article 21.21 - the heart of the Spencers' case.273
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court should not disregard the
jury's answer to Question I(A) and remanded a judgment n.o.v. Instead, the
trial court should have granted a new trial.
The Spencers argued that Eagle Star waived any objection to Question
I(A) and judgment should be rendered in their favor based on the jury's
verdict. The court disagreed. Because the defect was with an instruction,
the court - focusing on Rule 274 rather than Rule 278 - held that Eagle
Star was required to object, rather than request a proper instruction. 274 The
court determined that Eagle Star properly objected to the instruction and
thus, a new trial was in order.
One of the issues in Commonwealth Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Downs 275 was
the propriety of the questions submitting DTPA and article 21.21 liability to
the jury. Downs sued his insurance company after it failed to pay for the
death of five horses caused by the collapse of the roof of his horse arena after
a severe winter storm. The jury found that the loss was covered by the pol-
icy, that Commonwealth breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing and
violated the DTPA and article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. The court of
appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment, finding no coverage
under the policy.
Even so, the court addressed Commonwealth's argument that the ques-
tions relating to the article 21.21 and DTPA causes of action were so vague
and incomprehensible as to violate its right to due process. These questions
read as follows:
Jury Question No. 4:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant en-
gaged in any unfair or deceptive act or practice that was a producing
269. Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 780 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd, 37
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 579 (Feb. 9, 1994).
270. 601 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Tex.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980).




275. 853 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
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cause of damages to Plaintiff? 276
You are instructed that "unfair or deceptive act or practice" means any
of the following:
(A) [e]ngaging in any false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices.
"False, misleading, or deceptive act or practice" means an act or series
of acts that have the tendency to deceive an average ordinary person,
even though that person may have been ignorant, unthinking or gulli-
ble;277 or
(B) [m]aking or causing to be made any statement misrepresenting the
terms, benefits, or advantages of an insurance policy; 278 or
(C) [m]aking, directly or indirectly causing to be made, any assertion,
representation, or statement with respect to insurance that was untrue,
deceptive, or misleading. 279
Jury Question No. 13:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant en-
gaged in any "false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice" that was a
producing cause of damages to Plaintiff? 28 0
"False, misleading, or deceptive act or practice" means any of the
following:
(A) [riepresenting that goods or services had or would have character-
istics or benefits that they did not have;28' or
(B) [r]epresenting that goods or services are or will be of a particular
standard, quality or grade if they were of another;28 2 or
(C) [r]epresenting that an agreement confers or involves rights and
remedies it did not have or involve; 28 3 or
(D) [flailing to disclose information about goods or services that was
known at the time of the transaction with the intention to induce an-
other into a transaction; 28 4 or
(E) [flailing to attempt in good faith to investigate, process and pay the
claim promptly, fairly, and equitably when liability has become reason-
ably clear. 28 5
The court held that the questions were properly worded.286 Question
4(A) was taken from Spradling v. Williams 28 7 which was cited with approval
in Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 288 Additionally, Ques-
tion 4(B) was taken from article 21.21, section 4(1);289 Question 4(C) was
taken from article 21.21, section 4(2);290 and Question 13(A)-(D) tracked the
statutory language of the DTPA section 17.46(b)(5), (7), (12), and (23) re-
276. See 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 102.14 (1990).
277. Id. at 102.15.
278. Id. at 102.16.
279. Id. at 102.17.
280. Id. at 102.01.
281. Id. at 102.02.
282. Id. at 102.03.
283. Id. at 102.04.
284. Id. at 102.05.
285. Id. at 102.20.
286. Downs, 853 S.W.2d at 116.
287. 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978).
288. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
289. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
290. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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spectively. 291 The court did not address whether question 13(E) was prop-
erly worded because it had found that the damage to the arena was not
covered under the terms of the insurance policy. Therefore, there could be
no award of damages under Question 13(E).
The San Antonio court also had the opportunity to pass judgment on jury
questions submitting a cause of action under article 21.21 in Benefit Trust
Life Ins. Co. v. Littles.292 The question asked of the jury in this case was as
follows: "Did Benefit Trust Life Insurance Company engage in any unfair
or deceptive act or practice that resulted in damages to Leslie Littles or the
City of Victoria? '293 "Unfair or deceptive act or practice" was defined as:
1. Engaging in any false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices;
"False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices" means an act or se-
ries of acts that have the tendency to deceive an average ordinary per-
son, even though that person may have been ignorant, unthinking, or
gullible;29 4
2. Making, or directly or indirectly causing to be made, any assertion,
representation, or statement with respect to insurance that was untrue,
deceptive or misleading;295 or
3. Omitting any information or making any false implication or im-
pression that was either misleading or deceptive or had the capacity to
be misleading or deceptive;296 or
4. Not attempting in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equi-
table settlement of a claim if liability has become reasonably clear. 297
Benefit Trust claimed that subparts one and two of Question No. 1 were
similar to the questions that the court held to be immaterial in William H.
McGee & Co., Inc. v. Schick. 298 The court held that Schick was distinguish-
able because the question involved in that case did not specify the conduct
constituting unfair or deceptive acts or practices as found in the above ques-
tion.299 The court found this question proper because subsection 1
originated from section 17.46(a) of the DTPA;3°° subsection 2 was taken
from section 4 of article 21.21;301 subsection 3 was taken from the regula-
tions promulgated by the State Board of Insurance; 30 2 and subsection 4 from
article 21.21-2 of the Insurance Code. 30 3
291. TEX. Bus. & COM. ANN. §§ 17.46(b) (5, 7, 12 & 23) (Vernon 1987).
292. No. 04-91-00653-CV, 1993 WL 437192 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Oct. 29, 1993, writ
dism'd).
293. See 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 102.14 (1990).
294. Id. at 102.15.
295. Id. at 102.17.
296. Id. at 102.18.
297. Id. at 102.20.
298. 792 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990), writ dism'd, 843 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.
1992).
299. Littles, slip op. at 18.
300. In Vail, the court held that § 16 of article 21.21 incorporates and makes actionable all
of § 17.46 of the DTPA, even the prohibition against unlisted deceptive trade practices in
§ 17.46(a) which are no longer actionable to a consumer suing directly under the DTPA. See
Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 135.
301. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
302. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.112 (West 1993).





An action brought under article 21.21, as well as the DTPA, must be
brought within two years after the date on which the unfair or deceptive act
or practice occurred. 3° 4 Both statutes incorporate the "discovery rule" and
allow an action to be brought within two years after the unfair or deceptive
act or practice was discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have been discovered.305 Because the discovery rule is a plea of con-
fession and avoidance, the plaintiff has the burden to plead and prove its
application once the defendant has raised a limitations defense. 30 6 The bur-
den is somewhat different for purposes of summary judgment. Before a de-
fendant will be entitled to a summary judgment on his affirmative defense of
limitations, he must not only plead and prove that limitations bar the plain-
tiff's cause of action, he also must negate the discovery rule.30 7 The discov-
ery rule is negated by establishing, as a matter of law, the precise date on
which the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered facts giving rise to
the cause of action.308 In 3Z Corporation v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 309
the court held that a summary judgment on limitations should not have been
granted because the evidence revealed that, although the misrepresentation
occurred more than two years prior to suit being filed, the defendant did not
establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff knew or should have known
that the representation was false at the time it was made.
P.G. Bell Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 310 was an action
brought by Bell after USF&G refused to pay a judgment Bell obtain against
one of USF&G's insureds. The trial court granted a summary judgment in
favor of USF&G on its limitation defense. USF&G contended that limita-
tions began to run when it refused to defend its insured. The court of ap-
peals disagreed and reversed the summary judgment. According to the
court, limitations did not start to run until Bell obtained a judgment against
USF&G's insured, for it was at that time that the insured's obligation to pay
was finally determined. 3' 1 Because Bell's lawsuit was filed within two years
after obtaining judgment against the insured, the court held that suit was
timely filed.
A different result on similar facts was reached in Abe's Colony Club, Inc.
v. C & W Underwriters, Inc.31 2 This suit was brought by Abe's against its
liability insurers, C & W and Mt. Hawley, because they refused to defend
304. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(d) (Vernon Supp. 1993). See also TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN, § 17.565 (Vernon 1987).
305. Id.
306. Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1989).
307. 3Z Corp. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 851 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1993, writ denied). See also Burns v. Thomas, 786 S.W.2d 266, 267-68 (Tex. 1990).
308. 3Z Corp., 851 S.W.2d at 938. See also Eshelman v. Shield, 764 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex.
1989).
309. 851 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
310. 853 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
311. Id. at 192.
312. 852 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
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Abe's in a lawsuit brought against it by a person who was injured by an
intoxicated patron of Abe's. Boti insurers refused to provide a defense
based upon a liquor liability exclusion in the policy. The insurers obtained a
summary judgment that Abe's causes of action under article 21.21 and the
DTPA were barred by limitations.
Abe's argued to the court of appeals that limitations did not begin to run
until the judgment against it in the underlying suit became final. The court
disagreed, holding that limitations began when the insurers denied a defense
because it was then that Abe's began incurring damages in the form of de-
fense costs. 31 3 The lawsuit was not timely because it was filed almost four
years after the defense was denied.
2. "Unlawful Act" Rule
In Rodriguez v. Love 314 Rodriguez purchased an automobile insurance
policy from Northwestern National County Mutual through Joan Love, its
recording agent. On March 18, 1990, Northwestern informed Rodriguez
that her first premium payment was overdue and that the policy would be
canceled if the premium was not paid on or before March 28, 1990. On
March 20, 1990, Rodriguez went to Love's office and paid the insurance
premium.
One month later Northwestern sent Rodriguez's check back to her and
told her that the policy was canceled because it had not received the pre-
mium prior to the March 28th deadline. Northwestern also notified the
Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) of the cancellation of Rodriguez's
policy. Thereafter, Rodriguez's driving privileges were suspended by the
DPS. Rodriguez, however, continued to tender premium payments and as-
serted that she was advised by persons in Love's office that she was still
insured. In addition, Rodriguez was given insurance identification cards by
Love's office as proof of insurance coverage. According to these cards, Rod-
riguez was afforded insurance coverage until November 8, 1990. Neverthe-
less, the DPS failed to reinstate Rodriguez's driving privileges and arrested
her on July 7, 1990, and October 11, 1990, for the offense of driving with a
suspended license. Rodriguez never received notice from the DPS that her
license was reinstated.
After her arrest, Rodriguez filed suit against Northwestern and Love al-
leging causes of action for violations of the DTPA, article 21.21, breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and fraud. Northwestern
and Love moved for summary judgment asserting that Rodriguez could not
recover because her causes of action were predicated on her own unlawful
act of driving with a suspended license. The trial court granted summary
judgment in the favor of Northwestern and Love. The court of appeals af-
firmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
Initially, the court affirmed the summary judgment to the extent that Rod-
313. Id. at 91.
314. 860 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
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riguez's causes of action in damages are based on, and stemmed from, her
arrests for the offense of driving with a suspended license. The court held
that Rodriguez could not maintain these causes of action because of the "un-
lawful act" rule.315 This rule provides that no action can be based on an
admittedly unlawful act of the party asserting it. The evidence showed that
Rodriguez continued to drive despite receiving notice from the DPS that her
license had been suspended. This unlawful act caused Rodriguez arrest.
Thus, the court held that Rodriguez could not maintain a cause of action to
the extent it was based on her arrest for the offense of driving while her
license was suspended. The court held, however, that not all of Rodriguez's
causes of action were based on her arrest and, in fact, became viable before
she was ever arrested.316 The court, therefore, reversed the summary judg-
ment as to the causes of action independent of the arrest and remanded those
for trial.
The court incorrectly applied the "unlawful act" rule to the facts of this
case. Historically, courts have refused to allow a party to recover or benefit
from an illegal transaction. For example, in Langford v. Pickens317 Lang-
ford turned over to Pickens his wholesale drug and liquor business to pay off
his indebtedness to Pickens. Wartime regulations, in effect at the time, set
certain prices for the sale of beer and whiskey. Langford complained that
Pickens was charging more than the law allowed and not crediting Lang-
ford's indebtedness with the amounts received. The court refused to divide
the profits of these illegal transactions.
In Stevens v. Hallmark 3 18 Stevens attempted to recover 129 cases of beer
seized by the sheriff. Stevens, however, lived in a dry county and had in-
tended to sell the beer in that county. The court held that Stevens' posses-
sion of the beer violated the law and could not serve as the basis for his cause
of action. Additionally, the court noted that if the beer were returned to
Stevens, he would again be in violation of the law.
The legal principle precluding recovery in these two cases has no rele-
vance to Ms. Rodriguez's causes of action. Her claims were neither based on
an unlawful transaction in which she participated nor on her own unlawful
acts. Rather, she was complaining that the defendant's wrongful acts caused
the suspension of her license and her arrest. Furthermore, neither the
DTPA nor article 21.21 mention this doctrine as a defense. Thus, this de-
fense should not be imposed on a cause of action under the DTPA or article
21.21.
In Smith v. Baldwin 319 the supreme court held that common law defenses
may not be used to defeat a claim under the DTPA. Smith v. Baldwin in-
volved a builder's statement to a prospective purchaser of a custom built
home that the house, when completed, would meet V.A.-standards, thereby
315. Id. at 544.
316. Id.
317. 288 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1956, writ refd n.r.e.).
318. 109 S.W.2d 1106 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no writ).
319. 611 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980).
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enabling the purchaser to obtain permanent financing. Because of numerous
construction defects, the V.A. refused to approve the house. The builder
sued the purchaser on the building contract and interim construction note.
The purchaser counterclaimed under the DTPA. The court of appeals de-
nied the purchaser relief under the Act, holding that the builder's defense of
"substantial performance" was good.320  The supreme court, however,
disagreed:
Baldwin [the builder] argues that to hold builders liable for treble dam-
ages and attorneys' fees notwithstanding a substantial performance of
the building contract places an unreasonable burden on the builder.
Whether this is so or not, the Legislature in the DTPA did not provide




The court further held that:
The DTPA does not represent a codification of the common law. A
primary purpose of the enactment of the DTPA was to provide con-
sumers a cause of action for deceptive trade practices without the bur-
den of proof and numerous defenses encountered in a common law
fraud or breach of warranty suit. 322
The court, throughout the years, has consistently applied this principle
and has rejected attempts to imply into the DTPA defenses not found within
the statute. For example in Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc. ,323 supreme
court held that a person bringing suit under the DTPA need not be in con-
tractual privity with the person being sued. 324 Thus, the court allowed the
purchaser of a house to bring suit against the seller's agent for misrepresent-
ing the number of square feet in the house even though the purchaser had
not sought or acquired services from the agent.325
In Weitzel v. Barnes326 the court held that oral representations were not
only admissible but could serve as the basis for a DTPA action.327 The
court refused to apply the oral evidence rule, which would have barred proof
of oral representations in a contract action, because in a DTPA suit "tradi-
tional contractual notions do not apply."' 328 Relying on Weitzel, the court
held in Kennemore v. Bennett 329 that the contractual defenses of waiver and
estoppel were not controlling in a statutory DTPA action. 330 Other com-
mon law defenses that have been determined to be inapplicable to a DTPA
320. Baldwin v. Smith, 568 S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979), rev'd sub
nom, Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1981).
321. Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d at 616.
322. Id.
323. 618 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tex. 1981).
324. Id. at 541.
325. Id.
326. 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985).
327. Id. at 600.
328. Id.
329. 755 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. 1988).
330. Id. at 90-91.
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action are: (1) doctrine of merger by deed;331 (2) cemetery abandonment; 332
(3) constructive notice provided by a recording statute;333 (4) impossibility
of performance;334 (5) contractual limitation of damages (at least, as to mis-
representation claims);335 (6) "as is" clauses in the contract; 336 and (7) bona
fide error or good faith. 337
H. GROUNDLESS & BROUGHT IN BAD FAITH OR FOR THE
PURPOSE OF HARASSMENT
Article 21.21, like the DTPA, provides that the defendant can recover
attorney's fees and court costs if the court finds that the plaintiff's action
"was groundless and brought in bad faith or brought for the purpose of har-
assment .... ,,338 Whether an action satisfies these requirements is for the
court, not the jury, to decide. 339 To succeed on such a claim, the defendant
must meet a two-pronged test: the suit must be (1) groundless and (2)
brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. 34° An action is
groundless when it has no basis in law or fact and is not warranted by a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.34'
In Transport Indemnity Co. v. Orgain, Bell & Tucker342 an insurer's
DTPA action against its attorneys was found to be groundless or brought in
bad faith because the insurer admitted it was not a consumer, yet maintained
a DTPA action for another year and one-half.343 In this case, a truck owned
by Allied Van Lines collided with a car, resulting in the death of a man and
woman who were in the car. Allied Van Lines was insured by Transport
Indemnity and Transport Insurance Company ("Transport"). Transport
hired the law offices of Orgain, Bell & Tucker and two of its attorneys to
represent it in connection with the settlement of a wrongful death suit
threatened by Paula Trippell in 1984. Soon thereafter, Trippell's claim was
settled for $250,000 and paid by Transport. About four years after the set-
tlement, Trippell, no longer a minor, filed suit against Transport seeking to
331. Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988); ECC Parkway Joint Venture v.
Baldwin, 765 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
332. Haney v. Purcell Co., 770 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1989).
333. Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1988).
334. Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983).
335. American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015
(1980).
336. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 839 S.W.2d 866, 873 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ granted); Wyatt v. Petrila, 752 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, writ denied).
337. Miller v. Soliz, 648 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
338. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993). See also TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 1987).
339. Transport Indem. Co. v. Orgain, Bell & Tucker, 846 S.W.2d 878, 882 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont), writ denied per curiam, 856 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. 1993).
340. McCain v. NME Hosp., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
341. Id. at 757; Transport Indem., 846 S.W.2d at 882.
342. 846 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), writ denied per curiam, 856 S.W.2d 410
(Tex. 1993).
343. Id. at 883.
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overturn the settlement, contending that it was too low. Transport then
hired another attorney to defend the Trippell action and was advised that
Trippell had no standing to assert the previously settled wrongful death
claim due to the fact that she was not the natural or legally adopted child of
the persons who died in the accident.
Transport filed this suit against Orgain, Bell & Tucker, claiming that they
committed malpractice and violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Or-
gain, Bell & Tucker counterclaimed that Transport's DTPA claim was
brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. Orgain, Bell &
Tucker was granted summary judgment on the ground that Transport's
DTPA claim was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.
The judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. 344
Transport argued that the trial court erred in holding that its DTPA claim
was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. The court of
appeals rejected this argument noting that Transport admitted in response to
requests for admissions that it had assets of $25 million or more, precluding
it from maintaining consumer standing under § 17.45(4) of the DTPA. 345
Transport had continued to maintain its DTPA action for more than one
and one-half years after making the admission. Transport argued that while
the DTPA claim may have been groundless, there was no evidence that it
acted in bad faith or with an intent to harass. The court borrowed from the
law of negotiable instruments a definition of "bad faith" as acting in willful
disregard of, and refusal to learn available facts. 34 6 Under this definition,
the court held that Transport did act in bad faith because it knew that it did
not qualify as a consumer under the DTPA, disregarded this information,
and continued to assert a DTPA claim after such an admission. 347
In McCain v. NME Hospitals, Inc. 34 8 the court used a somewhat different
definition of "bad faith" than was used in Transport Indemnity. Here the
court held that to prove bad faith, it must be shown that the "motivation for
filing suit was malicious, discriminatory, or with a reckless disregard for the
defendant's rights. ' 349 The court also concluded that before a trial court
can determine whether a suit is brought in bad faith or for the purpose of
harassment the court must hear evidence about the motives and credibility
of the plaintiff.350
McCain arose out of the discharge of Cathey Wright, an incompetent
adult, from the Dallas Rehabilitation Institute (DRI). After Wright as-
signed her rights to insurance benefits to DRI, it negotiated a settlement
with the insurance companies for payment of Wright's medical expenses.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 883.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. 856 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ.).
349. Id. at 758. Other courts so defining "bad faith" include Selig v. BMW of N. Am.,
Inc., 832 S.W.2d 95, 103 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); Kazmir v. Subur-
ban Homes Realty, 824 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
350. Id. at 757-58.
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DRI discharged Wright from its care when Wright exhausted her insurance
benefits. Wright sued DRI, the insurance companies, and various lawyers
and their law firms, alleging that the defendants entered into a civil conspir-
acy to misrepresent her insurance benefits and wrongfully discharged her
from DRI.
Wright nonsuited the insurance companies after they were placed in re-
ceivership. The remaining defendants filed Rule 13 motions requesting a
dismissal with prejudice and attorney's fees. The court granted these mo-
tions and dismissed the cause of action with prejudice. The trial court also
imposed Rule 13 sanctions against Wright's attorneys. DRI then filed a
counterclaim under DTPA § 17.50(c) alleging that Wright's DTPA claim
was groundless and brought in bad faith. The trial court granted summary
judgment for DRI and assessed attorneys' fees against Wright. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded. 35 1
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that Wright's petition,
which alleged violations of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, was ground-
less.3 5 2 According to the court, article 21.21 applies only to persons or enti-
ties engaged in the business of insurance. 353 Since none of the defendants
were engaged in the business of insurance, the court found the petition
groundless. 354 However, DRI also had to prove that the suit was brought in
bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.3 55 To make such a determina-
tion, the court held, the trial court was required to hold an evidentiary hear-
ing to determine the motive and credibility of the person signing the alleged
groundless petition.356 In this case, the trial court did not hear evidence on
the circumstances surrounding the filing of the pleading and the signer's
credibility and motives and thus had no evidence to determine that Wright
or her attorneys filed the pleading in bad faith or to harass. Therefore, the
court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in assessing
sanctions under Rule 13 and in granting the summary judgment under
DTPA section 17.50(c). 357
The court does not disclose the exact nature of the article 21.21 cause of
action alleged against the defendants, nor does it present any analysis of
whether these people were engaging in the business of insurance. Thus, the
court's cursory treatment of this issue is disturbing.
The focus of article 21.21 is not on a certain type of person, but a certain
type of conduct. Section 1 declares that the purpose of article 21.21 "is to
regulate trade practices in the business of insurance .... -358 Section 3 pro-
vides that, "No person shall engage ... in any ... unfair or deceptive act or
351. Id. at 759.





357. Id. at 757-58.
358. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 1(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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practice in the business of insurance. ' '359
In Section 4, article 21.21 defines various acts to be unfair and decep-
tive.36° But this is not the only conduct regulated by article 21.21, as Section
16 makes actionable conduct declared to be unfair or deceptive by the
DTPA Section 17.46 and by the Department of Insurance rules and regula-
tions.361 One such regulation is Board Order 41060,362 which states as its
purpose:
... to further define and state the standards that are necessary to pro-
hibit deceptive acts or deceptive practices by insurers and insurance
agents and other persons in their conduct of the business of insurance or
in connection therewith, whether done directly or indirectly, and irrespec-
tive of whether the person is acting as insurer, principal, agent, employer,
or employee, or in other capacity or connection with such insurer.363
The business of insurance is defined in article 1.14-1 of the Insurance
Code and, as recognized in Vail, includes the investigation and adjustment of
claims and losses.36 Thus, if an attorney (or any other person) assists the
insurer in investigating and adjusting a claim or loss and engages in conduct
defined as unfair or deceptive, that person, just like the insurer, is subject to
liability under article 21.21.365
Thus, resolving the issue of whether a person is subject to liability under
article 21.21 requires a look at the conduct engaged in, rather than the per-
son committing the conduct. In this case, the court did not make such an
analysis.
I. MISCELLANEOUS
In Testoni v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Texas, Inc. 366 Testoni's wife
received private nursing care during the last seven months of her life. Tes-
toni had insurance with Blue Cross pursuant to his membership in the Em-
ployees Retirement System (ERS). Blue Cross denied coverage for the
private nursing care, claiming lack of medical necessity. Testoni filed an
administrative appeal with ERS. After ERS denied the claim, Testoni
moved for rehearing. ERS took no action, and the motion was eventually
overruled by operation of law. Testoni filed suit in the Travis County Dis-
trict Court seeking judicial review of the agency ruling and asserting, for the
first time, causes of action against Blue Cross based on breach of warranty,
359. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 3 (Vernon 1981).
360. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art 21.21, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
361. Id. § 16(a). See also Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 132
(Tex. 1988).
362. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 21.1-21.5 (West Supp. 1993) (Tex. Dept. of Ins. Trade
Practices).
363. Id. § 21.1 (emphasis added).
364. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-1, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1993); Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 132.
365. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Carter, 855 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993),
writ granted; judgment set aside, 859 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1993); Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822
S.W.2d 261, 268 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). Compare Pennington v. Sin-
gleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1980) (holding that a person can be subject to DTPA liabil-
ity even if he is a one-time seller of goods or services and not a merchant).
366. 861 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.).
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breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the
DTPA and Insurance Code. ERS filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting
sovereign immunity and that Testoni's motion for rehearing lacked the spec-
ificity required by the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act
(APTRA) to preserve his error for review. The trial court granted the plea
to the jurisdiction with respect to ERS. Later, Testoni requested discovery
from Blue Cross. In response, Blue Cross filed a motion to quash, claiming
that the extra-contractual claims would be barred if the ERS decision on the
coverage claim was upheld. Blue Cross also filed a plea to the jurisdiction
and asserted that Testoni failed to properly exhaust his administrative reme-
dies. The district court granted the motion to quash, partially granted the
plea to the jurisdiction by dismissing the administrative appeal, and rendered
a final judgment that res judicata barred the extra-contractual claims.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment based on res
judicata because Blue Cross did not raise this affirmative defense in an an-
swer, motion for summary judgment, or motion for judgment on the plead-
ings. 367 The court, however, did not remand for a new trial, holding that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction over the extra-contractual claims as well as the
review of the administrative agency decision. 368 According to the court,
coverage and the right of reimbursement under ERS policies were created by
the Legislature, not common law. 369 Citing Texas Catastrophe Property In-
surance Association v. Council of Co-Owners of Saida 11 Towers Condomin-
ium Association,370 the court held that a claimant must follow the strict
procedures of APTRA to resolve all disputes arising from a denial of pay-
ment for a claim. 371 Finding that when the Legislature creates a right, it can
also restrict the remedies available and the means of determining their en-
forcement, the court held that all statutory causes of action arising on a
legislatively created claim must be brought before the agency as part of a
contested hearing.3 72 Therefore, Testoni was required to file all of his claims
for relief related to the insurance coverage denial at the agency level before
pursuing review in the district court.373 Because he failed to do this with his
extra-contractual claims against Blue Cross, the court held that those claims
were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the district
court did not have jurisdiction.374
The court held that Testoni did not exhaust his administrative remedies
because he did not assert his extra-contractual claims in the proceeding
before the ERS. 375 The ERS does not have jurisdiction over these claims. 376
367. Id. at 390.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 389.
370. 706 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1986).








Thus, it would have been fruitless to ask the ERS for a determination on
these claims.
The Texas Employees Uniform Group Insurance Benefits Act establishes
a plan for the purchase of group life, accident, and health insurance for State
employees. 377 Section 4 of the Act gives to the Board of Trustees of the ERS
the sole power to administer and implement the Act.378 As an agency cre-
ated by statute, the Board has no inherent authority, but can exercise only
those powers conferred upon it by the clear and express language of the
statute.379 Moreover, no additional authority can by implied by judicial
construction. 380
Section 4B of article 3.50-2 gives the Board authority to adjudicate ques-
tions which relate to the "payment of claims arising from programs or cover-
ages provided under authority of this Act. ... -381 Thus, by the clear and
express language of the statute, the Board is limited to adjudicating only
those legal rights authorized by the terms of the Act; that is, whether the
insured has a right to insurance benefits.382 This issue was the subject of
Testoni's administrative appeal and the ERS determined that the claims
should not be paid. Even if the ERS had determined that Blue Cross was
wrong to deny coverage, the only remedy that the Board could grant would
be payment of the claim.
However, Testoni still had legal causes of action for Blue Cross & Blue
Shield's unfair practices in the business of insurance. These claims for dam-
ages are not created by article 3.50-2, but by article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code, the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and common law. Natividad v.
Alexsis, Inc. 383 recognized that a claims administrator owes an insured a
common law duty of good faith and fair dealing.3 84 The court reasoned that
when insurers delegate the duty of handling claims to third-party adjusters,
those claims adjusters are under the same duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing.38 5 Otherwise, the duty to handle claims fairly and promptly could be
abrogated by the insurer by delegating the claims handling responsibilities to
another entity.386
Because these causes of action are not created by article 3.50-2, the Board
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate them.387 In Beyer, a case cited by the court
377. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50-2 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1994).
378. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50-2, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
379. City of Sherman v. Public Utility Comm'n of Tx., 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983);
Sexton v. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 720 S.W.2d 129, 137 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
380. Sexton, 720 S.W.2d at 137.
381. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.50-2, § 4B(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
382. Beyer v. Employees Retirement Sys., 808 S.W.2d 622, 627 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991,
writ denied).
383. 833 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ granted).
384. Id. at 547-48.
385. Id.
386. Id. See also Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Littles, No. 04-91-00673-CV (Tex. App.-
San Antonio, Oct. 29, 1993, writ dism'd).
387. Beyer, 808 S.W.2d at 626-27. See also Beaver Express Serv., Inc. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 727 S.W.2d 768, 773 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied) (holding jurisdiction of
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as authority for its holding that all disputes must be brought before the ERS,
the court held that the Board, in adjudicating a claim for insurance benefits,
does not have jurisdiction to award penalties and attorney's fees under arti-
cle 3.62 of the Insurance Code because nothing in article 3.50-2 authorizes
such a recovery. 388 The Beyer court never determined that remedies beyond
those provided in article 3.50-2 can never be recovered in another forum,
such as the courts. 389 Instead, the court held that Beyer was not entitled to
the relief provided under article 3.62 because that relief is available only in
court proceedings - a class to which administrative proceedings do not
belong. 390
The court also incorrectly held that the district court had no jurisdiction
because Testoni did not file a sufficiently specific motion for rehearing with
the ERS. 39 1 Because the Board lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the extra-
contractual claims asserted by Testoni, the doctrine of exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies is not applicable. 392 Clearly, it would be futile to seek
remedies from an administrative agency that has no authority to grant those
remedies.
Many questions were raised by the court's decision. For example, must
the ERS hold a contested hearing on the causes of action asserted under
common law, the DTPA, and article 21.21? How can it do so when it has
jurisdiction only to decide the contractual issue? If the ERS can pass on
these causes of action, can the insured demand a jury trial? If not, would
this impinge upon the insured's constitutional right to a jury trial? Will it
ever be possible for an insured to recover damages under these extra-con-
tractual causes of action, or is the court implying that article 3.50-2
preempts these laws? Is article 3.50-2 the Texas equivalent of ERISA for
members of the Employees Retirement System?
The answer most consistent with article 3.50-2, article 21.21 and the
DTPA is that the ERS has jurisdiction only over the contract issue, while
the district courts have jurisdiction over all claims not created specifically by
article 3.50-2.
II. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A. NATURE OF THE DUTY
1. Who Owes the Duty/To Whom Is the Duty Owed
In Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co. v. Littles393 the court held that the
administrator of a health plan, having exclusive control over the claims han-
an administrative agency means the power to hear and determine a matter committed to the
agency's discretion by statute).




392. Texas Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks I.S.D., 830 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. 1992); City
of Sherman, 643 S.W.2d at 683.
393. No. 04-91-00673-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Oct. 29, 1993, writ dism'd). See also
Nativadad v. Alexis, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ granted).
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dling process, owes a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing to the
insured. 394 Leslie Littles almost burned to death in a gasoline fire at his
home. Over the next thirty-eight days, Littles underwent five surgeries in an
attempt to treat the second and third-degree burns over his face, head, and
body. This care was provided by the doctors at Burn Care Associates in San
Antonio's St. Luke's Hospital. Soon after Littles was released from St.
Luke's, a claim for the bill of Burn Care Associates in the amount of
$23,669.01 was submitted to Benefit Trust Life Insurance Company (Bene-
fit). Benefit was the company that wrote, administered, and partially funded
the group insurance plan provided by Littles' employer, the City of Victoria.
Eight months later, Littles returned to St. Luke's for additional treatment
and incurred another $13,473.24 in medical bills. At that time, Benefit had
neither paid the initial claims, nor given any reason for nonpayment. Even-
tually, Benefit paid $12,028.60 of the $37,142.25 owed to Burn Care Associ-
ates stating in a letter to Littles, that the remaining charges were not payable
under the plan because they were for services not medically necessary or
because the charges were above the usual and customary charge. Following
various efforts of the physicians to persuade Benefit to approve payment of
Littles' doctor bills, the physicians brought suit against Leslie Littles and
Benefit for payment. Following lengthy litigation, the physicians obtained
summary judgment against Leslie Littles for $67,290.36, representing the
outstanding medical bills along with attorney's fees and prejudgment inter-
est. Leslie Littles in turn brought an action against Benefit and the City of
Victoria for payment of the judgment taken against him by the physicians, as
well as for mental anguish, temporary disfigurement, and other elements of
damages. The City of Victoria then sued Benefit as its administrator and
excess-risk carrier, for various causes of action in connection with its claims
handling. The physicians resolved all their differences with the City of Vic-
toria and Benefit prior to trial; however, their judgment against Leslie Littles
remained unsatisfied.
After a jury trial, Leslie Littles obtained a judgment against Benefit in the
amount of $1,674,132.80, and a judgment against the City of Victoria for
$250,308.36. The City of Victoria obtained a judgment for contribution and
indemnity against Benefit, as well as a money judgment in the amount of
$153,767.31. The court of appeals modified the judgment and, as modified,
affirmed. 39 5
Benefit argued that it did not owe Littles the common law duty of good
faith and fair dealing because there was no contract of insurance between
Benefit and Littles. The court held, however, that there was a special rela-
tionship between Benefit and Littles by virtue of the administration contract
between it and the City of Victoria, which gave Benefit exclusive control
over the claims handling process.396 The potential for abuse was revealed in
this case as it was to Benefit's advantage to deny the claims once the total
394. Littles, slip op. at 21.
395. Id. at 22.
396. Id. at 21.
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payout reached $50,000 because it was at that point that Benefit became
liable under the excess policy. Additionally, Littles had unequal bargaining
power compared with Benefit as shown by his inability to get Benefit to pay
the claims. Moreover, the court noted that this duty has been imposed on
insurers even when there is no contractual relationship with the person.397
In Hopkins v. Highlands Insurance Co. 398 Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling
Company, Hopkins' employer, purchased liability insurance from High-
lands. This insurance was to cover losses resulting from accidents involving
trucks owned and operated by Magnolia. Shortly after the insurance became
effective, Highlands elected to exclude Hopkins from policy coverage. As a
result, Magnolia fired Hopkins. Hopkins then brought suit against High-
lands alleging, among other things, breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. The trial court granted a summary judgment on all causes of action
in favor of Highlands. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment
in favor of Highlands concerning the cause of action for breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing.3 99 The court rejected the argument that since
Magnolia purchased the insurance contract, there was no contract with
Hopkins from which the duty of good faith and fair dealing flowed.4 0 The
court found that the insurance policy defined insured to include the truck
drivers employed by Magnolia, of which Hopkins was one.40 1 Therefore,
Highlands owed Hopkins a duty of good faith and fair dealing as he was an
intended third-party beneficiary of the policy. 40 2
In Jackson v. City of Galveston 403 Jackson contended he injured his back
while in the course and scope of his employment as a waste collector with
the City of Galveston, a self-insured municipality. The City, unwilling to
abide by a decision of the Industrial Accident Board awarding benefits to
Jackson, filed suit to set aside the award. Jackson counterclaimed alleging
that the City had violated its duty to deal with him fairly and in good faith,
and he sought exemplary damages for the City's negligence and gross negli-
gence in denying his claim for benefits. In response to the City's special
exceptions, the trial court held, as a matter of law, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity shielded the City from Jackson's claim of breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The court of appeals affirmed.44
The court recognized that worker's compensation carriers have a duty to
deal fairly and in good faith with injured employees and the processing of
397. Id., slip op. at 21-22, (citing Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210
(Tex. 1988) (which held that a workers' compensation carrier owes a duty to an employee even
though the insurance contract is with the employer); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Luker, 801
S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ) (holding insurer owes duty to son of policy-
holder for whose benefit the policy was purchased); and Natividad v. Alexis, Inc., 833 S.W.2d
545 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ granted) (independent claims adjuster owes duty to
claimants).
398. 838 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
399. Id. at 825-26.
400. Id. at 826.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. 837 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ granted).
404. Id. at 869.
1994] 1287
SMU LAW REVIEW
compensation claims. 4° 5 However, the legislature has shielded municipali-
ties from tort liability when performing a governmental, rather than a pro-
prietary, function.4° 6 The court concluded that a city engages in a
governmental function when it self-insures in order to provide worker's com-
pensation coverage since the city is required to provide such coverage by
state law.40 7 Although article 8309h4° 8 gives a city three different options in
providing worker's compensation coverage, the court held that since the city
has no discretion to decline coverage to its employees, it performs a govern-
mental function in fulfilling the requirements of this statute. 4° 9 Further-
more, the court held that there was no indication in the Worker's
Compensation Act that the legislature intended, by giving cities several op-
tions to meet the requirement, to waive governmental immunity.4 10
Jackson, however, argued that even when a municipality acts in a govern-
mental function, it can be liable for personal injury caused by a condition or
use of tangible personal or real property. Jackson argued that the City failed
to carefully review his medical records and negligently refused to process his
claims for benefits, thus invoking the tangible property exception. The court
held, however, that Jackson failed to amend his pleadings to allege that his
medical records were used in a negligent manner, much less that they proxi-
mately caused him injury. 411 Therefore, the court found that Jackson had
failed to allege specific facts that would have brought his claim under the
tangible property exception. 4 12
The majority held that there is no indication in the Worker's Compensa-
tion Act that the legislature intended to waive governmental immunity when
a city becomes a self-insurer. 4 13 However, article 8308-10.42 provides:
In an action against an insurance carrier for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, recovery of exemplary damages is limited to the
greater of four times the amount of actual damages or one-quarter of
one million dollars. Such an action against a governmental entity or unit
or an employee of a governmental entity or unit is governed by the
Texas Tort Claims Act ... (emphasis added).4 14
Insurance carrier is defined by the Act as:
(A) a person authorized and admitted by the State Board of Insurance
to do insurance business in this state under a certificate of authority that
includes authorization to write workers' compensation insurance;
(B) a certified self-insurer for workers' compensation insurance as au-
thorized by law; or
(C) a governmental entity that self-insures, either individually or
405. Id. at 870 (citing Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 210).
406. Id.
407. Id. at 870-71.
408. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309h, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (repealed effec-
tive Sept. 1, 1993).









If the legislature had intended not to waive governmental immunity and
except cities from this duty, it would have used the terms "insurance com-
pany" and "certified self-insurer" in article 8308-10.42 rather than "insur-
ance carrier." Furthermore, the legislature would not have made a claim
against a governmental entity for breach of this duty subject to the Tort
Claims Act.
The majority opinion, thus treats article 8308-10.42 meaningless and con-
tradictory. By providing a cause of action against a city that self-insures
under the Worker's Compensation Act, the legislature took away govern-
mental immunity.
In Charter Roofing Co. v. Tri-State Insurance Co. 416 the court determined
that a general liability insurer does not owe a duty of good faith and fair
dealing to its policyholder. 41 7 Charter purchased a general comprehensive
liability policy from Tri-State. Soon thereafter, Charter contracted with
Weingarten to repair the roof of a shopping center in Louisiana. Charter
subcontracted the work to another contractor who, in turn, subcontracted
the work to another company. When the property was damaged by a wind-
storm, Weingarten requested payment from Charter for the damages. Char-
ter, in turn, filed a claim with Tri-State to cover the damages caused by the
windstorm. Tri-State hired Newman, a claims adjuster, to handle the Wein-
garten claim. Upon completing his investigation, Newman recommended
that Tri-State deny the claim because the work was not supervised by Char-
ter; because the damage was not caused by property in the care, custody, or
control of Charter; and because the damages were not caused by Charter's
workmanship. Tri-State followed Newman's advice and denied the claim.
Charter eventually paid Weingarten for the damages and then brought suit
against Tri-State alleging breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The trial court granted Tri-State's motion for summary judgment and en-
tered a take-nothing judgment against Charter. The court of appeals
affirmed.418
The court held that Tn-State did not owe a duty of good faith and fair
dealing to Charter because it was Weingarten, and not Charter, that made
the claim against Tri-State.41 9 The court held that the comprehensive gen-
eral liability policy purchased by Charter covered claims made against Char-
ter, not claims made by Charter. 420 The court noted that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing was recognized in Arnold v. National County Mutual
Fire Insurance Co.42 1 a first-party case, and thus, does not extend to liability
insurance. 4 22
415. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308-1.03(28) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
416. 841 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
417. Id. at 905.
418. Id. at 904.
419. Id. at 905-06.
420. Id.
421. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
422. Charter Roofing Co., 841 S.W.2d at 905.
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The court's decision that a general liability carrier does not owe its in-
sured a duty of good faith and fair dealing in third-party claims is wrong.
Apparently, the court did not understand that the duty of good faith actu-
ally grew out of third-party liability insurance and only later was extended to
first-party insurance. The duty arose in third-party liability insurance be-
cause of the particular relationship between the insurer and insured and the
tremendous potential for abuse by the insurer. Typically, liability policies
provide that the insurer will defend and indemnify the insured against the
right of liability the insurer may incur to a third-party. The insurer is given
complete and exclusive control of the claim and lawsuit brought against the
insured, and the insured is prohibited from making any settlement, except at
his own expense, without the consent of the insurer. Thus, in G.A. Stowers
Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co.,423 the court stated that "[a]ll
[cases] acknowledge a liability for.., lack of good faith, in refusing to set-
tle. '" 424 The question presented to the court in Stowers was whether, in addi-
tion to its duty of good faith, a liability insurer also had the duty to exercise
ordinary care and prudence in settling claims. 425
With the duty of good faith's doctrinal foundations so firmly established
in the liability insurance context, no one, until the court in the instant case,
ever questioned that a liability insurer owed the duty to its insured. The
only real question was whether the duty would be extended to first-party
insurance. Some courts, in fact, disfavored the duty in first-party cases, be-
lieving that the unique relationship that gives rise to the special duty of lia-
bility insurers to settle within policy limits is not present when an insurer is
called upon to pay an insured for a casualty.426 Texas, of course, recognized
the duty of good faith and fair dealing in first-party casualty insurance in
Arnold.427 In light of these historical considerations, Arnold cannot be read
as limiting the duty of good faith to first-party insurers.428
In P. G. Bell Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 429 the court held
that although a third-party judgment creditor can maintain a breach of con-
tract action against an insurer, the insurer does not owe a duty of good faith
and fair dealing to the third-party judgment creditor.430 Bell, a general con-
tractor, entered into a subcontract agreement with Superior Cranes to help
423. 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
424. Id. at 547.
425. Id.
426. See Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 562 P.2d 965, 969 (Ore. 1977). See also 16A
John A. Appleman, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 48878.15 at 424 (1981); Mathew E.
Karanian, California Casualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court. Bad Faith for All, 18
PAC. L.J. 307, 317 (1986).
427. Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987). See
also David S. Lill, Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.: Texas Adopts First-
Party Bad Faith, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 835 (1987) (noting that Stowers recognized a third-party
liability insurer's duty of good faith and Arnold held that there is an implied duty of good faith
in all contracts of insurance.)
428. For a more detailed discussion of the historical development of the duty see Stephen S.
Ashley, Bad Faith Actions, Liability and Damages, Chapter 2 (Supp. 1991).
429. 853 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
430. Id. at 190.
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build a shopping center. Superior was to erect precast concrete slabs that
formed the structures of the buildings. The subcontract required Superior to
secure a general liability policy with property damage limits of $100,000 per
accident. This insurance was provided to Superior by USF&G. While
working on the project, Superior cracked one of the slabs and refused to pay
Bell for the resulting damages. Bell sued Superior alleging breach of con-
tract and negligence. USF&G did not defend Superior in the case. Superior
failed to appear at trial and a default judgment was taken against Superior in
the amount of approximately $150,000 in actual damages, $150,000 in pre-
judgment interest, and $10,000 in attorney's fees. After USF&G refused to
pay this judgment, Bell sued for breach of contract, breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, and for violations of the DTPA. USF&G filed a
motion for summary judgment contending that Bell could not maintain any
causes of action against USF&G because USF&G did not have a contract
with Bell, it did not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to Bell, the
terms of the insurance policy were not complied with, and the statute of
limitations barred the claims. The trial court granted this motion and ren-
dered judgment in favor of USF&G. The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded for trial.43 1
USF&G argued that Bell could not maintain an action for breach of con-
tract because there was no contract between USF&G and Bell. However,
Bell was a third-party judgment creditor bound by the rights, duties, and
obligations of the insured under the terms and conditions of the contract
between the insurance company and the insured.432 The court, therefore,
held that once Bell acquired a default judgment against Superior for dam-
ages done to property covered by the USF&G policy, Bell had a cause of
action against USF&G for payment of those damages up to the policy
limits. 433
The court held, however, that Bell, even as a third-party judgment credi-
tor, was not owed a duty of good faith and fair dealing by USF&G. 4 3 4 The
court reasoned that the duty to deal fairly and in good faith arises from the
special relationship between the insured and the insurer.435 In this case, the
insured was Superior, not Bell. Bell argued that this duty did extend to it
because the insurance policy was created for its benefit. The court found this
case very similar to Chaffin v. TransAmerican Insurance Co. 436 in that the
subcontractor was the only person named on the policy and thus, it could
not be concluded that the general contractor was a beneficiary under the
policy.43 7 Moreover, the court held that the duty of good and fair dealing
should extend only to the insured because it is the primary beneficiary of the
policy, even though third-parties ultimately benefit from the existence of the
431. Id. at 188.




436. 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




In Shelton Insurance Agency v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. 439 the
court determined that an insurer does not owe a duty of good faith and fair
dealing to an insurance agency.440 John Roberts, an insurance agent work-
ing for the Shelton Agency, sold Frio Drilling Company a St. Paul policy
that insured it against losses resulting from oil well blowouts. After one of
Frio's wells blew out and St. Paul denied the claim, Frio sued the Shelton
Agency and St. Paul. St. Paul later settled with Frio, but did not settle the
claims against the Shelton Agency. St. Paul then hired an attorney to defend
the Shelton Agency in the Frio suit under an errors and omissions policy.
The Shelton Agency later dropped its claim against Frio for $40,000 in un-
paid premiums as part of a settlement of the Frio suit. The Shelton Agency
then sued St. Paul alleging that St. Paul was liable to pay damages under
either the blowout policy or the errors and omissions policy because it
wrongfully, and in bad faith, refused to timely pay either of the claims. The
Shelton Agency sought to recover the premiums that it wrote off in settling
the Frio suit plus commissions lost due to losing Frio as a customer.
The jury found that St. Paul denied Frio's claim with no reasonable basis
for the denial; failed to determine if there was a reasonable basis for denying
Frio's claim and failed to exercise good faith in the investigation, processing,
and denial of Frio's claim. The trial court, however, granted judgment n.o.v.
favorable to St. Paul, and ordered that the Shelton Agency take nothing.
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.441
The court held that St. Paul could not be liable to the Shelton Agency for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing because the Shelton Agency
was not an insured or intended beneficiary under the policy issued to Frio.442
The court noted that the Shelton Agency did not request jury questions on
whether St. Paul breached any duty owed directly to it, but merely asked
whether St. Paul was liable for the manner in which it handled the Frio
claim. Thus, according to the court, the "Shelton Agency waived any claim
it might have had for breach of a duty running between St. Paul and
itself.443
The court did hold that the Shelton Agency could recover from St. Paul
under a breach of contract theory. 444 St. Paul agreed to indemnify the
Shelton Agency against all claims that the Shelton Agency might become
obligated to pay as a result of any loss caused directly by St. Paul's error in
processing or handling policies. Here, the jury found that St. Paul denied
Frio's claims without a reasonable basis, thus establishing a breach of St.
Paul's contractual obligation to indemnify the Shelton Agency. 445 The dam-
438. PG. Bell Co., 853 S.W.2d at 190.
439. 848 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
440. Id. at 743.
441. Id. at 741.
442. Id. at 743.
443. Id. at 744.




ages that the Shelton Agency suffered were the amount of premiums that
Frio owed, but were written off by the Shelton Agency. St. Paul argued that
the evidence did not support the finding that it denied the claim without a
reasonable basis for doing so. The evidence, however, showed that several
people, including those hired by St. Paul, informed St. Paul that the loss Frio
suffered was due to a blowout. Furthermore, St. Paul obtained a legal opin-
ion that stated it would be very difficult to maintain that the damages suf-
fered were not caused by a blowout, especially in view of the lack of a
definitive definition of the term "blowout" in the policy. Thus, the court
held there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that St. Paul
had no reasonable basis for denying Frio's claim.446
In Central Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Stemmons Northwest Bank, N.A. 44 7
Central Savings purchased thirty mortgage loans from TriTexas. After a
dispute arose over the availability of private mortgage insurance on some of
the loans, the two entered into a settlement agreement wherein TriTexas
agreed to act as the mortgage insurer. TriTexas delivered to Central Savings
a letter of credit, issued by Stemmons, to secure TriTexas's obligations.
When Stemmons told Central Savings it would not renew the letter of credit,
Central Savings demanded that TriTexas comply with its obligations under
the settlement agreement. TriTexas refused to do so and thus, Central Sav-
ings presented the letter of credit to Stemmons. Stemmons refused to honor
it. Central Savings then sued Stemmons and TriTexas alleging, inter alia,
that each breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court
granted summary judgment against Central Savings on these causes of ac-
tion. The court of appeals affirmed. 4 8
With respect to Stemmons, Central Savings argued that the two had a
special relationship by virtue of the letter of credit giving rise to a common
law duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court found that the requisite
"special relationship" has been found only between an insurer and its in-
sured and has never been found to exist between the issuer of a letter of
credit and the beneficiary.449 The court thus viewed this duty as existing in
very limited circumstances, none of which were present in this case. 450 The
court further held that parties to a transaction governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code owe each other a duty of good faith and fair dealing, but a
breach thereof is not a tort, but gives rise to a breach of contract cause of
action. 41
With respect to TriTexas, Central Savings argued that because the settle-
ment agreement provided that TriTexas would act as the permanent mort-
gage insurer with respect to the loans, TriTexas owed Central Savings a duty
of good faith and fair dealing. According to the court, however, the evi-
446. Id. at 746.
447. 848 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
448. Id. at 236.
449. Id. at 239.
450. Id.
451. Id. (citing Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, writ denied)).
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dence revealed that TriTexas was not an insurance company but a mortgage
servicing company. 4 52 Because TriTexas was not an insurer and did not is-
sue mortgage guaranty insurance, the court held that TriTexas did not owe
Central Savings a duty of good faith and fair dealing.453
In a very brief opinion, conspicuously lacking any citations of authority,
the Fifth Circuit in Bui v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.454 held that a
person hired by the insurance company to investigate a loss cannot be held
liable for negligently investigating the claim.4 55 The extent of the court's
discussion of this issue was that no action could be maintained against the
investigator "because [the investigator] was not a party to the [insurance]
contract and, under the particular facts of this case, owed no duty to the
Buis under Texas law."'456 A contractual relationship, however, is not re-
quired to hold a person liable in negligence or for violations of the DTPA
and Insurance Code.
2. Breadth of the Duty. Underwriting/Claims Handling/Policy
Cancellation
When the supreme court first recognized the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, it did so in the context of a case involving the insurer's claims han-
dling procedures. 45 7 In Hopkins v. Highlands Insurance Co. 458 the court
held that an insurer breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing by can-
celing insurance coverage when: (1) there is an "absence of a reasonable
basis for cancellation of coverage; and (2) [t]he insurer knew, or should have
known, that there was not a reasonable basis for cancellation of [the] cover-
age."' 459 "The first element of this test require[s] an objective determination
of whether a reasonable insurer under similar circumstances would have
canceled insurance coverage, once coverage ha[d] commenced. '460 The evi-
452. Id. at 242.
453. Id. On the issue of who is an insurer, compare Temple Eastex, Inc. v. Old Orchard
Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied). While this case
does not involve an action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the court made
important holdings about insurance. Old Orchard owned an apartment complex and hired
Greener & Sumner as the general contractor for a construction project. One of the subcon-
tractors hired by Greener & Sumner caused a fire that destroyed the complex. Old Orchard
and Greener & Sumner executed a standard American Institute of Architects contract that
required Old Orchard to maintain adequate property insurance. The contract also provided
that Old Orchard would waive all its rights against Greener & Sumner and the subcontractors
for damages caused by fire and that the parties would look solely to the property insurance.
The contract required Old Orchard to notify Greener & Sumner if it intended not to carry
adequate insurance. Old Orchard never gave such notice but did not carry enough insurance
to cover the fire loss. The court held that Orchard, thus, became the insurer and was liable for
damages to the extent that an insurance carrier would have been liable had adequate insurance
been obtained. Id. at 731. Thus, it stands to reason that if TiTexas agrees to act as insurer,
even though not incorporated as such, it should have the same duties as any other insurer.
454. 981 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1993).
455. Id. at 210.
456. Id.
457. Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
458. 838 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).




dence in this case showed that, according to its own internal guidelines,
Highlands would cancel coverage on a driver when the driver had more than
three moving violations in the past three years. However, Hopkins had only
three tickets in the preceding three years; all of which were issued prior to
the effective date of the insurance policy. The court, therefore, held that
Highlands did not establish, as a matter of law, that there was a reasonable,
objective basis for canceling the coverage based on the application of its own
internal guidelines. 461 The court then held that the second element was met
when the insurer actually knew, or should have known, that there was no
reasonable basis for cancellation of insurance coverage.462 According to the
court, Highlands should have known that excluding Hopkins from policy
coverage was contrary to its own guidelines. Therefore, the summary judg-
ment was improper and reversed as to Highlands for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
Chief Justice Osborn wrote a concurring opinion to make clear that the
court was extending the rule announced in Aranda463 and Arnold as those
cases involved delays or denials of payment of claims. 46 This case, how-
ever, involved cancellation of coverage.465 Chief Justice Osborn noted that
the same concern regarding the need for this duty in connection with pay-
ment of claims is present with respect to the cancellation of coverage. That
is, since the insurer has exclusive control of the decision-making process and
a disparity of bargaining power exists between insurer and insured, without
the existence of a duty of good faith and fair dealing, an insurer can arbitrar-
ily cancel coverage. 466 According to Chief Justice Osborn, the right of an
insurance company to cancel a policy is not absolute and, once coverage is
provided, an insurer may not indiscriminately cancel that policy during a
policy period. 467 Chief Justice Osborn, however, noted that an insurance
company has an absolute right to cancel for nonpayment of premiums or a
violation of policy provisions that place some duty on the insured. 468
The court in Shelton v. Union Bankers Insurance Co.469 also held that an
insurer has the duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing when canceling
insurance policies.470 According to the court, this duty is applicable to the
entire contract, not just to the handling of claims.471
In Commonwealth Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Downs 472 the court refused to
extend the duty of good faith and fair dealing to cover the underwriting
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).





469. 853 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ granted).
470. Id. at 593.
471. Id.
472. 853 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
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phase of an insurance transaction.473 The court reached its conclusion be-
cause it could find no other cases recognizing the existence of the duty in
such a context, although no cases were cited rejecting this notion. 474
B. THE STANDARD BY WHICH BAD FAITH IS JUDGED
1. The Bona Fide Dispute Defense
The courts of appeals are split on how to judge whether the insurer had a
reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of a claim with some want-
ing to focus only on the facts known to the insurer that support its denial or
delay while others view all the evidence that supports the jury's findings.
The former courts tend to find no breach if the insurer shows some facts to
support its conclusion that there was no coverage, even if other facts support
a conclusion that there was coverage. The other courts give greater weight
to the jury's findings, allow the jury to make the determination of whether
the insurer acted in a reasonable manner.
The effort to recognize what has been called the "bona fide dispute" de-
fense has been spearheaded by the San Antonio court, most notably in State
Farm' Lloyds, Inc. v. Polasek.475 There the court held that, to establish a
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, an "insured must prove
that there were no facts before the insurer, which, if believed, would justify
denial of the claim."'476 Thus, according to the court, the jury should not
consider evidence contradicting insurer's position, but should only deter-
mine whether evidence relied upon by insurer supported a denial of the
claim.477
In 1990, a fire destroyed a video rental business owned by the Polaseks
and insured by State Farm. State Farm denied the Polaseks' claim after
concluding that the Polaseks started the fire. The Polaseks filed suit and,
ultimately, a jury found that they did not commit arson and that State Farm
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by denying the claim.
The court first decided that State Farm did not establish, as a matter of
law, that the Polaseks had set fire to the video store. 478 The court held that
in order to establish the defense of arson, State Farm had to prove that the
Polaseks set the fire or caused it to be set.479 While the court found some
evidence that the fire did have an incendiary origin and that the Polaseks
had an opportunity and motive to set the fire, the court also found evidence
that the Polaseks had nothing to do with the fire.480 Because the evidence on
this issue was conflicting, the court held that it was up to the jury to resolve
this fact issue.48' The court refused to disturb the jury's finding and affirmed
473. Id. at 119.
474. Id.
475. 847 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
476. Id. at 284.
477. Id. at 285.






the judgment based on the insurance contract.482
The court next turned to State Farm's argument that there was no evi-
dence to support the jury's finding that State Farm had breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The Polaseks had to prove that State Farm had
no reasonable basis for denying the claim or that it failed to determine
whether there was any reasonable basis for denying the claim. This burden
is not satisfied, wrote the court, by proving that the Polaseks did not commit
arson, that State Farm should have paid the claim, or that State Farm acted
unreasonably in denying the claim. 483 Instead, an "insured must prove that
there are no facts before the insurer which, if believed, would justify denial
of the claim."'484 According to the court, the trier of fact should not weigh
conflicting evidence on the issue of reasonableness, but should decide
whether evidence existed and whether, standing alone, it was a reasonable
ground for denying the claim.485 Therefore, if an insurer possesses evidence
reasonably showing that the insured's claim might not be valid, there is no
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law.486 The
court did concede that the basis for the denial must be reasonable, but the
court felt that the trier of fact should not be allowed to second guess the
insurer about reasonableness. 487 Furthermore, courts should be careful to
insure that an action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is
reserved for those cases of flagrant denial or delay of payment when no rea-
sonable basis exists and not for mere unreasonable denial or delay. 488 The
court then held that there was ample evidence that a reasonable basis existed
for denying Polaseks' claim. 489 There was evidence that the fire had an in-
cendiary origin, that there was no accidental cause, and that there was no
forced entry into the store. There was also evidence that Mrs. Polasek was
the last person on the premises the night of the fire, and that the Polaseks
lived a short drive from the store. The court also noted evidence that the
store was marginally profitable and that the Polaseks had a $6,500 note for
video tapes coming due five days after the fire. The court also pointed to
evidence that the Polaseks had borrowed some money to put into the busi-
ness, that they had been late paying rent, and that Mr. Polasek had removed
an uninsured air-compressor on the day of the fire. According to the court,
when State Farm decided whether arson by the Polaseks may have caused
the fire, it was entitled to assess the evidence in light of the substantive law of
arson that permits an arson finding on circumstantial evidence.490 The
court, therefore, held that, as a matter of law, a reasonable basis existed for
denying the claim. 491
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 284.
485. Polasek, 847 S.W.2d at 285.








The Polaseks argued that State Farm also breached the duty of good faith
and fair dealing by failing to determine whether there was a reasonable basis
for denying the claim. They argued that State Farm did not talk to persons
who would have loaned them money to pay debts rather than resorting to
burning their own store down. The court held that an insurer does not have
to pursue every lead and that the investigation done by State Farm was suffi-
cient.492 The court, therefore, reversed the judgment awarding mental
anguish and exemplary damages for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing and rendered judgment that the Polaseks take nothing.493
The court utilized the same reasoning in Employers National Insurance
Co. v. Dalros494 to reverse a judgment against the insurer based on the jury's
verdict that it breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing.495 After
Dalros drained his pool in order to clean and whitewash the sides he noticed
that the pool had risen about one foot above ground level. According to his
neighbor, this occurred because heavy rains had saturated the ground and
forced the empty pool up. The pool was refilled and it settled about half-way
back into the ground. A couple of weeks later, the pool cracked and Dalros
called Employers. Several days later, Employers told Dalros that the claim
would be denied due to flooding. Employers later sent an adjuster out to
inspect the pool, who suggested that the claim be denied because the loss was
caused by cracking, an exclusion under the policy. Approximately one year
later, an attorney hired by Dalros sent a demand letter to Employers.
Within two months Employers sent Dalros a $10,000 check, representing
the policy limits. Dalros later filed suit, alleging that Employers breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing. The jury found against Employers and
awarded $12,500 as damages for mental anguish and $250,000 in exemplary
damages. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment that Dalros
take nothing.
The court once again held that Dalros was required to show that there
were no facts, which if believed, supported Employers' initial denial and re-
sulted in delay in order to establish a breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing.496 According to the court, when there is a bona fide contro-
versy, the insurer has a right to deny the claim, await litigation, or even
change its mind and pay the claim, as long as there exists a reasonable basis
for denying the claim. 497
The court noted that the exclusion relied on by Employers was an exclu-
sion for losses caused by cracking. According to the court, no matter what
the cause, if cracking existed, it was excluded. In this case, there was no
dispute that the pool cracked after it rose, thereby presenting a reasonable
basis for denying the claim. The fact that Employers eventually paid the
claim, according to the court, did not mean that during the year of delay was
492. Id. at 288.
493. Id.
494. No. 04-92-00078-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Mar. 31, 1993, n.w.h.).
495. Id.




acting without a reasonable basis. 498 To the contrary, it would be an indica-
tion, at least to this court, of Employers' good faith desire to resolve the
conflict in spite of a clear exclusion in the policy. 499
Two courts have criticized and rejected the reasoning of Polasek as an
aberration in the law concerning the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The
first is State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simmons 50 and the other is Na-
tionwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Crowe.50 1
In Simmons, State Farm refused to pay a claim for fire loss that resulted in
the total destruction of their home, accusing the Simmonses of arson. The
jury found, among other things, that State Farm breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing and awarded $75,000 as contract benefits, $200,000 for
mental anguish, and $2 million for punitive damages. The trial court en-
tered judgment based on the jury's verdict and State Farm appealed. The
court of appeals affirmed.50 2
State Farm, relying on Polasek, argued that there was neither factually
nor legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that there was no
reasonable basis for State Farm's decision to deny the Simmonses' claim.
The court, however, held that Polasek is an abrupt substantive departure
from present law as it eliminates the "should have known" requirement50 3
under Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America.5° 4 In Aranda, the court
held that to prove breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, an in-
sured must show: "(1) the absence of a reasonable basis for denying or de-
laying payment of the benefits of the policy and (2) that the carrier knew or
should have known that there was a reasonable basis for denying the claim
or delaying payment of the claim." 50 5
The first element of this test requires an objective determination of
whether a reasonable insurer, under similar circumstances, would have
delayed or denied the claimant's benefits. Thus, the court imposed the duty
on an insurer to that degree of care and diligence, which a man of ordinary
care and prudence would exercise in the management of his own business.5 0 6
The Simmons court felt that Polasek abrogated the common law cause of
action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing because it re-
moved the question of good faith and fair dealing from the fact-finding pro-
cess and looked only at the insurer's evidence, rather than the insured's.50 7
The court felt that the determination of reasonable basis for denial of a claim
is a fact question and that the Polasek court left this matter solely to the
498. Id., slip op. at 8.
499. Id.
500. 857 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
501. 857 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), judgment set aside, 863 S.W.2d
462 (Tex. 1993).
502. Simmons, 857 S.W.2d at 143.
503. Id. at 134.
504. 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1988).
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Simmons, 857 S.W.2d at 134.
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insurers. 50 8 Thus, according to the court, Polasek is not only a dangerous,
but a frightening, precedent. 50 9 The court also wrote that the focus of Pola-
sek on the mind-set of State Farm as to the issue of reasonableness, destroys
the special relationship of loyalty owed by an insurer to its policyholders. 51 0
The duty of good faith and fair dealing, according to the court, is the stop-
gap that bridges the disparity of bargaining power and exclusive control that
an insurer has and exercises over claim processing. 511 If Polasek is correct,
wrote the court, "[t]he entire matter regarding claims investigation now be-
gins and ends with the insurer. ' 512 The court thus concluded that the far
better inquiry in bad faith actions is, "Did the insurer fulfill its duty to its
insured by pursuing a thorough, systematic, objective, fair, and honest inves-
tigation of the claim prior to the denying such claim?' 5 1 3
With all of this in mind, the court then reviewed the evidence presented by
both the Simmonses and State Farm and concluded that the jury had suffi-
cient evidence to find that State Farm did not use the degree of care and
diligence that a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in the manage-
ment of his own business in denying the Simmons' claim. The evidence
showed that on June 2, 1985, at approximately 2:00 a.m. the Simmonses left
their house for Louisiana. A short time later, Irene Lawrence, whose news-
paper delivery route took her by the Simmons' home, spotted smoke. Law-
rence borrowed a neighbor's phone and quickly alerted the fire department.
Within minutes, the volunteer fire department arrived on the scene and be-
gan attacking the fire. Unfortunately, by the time the firemen arrived, much
of the roof was already engulfed in flames and the firefighters were unable to
save the house. The Simmonses returned to their home in the early evening
of June 2, 1985 and discovered that their home and all of their possessions
had been destroyed by the fire. The following day the Simmonses reported
the fire to State Farm. The evidence showed that they cooperated fully with
State Farm in its investigation, which included the authorization of State
Farm to obtain all of the financial information it might desire.
The Simmonses contended that unknown to them, State Farm from the
inception decided to investigate them, and set out within a few days of the
investigation to establish that they were responsible for the fire. At the con-
clusion of State Farm's investigation, it decided that the Simmonses were
responsible for the fire, although it had no direct evidence of their involve-
ment. State Farm concluded that the fire was incendiary, that the Sim-
monses had opportunity to set the fire, and that they had motive to set the
fire. From the beginning of its investigation, State Farm viewed the fire as
suspicious because of a recent burglary to the Simmons' home. Thus, the
Simmons' claim was referred to State Farm's special investigative unit (SIU),
which operated as a special arson and fraud unit.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 135.
510. Id. at 135-36.





State Farm, when it took the recorded statement of Mr. Simmons, learned
that he was behind in his mortgage but had worked out a repayment agree-
ment with the Veteran's Administration that involved weekly payments in
lieu of a monthly obligation. Mr. Simmons further informed State Farm
that he was not current on those payments. According to State Farm, this
was the motive for the Simmonses to burn their house. However, the total
arrearage on the mortgage payments was not as great as State Farm had
originally thought since the information it received from the Veteran's Ad-
ministration was erroneous. Even after State Farm learned that the informa-
tion was incorrect, it did not change State Farm's position about motive.
The evidence also revealed that State Farm, about one month after the
fire, learned that someone had confessed to burglarizing the Simmons' home.
However, State Farm never contacted or interviewed the suspects regarding
their whereabouts at the time of the fire. State Farm did not investigate the
police criminal files on those individuals either. The reason given by State
Farm for not following through with an investigation of the suspects was
that it felt the suspects would not tell them anything. There was also evi-
dence that Mr. Simmons had a confrontation with one of the suspects who
burglarized his home, yet State Farm made no contact whatsoever with this
person. The jury also heard evidence that State Farm knew that even if the
policy proceeds had been paid and applied to the mortgage, there would still
have been a remaining mortgage balance. There was also evidence that the
fire was not incendiary in nature but may have been caused by unrepaired
electrical problems in the den. State Farm, however, did not fully investi-
gate this matter. In light of all of this evidence, the court concluded that the
jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that State Farm did not have a rea-
sonable basis for denying the Simmons' claim.514
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Crowe, the other case to explicitly
criticize Polasek, John Crowe suffered a heart attack while installing a water
heater at a job site and died later that day. Mr. Crowe's wife and son made a
claim for workers' compensation death benefits to Nationwide, the workers'
compensation carrier. Nationwide denied the claim contending that there
was no evidence that Mr. Crowe's death was in the course of his employ-
ment. The Crowes then brought suit against Nationwide alleging negligence
and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in failing to pay the
workers' compensation death benefits. The jury found in favor of the
Crowes and awarded each $10,000 in actual damages. The jury also found
that Nationwide acted with conscious indifference and awarded each of the
Crowes $500,000 in punitive damages. The court of appeals affirmed. 51 5
Nationwide first argued that there was no breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, as a matter of law, because the Industrial Accident Board
(IAB) also determined that Mr. Crowe's death was not in the course of em-
ployment and thus, denied the claim. Nationwide, therefore, argued that its
denial of the claim was reasonable. Nationwide also argued that Mr.
514. Id. at 137-38.
515. Crowe, 857 S.W.2d at 647 (judgment set aside).
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Crowe's death certificate, which did not state that his death was in the
course of employment, was a reasonable basis for denying the claim, as a
matter of law. The court held that a dispute about whether there is any
reasonable basis to support the denial of a claim is an issue for the jury, and
must be judged by the facts before the insurer at the time the claim is de-
nied. 516 In reaching this decision, the court disapproved of the holding in
Polasek to the extent that it implies that anything less than an objectively
reasonable basis to deny a claim would conflict with the Aranda standard. 517
The court, therefore, held that the probative value of the hearing examiner's
determination was limited because it was made after Nationwide had denied
the claim. 518 Thus, the only facts before Nationwide when it denied the
claim were those contained in the death certificate, which listed the immedi-
ate cause of death as massive myocardial infarction due to severe coronary
artery disease. Because there was evidence that it was not proper procedure
to deny a claim based solely on information in the death certificate, the court
held that there was a fact question to be submitted to the jury regarding
Nationwide's alleged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 519
The supreme court had the opportunity to resolve the differences in Pola-
sek and Simmons by granting an application for writ of error in either case,
but in both cases the application for writ of error was denied. The court,
instead, used Lyons v. Millers Casualty Insurance Co. 520 to write on this is-
sue. However, as will be seen, the court did not provide clear direction re-
garding the standard by which to judge bad faith. Lyons alleged that her
home was damaged in a windstorm. The insurer sent an adjuster and two
different experts, all of whom concluded the damage was from settling and
cracking, which were excluded causes. The jury found that the insurer acted
in bad faith and committed a false, misleading, or deceptive act by denying
the claim. The jury found that 75% of the damage was the result of settling
and cracking, but 25% was a covered loss caused by the windstorm. The
jury awarded $25,000 as cost of repairs, $75,000 in other actual damages,
and $8,700 as additional damages under DTPA § 17.50(b)(1). The court of
appeals found no evidence to support the jury finding that the insurer
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The supreme court af-
firmed. 521 The first issue addressed by the court was the method by which
Texas courts should conduct legal sufficiency review of fact findings of bad
faith against an insurer.522 The court noted that to prove breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing, the insured must prove that there is no reason-
able basis to deny the claim and the insurance company knew, or should
have known, that there was no reasonable basis. 523 After stating the tradi-
516. Id. at 648.
517. Id. at 648-49 n.1.
518. Id. at 649.
519. Id.
520. 866 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1993).
521. Id. at 602.




tional standard for a no-evidence review, the court held in the bad faith con-
text, the "focus should be on the relationship of the evidence arguably
supporting the bad faith finding to the elements of bad faith. '5 24 The court
continued by saying:
The evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the pre-
vailing party, must be such as to permit the logical inference that the
insurer had no reasonable basis to delay or deny payment of the claim,
and that it knew or should have known it had no reasonable basis for its
action. 525
The court further determined that the evidence must relate to the tort issue
of no reasonable basis, not just to the contract issue of coverage.5 26
The court noted that the evidence offered by Lyons to prove Millers' bad
faith included an expert's opinion that the wind caused the damage, and the
testimony of Lyons and her neighbors that the house was visibly damaged
after the storm. The court viewed this evidence as supporting contractual
liability, but did not consider it in connection with the bad faith claim. 527
Instead, the court found that "Lyons offered no evidence that the reports of
Millers' experts were not objectively prepared, or that Millers' reliance on
them was unreasonable, or any other evidence that showed that Millers ac-
ted without a reasonable basis."' 528 According to the court, the insurer will
not be liable for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing if it reason-
ably relied on expert reports which indicate that the loss incurred was not a
covered risk, even though liability on the policy is ultimately established. 529
Justice Doggett, joined by Justices Gammage and Hightower, dissented ac-
cusing the majority of engaging in a factual sufficiency review of the evi-
dence, which is prohibited by the Texas Constitution.5 30 According to the
dissent, under a legal sufficiency review, the court "must consider only the
evidence and inferences tending to support the jury's finding, viewed most
favorably in support of the finding, and disregard all contrary evidence and
inferences. '53'I The majority, said Justice Doggett, discounted Lyons' expert
witness, thereby evaluating "the credibility, sufficiency, and weight of Mill-
ers' experts in order to find that their investigation was serious, adequate and
factually constituted a reasonable basis for the denial of the claim. ' 532 As
such, the court engaged in a factual sufficiency review not a legal sufficiency
review. The dissent next recounted the evidence that would support the
jury's verdict and questioned why the majority chose to ignore such evi-
dence.5 33 Lyons and her neighbors testified about the damage to the home
524. Id.
525. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 600.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 601.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 602 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
531. Id. (Doggett, J. dissenting) (quoting Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456,
458 (Tex. 1992)).
532. Id. at 604 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
533. Id. (Doggett, J., dissenting).
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immediately after the windstorm. There was also expert testimony that the
wind had caused the damage to the home. Additionally, there was evidence
that Millers initially denied Lyons claim within a month of its receipt based
solely on a three sentence "report;" its claims adjuster refused to talk to
Lyons, even to the point of hanging up when she called with inquiries; and
its investigators consciously chose not to interview any independent eyewit-
nesses until Lyons, almost two years after making her claim, filed suit.534
Even after mentioning all this evidence, the dissent wrote that the court
should not be engaged in a review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence as
that is beyond the constitutional grant of jurisdiction. 535 According to Jus-
tice Doggett, the majority substituted its preference for the jury's verdict
thereby eroding the constitutional right to trial by jury.53 6
a. Other Cases Reviewing Insurer's Alleged Bad Faith
Most courts have not engaged in the Polasek/Simmons debate, but seem
to have adopted one of these two conflicting views concerning the standard
by which to determine whether an insurer acted in bad faith.
i. Courts Finding Bad Faith
Southern Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Alfaro,537 a case decided by a
different panel of the San Antonio Court of Appeals, while not mentioning
Polasek, rejected its approach by upholding the jury's finding of insurer's
lack of good faith in light of conflicting evidence on this issue.53
Tony Alfaro was shot and killed by Castillo. Tony was the named insured
in a $10,000 term life insurance policy issued by Southern Life & Health
Insurance Company (SL&H). The policy had a $10,000 accidental indem-
nity rider. Antonio Alfaro, Tony's uncle and primary beneficiary, was paid
the $10,000 face amount, but was denied the accidental double indemnity
claim because according to SL&H, Tony's death resulted directly, or indi-
rectly, from the commission of, or attempted commission of, an assault or
felony. Antonio sued SL&H claiming violations of the Texas Insurance
Code. The jury awarded Antonio the double indemnity accidental death
benefit, additional damages, and attorney's fees.
SL&H argued that there was no evidence that it did not attempt a good
faith settlement after liability had become reasonably clear because a bona
fide controversy is sufficient reason for an insurer not to pay a claim. In
deciding whether SL&H acted in good faith to affect a prompt, fair, and
equitable settlement of the claim, the court looked at all of the evidence
presented to the jury, which the court admitted was conflicting. 539 The
court found that there was some evidence that Tony was not attempting to
534. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 604 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
535. Id. at 605 (Doggett, J. dissenting).
536. Id. (Doggett, J., dissenting).
537. No. 04-91-00470-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Feb. 26, 1993, n.w.h.).




commit an assault or any other felony at the time Castillo shot him.5 40 Fur-
thermore, there was evidence that SL&H did not conduct a thorough inves-
tigation of the claim, as it did not interview two women who were present at
the murder scene and did not review Castillo's written confession until three
months after the claim was denied. Additionally, the jury was presented
with evidence that SL&H postponed its decision regarding the claim until
the end of Castillo's trial. In light of all of this evidence, the court held that
the jury's finding was not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of evi-
dence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. 54'
Recovery was also permitted in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Price,542 even though there was some evidence supporting State Farm's posi-
tion. Price made a claim under his homeowners policy issued by State Farm
for damage to his house. After the initial inspection of the damages, a claims
adjuster for State Farm told Price the claim would be paid because the
plumber determined that the damage was caused by a plumbing break. State
Farm then had an engineer inspect the house. Based on this inspection,
State Farm determined that the damage was caused by the settling of the
house over a period of years, and the claim was denied. The policy coverage
excluded loss caused by settling, cracking, bulging, shrinkage, or expansion
of foundations, walls, and floors except when caused by accidental air dis-
charge, breakage or overflow of water or steam within a plumbing, heating,
or air conditioning system.
The jury found that the damage to the house was caused by accidental
discharge, breakage, or overflow of water from within a plumbing, heating,
or air conditioning system, and that State Farm breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing. The jury found actual damages of $102,500 and the
trial court awarded additional damages of $205,000.
On appeal, State Farm argued that the evidence was not sufficient to sup-
port the jury's finding of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The court held that, in determining whether the evidence was legally suffi-
cient to support the jury's verdict, it could "consider only the evidence and
reasonable inferences which, when viewed in their most favorable light, sup-
port[ed] the findings and [should] disregard all evidence and inferences to
the contrary of the fact finding. ' 54 3 State Farm argued, relying on St. Paul
Guardian Insurance Co. v. Luker,5 " that its denial of Price's claim was in
good faith because the denial was based on information available at the time
of the denial. Such information included an analysis done by an engineer
hired by State Farm that showed that the damages were not caused by a leak
in the water lines, but by the soil being improperly prepared for the con-
struction, by the slab being too thin, and by the seasonal changes and mois-
ture content in the soil. The court held, however, that whether there was a
540. Id.
541. Id., slip op. at 13.
542. 845 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ dism'd).
543. Id. at 436.
544. 801 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
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reasonable basis for the denial of the claim, was a question for the jury to
resolve.5 4 5 After considering all the evidence, some of which supported the
position of Price and some of which supported State Farm, the court was
"unable to say that the jury's responses [were] so contrary to the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. ' 54 6 The court,
therefore, determined that it could not set aside the jury's verdict merely
because a different conclusion could have been drawn from the evidence.
547
In State Farm Lloyds v. Mower 548 Mower's home was involved in a seri-
ous fire. Mower had homeowner's insurance with State Farm that had a
face value of $175,000 for dwelling. First Federal, the mortgagee, was a loss
payee on the policy. After the fire, State Farm, based on the recommenda-
tion of an independent adjuster, set the reserve for Mower's claim at
$175,000. Soon after the fire, Mower requested bids to rebuild his home
from Hudnell, the original builder, and Stewart, a contractor specializing in
reconstruction of fire damaged homes. Hudnell submitted a bid of $88,000,
and Stewart bid about $86,000 to totally reconstruct the home, but Hudnell
would not guarantee the slab. Both estimates stated that the slab and garage
remnants would be used in the reconstruction. Based on these bids, State
Farm concluded that the loss was not total and offered to pay Mower
$90,000. Mower rejected this offer and submitted a counter-offer of
$104,000, which was the pay-off of the mortgage, which had been acceler-
ated because Mower had stopped making mortgage payments after the fire.
After Mower rejected State Farm's offer, State Farm notified First Federal
that it was offering $90,000 to pay the claim. First Federal informed Mower
that it intended to exercise its rights under the deed of trust to accept State
Farm's offer. Mower objected.
State Farm then filed an interpleader action to request instruction from
the court as to whom it should pay. Mower sued State Farm claiming that it
had breached its contract by not paying total loss benefits, and that it
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court ordered
separate trials on these issues. On the contract claim, the jury determined
that the house was a total loss. At the second trial, the jury determined that
State Farm breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by not paying
total loss benefits. The jury thus awarded Mower $50,000 for mental
anguish and $5 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded.5 49
State Farm argued that there was no evidence to support the jury's finding
that it breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court held there
was some evidence to raise an issue of whether State Farm had a reasonable
basis to deny the total loss claim, however, the court determined that the
trial court committed reversible error by excluding evidence that State Farm
545. Price, 845 S.W.2d at 437.
546. Id. at 438.
547. Id.




had in its possession, at the time it determined the home was not a total loss,
the bids from two experts that showed the home could be rebuilt for less
than the policy limits, and that both the slab and the garage were usable
remnants and would be used for rebuilding.550 According to the court, the
plaintiff in a bad faith case must prove that the insurer had no reasonable
basis for denying the claim or delaying payments, or that it failed to deter-
mine whether there was any reasonable basis for denying or delaying pay-
ment. 55' From this, the court determined that a plaintiff must prove that
there were no facts before the insurer which, if believed, would justify the
denial of the claim.552 Thus, the court held that the evidence State Farm
was prevented from offering to the jury was central to the issue of whether
State Farm had a reasonable basis for denying payment for total loss under
the policy. 553 The court, therefore, reversed the judgment based on a breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
ii. Courts Finding No Bad Faith
In Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 554 Dixon brought suit against
State Farm to recover contractual damages and damages for breach of the
common law duty of good faith and fair dealing due to the manner in which
her insurance claim was resolved. Dixon filed a claim with State Farm, her
insurer, after her house burned down. State Farm refused to pay the claim,
contending that she had paid someone to set the fire. Dixon filed suit upon
State Farm's refusal to pay her claim. State Farm moved for a partial sum-
mary judgment on the allegation of breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Dixon filed no opposition to this motion. The court held that State
Farm had properly met the burden of showing no genuine issue of material
fact, and that it was entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of
law. 555
The court held that under Texas law, insurance policies are to be liberally
construed in favor of the insured.55 6 An insurer may violate its duty of good
faith and fair dealing by failing to promptly pay a claim when its liability
becomes clear. The court stated that to prevail on such a cause of action,
"the insured must establish (1) the absence of a reasonable basis for denying
or delaying payment of the claim and (2) that the insurer knew, or should
have known, that there existed no reasonable basis for the denying or delay-
ing payment of the claim."'5 57 The court reasoned that in defending against
an action for breach of good faith and fair dealing, the insurer "need only
show that it had a reasonable basis for believing the [insured] was at
550. Id., slip op. at 11.
551. Id., slip op. at 10.
552. Id.
553. Id., slip op. at 11.
554. 799 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Tex. 1992).





fault."558 An insurer need not establish fault to a legal certainty, and need
only demonstrate a reasonable basis for attributing fault to the insured.5 59
According to the court, State Farm's uncontroverted evidence included: re-
corded admissions of Dixon, detection of flammable liquids at the scene, the
statement of an occupant of Dixon's house, a fire scene examination con-
cluding that the fire was the result of an incendiary act with the burn pattern
denoting deliberateness, and a committee report establishing motive and op-
portunity. Thus, State Farm met its burden. 56°
The Fifth Circuit reversed a judgment in favor of the insured based on
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in Thrash v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. 561 Thrash sued State Farm for, inter alia, breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing as a result of State Farm's refusal to pay for the
loss to his home caused by fire. State Farm denied the claim, accusing
Thrash of arson. The jury found that Thrash did not commit arson and
State Farm breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. Focusing only
on the evidence State Farm offered to support its denial of the claim, the
court concluded that "no reasonable juror could have concluded that State
Farm lacked a reasonable basis for believing that Thrash was responsible for
the fire. . .562
2. Comparative Bad Faith
Many attorneys representing insurance companies have begun to advance
the argument that the insured owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to
the insurer in an effort to submit comparative fault in a bad faith case.
While no reported case has accepted such a notion, a couple of the justices
on the San Antonio court have indicated their willingness to adopt this prin-
ciple.563 In Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. Soriano,564 Soriano, while driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol, attempted to pass a truck and collided
head-on with a vehicle driven by Medina. Soriano's friend, Lopez, was in
the car with him and was fatally injured as a result of the collision. In the
car with Mr. Medina were his wife and two children. The collision killed
Mrs. Medina, seriously injured Mr. Medina, and injured the two children.
Soriano was insured under his parent's policy with Farmers, which pro-
vided only the minimum coverage of $10,000 per person with the aggregate
not to exceed $20,000. Farmers initially attempted to settle the entire case
directly with the Medinas by tendering the policy limits of $20,000. The
Medinas refused this offer and hired an attorney to discover whether or not
Soriano possessed any personal assets. Eventually the parents of Lopez also
558. Id. (quoting Plattenburg v. Allstate Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1990)).
559. Id.
560. Id. at 695.
561. 992 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1993).
562. Id. at 1358.
563. Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 844 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992,
writ granted). (Decision en banc. Opinion by Justice Chapa; concurring opinions by Chief




hired an attorney and filed suit. Farmers hired Fred Auforth to defend Sori-
ano in both lawsuits, which were consolidated for trial. Before trial, Farm-
ers settled the Lopez claim for $5,000 and offered the remaining $15,000 of
insurance to the Medinas. The Medinas refused the offer and demanded the
full original policy limits of $20,000. The case went to trial and the Medinas
recovered a judgment of $172,187 plus interest against Soriano. Soriano
then assigned whatever rights he had against Farmers in exchange for a cov-
enant not to execute. Suit was then filed in Soriano's name against Farmers,
wherein various causes of action were alleged, including negligence, gross
negligence, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Farmers
sought contribution or indemnity from the law firm of Auforth, Keas &
O'Reilly, which had represented Soriano in the underlying lawsuits. The
jury found that Farmers was negligent and grossly negligent in handling the
Medina claims, and that it had breached its duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing to Soriano. Based on the jury verdict, the trial court rendered judgment
against Farmers for $520,577.24 in actual damages and prejudgment inter-
est, plus $5 million in exemplary damages. The trial court also ordered a
take-nothing judgment on Farmers' third-party action against Auforth,
Keas & O'Reilly. The court of appeals conditionally affirmed as reformed
on a condition of remittitur of exemplary damages.5 65
Farmers first argued that, in this multiple-claimant case, it could not be
liable in negligence or for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing because Soriano did not obtain a finding that the Lopez settlement, when
viewed by itself, was negligent or in bad faith. The court rejected this piece-
meal approach, and held that in determining whether an insurer has
breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the factfinder should con-
sider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the occurrence.166 This
would necessarily include the relationship between the insured and the in-
surer and all claims arising from the incident. 567 The court held that in
multiple claims cases, if the factfinder considers whether the settlement of
one claim was reasonable, viewed by itself and without regard to the other
unsettled claims, this would relieve the insurer of any responsibility to pro-
tect the insured as long as it could be said that the payment of one of the
claims was reasonable. 568 Therefore, the reasonableness of the insurer's han-
dling of the claim must be evaluated in light of all claims arising out of the
incident. 569
Justice Biery agreed with the majority that a fact finder should consider
all the relevant factors and relationships in deciding whether the duty of
good faith and fair dealing had been breached.5 7 0 Justice Biery noted that
comparative bad faith is but the logical extension of this notion.5 7 '
565. Id. at 831.
566. Id. at 817.
567. Id.
568. Id. at 816.
569. Id.
570. Id. at 832 (Biery, J. , concurring).
571. Soriano, 844 S.W.2d at 832 n.2 (Biery, J., concurring).
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Justice Peeples dissented, stating that each claim should be viewed inde-
pendently from any other claims arising out of the incident.5 72 Thus, since it
could not be said that Farmers was unreasonable in paying $5,000 on the
Lopez claim, when viewed by itself, Justice Peeples thought that Farmers
did not act in bad faith when it offered the remaining $15,000 under the
policy to Medina. 573 Thus, Justice Peeples would hold that an insurer could
settle with some claimants in good faith even though the settlement may
exhaust the insurance fund, or deplete it so that a subsequent judgment cred-
itor would be unable to collect his judgment in full from the remaining insur-
ance coverage. 574
Justice Butts also dissented and suggested that the duty of good faith and
fair dealing be applied to both the insurer and insured. 575 According to Jus-
tice Butts, the evidence in this case of the insured's lack of good faith was
that he was solely responsible for the accident causing the deaths and inju-
ries and had only minimum insurance coverage.5 76
The suggestion by Justices Biery and Butts, which Justice Chapa seemed
to agree with, that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a "two-way
street" and should extend to the insured as well as the insurer misappre-
hends the basis of the duty in Texas. Justices Biery and Butts cite with
approval an article by James Walker 577 that it is based almost solely on Cali-
fornia law, which is very different from Texas law.
In Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co. ,578 the court noted that
under California law, there is "an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure
the rights of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement., 579 The court
extended this general rule to contracts of insurance and held that there is an
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the insurer to
settle claims in a reasonable manner. 580
Texas law, however, does not recognize a two-way implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in every contract. In fact, in English v. Fischer,
the court expressly refused to adopt this "novel theory of law enunciated
only by California courts." 581 Justice Spears' concurrence in English v.
Fischer agreed there was no implied, two-way covenant, but noted that
Texas law does recognize a duty of good faith and fair dealing in certain
special relationships, including insurance. 582
Approximately three years after deciding English v. Fischer, the court held
572. Id. at 839 (Peeples, J., dissenting).
573. Id. at 844 (Peeples, J., dissenting).
574. Id. at 843 (Peeples, J., dissenting).
575. Id. (Butts, J., dissenting).
576. Id. at 821 (Butts, J., dissenting).
577. James W. Walker, Comparative Bad Faith-Its Time Has Come in Texas, 55 TEx.
B.J. 792 (1992).
578. 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198-200 (1958).
579. Id. at 198-200 (emphasis added).
580. Id. at 201.
581. 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).
582. Id. at 524.
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that an insurer owes a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing to its
insured. 583 In so doing, the court once again stated that it was refusing to
impose an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.584 Instead, the
court explained that because of the special relationship between the insurer
and insured, the insurer owed the insured a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing. 585 The court further explained that a special relationship exists because
the parties have unequal bargaining power and the insurer has exclusive con-
trol over the evaluation, processing, and denial of claims.5 86 Without such a
duty, the insurer would be able to "arbitrarily deny coverage and delay pay-
ment of a claim with no more penalty than interest on the amount owed. '587
Thus, it is clear that under Texas law the duty is imposed only on the
insurer because of the insurer's superior bargaining power and exclusive con-
trol over the handling and paying of the claim. Since the insured, by defini-
tion, has inferior bargaining power and lacks control over the decision to pay
claims, he owes no duty of good faith to the insurer.
Moreover, the refusal to adopt a doctrine of comparative bad faith will not
prevent an insurer from offering evidence that its denial or delay in payment
was reasonable because of some conduct of the insured, such as the failure to
cooperate or submit the necessary information to process the claim. But
how could the fact that the insured caused an accident (for which insurance
was purchased) or that not enough insurance was obtained serve as an ex-
cuse for the insurer's unreasonable denial or delay. Yet this is exactly what
the dissenters find Mr. Soriano guilty of.
C. RELATIONSHIP OF COVERAGE TO BREACH OF DUTY
Because the duty of good faith and fair dealing is imposed as a result of a
special relationship between the insurer and the insured and does not ema-
nate from the terms of the insurance contract, a breach of this duty gives rise
to an action in tort that is separate from a breach of contract action. 588
Thus, it is possible for an insurer to breach its duty of good faith and fair
dealing even though there is no coverage under the policy.58 9 However, in
most cases, an insurer will be able to show that it had a reasonable basis for
denying the claim if there is no coverage under the policy, as is seen by the
following cases.
As seen above, the court in Charter Roofing Co. v. Tri-State Insurance
Co. 590 affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the insurer holding that a
general liability insurer does not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to
its policyholder. 59' The court also concluded that even if Tri-State did owe





588. Viles v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990).
589. First Texas Sav. Ass'n v. Reliance Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 1171, 1179 (5th Cir. 1992).
590. 841 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
591. Id. at 904.
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Charter a duty of good faith and fair dealing, the summary judgment evi-
dence established, as a matter of law, that Tri-State conducted a reasonable
investigation and had a reasonable basis for denying the claim.592 The evi-
dence showed that the claims adjuster spoke with a representative of Charter
and with the subcontractor as well as investigating the scene. The adjuster
found that the work was not supervised by Charter and recommended that
the claim be denied because the policy excluded coverage for damage not
caused by property in the care, custody, and control of Charter. Charter's
controverting evidence was an affidavit by its president stating that Tri-State
unfairly failed and refused to pay the claim; failed to investigate the claim;
and did not attempt, in good faith, to settle the claim. The court held that
these statements were opinions and conclusions and were therefore incompe-
tent summary judgment proof.593 Because the court felt that Charter did
not raise a fact issue as to Tri-State's lack of good faith, it held that the
summary judgment was proper.594
In Martinka v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.595 the court
found that a title insurer did not breach its duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing. 596 Martinka purchased title insurance from Commonwealth at the time
he purchased a condominium from Minns. Several years later when at-
tempting to refinance his mortgage, Martinka discovered that Piotrowski, in
seeking a divorce from Minns, had filed a lis pendens on the property on the
day Martinka purchased the property. Martinka requested that Common-
wealth defend his title. Martinka then intervened in the divorce proceeding,
naming Commonwealth as another defendant. The divorce action, however,
had been previously abated. Two years later the abatement was lifted and
within a few months Commonwealth obtained a summary judgment denying
Piotrowski her claim to the property. Martinka's claims against Common-
wealth were then transferred out of the divorce proceeding and a summary
judgment rendered in favor of Commonwealth.
On appeal, Martinka argued that trial court erred in granting the sum-
mary judgment on his claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Martinka had alleged that Commonwealth unreasonably delayed in
responding to his request to either defend his title or pay under the policy,
preventing him from refinancing and eventually losing the property. The
court of appeals held that Martinka's allegations did not support a bad faith
claim.597 According to the court, Martinka had to show that Common-
wealth had no reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of a
claim. 598 Commonwealth, however, was never obligated to pay under the
592. Id. at 906. This may explain the reason for the supreme court denying Charter Roof-
ing's application for writ of error since the court of appeals was clearly wrong in holding that a




595. 836 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).





title policy because it had successfully defended Martinka's title.599
In Redwine v. AAA Life Insurance Co. 6w Redwine's mother bought her a
travel accident insurance policy from AAA based on the representation by
an AAA employee that the policy would cover any injuries sustained in a
serious travel accident. After Redwine suffered a spinal cord injury and in-
complete paralysis of her lower limbs in a car accident a claim was submit-
ted to AAA. AAA, however, denied the claim because the policy provided
coverage only in the event of death, loss of limb, or loss of sight. Redwine
contended that "loss of limb", a term not defined in the advertisement sent
to her mother, included loss of use. AAA showed, however, that the certifi-
cate of insurance defined "loss of limb" as "severance at or above the wrist
or ankle joint."
The trial court, at the close of Redwine's case, granted a directed verdict
that there was no coverage under the policy and that AAA did not breach its
duty of good faith and fair dealing. In its charge to the jury on the remain-
ing causes of action, the trial court instructed the jury that AAA did not
breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing and that there was no coverage.
The jury resolved all remaining issues in AAA's favor.
Redwine appealed, arguing that the trial court's instructions amounted to
a comment on the weight of the evidence. The court of appeals agreed find-
ing that the jury did not need to be instructed on these matters decided as a
matter of law because the instructions did not clarify any of the remaining
issues.601 According to the court, the instructions served only to suggest to
the jurors that the trial court viewed AAA's case favorably and that they
should resolve the remaining causes of action in AAA's favor as well.60 2
Thus, while affirming the directed verdict, the court reversed and remanded
for new trial the remaining causes of action. 60 3
In Bartlett v. American Republic Insurance Co.604 the insurer denied a
claim for benefits relating to a radical mastectomy and radiation and chemo-
therapy treatment received by Carolyn Bartlett. Additionally, American
Republic rescinded the policy which covered the entire Bartlett family. The
denial of the claim was based on the pre-existing nature of Carolyn's illness,
while the policy was rescinded because of alleged misrepresentations on the
policy application. The Bartletts filed suit against American Republic for
breach of contract, a 12% penalty under article 3.62 of the Insurance Code,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the
DTPA and article 21.21. The trial court granted American Republic's mo-
tion for summary judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment against
the Bartletts.
The Bartletts argued that the summary judgment on their breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing claim was improper. The court, having
599. Id.
600. 852 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
601. Id. at 16.
602. Id.
603. Id. at 17.
604. 845 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
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found that Carolyn's condition fell within the policy's exclusion from cover-
age of preexisting conditions, held that American Republic established a
valid basis for denying the Bartletts' claim.6 5 Thus, American Republic
negated an element of the Bartletts' claim for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing based on its denial of the claim, making the summary
judgment proper in this case. 6° 6
The Bartletts next argued that since American Republic's motion ad-
dressed only their cause of action for refusal to pay a claim and did not
address their claim for wrongful rescission of the policy, the trial court
should not have granted a summary judgment on all of their claims. The
Bartletts argued that regardless of whether American Republic had an obli-
gation to pay the claim submitted, a question remained concerning Ameri-
can Republic's authority to cancel the policy and refuse coverage for any
other ailment. The court of appeals agreed, and remanded to the trial court
the Bartletts' claims for wrongful rescission. 60 7
In McCracken v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 60 8 the court held that
an insurer does not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing where both
insured and insurer present reasonable interpretations of a policy term and
the insurer seeks a declaratory judgment prior to denying coverage. 60 9
While driving his stepfather's power boat, McCracken was involved in an
accident in which he ran over and killed his friend, Doug Swafford, who had
been water skiing behind the boat. Williams, the stepfather, had watercraft
insurance through State Farm and an umbrella policy through United States
Fire. The umbrella policy provided coverage for watercraft liability in ex-
cess of the $100,000 limit of Williams' underlying State Farm insurance pol-
icy. The United States Fire policy in question defined "insured" as, "... (c)
any other person under the age of 21 in the care of any insured. .". 60 In
contrast, the State Farm policy defined "insured" as "any person using the
power boat with Williams' permission. '6 1
Following the accident, the Swafford family filed a wrongful death and
survival statute lawsuit against McCracken and Williams. However, United
States Fire notified McCracken that he was not covered under Williams'
umbrella policy because he did not fit the policy's definition of an "insured."
United States Fire then filed a declaratory judgment action concerning cov-
erage under the policy. After a trial on the merits, the court found (1) the
umbrella policy's definition of "insured" to be ambiguous; and (2) Mc-
Cracken was an "insured" under the policy because such ambiguities must
be resolved in favor of recovery for the insured. The Swafford's eventually
agreed to a $550,000 settlement, $350,000 of which was paid by United
States Fire.
605. Id. at 348.
606. Id. at 348-49.
607. Id. at 349.
608. 802 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
609. Id. at 37.




McCracken then filed this lawsuit against U.S. Fire for violations of the
Insurance Code and DTPA, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. McCracken sought to recover past and pending attorney's fees as
well as damages for emotional distress. United States Fire moved for sum-
mary judgment on McCracken's claims of misrepresentation, failure to de-
fend, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court
granted this motion.612 The court, when considering McCracken's cause of
action for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing stated that to
prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must show: "(1) the absence of a rea-
sonable basis for denying or delaying the payment of policy benefits and (2)
that the insurer knew or should have known that there was no reasonable
basis for denying the claim or delaying payment. '6 13
The court determined that no reasonable juror would conclude that U.S.
Fire breached this duty because coverage of a stepchild had not been consid-
ered by a Texas court and that the court, in the initial lawsuit, determined
that both parties presented reasonable interpretations of the definition of "in-
sured."16 14 Moreover, United States Fire brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion to confirm its position before denying coverage.
The court wrongly concluded that United States Fire did not breach its
duty of good faith and fair dealing. The reason why coverage was deter-
mined to exist in the first declaratory judgment action was because when an
insurance policy is ambiguous, that is, it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation, the court must construe the policy in favor of the
insured. 6 15 This rule of contract construction has long been utilized by
Texas courts in construing insurance policies. 6 16 Thus, insurers know, or
should know, of this legal principle favoring coverage. Accordingly, it is
difficult to conclude that, as a matter of law, an insurer acted reasonably and
in good faith by insisting on a contract interpretation denying coverage when
the insured has offered a reasonable interpretation providing coverage. This
fact issue should be left for a jury to resolve. 6 17
D. LIMITATIONS
In Davis v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 6 18 Davis suffered an injury on
September 18, 1984, while working for Allright Parking. He filed a claim
with Aetna for benefits and medical expenses under the Worker's Compen-
sation Act. On January 7, 1986, Aetna denied Davis' claim. On September
28, 1987, the Industrial Accident Board awarded Davis benefits under the
612. Id. at 39.
613. Id. at 36, (citing Automobile Ins. Co. v. Davila, 805 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied)).
614. Id. at 37.
615. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Reed, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1315 (Sept. 29, 1993);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991).
616. See Brown v. Palatine, 89 Tex. 590, 25 S.W. 1060, 1060 (1896).
617. See Philip K. Maxwell, The "Bona Fide Dispute" Defense in Bad Faith Litigation:
Second Guessing the Jury, 11 Texas Consumer Law Reporter 123.
618. 843 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
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Act. Aetna appealed. In a deposition taken during preparation for the trial
of the worker's compensation appeal, Dr. Criswell testified that Davis' injury
had aggravated a preexisting condition and had left him totally and perma-
nently disabled. The case subsequently went to trial, and the jury found for
Davis. On March 9, 1990, Davis filed this breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing suit against Aetna. The trial court granted a summary judg-
ment in favor of Aetna finding that his suit was barred by the statute of
limitations. The court of appeals affirmed.6 19
The court noted that a suit for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing must be filed within two years after the insurer denies coverage.
620
Aetna denied coverage on January 7, 1986, but the suit was not filed until
March 9, 1990. Davis argued, however, that the discovery rule should be
applied. The court disagreed holding that application of the discovery rule is
limited to those cases where there has been no outright denial of a claim.
62 1
In such a case, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has sufficient
facts to put a reasonable person on notice that the claim was being denied.
622
Davis then argued that Aetna committed a new breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing when it failed to honor his claim after it learned of Dr.
Criswell's diagnosis as stated in his deposition. The court disagreed holding
that the injury-producing event was the denial of coverage. 623 While acts of
bad faith committed after the denial of the claim may be evidence supporting
the cause of action, the court held that they were not the cause of action
itself and that this tort was not a continuing one.6 24 The court further held
that limitations are not tolled by additional wrongful acts or damages occur-
ring after the denial of the claim. 6
25
E. DAMAGES
In Davis v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co. 626 Davis injured her lower back
in the course and scope of her employment. She filed a workers' compensa-
tion claim against Twin City, her employer's workers' compensation carrier.
The parties eventually entered into a compromise settlement agreement
under which Twin City agreed to pay Davis a lump-sum of $37,500 in addi-
tion to five years future medical expenses with Dr. Key. Prior to signing the
settlement agreement, Dr. Key had prescribed for Davis a hot tub or jacuzzi
for a large body for life. This prescription was sent to Twin City, who then
requested that Dr. Key provide a letter of medical necessity. Davis provided
Dr. Key's letter and four estimates for hot tubs. Twin City forwarded Dr.
Key's letter to Texas Medical Foundation (TMF), which Twin City had re-
tained to do medical consultations. TMF completed its review and sup-
619. Id. at 777.






626. 865 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ requested).
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ported the use of the hot tub for Davis' condition. Twin City, however,
denied the claim for the hot tub.
Davis then filed suit against Twin City alleging fraud, breach of contract,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Insur-
ance Code and DTPA. The jury found that Twin City breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing, engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
and acted with conscious indifference to Davis. The jury did not award any
damages for mental anguish, but assessed $100,000 in exemplary damages
against Twin City. The trial court granted Twin City's motion to disregard
jury findings, and did not award exemplary damages in the judgment. In-
stead, the court rendered judgment for Davis for $3,500 (the cost of the hot
tub) plus attorney's fees.
Twin City argued that trial court was correct in denying recovery of ex-
emplary damages as a result of the breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing because the $3,500 actual damages could have been awarded under
Davis' breach of contract action. The court, however, followed Vail v. Texas
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 627 and held that, as a matter of law, the
damages for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing are the amount
of the benefits wrongly withheld. 628 Therefore, Twin City's tortious conduct
caused Davis actual damages, as a matter of law, and exemplary damages
were available. 629 Furthermore, the court held that when the prevailing
party fails to elect between alternative measures of damages, the court
should utilize the findings affording the greatest amount of recovery and
render judgment accordingly. 630 In this case, Davis could recover greater
damages under the tort action than under the contract action because of the
availability of exemplary damages. Therefore, according to the court of ap-
peals, the trial court should have rendered judgment for the exemplary
damages.63'
Twin City also argued that the trial court should have been deemed to
have found that Twin City's tortious conduct did not proximately cause Da-
vis to incur actual damages. However, because the damages for a breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing are, as a matter of law, the amount of
the benefits withheld, the court held that no finding of proximate cause was
necessary and none should have been deemed. 632 Furthermore, proximate
cause becomes an issue in suits alleging bad faith only when the plaintiff
seeks actual damages beyond the amount of the benefits wrongly with-
held.633 Twin City further contended that an award of exemplary damages
would be improper because the jury did not award any damages for mental
anguish. The court held that a finding of conscious indifference to the rights
627. 754 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex. 1988).









of others supports an award of exemplary damages even in the absence of
any damages for mental anguish.634
Next, Twin City asserted that the exemplary damages awarded by the jury
were excessive because they were more than twenty-eight times the actual
damages. After considering the nature of the wrong, the character of the of
the conduct involved, the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer, the situa-
tion and sensibilities of the parties, and the extent to which such conduct
offended a public sense of justice and propriety, the court concluded that
there was ample evidence to support the award of exemplary damages found
by the jury. 635 In this case, Twin City wrongly denied Davis a piece of medi-
cal equipment that an orthopedist concluded would help treat her back pain.
Moreover, Twin City misplaced a vital review of Davis' file and admittedly
lied to Davis in denying the claim. The court also felt that the exemplary
damages were necessary to deter Twin City from treating other injured
workers in a similar way.
Davis next argued that she should have been awarded prejudgment inter-
est as requested in her pleadings. The court agreed and held that the trial
court should have awarded Davis prejudgment interest on her actual dam-
ages of $3,500 calculated at 10% per annum, accruing from the day Twin
City refused to pay her claim. 636
F. SEVERANCE
Counsel for insurers are more frequently attempting to sever the breach of
contract action from the so-called extra-contractual claims, such a breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing and violations of article 21.21 of the
Insurance Code and the DTPA. Both Houston courts of appeals have held
that a trial court's failure to sever the underlying contract claim from a bad
faith claim based on the insurer's denial of coverage amounts to an abuse of
discretion.6 37 In both cases, the courts held that severance was necessary
because of the prejudice to the insurers' interests that would result by trying
the contract claim, wherein settlement negotiations are not admissible, with
the bad faith claim in which settlement negotiations can be raised by the
insurer to show that it acted in good faith. 638 The court in Millard further
held that severance was appropriate because the bad faith, Insurance Code,
and DTPA claims were dependent on the outcome of the contract claim. 639
Thus, according to the court, if the plaintiff does not prevail on the contract
claim, there will be no need to try the other claims. 640
634. Davis, 865 S.W.2d at 236. See also Trenholm v. Radcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 933 (Tex.
1983).
635. Davis, 865 S.W.2d at 237.
636. Id. at 239.
637. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, original proceeding) [leave denied] and United States Fire Ins. Co.
v. Millard, 847 S.W.2d 668, 672-73 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, original proceed-
ing) [leave denied].
638. See Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d at 261; Millard, 847 S.W.2d at 672-73.




The El Paso and Corpus Christi courts, while agreeing that severance is
sometimes warranted, have disagreed with the Houston courts' view that
severance of the contract and bad faith claims is mandatory.64 In Progres-
sive County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Parks642 Progressive County Mutual
asked the court of appeals to order Judge Parks to sever a breach of the
contract action from the causes of action for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, violations of the insurance code, and violations of the
DTPA. Progressive, relying on Wilborn and Millard, argued that the sever-
ance was mandatory and that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing
to sever the causes of action. The court held that severance of the breach of
contract claim is not mandatory when joined with a bad faith claim.643 In-
stead, the court considered the specifics of the lawsuit to determine whether
any prejudice could result from evidence of settlement offers. The court held
that the need for severance had not been established as there was no indica-
tion of any offers of settlement being made or any attempt to discover privi-
leged materials that might be admissible on one claim but not on the
other.6"
After the court denied the petition for writ of mandamus, Progressive
County Mutual filed another motion for severance in the trial court. The
trial court granted the motion, but ordered, to the insurer's displeasure, that
the bad faith claim be tried before the contract claim. Progressive County
Mutual then filed another petition for writ of mandamus. This time it asked
the court of appeals to order the trial court to try the contract claim first.
Again, the court refused to grant the relief requested.645 The court held that
it was not within its power to set the trial court's docket and that Progressive
County Mutual failed in its burden of showing that facts and law permit a
trial court to make but one decision of the proper scheduling of civil
cases. 646 Consequently, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion ordering the bad faith claim tried first.647
Justice Koehler dissented, arguing that the trial court did abuse its discre-
tion in ordering the extra-contractual claims tried prior to the contractual
claim. 648 According to Justice Koehler, the extracontractual claims depend
on the result reached in the contractual cause of action.649 Justice Koehler
also wrote that because of this interdependency, a nonsuit of the contractual
claim would also result in a nonsuit of the noncontractual claims.650 The
majority, however, rejected such a view, finding no authority for the auto-
matic nonsuit of extracontractual claims because of the nonsuit of a contrac-
641. See infra note 632.
642. 856 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, orig. proceeding, no writ).
643. Id. at 779.
644. Id.
645. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parks, 856 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1993, orig. proceeding).








The Corpus Christi court also has determined that there is no presump-
tion that the mere joining of contract and bad faith claims creates a conflict
requiring severance. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hunter65 2 Allstate argued
that severance of the contract claim from the tort claims is required because
of the problems inherent in a joint trial with regard to evidence of settlement
negotiations and of privileged matters such as advice of counsel regarding
coverage. The court of appeals held that Allstate did not show that the trial
court abused its discretion by refusing to sever and thus denied the petition
for writ of mandamus. 653
The court began its discussion by noting that the trial court has broad
discretion in determining whether or not to sever causes of action. The
court held that a trial court has a duty to order severance when all of the
facts and circumstances indicate that the legal rights of the parties will be
prejudiced and an injustice will result if the severance is not ordered. 654 The
court then noted that the Houston courts in Wilborn and Millard held that a
trial court's failure to sever the underlying contract claim from a bad faith
claim amounts to an abuse of discretion. 65 5 The court, however, disagreed
with the Houston courts and held that there is no general prohibition against
trying contract and bad faith claims together, nor is severance of such claims
always required. 656 The court also noted that it is not necessarily true that
the bad faith, Insurance Code, and DTPA claims are contingent on the out-
come of the underlying contract claim.6 57
Moreover, even if the bad faith claims were derivative or contingent on
the contract claim, the court found that there was no general prohibition
against trying the two claims together.658 The court held that it is not the
law in Texas that a contingent or dependent claim may never be joined and
tried together with the underlying claim because of the possibility that the
underlying claim may fail. 659 To the contrary, the court recognized that it
may be judicially efficient to try both cases together because if the claimant
recovers on the underlying claim, the contingent claim would become viable
and there would be no need for a second trial. 66°
The court next turned to whether the existence of settlement offers and
privileged matters concerning claims and coverage determinations would be
prejudicial and inadmissible with regard to the contract claim, thus requir-
651. Id. at 782 n.1.
652. 865 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, orig. proceeding).
653. Id. at 194.
654. Id. at 192.
655. Id.
656. Id. at 193. See Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 168 n.1
(Tex. 1987) (recognizing that a contract claim and a claim for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing may, in some cases, be tried together).
657. Hunter, 865 S.W.2d at 193. See Viles v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.
1990).





ing severance. The court first noted that the problem presented by a joint
trial of the contract and bad faith claims did not involve a conflict between
the interest of the plaintiff to present evidence of settlement offers or privi-
leged materials and that of the defendant to exclude them. Instead, the
court found the real problem to be the internal conflict that may unfairly
force the insurer to choose between insisting on its right to exclude evidence
of settlement negotiations and coverage determinations, thereby losing the
advantage of showing that it was attempting to be reasonable in defense of
the bad faith claims, and putting on such evidence thus risking a prejudicial
inference that it had admitted liability on the contract action.66 1
The court, agreeing with Progressive County Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Parks,662 held that before a severance is required, the insurer must present
evidence to the trial court showing that such a conflict would necessarily
develop at trial.66 3 Allstate, however, failed to allege any specific settlement
negotiations or offers and further failed to present what specific advice it had
received from its attorney or how such advice might be both prejudicial to its
defense against the contract claim and beneficial to its defense against the
bad faith claims. The court could find, at the most, generalized allegations
of prejudice, and thus held that Allstate failed to carry its burden of
proof.664
In F.A. Richard & Associates v. Millard665 the court was faced with a
different issue relating to severance. Holton and Gallery had a car accident.
Holton sued Gallery for his alleged negligence. Holton also sued Highlands
Insurance Company, Gallery's insurer, and Richard, an independent ad-
juster hired by Highlands, for violations of the DTPA and article 21.21.
After the trial court refused to sever and abate the action against Highlands
and Richard, Richard brought this mandamus proceeding asking the court
of appeals to order the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion for
severance and plea in abatement.
The court of appeals held that trial courts are given broad discretion to
sever and their decisions will be reversed only when there is an abuse of
discretion. 66 6 The court, however, held that the trial court did not have
discretion, in this case, to deny severance and abatement because a simulta-
neous trial of Holton's claim against Gallery, Highlands, and Richard would
unduly prejudice all parties' rights to develop their claims and defenses and
would force Richard to defend against Holton's suit prematurely. 667
According to the court, a simultaneous trial of the negligence and bad
faith claims would require evidence of insurance, thus prejudicing Gallery's
defense and violating his right to have his liability decided without any men-
661. Id.
662. 856 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, original proceeding).
663. Hunter, 865 S.W.2d at 194.
664. Id.
665. 856 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).




tion of insurance.668 The court also decided that Gallery would be
prejudiced by the mention of settlement offers. 669 The court further con-
cluded that to exclude evidence of insurance and settlement negotiations
would prejudice Holton's right to develop her bad faith claims against Rich-
ard and Highlands. 670 Additionally, the court concluded that Richard
would be forced to prematurely defend because, if in Holton's negligence
lawsuit Gallery were found to be liable for damages in an amount equal to or
less than Richard's highest offer, Holton's bad faith claims against Richard
would be rendered moot.671 Lastly, the court concluded that the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to abate the causes of action under the In-
surance Code and the DTPA until the negligence claim was resolved because
an abatement is necessary to avoid the parties unnecessarily expending effort
and funds conducting discovery and preparing for trial claims that may be
disposed of in a negligence case. 672
The court's decision to sever the negligence and bad faith claims was cor-
rect and answers the outcries of the insurance industry made in connection
with Watson v. Allstate Insurance Co. 673 In Watson, the court permitted an
injured person to bring suit against both the tortfeasor and his insurer. All-
state complained that this results in an impermissible joinder of a liability
carrier to a tort action. The answer, of course, is to sever the action against
the liability carrier.
The court, however, was not necessarily correct that the bad faith claims
are rendered moot if the jury, in the negligence lawsuit, finds the damages to
be equal to or less than the insurer's highest offer. An insurer has a duty
under article 21.21 to settle a claim when liability becomes reasonably clear.
Thus, if the offer to settle is unreasonably delayed, the insurer can be liable
regardless of the amount of the offer.
Moreover, the action against the insurer would not necessarily have to be
abated until the negligence action is decided. Because an insurer must pay a
claim once liability becomes reasonably, not absolutely, clear, a judicial de-
termination of the tortfeasor's negligence should not be required before the
injured person can pursue an action against the liability insurer. A jury can
decide when liability became reasonably clear without waiting for a final
judgment against the tortfeasor.
G. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
In Haines v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. 674 Haines sought a re-
mand to state court after National Union removed based on diversity juris-
diction, arguing that her claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Millard, 856 S.W.2d at 767.
671. Id.
672. Id.
673. 828 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992), rev'd, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 408 (Jan.
12, 1994).
674. 812 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
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dealing arose under the Workers' Compensation Act and thus was not re-
movable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). The court held that the bad faith
claim was separate and distinct from the workers' compensation claim aris-
ing out of the work-related injury. 675 For instance, the damages sought by
Haines in the bad faith claim were distinct from the contract damages
sought in the workers' compensation claim. Moreover, section 1445(c)'s
prohibition of the removal of workers' compensation claims arises out of the
concern to have state courts interpret and apply workers' compensation
laws.676 No similar concern arises regarding claims for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
Haines also argued that there was no basis for diversity jurisdiction since
she had sued a Texas resident, namely, Vallot, who was an employee of the
firm that adjusted National Union's claims. The only cause of action alleged
against Vallot was that he, along with the other defendants, breached the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court held that Vallot had been
fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction because, while the duty of
good faith and fair dealing extends to adjusting firms, it does not extend to
their employees. 677 The court did acknowledge that Vallot could be liable
for misrepresentations made or deceptive trade practices committed.678
However, Haines had not alleged any such causes of action against him.
III. THE DUTY OF AGENTS TO INSURED PARTIES
The issue in May v. United Services Ass'n of America679 was the extent of
an agent's duty to the insured in rendering advice about and procuring a
policy for health insurance. Shortly after Daryl and Faith May were mar-
ried, they decided to take out a health insurance policy. Alice May, Daryl's
mother, worked next door to the Preston Insurance Agency, and as a favor
to her son and daughter-in-law, visited Preston and spoke with Rex Wiley,
one of the agents. She was given a brochure describing the "Double Eagle"
group policy, which she later gave to Daryl and Faith.
The Double Eagle policy was underwritten by Continental Bankers and
could be purchased by members of the United Services Association of
America. This policy featured relatively low premiums and deductibles, but
its termination provision allowed the underwriter to cancel the entire group
at any time. The policy also contained a deferral provision that permitted
the underwriter to defer coverage on group members or covered dependents
who were hospitalized or totally disabled at the time coverage began.
675. Id. at 95.
676. Id.
677. Id. at 96. See also Ayoub v. Baggett, 820 F. Supp. 298, 299-300 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(holding that employee of insurance company was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity even
though causes of action under article 21.21 were alleged against the employee and that article
21.21 does not extend to the employees of insurance companies). But see Herman v. Millicov-
sky, 834 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (remanding case because article 21.21 provides a cause
of action against insurance adjuster).
678. Id.
679. 844 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. 1992).
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Some time after being given the brochure describing the policy, Faith May
visited the Preston Agency and spoke with Wiley about the Double Eagle
policy. Wiley explained the basic provisions of the policy but did not tell her
that Continental had received only a "C" rating from the A.M. Best Com-
pany, or that Preston sold other coverages, including an individual health
policy from Reserve Life. Faith May told Wiley that they were concerned
about covering medical expenses associated with pregnancy and childbirth
because she had lost an infant child in a prior marriage. Wiley added a
hand-written maternity rider to the policy. The Mays then joined the
United group and purchased the Double Eagle policy. The coverage began
on April 1, 1983.
In mid-1984, the Mays received notice that Continental had terminated
the entire United group and that Hermitage, another underwriter, had
agreed to underwrite the plan with identical benefits. Faith May was preg-
nant at the time and telephoned Wiley to determine what effect the change
would have on the Mays' coverage. Wiley told her that Hermitage would
continue to cover them on the same terms as Continental. Jared May was
born on August 1, 1984, with congenital heart and lung disorders that re-
quired immediate medical attention. Hermitage covered his medical ex-
penses under the policy.
In July 1985, Hermitage also terminated the United group and Keystone
assumed the group's coverage. Keystone, however, classified Jared May as a
totally disabled dependent and, asserting the deferral provision of the policy,
refused to cover any of his medical expenses. Hermitage covered Jared May
for ninety days after termination of the group. Thereafter, however, Jared
May was without insurance coverage until he died in November of 1987.
In January 1987, the Mays filed suit against Preston, United, Keystone,
and Hermitage seeking actual damages for unpaid medical bills and mental
anguish, punitive damages, and interest. The causes of action against Key-
stone and Hermitage were severed because both companies were placed in
receivership, and the Mays went to trial against United and Preston under
common law causes of action including misrepresentation and negligence.
The jury failed to find misrepresentation, but it did find that the negligence
of both United and Preston proximately caused the Mays' injuries. The jury
awarded $140,000 in damages for unpaid medical expenses and $40,000 in
exemplary damages against Preston and United each. The jury did not
award any damages for mental anguish. As the jury failed to find gross neg-
ligence, the trial court rendered judgment against Preston and United jointly
and severally for $140,000 plus interest and costs.
Only Preston appealed. The court of appeals reversed the judgment as to
Preston's liability holding that there was no evidence of a negligent act by
Preston. The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals. 6 0
The Mays first claimed that Preston was negligent in procuring insurance
680. Id. at 666-67.
[Vol. 471324
INSURANCE LAW
that exposed them to the possibility of having no coverage on their son be-
cause Preston knew, or should have known, of the danger of a plan where
the shifting of insurance coverage could result in the loss of insurance. The
court recognized that an insurance agent who undertakes to procure insur-
ance for another owes a duty to the client to use reasonable diligence in
attempting to place the requested insurance and to inform the client
promptly if unable to do so. 68 I However, according to the court, that duty is
typically breached when the client is misled into believing that a policy ex-
isted or that a particular risk was covered when it was not.682 The court
determined that a breach of this duty was not at issue because the jury did
not find a misrepresentation and the Mays acknowledged that Wiley told
them of the termination provision allowing an underwriter to cancel cover-
age for the entire group.683
According to the court, the crux of the Mays' first negligence claim was
that Wiley did not exercise reasonable, prudent, professional judgment in
recommending the Double Eagle policy to the Mays.684 The court, however,
could find no evidence of negligence because the Mays based their claim
solely on a limitation of coverage, about which they were fully apprised, and
did not identify a particular negligent failure by Wiley.685 The Mays
claimed that Wiley was negligent because he should have known of the risk
posed to them by the potential shifting of the underwriters, but offered no
evidence as to why this risk was unjustified for them in particular, or why
Wiley should have prevented them from assuming it. The court held that if
a breach of due care could be proved without a more concrete showing than
a subsequent failure of coverage, agents would be rendered blanket insur-
ers. 686 The court also viewed as important the fact that the Mays never
requested the "best available" policy and that they never asked to see differ-
ent policies. 687
The Mays next theory of negligence alleged that Preston was negligent in
placing the coverage because Wiley either failed to investigate, or failed to
investigate adequately, the financial solvency of Hermitage and Keystone, or
if he did discover the financial condition of the underwriters, he was negli-
gent for placing the Mays' coverage with them. The court noted, however,
that when coverage was initially placed, Hermitage and Keystone were not
yet in the picture, and the underwriter was Continental. Therefore, the
court could find no negligence by Wiley in investigating Hermitage or Key-
stone in connection with the Mays purchasing the Double Eagle policy.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no evidence that the unstable
financial condition of Hermitage and Keystone contributed to the Mays'
681. Id. at 669.
682. Id.
683. Id. at 670.
684. May, 844 S.W.2d at 670.
685. Id. at 672.
686. Id.
687. Id. at 673.
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loss. 688 The court, therefore, concluded that there was no evidence of negli-
gence on the part of Wiley and Preston. 689
Justice Doggett dissented. According to Justice Doggett, insurance agents
must exercise reasonable care in advising their clients in keeping them fully
informed so as to remain safely insured.690 When Faith Mays sought an
affordable "good policy" that would provide coverage for any future chil-
dren, she entrusted to Wiley the job of assessing the available alternatives
and advising her as to the most appropriate coverage. He not only failed to
make such an evaluation, but neglected to inform the Mays that there were
alternatives to the policy he recommended. Justice Doggett asserted that the
jury's verdict should not have been disturbed.
Justice Gammage, joined by Justice Mauzy, also dissented, arguing that
the majority substituted its own verdict for that of the jury's. According to
Justice Gammage, Wiley had an affirmative duty to offer advice to the Mays
because they had come to him seeking advice about which insurance policy
was best suited for their needs. 691 Justice Gammage found sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's finding that Preston was negligent because Wiley
testified that he performed little or no investigation into alternative policies,
never determined what the Mays were willing to pay, and never disclosed to
the Mays other policies in a comparison of their premium costs. Wiley also
testified that he could have sold them a health insurance policy that would
have avoided the loss of coverage for Jared, but that he made no attempt to
determine the relative cost or to show the Mays what the premium difference
would have been. Justice Gammage also found evidence that Wiley was
concerned that the Double Eagle went through two underwriters, both of
which were the subjects of insolvency proceedings, but he never communi-
cated that concern to the Mays. Rather, each time the Mays contacted them
to express their concern, he reassured them and encouraged them to stick
with the Double Eagle. 692
Justice Gammage found that there was sufficient evidence to show that
Preston had failed to provide accurate information regarding the available
insurance, which Wiley, the agent, knew or should have known the customer
desired. Justice Gammage, like Justice Doggett, would have upheld the
jury's verdict.
In Pickens v. Texas Farm Bureau Insurance Co. 693 the court held that an
insurer owes no duty to advise insured of various coverage limits and premi-
ums available and thus was not liable to the insured under theories of negli-
gence, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, or violations of the
Insurance Code and Deceptive Trade Practices Act for failing to advise of
other coverages available. 694
688. Id.
689. May, 844 S.W.2d at 673.
690. Id. at 675.
691. Id. at 676.
692. Id. at 678.
693. 836 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
694. Id. at 806.
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The Bennetts, upon moving to Amarillo, purchased a homeowner's policy
with liability limits of $25,000. Mrs. Bennett did not seek advice about cov-
erage and did not confer with an agent. While the homeowner's policy was
in effect, Johnny Bennett was cleaning a rifle in his garage when it dis-
charged and struck James Pickens in the right arm. James Pickens and his
parents filed suit against Bennett for damages. On March 31, 1986, a con-
sent judgment was entered in favor of Pickens in the amount of $953,000.
Texas Farm Bureau paid the policy limits of $25,000 on behalf of Bennett.
Later, Pickens and Bennett signed a covenant not to execute wherein the
Bennetts agreed to pay an additional $15,000 on the judgment and assigned
any causes of action they might have against Texas Farm Bureau to Pickens.
After the assignment, Pickens sued Texas Farm Bureau alleging negligence,
breach of warranty, and violations of the DTPA and Insurance Code. All of
these causes of action were based on the allegations that Texas Farm Bureau
failed to advise the Bennetts, when they purchased the homeowner's policy,
of various liability coverage limits and premiums available. The trial court
rendered a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of Texas Farm Bureau.
The court of appeals affirmed. 695
The court initially held that Texas Farm Bureau could not be held liable
for negligence since it did not owe a duty to the Bennetts to offer benefits in
excess of the statutory minimum.696 The court found evidence to show that
the Bennetts did not seek advice from Texas Farm Bureau as to how much
coverage they should have obtained. The Bennetts received an updated pol-
icy every six months, showing the policy coverage. They did not question
the amount of coverage, nor did they inquire about the other coverages
available. The court also found that the Bennetts were aware of the process
utilized to raise coverage limits on the policy since they had done so with
respect to obtaining additional coverage when their home increased in value
and when it was discovered that their gun collection was not covered by the
policy.
6 9 7
The court held that Texas Farm Bureau did not breach the common law
duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to advise the Bennetts of un-
dercoverage. 698 The court noted that a cause of action for breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing is stated when it is alleged that there is no
reasonable basis for denial of a claim or delay in payment or a failure on the
part of the insurer to determine whether there is reasonable basis for the
denial or delay. In this case, Texas Farm Bureau paid the full amount of the
Bennetts' policy limits. Since there was no contention that Texas Farm Bu-
reau wrongfully denied or delayed payment, the court held that there was no
breach of this duty, and stated that it would not extend the duty to require
an insurer to disclose the range of liability coverage amounts.699 The court
695. Id. at 807.
696. Id. at 805.
697. Id. at 806.




also rejected Pickens' argument that Texas Farm Bureau violated the DTPA
and Insurance Code by failing to disclose coverage options. Again, the court
held that since Texas Farm Bureau owed no duty to defendants beyond sell-
ing them the homeowner's policy, there could be no violation of the DTPA
or Insurance Code in this case.7° °
IV. LIABILITY OF INSURERS FOR AGENT
MISREPRESENTATIONS
In Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats70 1 the court considered when an in-
surance company would be liable for the misrepresentations of its agent. In
September 1984, Coats met with Harrell, Celtic's agent, to discuss obtaining
replacement insurance coverage for the employees of his swimming pool
business. Coats specifically told Harrell that he was interested in obtaining a
policy that provided psychiatric benefits equal to or greater than the $20,000
benefits he had under his prior policy. Harrell later returned with a
brochure describing the coverage and benefits of a Celtic policy. According
to Harrell and the brochure, the policy had a $1 million maximum lifetime
benefit for in-hospital care. Harrell did not inform Coats that psychiatric
care was subject to a $10,000 limit rather than the $1 million limit.
After this meeting, Coats delegated to Engelmann, his business manager,
the responsibility of determining whether the Celtic policy should be
purchased. After reading the brochure Engelmann met with Harrell to dis-
cuss the benefits, especially the psychiatric care benefits. Harrell told her
that in-hospital psychiatric care had a $1 million maximum lifetime benefit.
Based upon this information, Engelmann recommended to Coats that the
Celtic policy be purchased, and the policy became effective February 1,
1985.
In August of 1985, Coats' son was admitted to Shoal Creek Hospital for
psychiatric care. Shoal Creek then called Coats and told him that Celtic was
claiming that the policy covered only $10,000 of his son's psychiatric treat-
ment. Coats immediately called Harrell, who once again said not to worry
because the policy had a $1 million hospital limit. Celtic, however, paid only
$10,000 of the $27,000 medical expenses.
Coats filed suit against Celtic under the DTPA and article 21.21 alleging
that it was liable for the misrepresentations of its agent, Harrell. The jury
found that Harrell had misrepresented the terms, benefits, provisions or con-
ditions of the policy, and that he had authority to explain, on behalf of
Celtic, the benefits of the policy. The jury failed to find that the misrepresen-
tation was made knowingly. The trial court rendered judgment against
Celtic in favor of Coats. The court of appeals affirmed. 70 2 The supreme
court, however, reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Celtic.70 3
700. Id.
701. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1259 (Sept. 10, 1993).
702. Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 831 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), rev'd, 36
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1259 (Sept. 10, 1993).
703. Celtic Life, 36 Tex. Sup. C. J. at 1261.
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The sole basis for the court's reversal was that Celtic could not be liable
for Harrell's misrepresentations because he did not have authority to make
representations "outside the scope of the written policy. ' ' 7° 4 The jury was
asked two questions regarding Harrell's authority. In answer to Question 2,
the jury found that Harrell had the authority to "explain," on behalf of
Celtic, the benefits of the policy, but in answer to Question 3, the jury found
that Harrell did not have authority to make representations "outside the
scope of the written document."
The court held that Harrell was Celtic's agent by virtue of article 21.02 of
the Insurance Code.70 5 Article 21.02, entitled "Who Are Agents," states
that anyone soliciting for an insurance company "shall be held to be the
agent of the company for which the act is done, or the risk is taken, as far as
relates to all the liabilities, duties, requirements and penalties set forth in this
chapter... ",706 However, according to the court, article 21.02 does not
delineate the scope of Harrell's authority and reference must be made to
common law rules of agency.707
The court concluded that the jury's finding that Harrell had authority to
explain the policy was immaterial to Celtic's liability, holding that the au-
thority to "explain" is different and less than the authority to "represent,"
citing the 1980 edition of Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary ("ex-
plain" meaning "to make plain or understandable" and "represent" meaning
"to describe as having a specified character or quality"). 708 The level of
authority needed, according to the court, is the authority "to make represen-
tations at issue." Thus, according to the court, the jury's finding that Har-
rell did not have authority from Celtic to make representations outside the
scope of the written document precludes Celtic's vicarious liability for the
misrepresentations of its agent. 70 9
Justice Spector, joined by Justices Doggett and Gammage, wrote a dis-
senting opinion criticizing the majority for abandoning long-established
common law rules of principal - agency law that imposed liability on a
principal for the acts of its agent done in the scope of his authority even
though the principal has not authorized the specific act. According to the
dissent, the majority opinion is tantamount to requiring the principal to au-
thorize misrepresentations before liability will attach. 710
Justice Spector also criticized Justice Enoch, author of the majority opin-
ion, for completely disregarding his recent opinion in Maccabees Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. McNiel.711 In Maccabees, Justice Enoch wrote, while
still on the Dallas Court of Appeals, that the insurer was liable for the
agent's misrepresentations because the agent was the agent of the company
704. Id.
705. Id. at 1260.
706. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.02 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
707. Celtic Life, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1260.
708. Id. at 1261.
709. Id.
710. Id.
711. 836 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
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under article 21.02.712 Thus, while the agent could not contractually bind
the company, he could render it liable under the DTPA and Insurance Code
because of his misrepresentations.
The court has strained to find a distinction between the authority to "ex-
plain" and the authority to "represent" in order to strip from a Texas in-
sured a judgment against a foreign insurance company for the
misrepresentations of its Texas agent. In answer to Question 2, the jury
found that Ken Harrell had the authority, on behalf of Celtic, to explain the
terms and benefits of Celtic's insurance policy. The court dismissed this
finding as immaterial because the authority to "explain," the court tells us, is
not equivalent to the authority to "represent.1 713 According to the court, a
showing of authority greater than the authority to "explain" is required
before Celtic could be liable for Harrell's misrepresentations. However, as
the definitions of these words reveal, there is no qualitative difference be-
tween "explain" and "represent."
In the most recent edition of Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary,
"explain" is defined as "to make known. '7 14 Additionally, "explain" means
"to make something clear or understandable." Explain implies a making
plain or intelligible what is not immediately obvious or entirely known.7 15
"Represent" is defined as "to bring clearly before the mind."' 716 Surely,
there is no difference between a word that means "to make something clear
or understandable" and one that means "to bring clearly before the mind."
Moreover, the definitions of these words make clear that "explain" does
not entail something less than "represent." Two of the synonyms for "ex-
plain" are "interpret" and "construe. ' 717 "Interpret," in turn, means, "[t]o
explain the meaning of; to conceive the significance of; construe. '7 18 Simi-
larly, "construe" means, "[t]o adduce or explain the meaning of inter-
pret."' 7 19 The jury found that Harrell had the authority to explain the terms
and benefits of the Celtic policy and thus the authority to interpret and con-
strue the meaning of these benefits. Thus, there is absolutely no basis for the
court's conclusion that Harrell did not have sufficient authority to render
Celtic liable for his misrepresentations made while explaining, describing,
interpreting and construing the meaning of the coverage as it applied to psy-
chiatric benefits.
If Question 2 was immaterial, it was not because of a difference between
"explaining" what the benefits of an insurance policy are and "representing"
what they are. It was because Harrell's authority was proven as a matter of
law. The court held in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc. 720
712. Id. at 235.
713. Celtic Life, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1261.
714. Id.
715. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 409 (1993).
716. Id. at 993.
717. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 645 (3d ed.
1992).
718. Id. at 943.
719. Id. at 405.
720. 577 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1979) (emphasis added). See also C. V. Hill & Co. v. Fricke,
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that when an agent is given the authority to sell policies, the principal-insurer
also gives the agent the authority "to represent the coverage afforded by such
policies to the consumer."'721
Even without the authority of Royal Globe, common sense and the plain
meaning of the word "sell" lead inescapably to the conclusion that the au-
thority to sell includes the authority to represent and explain the thing that
is being sold. The meaning of "sell" includes: "to persuade or induce some-
one to buy (something); ' 722 "to persuade (another) to recognize the worth
or desirability of;" 7 2 3 and "to influence or induce to make a purchase. '724 It
would have been impossible for Harrell to have persuaded or induced John
Coats to purchase the Celtic policy if Harrell had not told Coats what type
of coverage the policy provided in the case of treatment for psychiatric
problems. These were the only benefits of importance to John Coats. Thus,
it defies common sense, experience, reason, and law to conclude that the
authority to sell insurance does not include the authority to explain, make
known, describe, define, and make understandable the coverage and benefits
afforded by the insurance policy. Celtic admitted that Harrell had Celtic's
authority to sell its policies in Texas. Celtic also conceded that not many
Celtic policies would be sold if the agent merely placed the brochure in front
of the prospective purchaser and did not say anything about the coverage
provided by the policy. Additionally, Harrell testified that Celtic authorized
him to sell Celtic policies in Texas and that as part of that authority he could
explain and describe the terms and benefits of the policy.
Because Harrell had the authority to sell Celtic's policies, he necessarily
had the authority to represent coverage provided by the policy. This author-
ity was undisputed and established as a matter of law. Thus, the lower
courts were correct in holding Celtic vicariously liable for the misrepresenta-
tions of its agent, Ken Harrell, and the supreme court was wrong to reverse
this judgment.
Question 3 asked: "Did Ken Harrell have the authority of Celtic to make
representations concerning the insurance policy's terms, benefits, provisions,
and conditions, which were outside the scope of the written document?"
The jury's answer of "No" to Question 3, however, is immaterial because
the representations upon which liability is based were within the scope of the
policy and the brochure. The object or intention of the policy, and the
brochure describing the policy, were to provide a description or explanation
of the coverage so that the insured would know the type of coverage being
purchased. Included within this description of coverage were benefits for
135 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1940, writ dism'd) (finding that an agent
that had the authority to sell equipment also had authority to make representations about the
characteristics and qualities of the equipment so as to render principal liable when agent mis-
represented those characteristics and qualities).
721. Royal Globe, 577 S.W.2d at 694 (emphasis added).
722. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1296 (1989).
723. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1639 (1992).
724. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1062 (1993).
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psychiatric treatment; the only benefits in which John Coats was interested,
as fully explained to Harrell.
The representations made by Harrell, which the jury found to be misrep-
resentations, concerned these benefits for psychiatric care. Coats alleged,
and the jury found, that Harrell stated that the policy provided a $1 million
life-time maximum benefit for psychiatric treatment rendered in a hospital as
opposed to a $10,000 limit for out-patient psychiatric treatment. Clearly,
this representation concerned a subject within the scope of the brochure and
policy - coverage for psychiatric treatment - and was within the scope of
Harrell's authority to make. Thus, Question 3 had no relevance to any issue
in this case and should have been disregarded.
The court correctly stated the general rule that an insurance company will
be liable for the wrongful acts of its agent when the agent commits the
wrongful acts within the scope of his actual or apparent authority.725 The
court then quotes from section 257 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
which provides: "A principal is subject to liability for loss caused to another
by the other's reliance upon a tortious representation of a servant or other
agent, if the representation is:
(a) authorized;
(b) apparently authorized; or
(c) within the power of the agent to make for the principal. '726
Although not expressly stated, the court seems to decide that a principal
will be liable only if he authorizes the representation as provided in section
257(a). As applied to this case, this would require Celtic to have told Har-
rell to make the representation or that Harrell had "reason to believe from
his principal's conduct that the principal wishes the statement made
although untrue." 727 The comment to section 257, however, makes clear
that there are two other situations where a principal can be liable for the
representations of its agent. The first is when the other party to the transac-
tion (here, John Coats) "reasonably believes from the conduct for which the
principal is responsible that the agent is authorized to make the representa-
tions as made. "728 The second is when the agent makes a representation
which, if true, is one the agent would have been authorized to make. 729
In this case, the evidence showed that while Celtic did not tell Harrell to
make untrue statements about the policy, the representation Harrell made
about psychiatric benefits was one that, if true, he was authorized to make.
In other words, Celtic gave Harrell authority to make representations about
coverage in order to effectuate the sale of Celtic insurance policies. Thus,
such representations were within Harrell's power to make for Celtic. Ac-
725. Celtic Life, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1260.
726. Id. at 1261 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 257
(1958)).





cording to section 257 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, Celtic is lia-
ble for Harrell's misrepresentations.
It has long been the law in Texas that a principal will be liable for the torts
of its agent if the tort was committed while the agent was acting within the
scope of his actual or apparent authority even if the principal did not author-
ize or know about the specific act.730 Moreover, the law has imposed liabil-
ity upon the principal even if the agent's specific act was in disobedience of
and contrary to the order of the principal.7 3 1 Not only has this been the law
of agency in Texas for almost one hundred and fifty years, it is the law in
every other state.732 Thus, by requiring the principal to authorize the spe-
cific wrongful conduct, Texas becomes a minority of one on this issue.
730. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consult., Inc., 577 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex. 1979); Interna-
tional & G.N.R. Co. v. Anderson, 82 Tex. 516, 17 S.W. 1039 (1891); Wright v. Calhoun, 19
Tex. 412 (1857); Henderson v. San Antonio & M.G.R. Co., 17 Tex. 560 (1856); Hedley Feed-
lot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 837 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
731. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Guffey, 129 Tex. 293, 102 S.W.2d 408, 409 (1937); King v.
Loessin, 572 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ); Bass v. Metz-
ger, 569 S.W.2d 917, 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Arterbury v.
American Bank & Trust Co., 553 S.W.2d 943, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no
writ).
732. See Autrey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 481 So.2d 345, 347-48 (Ala.
1985); Alaskan Village, Inc. v, Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 948-49 (Alaska 1986); Nason v. Voight,
625 P.2d 974, 976 (Ariz. App. 1981); Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 479 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Ark.
1972); In re Nelson, 761 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1985) (California law); Life Investors Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Smith, 833 P.2d 864, 868-69 (Colo. App. 1992); Dyer v. Johnson, 757 P.2d 178,
180 (Colo. App. 1988); In re Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd., 306 A.2d 24, 27 (Del. 1973);
Sumpolec v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 563 So.2d 778, 779 (Fla. App. 1990); Piedmont Cotton Mills
v. General Warehouse No. Two, 149 S.E.2d 72, 76 (Ga. 1966); Silva v. Bisbee, 628 P.2d 214,
217 (Haw. App. 1981); Fowler v. Uezzell, 500 P.2d 852, 856 (Idaho 1972); Phipps v. Cohn,
487 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ill. App. 1985); Clark v. Millikin Mortg. Co., 495 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Ind.
App. 1986); Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thatcher, 285 N.E.2d 660, 671 (Ind. App. 1972);
State v. Sellers, 258 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Iowa 1977); New York Life Ins. Co. v. McGowan, 18
Kan. 300, 320 (1877); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Gruenberger, 477 S.W.2d 503, 505
(Ky. App. 1972); Woodward v. Barringer, 24 So.2d 200, 203 (La. App. 1945); Crowley v.
Dubuc, 430 A.2d 549, 552 (Me. 1981); Sanders v. Rowan, 484 A.2d 1023, 1030 (Md. App.
1984); New England Accept. Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 344 N.E.2d 208, 212
(Mass. App. 1976); Renda v. International Union, 114 N.W.2d 343, 361 (Mich. 1962); Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 1043 (1968) (Minnesota
law); Napp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 159 So.2d 164, 166 (Miss. 1963); Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Huger, 728 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Mo. App. 1987); McCarty v. Lincoln Green, Inc., 620 P.2d
1221, 1224 (Mont. 1980); Wolfson Car Leasing Co. v. Weberg, 264 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Neb.
1978); Young v. Nevada Title Co., 744 P.2d 902, 903 (Nev. 1987); Gardner v. Rosecliff Realty
Co., 124 A.2d 30, 34 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1956); Echols v. N. C. Ribble Co., 511 P.2d 566,
569 (N.M. App. 1973); Gleason v. Temple Hill Assoc., 553 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (App. Div.
1990); Parsons v. Bailey, 227 S.E.2d 166, 168 (N.C. App. 1976); Dewey v. Lutz, 462 N.W.2d
435, 443 (N.D. 1990); Pannunzio v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 151 N.E.2d 545, 552 (Ohio
1958); Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1127 (Ohio App. 1981); Estate of
Bras v. First Bank & Trust Co., 821 P.2d 387, 391 (Okla. App. 1991); Seiders v. Hefner, 747
P.2d 1003, 1005 (Or. App. 1987); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r,
551 A.2d 368, 373 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); Cohen v. Goldman, 132 A.2d 414, 417 (R.I. 1957);
Fudge v. Physicians Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 653, 657 (W.D.S.C. 1954); Leafgreen v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 275, 277 (S.D. 1986); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690,
696 (6th Cir. 1976) (Tennessee law); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1979);
Dodge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 250 A.2d 742, 744 (Vt. 1969); Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co. v. Hedrick, 27 S.E.2d 198, 202 (Va. 1943); Watson v. Yasunaga, 438 P.2d 607, 610 (Wash.
1968); Holliday v. Gilkeson, 363 S.E.2d 133, 134 (W.Va. 1987); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640
F.2d 880, 887 (7th Dist. 1981) (Wisconsin law).
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The court has also abolished the rule of law that a principal is responsible
for an unlawful act of its agent where the act is committed by the agent for
the purpose of accomplishing the mission intrusted to him by the princi-
pal.733 Harrell, of course, was acting in the furtherance of Celtic's business
of selling insurance policies in Texas when he found himself describing and
answering questions about the coverage. Consequently, the court should
have affirmed the judgment against Celtic, as Harrell's principal.
The court's decision also unfairly discriminates between insurers whose
agents are "employees" and insurers whose agents are not "employees,"
holding the former strictly accountable for the acts of their agents while
shielding the latter from any accountability for acts of their agents. This
discrimination results from the reason given by the court for refusing to fol-
low Justice Enoch's opinion in Maccabees. Maccabees correctly held that
even if he lacked actual, apparent, or implied authority to bind coverage
"[a]n Article 21.02 agent of an insurance company who misrepresents cover-
age may render the insurance company he represents vicariously liable for
the misrepresentations under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)
and article 21.21, § 16 of the Insurance Code."' 734 In explaining why it was
not following Maccabees in Celtic Life, the court "note[d] that Maccabees
involved misrepresentations by the insurer's employee and sales representa-
tive, rather than an independent agent. ' 735 Thus, State Farm, Allstate, and
New York Life, for the sole reason that they sell their policies through an
employee sales force, are liable for the very same misrepresentations that
impose no liability on Celtic Life. This result is not only inequitable, it is
unsupported by Article 21.02 upon which Maccabees rests. Article 21.02
makes an agent of the company "[a]ny person who solicits insurance" 736 -
not any employee who solicits insurance. Indeed, Article 21.02 is expressly
unconcerned with the legal relationship between the company and the per-
son soliciting. It is the person's act of solicitation of insurance that makes
him the agent of the company "whether any such act!] shall be done at the
instance or request, or by the employment of such insurance company.' 737
Whether the agent is an "employee" or an "independent agent" is therefore
immaterial under Article 21.02 and the distinction thus provides no basis for
the court's refusal to follow Maccabees in the instant case.
According to Appleman, statutory provisions similar to article 21.02 are
common. 738 The purpose of such statutes, "is to make it as safe for persons
733. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Love, 132 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986, 990 (1938) (holding
an insurance company liable for adjuster's conduct in getting public official to order unlawful
autopsy); see also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Guffey, 129 Tex. 293, 102 S.W.2d 408, 409
(1937); Southwestern Bell Tele. Co. v. Wilson, 768 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, writ denied); King v. Loessin, 572 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1978, no writ); Bass v. Metzger, 569 S.W.2d 917, 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
734. Maccabees, 836 S.W.2d at 233.
735. Celtic Life, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1260, n. 5 (emphasis added).
736. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.02 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
737. Id. (emphasis added).
738. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 8671, at 176 (1981).
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seeking insurance to deal with the agents, with whom alone they ordinarily
transact their business as if they were dealing directly with the companies
themselves. ' 739 Moreover, Appleman continues:
And where the statute makes such agent the agent of the insurer "as to
all duties and liabilities imposed by law", this refers not to the duties
and liabilities growing out of the contract of insurance but to duties and
liabilities imposed on insurance companies and agents by law independ-
ent of the provisions of the contract of insurance. Therefore, in all mat-
ters relating to the application for the policy and issuance in
consequence thereof, the agent is regarded as the agent of the
company. 74 o
In construing a statute similar to article 21.02, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that such statute governed the question of authority and the in-
surer's liability for the agent's conduct concerning the agent's acts up to and
including the consummation of insurance, while principles of common law
govern other matters. 74 1 Thus, if a statute designates a person as an author-
ized agent of an insurance company by virtue of the activities in which that
person engages on behalf of the company, those activities must be within the
agent's authority. If the agent violates article 21.21 and/or the DTPA while
engaged in those activities, then the insurer, as principal, must be liable for
such acts of its agent. It would be incongruent with article 21.02 to find that
a person is an agent of an insurance company because he was soliciting in-
surance on its behalf, but to conclude that the insurer was not responsible for
the agent's misrepresentations made while soliciting the insurance, when
such misrepresentations are prohibited by article 21.21.
The purpose of article 21.02 is clearly to impose liability on an insurer for
the acts of its agents which violate Chapter 21 of the Insurance Code. The
court's unfortunate decision not only frustrates this legislative intent, it ne-
gates it. The court's opinion is contrary to the plain meanings of "explain,"
"sell," and "represent." It departs dramatically, and without explanation,
from established case precedent. It proceeds on a misreading of the evidence
in the record. It saps all meaning from the Insurance Code's mandate that
agents who solicit insurance are agents of the insurance company whose pol-
icy they are selling. The court's decision is, in a word, wrong on all bases on
which it purports to rest.
In Shandee Corp. v. Kemper Group 742 the court held that an agent had
apparent authority sufficient to hold the insurer vicariously liable for the
agent's fraud.7 4 3 Shandee purchased a general liability insurance policy
from Kemper through an agent named Johnston. Prior to the expiration of
the policy, Johnston told Shandee that it and Shandee's other policies would
be renewed and merged into a single Texas Multiple Perils (TMP) policy.
739. Hurd v. Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 27 A.2d 918, 924 (Me. 1942). See also 16 Ap-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 8671 (1981).
740. 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 8671, at 177 (1981).
741. Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Fagan Chevrolet Co., 150 So. 2d 172 (Miss. 1963).
742. No. C14-92-00126-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Sept. 30, 1993, n.w.h.).
743. Id., slip op. at 6.
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After Johnston told Shandee that it would be covered, he issued certificates
of insurance reflecting the existence of a general liability policy with an effec-
tive date of July 20, 1986 through July 20, 1987. During the fall of 1986,
Shandee experienced several losses and submitted claims to Kemper. Ini-
tially, Kemper paid those claims but later informed Shandee that the general
liability policy had not been renewed and demanded reimbursement for pay-
ment of the claims. Shandee failed to make the reimbursement and filed suit
against Johnston and Kemper alleging fraud and breach of contract.
The jury found that Kemper and Johnston were guilty of fraud and as-
sessed approximately $52,000 in actual damages against each. The jury also
found that Kemper and Johnston had acted with conscious disregard and
assessed $750,000 in exemplary damages against Kemper and $1 million
against Johnston. The jury also found that a contract for general liability
coverage existed for the period of July 1986 through July 1987 and this con-
tract had been breached by Kemper. The jury assessed about $52,000 in
actual damages and $68,000 as reasonable attorney's fees under the breach
of contract theory.
The trial court disregarded the jury findings of fraud against Kemper, dis-
regarded the jury findings of fraud as to the general liability policy by John-
ston, reduced the award of exemplary damages assessed against Johnston,
and disregarded the finding of attorney's fees for breach of contract. The
trial court then vacated the judgment against Johnston, severed the cause
against Johnston, and required Shandee to tender a remittitur or a new trial
would be ordered.
Shandee then pursued its claims against Johnston in the severed cause,
and proceeded to trial once again. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Shandee again awarding approximately $52,000 in actual damages and $1
million in exemplary damages. Both cases where then consolidated for the
purposes of appeal.
Shandee argued that Kemper should be vicariously liable for Johnston's
fraud because he had actual or apparent authority from Kemper to make
particular representations, quotes, or statements about coverage to Shandee.
The evidence showed that the policies were usually renewed with no corre-
spondence from Kemper. When Shandee received a billing statement indi-
cating that the general liability policy was nonrenewed, Shandee contacted
Johnston, who said not to worry because he was securing a TMP policy that
would encompass general liability coverage. Shandee had purchased insur-
ance coverage through Johnston since 1971 and had purchased insurance
coverage from Kemper since 1982. Kemper had never notified Shandee that
Johnston was not authorized to secure insurance coverage. In fact, internal
memos from Kemper regarding the discussion about a TMP policy indicated
that Kemper acknowledged Johnston's authority to make representations to
Shandee that he was securing a TMP policy and not renewing the former
general liability policy.
The court therefore held that the evidence showed that Johnston had the
authority to secure coverage for customers such as Shandee and to assure
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them that they were covered.744 The evidence also showed that the repre-
sentations of coverage were false and that Johnston knew, or should have
known, that they were false. Furthermore, Shandee relied on the representa-
tions and did not secure other coverage. Instead, Shandee submitted claims,
which Kemper initially paid, indicating to Shandee that Johnston's represen-
tations were true. Kemper's actions, tending to ratify Johnston's representa-
tions, also kept Shandee from securing additional coverage. The court held
that there was some evidence of Johnston's apparent authority to make the
representations he made to Shandee. 745 Thus, the court found that there
was sufficient evidence to establish Kemper's vicarious liability for John-
ston's fraud.746
Abe's Colony Club, Inc. v. C & W Underwriters, Inc. 7 4 7 was brought by
Abe's against its liability insurers, C & W and Mt. Hawley, for expenses
incurred in defending a lawsuit brought against Abe by Callihan for injuries
he incurred in a vehicle accident caused by an intoxicated patron of a bar
owned and operated by Abe's. Both insurers refused to provide a defense
based upon a liquor liability exclusion in the policy. Mt. Hawley and C & W
sought a summary judgment that no defense was required due to a liquor
liability exclusion provision in the policy and due to the statute of limitations
barring Abe's DTPA, Insurance Code, and breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing causes of action. The trial court granted this motion and the
court of appeals affirmed.748
Abe's argued that Mt. Hawley had a duty to defend notwithstanding the
policy exclusion because an alleged agent of Mt. Hawley misrepresented the
policy's coverage. Esquell, the agent, told Abe's that she could secure liquor
liability insurance. However, there was no evidence that Esquell represented
that Mt. Hawley would provide liquor liability insurance. Moreover, the
public records of the State of Texas did not list Esquell as an agent for Mt.
Hawley. Abe's argued that Esquell was a soliciting agent of Mt. Hawley and
therefore Mt. Hawley was liable for Esquell's misrepresentation by virtue of
Texas Insurance Code, article 21.02. The court held that even if Esquell was
a soliciting agent of Mt. Hawley, she could not bind Mt. Hawley by her
representation unless Mt. Hawley bestowed apparent authority on her.749
Because the facts showed that Mt. Hawley had absolutely no contact with
Abe's when the alleged misrepresentations were made, the court held that





747. 852 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
748. Id. at 91.




V. ACTIONS BY INSURER AGAINST AGENT
In American Indemnity Co. v. Baumgart T7 5 American Indemnity sued its
local recording agent, Baumgart, to recover damages for defending and set-
tling a personal injury claim brought against its alleged insureds. American
sued Baumgart for indemnity, violations of the Texas Insurance Code, the
DTPA, negligence, breach of contract, and fraud.
American alleged that in April, 1984, Baumgart obtained auto insurance
for John Ventura and his wife, Jane Ford. This insurance was written
through Travelers, and the Venturas renewed the policy every six months.
On October 29, 1985, the policy was renewed and would have expired in
April of 1986. On November 1, 1985, Ms. Ford leased a 1986 Oldsmobile
and asked Baumgart to add this vehicle to the Travelers' policy. Baumgart
then sent a change order to Travelers requesting that it add the Oldsmobile
as an additional insured vehicle to the policy, and also requested that Travel-
ers increase the liability limits on the Oldsmobile.
A couple of weeks later, Baumgart received a letter from Travelers that it
would not increase liability exposure for the Venturas' account and that the
Venturas' file had been marked for nonrenewal due to their driving records
and loss activity. Thereafter, Ms. Ford instructed Baumgart to place cover-
age on the Oldsmobile with another carrier. On November 20, 1985, Baum-
gart deleted the Oldsmobile from the Travelers' policy and sent an
application for insurance to American. By mailing the insurance applica-
tion, Baumgart acted within his authority as local recording agent and
bound coverage on the Oldsmobile with American for thirty days following
the application's effective date of November 20, 1985.
On December 6, 1985, American sent Baumgart its rejection of the Ven-
turas' application. The rejection confirmed that binder coverage would end
on December 20, 1985. On December 31, 1985, one of the Venturas' em-
ployees was driving the Oldsmobile when it was involved in a collision.
Sergio Martinez was injured and sued the employee, the Venturas, and the
Venturas' law firm. Baumgart submitted a loss notice to American, who
reminded Baumgart that the Venturas' application had been rejected and
that the Oldsmobile was not covered. Baumgart, however, did not notify the
Venturas that American had rejected their application until after the colli-
sion had taken place.
American undertook a defense of the Martinez lawsuit under a reservation
of rights. On March 18, 1988, American paid $100,000 to settle the suit.
Thereafter, the Venturas assigned to American all their potential claims
against Baumgart. Pursuant to the assignment, American sought indemnity
from Baumgart for at least $100,000, in addition to the claims accruing to
American directly against Baumgart. American alleged that Baumgart was
negligent in deleting the Oldsmobile from the Travelers' policy, which other-
wise would have provided coverage at the time of the collision. American
751. 840 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
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also asserted claims against Baumgart for violations of the Texas Insurance
Code, the DTPA, fraud, and breach of contract.
The trial court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Baumgart
ordering that American take nothing on all of its claims save its indemnity
claim. American appealed and the court of appeals reversed and
remanded. 752
On appeal, Baumgart argued that the assignment of the Venturas' claims
to American was void because Texas law does not allow a joint tortfeasor to
purchase a claim from a plaintiff to whose injury a tortfeasor contributed. 753
However, Baumgart did not prove, as a matter of law, that he and American
were joint tortfeasors. Furthermore, the court held that since there was no
statute expressly prohibiting this assignment, it was not void as against pub-
lic policy.75 4
Baumgart next argued that American could not assert the Venturas'
claims because the Venturas did not sustain any damages as American pro-
vided them a defense and even paid to settle the Martinez suit. The court
rejected this argument as well, holding that the fact that American funded
the settlement and paid the defense costs did not negate the damage element,
as a matter of law, since the Venturas could have alleged additional compen-
satory damages against Baumgart.7 55
American complained that the trial court erred in holding that it had no
right to bring a cause of action against Baumgart independent of the assign-
ment. American contended that it had causes of action of its own for negli-
gence, breach of contract, and fraud based on Baumgart's direct breaches of
his duty to American. The court of appeals agreed. 75 6
First of all, the court noted that American's alleged tortious acts injured
the Venturas. If American was liable to the Venturas, it was liable only
through Baumgart because he was its local recording agent. When Ameri-
can settled the Martinez suit and acquired an assignment of the Venturas'
potential claims against Baumgart, it gained the right to seek indemnity
against Baumgart. 757
Secondly, the court held that American had a breach of contract claim
against Baumgart independent of the assignment. 758 American and Baum-
gart entered into an agency contract in which Baumgart became American's
agent and was granted authority to procure applications for insurance on
American's behalf. American alleged that Baumgart breached this contract
by breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in such con-
tracts. The court held that the agency contract created a fiduciary duty and
a special relationship giving rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
752. Id. at 636.
753. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1987).




758. Id. at 639.
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every transaction made on American's behalf.759 Since Baumgart did not
negate American's allegations, the court held that the summary judgment on
such a claim was improper. 76°
Lastly, the court held that American had a negligence claim against
Baumgart independent of the assignment.761 American's negligence claim
was that, had Baumgart exercised the care of an ordinary prudent local re-
cording agent, then it would not have been compelled to undertake the de-
fense of a risk that it had previously rejected. The court held that when
management of a principal's property includes entering into contracts on the
principal's behalf, the laws of negligence may also apply to the agent's acts
with regard to those contracts. 762 In the present case, Baumgart did not
negate American's allegations that his negligence caused it to suffer damages
in defending and settling the Martinez suit.
In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Commercial Casualty Consul-
tants, Inc. 763 Fidelity, an underwriter of bonds and insurance policies,
brought suit against Ward and Benson as sole shareholders of Commercial
Casualty, an independent insurance agency. Fidelity alleged that Commer-
cial's corporate veil should be disregarded in holding Ward and Benson per-
sonally liable for the agency's debt, and that Ward and Benson knowingly
breached their fiduciary duty to Fidelity in connection with the misappropri-
ation and fraudulent personal use of insurance premium funds. The trial
court found Ward and Benson liable on both the tort theory and the corpo-
rate disregard theory. The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment on the corpo-
rate disregard theory, affirmed the judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty,
and reversed Fidelity's award of attorney's fees against Ward and Benson.764
The court first held that Fidelity had produced insufficient evidence to
establish the reliance component of the corporate disregard theory. 765 The
court explained that the corporate veil may be pierced when: (1) the corpo-
ration is the alter ego of its owners and shareholders; (2) the corporation is
used for an illegal purpose; or (3) the corporation is used as a sham to perpe-
trate a fraud. 766 Fidelity sought to recover under the third theory. The fo-
cus of the "sham to perpetrate a fraud theory," under which Fidelity sought
to recover, is on "injustice or unfairness to the claimant caused by the corpo-
ration and its owners. '767 The court noted that Fidelity failed to establish
such unfairness because it failed to prove its own reliance on the financial
backing of the owners, Ward and Benson. The court reasoned that Fidelity
was never aware of Ward and Benson's financial condition or the extent of
their involvement with Commercial. The court found no evidence sug-




763. 976 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1992).
764. Id. at 273.
765. Id. at 274.
766. Id. at 274-75.




gesting Fidelity specifically relied on Ward and Benson to personally per-
form Commercial's corporate functions or guarantee Commercial's
performance. Therefore, the court concluded that Fidelity failed to prove
the reliance necessary to prevail on its corporate disregard theory. 768
The court did hold, however, that the evidence was sufficient to support
the personal judgment against Ward and Benson for knowingly breaching
their fiduciary duty to Fidelity.769 The court reasoned that Commercial's
agency contract with Fidelity created a fiduciary relationship between the
two parties.770 Commercial's breach of the duty implicit in such a special
relationship was, therefore, sufficient to sustain Fidelity's independent tort
action. The court noted that Ward and Benson had personal knowledge of
Commercial's failure to keep insurance premium funds "separate and dis-
tinct" from general revenues despite the recommendations of a consultant,
and later, the president of Commercial, to establish a separate account for
insurance premiums. 77'
VI. FRAUD
In Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters v. Saenz 7 7 2 Saenz suffered
a severe head injury when she fell over backwards in a chair at work. She
was diagnosed with post-concussion syndrome and her doctor determined
that her condition would require indefinite medical attention. Saenz sought
to recover worker's compensation benefits from Fidelity, her employer's
worker's compensation carrier. Armstrong was Fidelity's adjuster in charge
of Saenz's case.
While continuing to pay Saenz's weekly benefits, Fidelity requested a pre-
hearing conference before the Industrial Accident Board. Prior to this pre-
hearing conference, Armstrong called Saenz and offered her $65,000 cash
and an additional five years of open medical. Saenz declined because she
was concerned about future medical costs. At the prehearing conference,
Saenz accepted Fidelity's settlement offer of $65,000 cash and five years open
medical care. Fidelity was represented by an attorney but Saenz was not.
Saenz claimed that the only reason she accepted the offer was that Arm-
strong had told her that the maximum worker's compensation benefit she
could receive was five years of medical care.
Saenz brought suit against Fidelity and Armstrong alleging various causes
of action including fraud. The jury found that Fidelity ratified Armstrong's
malicious, knowing, and fraudulent misrepresentation of the worker's com-
pensation policy benefits to Saenz. Based on the jury's verdict, the court
rendered judgment in favor of Saenz for $50,000 for past mental anguish,
$200,000 for future mental anguish, $500,000 for future medical care, and
$250,000 in punitive damages against Armstrong, and $4 million in punitive
768. Fidelity, 976 F.2d at 275.
769. Id. at 275-76.
770. Id. at 276.
771. Id.
772. 865 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ requested).
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damages against Fidelity. The court of appeals, en banc, reversed in part
and rendered in part, and reversed and remanded in part.7 7 3
Fidelity first argued that the only remedy available to Saenz was a suit to
rescind the settlement agreement. Because Saenz did not seek rescission,
Fidelity argued, she had no remedy for any alleged fraud. The court, how-
ever, held that Saenz's action was not for additional worker's compensation
benefits, but for recovery of damages resulting from Fidelity's misrepresenta-
tion of recoverable medical benefits and therefore concluded that Saenz was
not required to seek rescission of the settlement agreement.774
Fidelity next asserted that the alleged statements made by Armstrong
were only opinions about the law and thus were not actionable fraudulent
misrepresentations of fact. The court noted that, generally, misrepresenta-
tions involving a point of law will not support an action of fraud. However,
when a party having superior knowledge takes advantage of another's igno-
rance of the law to deceive that person, the misrepresentation can amount to
fraud. Additionally, misrepresentations involving a point of law will be con-
sidered misrepresentations of fact if they were intended and understood as
such.
The evidence in this case was that Saenz told Armstrong that she wanted
workers' compensation to pay her lifetime medical benefits resulting from
her head injury. Armstrong, however, told Saenz that the most workers'
compensation would pay her as future medical benefits was five years.
Moreover, Saenz testified that she mentioned to Armstrong that perhaps she
should get an attorney. Armstrong responded that an attorney was not
needed because the settlement would be the same, and Saenz would have to
pay a lawyer twenty-five percent (25%) out of the settlement. Additionally,
there was a letter from Fidelity's attorney to Armstrong suggesting that
Saenz's case was potentially dangerous, and that efforts should be made to
avoid scaring Saenz off to an attorney. From this evidence, the court held
that the jury could infer that Armstrong intended the statement that work-
ers' compensation would allow only five years of medical benefits was a
fraudulent misrepresentation of a point of law.775 The court also concluded
that this statement was a misrepresentation of fact and thus actionable as
fraud. 776
Fidelity next contended that there was no, or insufficient, evidence that
any misrepresentation made by Armstrong was the proximate or producing
cause of damages to Saenz. The court disagreed, pointing to the evidence
that Saenz relied on Armstrong's statements and would not have signed the
settlement agreement except for the representations made to her that the law
did not allow her any additional medical benefits other than the five years
offered by Fidelity.777
773. Id. at 108.
774. Id. at 110.
775. Id. at 111.
776. Id.
777. Saenz, 865 S.W.2d at 112.
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Fidelity next complained about the damages awarded for Saenz's past and
future mental anguish. Fidelity contended that the only evidence of mental
anguish was that Saenz worried about who would pay the medical bills and
that she might lose her home. The court held that to establish mental
anguish, a plaintiff must show more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, em-
barrassment, or anger.778 Here, the evidence showed that Saenz was very
worried about who would pay the medical bills and was afraid that if she
were responsible for the bills that she might lose her home. The court held
that this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of past mental
anguish. 779
The court further concluded that once the existence of mental anguish is
established, much discretion must be given to the jury in setting the amount
of the damages since claims for mental anguish are necessarily specula-
tive. 780 Because the court could not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury, it upheld the award of $50,000 for past mental anguish.78 ' Likewise,
the court affirmed the judgment of $200,000 for future mental anguish
damages. 782
Fidelity next argued that there was no evidence, or insufficient evidence,
to support the award of $500,000 as future medical damages. The court
agreed, because the only evidence presented was of future medical expenses
related to Saenz's head injury, which was the subject of the workers' com-
pensation claim.783 As such, said the court, article 8307 § 5 precludes recov-
ery of these expenses without first rescinding the settlement agreement. The
court, therefore, remanded the case to the trial court to consider rescission of
the compromise settlement agreement with regard to future medical
expenses. 78 4
Fidelity next argued that there was no evidence, or insufficient evidence,
to support the jury's finding that Fidelity ratified Armstrong's acts and rep-
resentations relating to the settlement of Saenz's claim. The court noted that
before Fidelity could be liable for exemplary damages based on Armstrong's
conduct, Saenz had to prove that Fidelity ratified Armstrong's misrepresen-
tations through a managerial agent.785 Saenz attempted to prove ratification
by showing that Lawson, Armstrong's supervisor, was such a managerial
agent. A managerial agent is one who has the authority to hire, fire, and
direct employees of the corporation, or who has the authority to manage the
entire corporation or a department or division of its business.786 The court
concluded that Saenz failed to establish that Lawson was a managerial
agent.787 The evidence presented at trial was that Lawson was a supervisor
778. Id. at 113.
779. Id.
780. Id. at 113-14.
781. Id. at 114.




786. Id. at 115.
787. Saenz, 865 S.W.2d at 115.
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for two or three claim adjusters and had worked for Fidelity for about
twenty-five years. Additionally, there was evidence that Lawson approved
of everything that Armstrong did in handling Saenz's claim. The court held
that this evidence did not show that Lawson had the ability to hire, fire, and
direct employees of the corporation, or had the authority to manage any part
of Fidelity's business. 78 8 The court further concluded that the evidence that
Lawson approved of everything that Armstrong did could not be construed
to mean that he approved of the misrepresentation to Saenz. 78 9 The court,
finding no evidence of ratification, thus reversed the award of $4 million in
punitive damages against Fidelity. 790 The court, however, upheld the
$250,000 punitive damages assessed against Armstrong based on the finding
of conscious indifference. 791
In Shandee Corp. v. Kemper Group 792 Shandee sued Kemper and its
agent, Johnston, for fraud. Johnston told Shandee that its insurance policies
with Kemper would be renewed and merged into a single Texas Multiple
Perils (TMP) policy. Johnston then issued certificates of insurance reflecting
the existence of a general liability policy with an effective date of July 20,
1986 through July 20, 1987. During the fall of 1986, Shandee experienced
several losses and submitted claims to Kemper. Initially, Kemper paid those
claims but later informed Shandee that the general liability policy had not
been renewed and demanded reimbursement for payment of the claims.
Shandee failed to make the reimbursement.
The jury found that Kemper and Johnston were guilty of fraud and as-
sessed approximately $52,000 in actual damages against each. The jury also
found that a contract for general liability coverage existed for the period of
July 1986 through July 1987 and this contract had been breached by Kem-
per. The trial court disregarded the jury findings of fraud against Kemper
and of fraud as to the general liability policy by Johnston.
Shandee first argued that the judgment n.o.v., which disregarded the find-
ings that Kemper had engaged in fraud, was improper because there was
evidence that Kemper directly participated in the fraud. Shandee argued
that Kemper's payment of claims in the fall of 1986, and its subsequent re-
fusal to pay additional claims because of lack of coverage constituted fraud.
The court held that this could constitute a material misrepresentation that
coverage existed, but that Shandee was not damaged by this misrepresenta-
tion.793 Kemper paid the claims and later requested reimbursement of the
amounts paid, but Shandee never reimbursed Kemper for those sums. Addi-
tionally, Kemper's notice that the general liability policy had not been re-
newed and Kemper's refusal to pay additional claims could not constitute
material misrepresentations because they were true. The court, therefore,
788. Id. at 115-16.
789. Id. at 117.
790. Id.
791. Id. at 118.
792. No. C14-92-00126-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Sept. 30, 1993, n.w.h.).
793. Id., slip op. at 4.
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found no evidence of any fraudulent acts committed directly by Kemper.7 9 4
After the jury returned its second verdict against Johnston finding fraud
in connection with the TMP policy and awarding $1 million in exemplary
damages, the trial court disregarded the finding of fraud as to the TMP pol-
icy and reduced the exemplary damages to $80,000. On appeal, Shandee
argued that the evidence supported the jury's finding of fraud by Johnston in
the handling of the TMP policy and that the court erred by reducing the
exemplary damages. According to the court of appeals, the evidence showed
that Johnston represented that the general liability policy would be renewed
as a TMP policy. Furthermore, Johnston advised Kemper not to renew the
general liability policy because Shandee would be applying for a TMP.
Kemper did not issue a TMP policy because it claimed it never received a
completed application from Johnston, who was responsible for making the
application on behalf of Shandee. The court held that this was sufficient
evidence that Johnston made a false material misrepresentation and that
Johnston intended for Shandee to rely on it. 7 9 5 The court, therefore, held
that the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's findings regarding fraud
in connection with the TMP policy. 796
The court also held that the jury's award of $1 million as exemplary dam-
ages was not excessive or unreasonable. 797 The court held that there is no
set ratio between the amount of actual damages and the amount of exem-
plary damages, and whether exemplary damages are reasonable depends
upon the facts of each case.798 Five factors to consider include: (1) the na-
ture of the wrong; (2) the character of the conduct involved; (3) the degree of
culpability of the wrongdoer; (4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties
concerned; and (5) the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense
of justice and propriety. 799 The court held that insurance consumers depend
on the representations of agents regarding coverage, and when insurance
agents fail to live up to their promises, the consumers can suffer catastrophic
losses. 80° Johnston's representations that he was obtaining coverage and his
subsequent failure to submit an application and obtain coverage for Shandee
constituted outrageous conduct that could have caused far more damage to
Shandee. The court, therefore, held that the trial court should not have re-
duced the exemplary damages assessed Johnston.8 0 l
VII. DUTY TO DEFEND
In deciding whether an insurer has a duty to defend, the court must look
only to the pleadings in the case brought against the insured and the insur-
ance policy. The court cannot consider the truth or falsity of the allegations
794. Id.
795. Id,, slip op. at 7-8.
796. Id., slip op. at 8.







in the underlying pleadings, and cannot consider facts ascertained before,
during, or after the suit. If the factual allegations against the insured, when
fairly and reasonably construed, state a cause of action potentially covered
by the policy, the insurer has a duty to defend. In determining the applica-
bility of provisions of the policy, the court must focus on the facts that show
the origin of the damages, not the legal theories asserted for recovery. Fur-
thermore, the court must indulge a liberal interpretation of the meaning of
the allegations and resolve any doubt regarding coverage in favor of the
insured.80 2
A. LIABILITY INSURANCE
1. What Is an "Occurrence'?
In Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Associates,
Inc. 803 the court held that there is no duty to defend a sexual harassment
claim because such a claim is excluded from the definition of "occurrence"
as an intentional act. 8°4 Hankins, Robertson, and Brasier were employed as
nurses at a nursing home owned and operated by CHCA. Claiming that
Tarris, the administrator of CHCA, subjected them to sexual harassment
that ultimately resulted in their resignations, the nurses filed suit against
Tarris and CHCA alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, gross negli-
gence, and negligent hiring. CHCA was insured by Old Republic and Uni-
gard and both companies refused to defend CHCA in the nurses' lawsuit.
Tarris and CHCA ultimately hired their own attorney and received a verdict
in their favor. The insurers brought this action seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that they had no duty to defend.
According to the court, the basis of the nurses' suit against Tarris and
CHCA was that Tarris engaged in intentional acts constituting sexual har-
assment. The question for the court, therefore, was whether an "occur-
rence" under the policy included intentional or willful acts. The Old
Republic policy defined "occurrence" as those damages neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured, while the Unigard policy de-
fined "occurrence" as an accident, including continuous or repeated expo-
sure to conditions, which result in personal injury, property damage, or
advertising liability neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured. The court found that similar definitions of "occurrence" have con-
sistently been interpreted as excluding coverage for intentional acts. 80 5 In
802. All or some of these principles are set forth in Adamo v. State Farm Lloyds Co., 853
S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Cullen/Frost Bank of Dal-
las v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ
granted); and Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., 786 F. Supp. 629
(N.D. Tex. 1992), affid, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993).
803. 786 F. Supp. 629 (N.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1993).
804. Id. at 633. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the exclusions under the policies
were dispositive and therefore declined to revisit the meaning of "occurrences." Old Republic,
2 F.3d at 107.
805. Old Republic, 786 F. Supp. at 632.
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fact, in Aberdeen Insurance Co. v. Bovee8 ° 6 the court found that the insurer
did not have a duty to defend sexual harassment claims because the policy
did not provide for such a duty. The court, thus concluded that the insurers
did not have a duty to defend Tarris and CHCA in the nurses' lawsuit that
arose out of claims of sexual harassment because the claims alleged inten-
tional acts that were not "occurrences" for purposes of policy coverage. 80 7
In Cullen/Frost Bank of Dallas v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance
Co. 808 the bank foreclosed on a condominium project and began selling indi-
vidual units. In 1987, some of the condominium owners sued the bank for
negligence, misrepresentations under the DTPA, breach of express and im-
plied warranties, and for rescission due to defects in the property. (This will
be referred to as the Tompkins suit.) The bank had comprehensive general
liability policies with Commonwealth and United States Fire Insurance
Company, both of whom were notified of the Tompkins suit. The bank de-
manded from the insurers a defense and indemnity. The insurers refused to
defend, claiming that the allegations in the Tompkins suit were not within
coverage or were, alternatively, excluded from coverage. The insurers then
filed this action for a declaratory judgment that they had no duty to defend
the bank in the Tompkins suit. The bank counterclaimed for a defense and
indemnity. The trial court granted the insurers' motion for summary judg-
ment finding that, as a matter of law, the insurers had no duty to defend the
bank. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause to the trial
court. 809
The insurers asserted that they did not have a duty to defend because the
allegations in the Tompkins suit failed to allege an "occurrence" as defined
in the policies. The bank contended that the Tompkins plaintiffs alleged
continuous or multiple occurrences that fell within coverage periods of all
five insurance policies, while the insurers argued that there was only one
occurrence in the Spring of 1986, when the Tompkins plaintiffs discovered
the property damage. The policies defined "occurrence" as, "an accident,
including continuous, or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured."
The court held that the time of the occurrence was when the complaining
party was actually damaged, not the time when the wrongful act was com-
mitted.8 10 In cases involving continuous or repeated exposure to a condi-
tion, there can be more than one manifestation of damage, and hence, an
"occurrence" under more than one policy.8 1' The court held that under the
definition of "occurrence" in this case, there could be a new "occurrence"
each time the complaining parties suffered damage.8 12
806. 777 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
807. Old Republic, 786 F. Supp. at 633.
808. 852 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ granted).
809. Id. at 254.





The allegations in the Tompkins case were that the defects were discov-
ered in the Spring of 1986. However, the allegations did not make it clear
that all the property damage had manifested itself by the Spring of 1986. In
fact, the petition asserted that the bank's failure to remedy the defects had
caused repeated and continued exposure, causing loss of use of the property.
The court, therefore, concluded that there were allegations that at least some
property damage manifested itself after the Spring of 1986 and that the suit
involved more than one "occurrence. 8 1 3
The insurers also argued that there could be no coverage because the bank
intended or expected the accident constituting the "occurrence" because it
knew about the damage in the Spring of 1986. The court noted that there
were inconsistent allegations as to who inspected the property in the Spring
of 1986 and discovered the defects. At one point the Tompkins plaintiffs
alleged that they inspected the building, while at another point they alleged
that the bank conducted the inspection. The court decided that it must ac-
cept the allegation that the Tompkins plaintiffs inspected the property in
resolving this doubt.8 14 The court also noted that there was no allegation
that the Tompkins plaintiffs informed the bank of the damage.
Another reason the insurers asserted for failing to provide a defense was
that the Tompkins suit failed to allege property damage, which was defined
in the insurance policies as:
(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs
during the policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time
resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of the use of tangible property which has
not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is
caused by an occurrence during the policy period.
The court found that the Tompkins plaintiffs alleged property damage in
accordance with this definition as they complained of drainage problems in
the garage floor, excessive floor displacement, warped and swollen door and
window frames, rotten woodwork on patio doors and window sills, warped
and uneven floors, and repeated breakdown of elevators.8 15
The insurers also claimed that they did not have a duty to defend because
the policies excluded from coverage property that had been alienated by the
bank. The court noted that while the bank had sold nine of the condomin-
ium units, it had retained ownership of one unit and a corresponding per-
centage of the common areas. The court held that the alienated-property
exclusion precluded coverage of the underlying claims only to the extent that
the Tompkins suit alleged damages to the plaintiffs' individual condominium
units.81 6 However, this exclusion did not apply to the allegations based on
property damage to a common area that was not alienated by the bank.
Similarly, the court held that the completed-operations exclusion did not
apply because not all of the alleged property damage occurred on the prem-
813. Cullen/Frost, 852 S.W.2d at 258.
814. Id.
815. Id. at 256.
816. Id. at 259.
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ises no longer owned by the bank. 817 As previously noted, the bank had not
relinquished all the possession and control to the common areas and part of
the complaint in the Tompkins suit involved the common areas. Moreover,
the policy providing coverage from April 9 to November 6, 1987, did not
contain a completed-operations exclusion and, therefore, there was a possi-
bility of coverage giving rise to the duty to defend under this policy.
2. Policy Exclusions
Abe's Colony Club, Inc. v. C & W Underwriters, Inc. 818 is a duty to defend
case involving a liquor liability exclusion. Abe's Colony Club was sued by
Callihan for injuries he incurred in a vehicle accident caused by an intoxi-
cated patron of a bar owned and operated by Abe's. Abe's requested that C
& W and Mt. Hawley Insurance defend the suit based on Abe's liability
insurance policy. Both insurers refused to provide a defense. Abe's later
brought suit against C & W and Mt. Hawley for expenses incurred in de-
fending against Callihan's claim. Mt. Hawley and C & W sought a summary
judgment that no defense was required due to a liquor liability exclusion
provision in the policy and due to the statute of limitations barring Abe's
DTPA, Insurance Code, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing causes of action. The trial court granted this motion and the court of
appeals affirmed.
The policy issued by Mt. Hawley to Abe's provided that there was no
coverage for loss resulting from a violation of any statute, ordinance, or reg-
ulation pertaining to the sale, gift, distribution, or use of any alcoholic bever-
age, or by reason of the selling, serving, or giving of any alcoholic beverage
to a minor or a person under the influence of alcohol, or which causes or
contributes to the intoxication of any person. The court held that this exclu-
sion negated coverage for liability arising out of the business of selling or
serving alcohol.819 Abe's argued that some of the allegations made by Cal-
lihan fell outside of the liquor liability exclusion, namely that Abe's was neg-
ligent in its failure to determine, discover, or notice that its customer was
intoxicated, in its failure to offer its patron alternative transportation, and in
its failure to properly train and supervise its employees. The court found
that all of these allegations arose from the business of selling or serving alco-
hol to a person under the influence of alcohol or that causes or contributes to
the intoxication of any person. Therefore, Callihan's complaint fell within
the liquor liability exclusion and Mt. Hawley had no duty to defend under
the policy.8 20
The court also affirmed the summary judgment based on limitations, hold-
ing that limitations began to run at the time Mt. Hawley denied coverage
under the policy, rather than the date the underlying lawsuit became final. 821
817. Id. at 260.
818. 852 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
819. Id. at 89.
820. Id.
821. Id. at 91.
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Because Mt. Hawley denied Abe's coverage under the policy more than
three years before Mt. Hawley was sued, the court held that Abe's DTPA,
Insurance Code, and duty of good faith and fair dealing claims were barred
by limitations.8 22
The liquor liability exclusion was also the subject of Western Heritage In-
surance Co. v. River Entertainment.8 23 Western Heritage sought a declara-
tion that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured, River
Entertainment, in connection with a lawsuit Rodriguez brought against Hill
and River Entertainment. Rodriguez originally alleged that Hill became in-
toxicated at an establishment owned by River Entertainment, and on his
way home ran into Rodriguez's vehicle, killing his daughter. River En-
tertainment requested that Western Heritage defend and indemnify it pursu-
ant to the terms of Western Heritage's comprehensive general liability
policy. Western Heritage declined because of a liquor liability exclusion in
the policy.
In the declaratory judgment action, the federal district court concluded
that Western Heritage had no duty to defend River Entertainment. The dis-
trict court dismissed the action as to the indemnity issue because any deci-
sion regarding indemnity would amount to an advisory ruling. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed in part and modified and rendered in part. 824
River Entertainment argued that the district court erred in finding no
duty to defend because it did not follow the "complaint allegation rule"
under Texas law. This rule, as mentioned above, asserts that an insurer's
duty to defend is determined only by reference to the petition and the pol-
icy's provisions. In this case, the pleading under consideration by the court
had no references to Hill being intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol.
These allegations were removed from Rodriguez's petition after Western
Heritage asserted the liquor liability exclusion. Yet, the district court con-
sidered facts extraneous to this petition and determined that because Hill's
impaired state was a result of having consumed numerous alcoholic bever-
ages, the liquor liability exclusion applied and Western Heritage had no duty
to defend. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court's consideration of
extraneous facts was proper because the petition did not contain sufficient
facts to enable the court to determine if coverage existed.825 Relying on
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wade,826 the court concluded that Texas
law would sanction the district court's methodology in reaching its
conclusion.8 27
In Wade the court was faced with the issue of whether a private boat
owner's policy would provide a defense to an underlying action brought by
the representatives of a deceased passenger. The insurer alleged that the
decedent was using the boat in a commercial activity and this was excluded
822. Id.
823. 998 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1993).
824. Id. at 315.
825. Id. at 314.
826. 827 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
827. Western Heritage, 998 F.2d at 314.
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from coverage. Because the petition did not state how the boat was being
used, the court looked to extraneous facts to make this determination, which
was critical to resolving the issue of coverage. The Fifth Circuit held that it
was impossible to discern from the Rodriguez complaint why Hill was im-
paired to the point where River Entertainment's employees should have re-
strained him.8 28 According to the court, such an explanation is critical to
the question of coverage, and thus consideration of extraneous facts was
proper. 829 The court further held that because there was no duty to defend
under the policy in light of the liquor liability exclusion, there could be no
duty to indemnify. 830 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit modified the judgment of
the district court and rendered judgment that Western Heritage had no duty
to defend or indemnify River Entertainment.8 3 1
Departing even further from the complaint allegation rule is the case of
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Cooper Machinery Corp. 832 In this case,
Ohio Casualty sought a declaration that it had no obligation to defend or
indemnify its insured, Cooper, in an action brought by James. James alleged
that he sustained damages in an accident caused by a defective steamroller
sold to his employer by Cooper and manufactured by Mauldin. Ohio Casu-
alty refused to defend and indemnify Cooper based on the policy exclusion
for completed operations. James then amended his pleadings to allege that
Mauldin and Cooper failed to properly complete and finish the manufactur-
ing of the steamroller. Cooper, thus, argued that the complete operations
hazard exclusion did not apply.
The court, ignoring the principle that the truth or falsity of the allegations
in the underlying pleadings cannot be considered, held that Ohio Casualty
could avoid its defense obligation by showing extrinsic facts that the allega-
tions indicating coverage are in fact false and that under the true facts there
is no coverage.8 33 The court felt that James's petition, on its face, did not
state a cause of action within coverage. But, said the court, "even if there
were allegations of facts that would indicate the existence of coverage, the
insurance company would be entitled in the declaratory judgment action to
establish that the facts are false and that, therefore, there is no obligation
under the policy, either to defend or to pay."9834
In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Conner835 Fidelity & Deposit
brought a declaratory judgment action after several former directors of an
insolvent bank requested a defense in an action brought against them by the
FDIC and in which the directors asserted claims against each other. Fidel-
ity & Deposit refused to provide a defense under the directors and officers
liability insurance policy it had issued to the failed bank, claiming coverage




832. 817 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
833. Id. at 48.
834. Id.
835. 973 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1992).
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was precluded by the "regulatory" 836 and "insured vs. insured" 837 exclu-
sions. The district court granted summary judgment for Fidelity & Deposit,
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.8 38
The FDIC argued that the exclusions did not apply because its action was
a shareholder/depositor derivative action. The court rejected this argument
since the FDIC made no attempt to show an independent breach of duty
toward the bank's depositors or shareholders-a requirement for independ-
ent shareholder liability. 839 Moreover, the FDIC made no effort to comply
with Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is the rule
that sets forth the pleading requirements of a shareholders' derivative action.
Rather than being a shareholders' derivative action, the court found that the
FDIC's claims were asserted as subrogee of the bank.84°
The FDIC next argued that enforcement of these exclusions would violate
public policy by depriving it of its rights under the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).8 4' The court held that
generally people have the utmost liberty of contract and these agreements
will be invalidated on grounds of public policy only in very limited situa-
tions.842 The court concluded that public policy did not preclude the en-
forcement of the exclusions because public policy cannot be used to create
coverage that does not otherwise exist. 843 Moreover, Congress rejected a
proposal by the FDIC to include in FIRREA a provision that would have
rendered unenforceable the regulatory and insured vs. insured exclusions. 844
Thus, the court rejected the notion that FIRREA's policy would be im-
paired by enforcing the exclusions since Congress had revealed its desire to
remain neutral on this issue.8 45
The FDIC was also unsuccessful in its attempt to convince the court that
the exclusions were ambiguous and thus should be construed in favor of
coverage. The court held that the exclusions are clear, plain and unequivo-
cal and thus would not read ambiguity into the policy language.8 46
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. FDIC8 47 United States Fire sought
a declaration that a fidelity bond it had issued to protect Empire Savings and
Loan from employee fraud and dishonesty automatically terminated when
836. This exclusion provided that Fidelity & Deposit would not be liable for any loss in
connection with claims made against the directors and officers by "any State or Federal Official
or Agency, including but not limited to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation." Id. at 1238.
837. This exclusion provided that Fidelity & Deposit would not be liable for any loss in
connection with claims made against the directors and officers by "any other Director or Of-
ficer of the Bank/Association or by the Bank/Association, except for a shareholders' deriva-
tive action. Id.
838. Id.
839. Id. at 1240.
840. Conner, 973 F.2d at 1241.
841. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1833(e) (1989).
842. Conner, 973 F.2d at 1241.
843. Id. at 1243.
844. Id. at 1242.
845. Id. at 1242-43.
846. Id. at 1245.
847. 981 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
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Empire was placed in supervision. The district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of United States Fire and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.8 48 The
bond provided that it would automatically terminate "immediately upon the
taking over of the Insured by a receiver or other liquidator or by State or
Federal officials." The FDIC argued that this provision was contrary to
public policy, was ambiguous, and that a takeover did not occur. The Fifth
Circuit dismissed these arguments as each had been previously rejected by
the court in Sharp v. FSLIC.8 4 9 The court further held that a takeover did
indeed occur even though Empire placed itself under voluntary supervisory
control by the Texas Savings and Loan Commission. 85 0 The court found
that Empire, in doing so, was prohibited from engaging in activities that are
core functions of a savings and loan. Since another entity assumed control
or management of Empire, the court held that a takeover did occur.8 5 1
3. Excess Liability Carriers
Columbia Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc. 852 was a declaratory
judgment action brought by Columbia, Fiesta's excess liability insurer, after
the demand that it indemnify Fiesta for a $7 million judgment. Fiesta had
leased space in its stores to Monytron in order to provide financial services
to its customers. However, Monytron proceeded to defraud Fiesta's custom-
ers by siphoning deposits and investments involving an illegal conversion of
pesos to dollars. After Fiesta notified Columbia of the pending class action
suit, Columbia issued a reservation of rights letter and refused to defend
Fiesta in the resulting legal action. Fiesta ultimately settled the claims
against it for $7 million and demanded indemnification from Columbia. The
district court granted summary judgment for Fiesta, holding that Columbia
was obligated to indemnify it for the judgment. The Fifth Circuit
reversed.8 53
The court first noted that when an insurer breaches a duty to defend it is
bound in subsequent proceedings by a settlement or judgment rendered
against the insured. However, said the court, the issue of the insured's liabil-
ity and coverage under the policy are separate and distinct. Thus, a prior
judgment establishing liability of the insured to a third-party is not binding
in a subsequent proceeding to determine whether the insurance policy pro-
vides coverage requiring the insurer to defend and/or indemnify the in-
sured.8 54 Moreover, the insurer will not be bound by liability findings
against the insured unless the finding was essential to the judgment and priv-
ity existed between insurer and insured.8
55
The judgment against Fiesta stated that Fiesta's negligence and DTPA
848. Id. at 852.
849. 858 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1988).
850. U. S. Fire Ins., 981 F.2d at 851.
851. Id. at 851.
852. 987 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1993).





violations were an "occurrence" resulting in property damage and bodily
injury. The court held that this finding of "occurrence" was not essential to
a judgment based on negligence or DTPA violations.8 56 The court also con-
cluded that there was no privity between Columbia and Fiesta because their
positions regarding coverage were in conflict.8 57 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the establishment of Fiesta's liability did not prevent the litiga-
tion of Columbia's insurance coverage in the present case.8 58
The court next held that Fiesta's exposure to Monytron's fraudulent activ-
ity did not constitute an "occurrence" under Columbia's insurance policy.859
The court reasoned that the "occurrence" in question was not due to Fiesta's
direct negligent and unknowing acts. 86° Instead, Fiesta's liability was "re-
lated [to] and interdependent" on Monytron's fraud.861 The court, there-
fore, construed the "ultimate issue" to be whether Columbia's insurance
policy covered Monytron's fraudulent activity.
Noting the lack of Texas Supreme Court authority, the court agreed with
Houston Petroleum Co. v. Highlands Insurance Co. 8 62 which held that an
insured's exposure to the fraud of a third party does not comport with its
insurance policy's definition of an "occurrence. '8 63 The court concluded
that Fiesta's mere exposure to Monytron's fraud did not constitute an "oc-
currence" under Columbia's policy, and thus there was no coverage.8
64
In Harbor Insurance Co. v. Urban Construction Co. 8 65 Harbor brought a
declaratory judgment suit, as Urban's excess liability insurer, after the de-
mand that it indemnify Urban for its share of a $1.26 million judgment.
During the policy period, Urban was sued for property damage caused by
defects in the construction of a condominium project. As general contrac-
tor, Urban had subcontracted most of the work on the project. Urban noti-
fied Harbor of the pending suit, and Harbor reserved its rights under the
policy pending an investigation of the claim. Urban's previous insurance
policy with Harbor had contained a special endorsement that covered prop-
erty damage performed on behalf of Urban. However, the endorsement was
mistakenly omitted from the renewal policy.
As a result of arbitration, Urban was found liable for the construction
defects in the amount of $1.26 million. Urban's primary insurers tendered
the limits of their policies. However, Harbor refused to pay under the claim
and filed this declaratory judgment action. Urban counterclaimed for
breach of contract, negligence, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code
and DTPA. The district court granted summary judgment for Harbor on all
856. Id. at 1128.




861. Id. (citing Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 786 F.
Supp. 629, 632 (N.D. Tex. 1992)).
862. 830 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
863. Id. at 155-56.
864. Columbia Mut., 987 F.2d at 1128.
865. 990 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1993).
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claims. The district court reasoned that it was precluded from considering
any extrinsic evidence of the coverage issue, even if offered to prove the par-
ties were mutually mistaken that coverage existed under the policy. The
district court further reasoned that Urban's statutory counterclaims were
barred by the statute of limitations because Urban should have discovered
that the renewal policy lacked the desired endorsement when it was deliv-
ered, or at the latest when Urban was sued for defective construction. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed.8 66
The court first repudiated the district court's conclusions that (1) the pa-
rol evidence rule prevented reformation of an integrated policy containing a
mutual mistake; and (2) as a matter of law, Urban was bound by the terms of
the policy when it accepted the policy. 867 Instead, the Fifth Circuit held
that Texas law allows reformation even when a written contract purports to
be completely integrated.8 68 Moreover, the court noted that "the parol evi-
dence rule does not preclude such a showing of mistake. '8 69 The court also
held that under Texas law, an insured's failure to read an insurance policy
does not bar correction of the mistake. 870 The insured, said the court, is not
required to examine the delivered policy, and may rely on the assumption
that the agreement was expressed in writing.
The court held, however, that the statute of limitations barred Urban's
assertion of mutual mistake under the policy. 87 1 The court viewed Urban's
action as one for reformation of a contract rather than breach of an intended
agreement. Even though intended agreements can be enforced without a
prior action for reformation, the court held that because a party asserting
mutual mistake is in essence seeking reformation, the statute of limitations
applicable to reformation actions also applies to the defense of mutual mis-
take.8 7 2 Thus, the court held that limitations began to run when Urban
knew, or should have known, that the policy did not contain the desired
endorsement. 873 The evidence showed that Urban knew of the omission in
1981 and should have known of this omission, at the latest, in February 1985
when it was sued. Urban, however, did not assert mutual mistake until Sep-
tember 1989, after Harbor denied the claim. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that Urban's failure to assert reformation in a timely fashion due to
mutual mistake precluded its contractual claim against Harbor.8 74
Because Urban could not insist on the policy with the desired endorse-
ments - the only basis for coverage - the court held that Harbor had a
866. Id. at 202.
867. Id. at 199.
868. Id.
869. Id. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 741 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. 1987) (quot-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155, cmt. a (1981)).
870. Harbor Ins., 990 F.2d at 199-200 (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Paddock, 301 F.2d 807, 811
(5th Cir. 1962)).
871. Id. at 200-01.
872. Id. at 200.




reasonable basis for denying Urban's claim. 875 Thus, the court concluded
that Harbor did not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing.
876
The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's rulings. 877 The
court held that Urban's negligence claim failed because Harbor had a rea-
sonable basis for denying coverage; Harbor was, therefore, not negligent for
refusing to settle the underlying suit.878 The court also held that limitations
barred Urban's misrepresentation claims under the Texas Insurance Code
and the DTPA due to its knowledge of the omission of the endorsement in
1981.879
The court, by forcing Urban to bring suit for reformation within four
years of its discovery of the absence of the endorsement, but before Harbor's
denial of the claim, requires Urban to accurately predict that Harbor would
not abide by the agreement, even though both parties admitted they knew
the true nature of the agreement. The limitations should have begun to run
from the time Urban knew, or should have known, that Harbor would not
comply with the agreement. This did not happen until April 1989, when
Harbor reserved its rights under the policy pending an investigation of the
claims asserted against Urban. Within days after Harbor's denial of the
claim in September 1989, the suit was filed and Urban was asserting mutual
mistake to prove the true agreement.
The inequities of the court's decision are shown by the evidence that the
custom in the insurance industry is to provide coverage on the basis of in-
tended agreements as shown by underwriting files regardless of actual policy
language.880 Thus, Urban justifiably expected Harbor to provide coverage as
provided in the endorsement and had no reason to institute a suit for refor-
mation until it became clear that Harbor would act differently. The court
has allowed the insurer to take advantage of an industry custom and practice
to the detriment of the insured.
B. HOMEOWNERS' INSURANCE
In Chiles v. Chubb Lloyds Insurance Co. 881 Lloyds issued a homeowner's
policy that provided Chiles personal liability coverage for bodily injury dam-
ages he might become obligated to pay. The policy excluded coverage for
damages resulting from bodily injury caused intentionally by, or at the direc-
tion of, the insured. Patti Chiles sued Chiles for divorce, and sought dam-
ages resulting from his alleged intentional and negligent conduct, which
caused her physical pain and mental anguish. Patti's negligence claims were
not submitted to the jury, and the trial court entered judgment awarding
Patti monetary damages for Chiles intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals modified the trial court's
875. Harbor Ins., 990 F.2d at 201.




880. Harbor Ins., 990 F.2d at 201 n. 7.
881. 858 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
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judgment, and denied Patti all relief except the granting of the divorce.8 12
Chiles first notified Lloyds of the suit and Patti's claims after the trial and
requested that Lloyds pay the cost of defense in this divorce action. In this
declaratory judgment action, the trial court determined that Lloyds did not
owe a duty to Chiles to defend or pay the cost of a defense because Chiles
breached the policy's conditions. The court of appeals affirmed.88 3
Chiles argued to the court of appeals that he did not breach the policy's
condition precedent concerning notice because Texas law does not consider
a timely notice provision in a general liability policy to be a condition prece-
dent to coverage. The court noted that by an amendatory endorsement ef-
fective May 1, 1973,884 and applicable to all general liability policies in
Texas, the State Board of Insurance now requires that the insurer be
prejudiced by the insured's failure to forward suit papers before such a fail-
ure will bar liability under the policy.88 5 However, there was no showing to
the trial court that this endorsement applied to homeowner's policies, or that
a homeowner's policy is a general liability policy. Moreover, Lloyds
presented an affidavit from an employee of the Department of Insurance
who stated that he had searched all the policy forms and endorsements for
homeowner's insurance and could find no endorsement for homeowner's
policies requiring the insurer to show prejudice before denying coverage for
the lack of timely notice. Therefore, because the homeowner's policy in this
case stated that notice was a condition precedent, the court of appeals held
that Lloyds had no duty to defend or pay defense costs because Chiles failed
to give timely notice of his claims.886
In Adamo v. State Farm Lloyds Co. 8 87 the court was presented with the
issue of whether State Farm had a duty to defend Adamo in a legal malprac-
tice claim pursuant to the terms of his homeowner's policy. When Marino
was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury, he turned to Adamo, his
friend and attorney, for advice. Marino alleged that Adamo advised him to
leave the country until the criminal investigation was resolved. Marino and
Adamo then made arrangements for the transfer of Marino's personal prop-
erty and management of his business to Rebescher, a friend of Adamo.
When Marino returned to the United States, he found that his business had
been reincorporated under a different name and Rebescher refused to relin-
quish control. Marino then sued Adamo and his wife, Tana, Adamo's law
partner and Rebescher for legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud and conspiracy to defraud, and conversion.
Adamo requested a defense from State Farm under his homeowner's pol-
icy. State Farm determined that it had no duty to defend because of policy
exclusions for business pursuits and the rendering of professional services.
State Farm then filed this declaratory judgment action. The trial court
882. Id. at 635.
883. Id.
884. Board Order 23080.
885. Chiles, 858 S.W.2d at 635.
886. Id. at 635-36.
887. 853 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
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granted a summary judgment in favor of State Farm. The court of appeals
affirmed.18
Adamo argued that if a case is potentially within policy coverage, the in-
surer has a duty to defend, even if some of the causes of action are clearly
outside coverage. Adamo claimed that Marino's lawsuit potentially fell
within coverage because he alleged that a fiduciary relationship existed be-
tween the parties as the result of a long-time personal friendship. Thus, ac-
cording to Adamo, there existed the potential that Marino's causes of action
arose out of a personal, rather than a professional, relationship.
The court rejected this argument, holding that it is not the cause of action
alleged which determines coverage, but the facts giving rise to the alleged
actionable conduct.8 9 The court concluded that Marino's damages
stemmed from the professional relationship between him and Adamo, acting
as his attorney. 890 According to the court, but for the fact that Adamo was
an attorney, Marino would not have turned to him for advice. Because Ma-
rino's causes of action arose only because of the attorney-client relationship,
the court held that State Farm had no duty to defend Adamo.89
VIII. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
A. UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
1. Stacking of Coverage
In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court decided in Stracener v. United Services
Automobile Association 892 that an insurer cannot deduct from its underin-
sured coverage limits the amount paid to its insured under a separate pol-
icy. 89 3 In Bowen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 894 the court was faced with
whether to give Stracener a prospective or retrospective application.
Bowen was covered by an automobile insurance policy issued by Aetna,
which provided a limit of $100,000 under the underinsured motorist provi-
sion. Bowen was rear-ended by another driver, which caused her over
$125,000 in damages and personal injuries. With Aetna's consent, Bowen
settled with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier for $25,000, the maximum ben-
efits under the policy. Bowen then looked to Aetna for the balance of the
damages.
Aetna deducted the $25,000 paid by the other carrier and agreed to pay a
total of $75,000. Bowen signed a release, gave it to her attorney, and cashed
the check from Aetna. Bowen's attorney did not deliver the release to
Aetna. A few days later, Stracener was decided. Bowen then filed suit to
recover the additional $25,000 Aetna had deducted from her coverage.
Aetna answered, contending that it owed nothing further because its debt
888. Id. at 674.
889. Id. at 676.
890. Id.
891. Id.
892. 777 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1989).
893. Id. at 379-80.
894. 837 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1992).
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had been extinguished under the doctrines of payment, release, accord and
satisfaction, and compromise and settlement. Both parties sought a sum-
mary judgment, and the trial court granted Aetna's and denied Bowen's.
On appeal, Bowen argued that the Stracener holding should apply and
that Aetna should have paid the full $100,000. The San Antonio Court of
Appeals held that the Stracener decision should be applied prospectively,
since there was no foreshadowing of the Stracener decision, and because it
would be inequitable to apply it to litigants who had relied on lower court
rulings to the contrary. The supreme court reversed and remanded.8 95 The
court held that its decisions operate retroactively unless the court exercises
its discretion to modify that application.8 96 The court held that Stracener
should be applied retroactively since it corrected a misinterpretation of arti-
cle 5.06-1 of the Texas Insurance Code by some courts of appeal, which had
added words not found in the statute and had failed to construe the insur-
ance law in accordance with its policy statements. 897
The court in Upshaw v. The Trinity Co. 898 refused to apply Stracener to a
situation where the insured was attempting to stack underinsured motorist
coverage for multiple vehicles insured under a single policy. George Up-
shaw was killed when his car collided with a vehicle owned by Brett Field
and driven by John Pleasant. At the time of the accident, Upshaw had a
single multi-vehicle insurance policy issued by Trinity covering three
automobiles. Upshaw paid three separate premiums for unin-
sured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage; one for each car. Cov-
erage under the policy for UM/UIM protection was $20,000 per person and
$40,000 per accident.
Upshaw's surviving son and daughter filed suit against Field and Pleasant
for negligence and against Trinity under its policy. In the suit against Trin-
ity, which was severed from the negligence action, the Upshaws sought a
declaration that the UM/UIM provisions of the policy could be stacked to
allow a maximum recovery of $40,000, arguing that the separate premiums
paid on each vehicle entitled them to such coverage. The trial court held
that the UIM coverage for the multiple vehicles insured under the policy
could not be stacked, and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court
affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in favor of Trinity. 899
Initially, the Upshaws argued to the supreme court that the policy was
ambiguous and should be construed to maximize coverage. The UM/UIM
coverage provided that:
If separate limits of liability for bodily injury and property damage lia-
bility are shown in the Declarations for this coverage the limit of liabil-
ityfor "each person"for bodily injury liability is our maximum limit of
895. Id. at 100.
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. 842 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. 1992). See also Monroe v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
845 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied), which follows Upshaw in
not permitting intrapolicy stacking of policy limits.
899. Upshaw, 842 S.W.2d at 632.
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liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in
any one accident. Subject to this limit for "each person," the limit of
liability shown in the Declarations for "each accident" for bodily injury
liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily
injury resulting from any one auto accident. 9° °
The court held that this language was certain and not reasonably suscepti-
ble to more than one interpretation. 90 1 According to the court, the contract
provided that for any one person, the limits of coverage are $20,000 per
accident. It also limited to $40,000 the total recovery when more than one
person suffers a loss in a single accident. Therefore, the court held that the
policy unambiguously limited coverage to prohibit intrapolicy stacking. 90 2
The Upshaws also argued that public .policy mandates the intrapolicy
stacking of limits because additional premiums were charged and paid in
exchange for UIM coverage for each vehicle listed on the policy. In re-
sponding to this argument, the court first looked to article 5.06-1 of the In-
surance Code, which mandates the minimum coverages of UM/UIM
insurance and -provides that such coverage;
shall include provisions that, regardless of the number of persons in-
sured, policies or bonds applicable, vehicles involved, or claims made,
the total aggregate limit of liability to any one person who sustains bod-
ily injury or property damage as the result of any one occurrence shall
not exceed the limit of liability for these coverages as stated in the pol-
icy ... 903
According to the court, this statute shows the legislature's intent to permit
insurance companies to limit a single multi-vehicle policy's required UIM
coverage to the stated limit of liability contained in the policy without al-
lowing for intrapolicy stacking.904
The court next distinguished Stracener and held that when there are mul-
tiple insurers, a primary concern is that no single insurer be allowed to avoid
liability entirely by pointing to coverage in another insurance policy. How-
ever, when there is just one insurance policy covering several automobiles,
there is no danger, according 'to the court, that the single insurer will avoid
liability entirely. The court, therefore, held that there was no overriding
public policy to allow intrapolicy stacking.90 5
Without citing or relying upon Upshaw, the courts in Texas Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tatum 90 6 and Bergensen v. Hartford Insurance
Co. 907 both held that it is not permissible to stack uninsured/underinsured
motorist coverage where there is single multi-car coverage.
In the Tatum case, a car owned by Cecil and Ida Tatum was involved in a
one-car accident. The car was driven by Moody, with the permission of
900. Id. at 633 (emphasis by the court).
901. Id.
902. Id.
903. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(2)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
904. Upshaw, 842 S.W.2d at 635.
905. Id.
906. 841 S.W.2d 89, 94 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
907. 845 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ requested).
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Melanie Tatum, the Tatums' daughter. As a result of the accident, Melanie
was killed and two friends, Robert Powell and Cherie Stanley, were injured.
It was uncontested that the negligence of Moody was one of the proximate
causes of the accident and damages.
At the time of the accident, Moody was insured by Allstate, which pro-
vided liability coverage in the amount of $40,000 per accident. The Tatums'
policy with Texas Farm Bureau provided an aggregate liability coverage of
$50,000 per accident and uninsured/underinsured coverage of $20,000 per
person and $40,000 per accident. Both carriers tendered into the registry of
the court their maximum liability coverage.
The trial court found that the Tatums suffered $350,000 in actual damages
as a result of Melanie's death, Robert Powell suffered $350,000 actual dam-
ages, and Cherie Stanley suffered $77,000 actual damages. The court then
prorated the $90,000, which was deposited into the registry of the court,
among the Tatums, Powell, and Stanley. The court then determined that the
Tatums, Powell, and Stanley were underinsured within the provisions of
Texas Farm Bureau's policy and ordered that they recover under the under-
insured coverage. Because the Tatums had four cars listed and insured on
their policy, the trial court stacked the underinsured coverage and awarded
the Tatums $86,154.
Texas Farm Bureau appealed, arguing first that the Tatums, Powell, and
Stanley were not entitled to benefits under the underinsured provision of the
policy because the Tatum vehicle was specifically excluded from the defini-
tion of an "underinsured" vehicle. The Tatums conceded that their vehicle
was excluded from coverage by the definition of "uninsured/underinsured"
in the policy, but argued that such exclusion frustrates the intention of the
legislature in enacting article 5.06-1 of the Texas Insurance Code. The
Tatums relied on Stracener and Briones v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.908
The court found both Stracener and Briones distinguishable from the pres-
ent case.909 The question in Stracener was whether the amount of multi-
policy insurance coverage available or whether the amount of the injured
parties' actual damages determined if the injured party qualified to recover
underinsured benefits. The court allowed the stacking of the limits of under-
insured coverage under four separate policies to determine whether a
tortfeasor was underinsured. Briones, according to the court, was different
because it did not involve a situation where both the operator and owner of
the car were insured. Instead, Briones involved a situation where a passen-
ger in a vehicle owned by his uninsured employer and driven by an unin-
sured co-worker was allowed to recover under the uninsured provisions of
his personal automobile policy.
The court instead found Scarborough v. Employers Casualty Co.910 to be
more similar to the facts of this case. In Scarborough Mrs. Scarborough
908. 790 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
909. Tatum, 841 S.W.2d at 92.
910. 820 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
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sued her husband for injuries she sustained as a result of his negligence while
driving their car and also sued the insurer for uninsured/underinsured bene-
fits. The court of appeals in Scarborough affirmed a summary judgment in
favor of the insurer, relying on a statement in Stracener that:
By purchasing this coverage along with basic liability coverage, the in-
sured has expressed an intent not only to protect others from his or her
own negligence but also to protect that person's own family and guests
from the negligence of others.911
The Scarborough court reasoned that the word "others" meant strangers to
the policyholders, not Mrs. Scarborough's husband. 912
The Tatum court, therefore, concluded that the exclusionary language in
the Tatums' policy did not frustrate the intent and purpose of the legislature
in enacting article 5.06-1 of the Texas Insurance Code.913
Texas Farm Bureau next argued that the trial court was wrong to stack
the Tatums' underinsured coverage in its award to the Tatums. Again, the
Tatums relied on Stracener for their argument that stacking is permissible
when there is single-policy coverage. The court disagreed, finding that
Stracener was limited to those cases where two or more policies were in-
volved.914 The court, instead, relied on Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v.
Tucker,915 where the court held that Tucker was not entitled to stack his
uninsured motorist coverage because he had paid for that coverage on sev-
eral vehicles named in the policy. The court, therefore, concluded that
stacking of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle coverage is not permissi-
ble when there is single multi-car coverage.916
In Bergensen v. Hartford Insurance Co.9 17 Hartford issued an automobile
policy to the Bergensens that included UM/UIM coverage. After being in-
jured while riding in their car driven by Mr. Bergensen, Mrs. Bergensen sued
her husband, alleging that his negligence was the proximate cause of her
damages. Hartford paid $100,000 to settle the lawsuit, which was the maxi-
mum amount covered under the liability portion of the Bergensens' policy.
Later, Mrs. Bergensen filed a second suit contending that her husband was
underinsured and that Hartford was liable under the UM/UIM provision of
the Bergensens' policy. The trial court granted Hartford's motion for sum-
mary judgment and entered a take-nothing judgment against Mrs. Bergen-
sen. The court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal, Mrs. Bergensen, relying on Stracener, argued that she was en-
titled to stack the uninsured motorist and liability provisions of the insur-
ance policy. The court found Stracener distinguishable because there the
court allowed the stacking of the limits of underinsured motorist coverage
911. Id. at 34 (quoting Stracener, 777 S.W.2d at 384) (emphasis added by the court of
appeals).
912. Scarborough, 820 S.W.2d at 34.
913. Tatum, 841 S.W.2d at 93.
914. Id. at 94.
915. 512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974).
916. Tatum, 841 S.W.2d at 94.
917. 845 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ requested).
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under four separate insurance policies to determine whether a tortfeasor was
uninsured. Mrs. Bergensen, by contrast, sought payment under two cover-
age provisions contained in a single insurance policy. Furthermore, the
court found the uninsured motorist provision of the contract explicitly stated
that it did not apply to vehicles owned by the insured. 918
Mrs. Bergensen next argued that excluding their car from the definition of
"uninsured" vehicle would be contrary to public policy. The court, relying
on Stracener and Scarborough, held that underinsured motorist coverage
was intended to protect the insured from the negligence of persons who are
not members of the policyholder's family.919
Mrs. Bergensen next compared this case to National County Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Johnson920 where the court held that the family-member
exclusion in a liability insurance contract was void and contrary to the
Safety Responsibility Act that requires drivers to carry liability insurance
covering all damages arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. The
court did not find National County Mutual persuasive because article 5.06-1
of the Texas Insurance Code permits the adoption of policy forms that limit
the definition of "uninsured" motor vehicle. The court, therefore, deter-
mined that the exclusion of the Bergensens' vehicle from the definition of
"uninsured" motor vehicle did not contravene the policy underlying article
5.06-1.921
In Fontanez v. Texas Farm Bureau Insurance Cos. 922 the court held that
the exclusion of the insured's vehicle from the definition of "uninsured" mo-
tor vehicle did contravene the policy underlying article 5.06-1. In this case,
Chipman, the insured, was killed when struck by the door of her car as
Street was attempting to steal it. Texas Farm Bureau refused to pay under
the uninsured motorist coverage claiming that Chipman's vehicle was not an
uninsured motor vehicle as defined by the policy. In reversing a summary
judgment in favor of the insurer, the court relied on Briones, where Briones
was permitted to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of his per-
sonal insurance for injuries sustained in a vehicle owned by his employer,
which was not insured, and being driven by another employee, who also was
uninsured. State Farm argued that there was no coverage because the vehi-
cle was excluded from the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" because it
was furnished for Briones' regular use. The court held that denying Briones
recovery would frustrate the intent of the legislature to provide protection
for conscientious motorists from financial loss caused by negligent, finan-
cially irresponsible motorists.
Following this rationale, the court held that it was unlikely that Chipman
realized that her uninsured coverage would not apply when an uninsured
918. Bergensen, 845 S.W.2d at 376.
919. Id. at 377.
920. 829 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), aff'd, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 75 (Oct. 27,
1993).
921. Bergensen, 845 S.W.2d at 377.
922. 840 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
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thief operating her car without permission struck and killed her.923 The
court thus concluded that to deny recovery under the uninsured motorist
coverage under these facts would frustrate and defeat the purpose and intent
of the Uninsured Motorist Act.92
4
In Rosales v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.925 the court
held that injured passengers are not allowed to recover both liability and
uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits under a single insurance policy.
Rosales and Rivera were passengers in Barrett's car when it collided with
another vehicle. It was undisputed that Barrett caused the accident and that
Rosales and Rivera were seriously injured. Barrett carried a State Farm au-
tomobile insurance policy that provided liability and unin-
sured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage. State Farm paid
Rosales and Rivera $25,000 each, the maximum amount of bodily injury
liability insurance available per person under Barrett's policy. In addition,
Rosales and Rivera received underinsured motorist insurance benefits from
their own insurance policies. Rosales and Rivera also made claims for UIM
benefits under Barrett's policy, but State Farm denied these claims.
After Rosales and Rivera filed suit, State Farm moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that it had no obligation to pay UIM benefits to Rosales
and Rivera because Barrett's vehicle was not an underinsured vehicle ac-
cording to the policy's terms. The trial court granted summary judgment for
State Farm, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The policy issued by State Farm specified that uninsured/underinsured
vehicles do not include vehicles owned by, furnished, or available for the
regular use of a named insured. It was undisputed that the vehicle in which
Rosales and Rivera were riding was owned by or available for the regular
use of Barrett at the time of the accident. The court concluded that the
policy's unambiguous language prevented Rosales and Rivera from recover-
ing UM/UIM benefits because Barrett's vehicle was not an underinsured
vehicle. 926
Rosales and Rivera next argued that this definitional exclusion contra-
venes the purpose and intent of Texas Insurance Code art. 5.06-1, the unin-
sured/underinsured motorist statute. According to the court, the purpose of
this statute is to protect conscientious motorists from financial loss caused
by financially irresponsible motorists. The court could find no authority for
Rosales' attempt to combine or stack the liability and UIM benefits under a
single insurance policy. The court refused to invalidate the definitional ex-
clusion because nothing indicated that Barrett was a financially irresponsible
motorist. 927
The court also agreed with State Farm that Barrett did not purchase UIM
coverage for the purpose of increasing her own policy limits or protecting
923. Fontanez, 840 S.W.2d at 649.
924. Id. at 650.
925. 835 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); see also State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Conn, 842 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
926. Rosales, 835 S.W.2d at 805.
927. Id. at 806.
1364 [Vol. 47
INSURANCE LAW
her passengers from her own negligence, but as a protection from the negli-
gence of other uninsured and underinsured drivers. To allow recovery of
both liability and UIM benefits under one policy would effectively convert
UIM coverage into a second layer of liability coverage, a result not contem-
plated by the parties to the policy and not calculated in the cost of the policy
premiums. Accordingly, the court held that UIM coverage is not available
for damages sustained by a passenger who has already recovered the full
amount of liability limits under that same policy.928
In Leal v. Northwestern National County Mutual Insurance Co. 929 the
court held that an injured person is not required to exhaust the limits of a
tortfeasor's insurance coverage before he or she is entitled to recover under
the underinsured motorist provision of his or her own policy. However, if
the injured person settles with the tortfeasor for less than the tortfeasor's
liability coverage, recovery under the injured person's underinsured motorist
coverage would be only for those damages in excess of the total amount of
the tortfeasor's liability coverage.9 30
Leal sued Appling alleging that she negligently caused an automobile col-
lision injuring Leal. Leal also filed suit against Northwestern to recover
under her own automobile insurance policy's underinsured motorist cover-
age, which had a limit of $20,010. Leal negotiated a settlement of all claims
with Appling for $20,000 after Appling stated that this was the amount of
her liability coverage. Before the settlement was completed, Leal was ad-
vised that Appling's liability coverage was actually $25,000 per person. Fol-
lowing the settlement, Northwestern filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting that because Leal had settled with Appling for less than the limits
of Appling's liability coverage, Appling was not an underinsured motorist
and Leal could not recover from Northwestern under her underinsured mo-
torist coverage. The trial court agreed and granted Northwestern's motion,
rendering judgment that Leal take nothing. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded.
In order to determine whether Appling was an underinsured motorist, the
court looked to article 5.06-1(2)(b) of the Texas Insurance Code, which de-
fines an underinsured motor vehicle as:
an insured motor vehicle on which there is valid and collectible liability
insurance coverage with limits of liability for the owner or operator
which were originally lower than, or have been reduced by the payment
of claims arising from the same accident to, an amount less than the
limit of liability stated in the underinsured coverage of the insured's
policy. 93 1
In Stracener, the court held that "payment of claims" includes any pay-
ments made by the liability carrier to the beneficiary of an underinsured
928. Id.
929. 846 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993; no writ); see also Olivas v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).
930. Leal, 846 S.W.2d, at 579; Olivas, 850 S.W.2d at 565.
931. Leal, 846 S.W.2d at 578 (emphasis by the court).
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motorist policy.932 Therefore, as applied to this case, the court held that
payment made by Appling's insurance carrier to Leal effectively reduced the
limits of Appling's liability coverage for purposes of determining her status
as an underinsured motorist.933 Thus, Appling's liability limits of $25,000
were reduced by the $20,000 paid in settlement to Leal, leaving Appling with
$5,000 remaining liability coverage. Because this $5,000 in remaining cover-
age was less than the $20,010 limit of underinsured motorist coverage as
stated in Leal's policy, Appling was an underinsured motorist.
Northwestern argued that, even if Leal were underinsured, she had to ex-
haust the limits of Appling's insurance coverage before Leal could recover
under her own policy. The court, however, could find no such requirement
in the statute or-in Leal's policy. Instead, the statute, article 5.06-1(5), sim-
ply requires that the insured's recovery of actual damages be reduced by the
amount "recovered or recoverable" from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier.
Thus, the court held that once Leal's actual damages were determined, the
full amount recoverable from Appling's insurance carrier (policy limits)
should be deducted, whereafter Leal would be entitled to recover from
Northwestern the remainder of her actual damages up to the $20,010 liabil-
ity limit of her underinsured motorist coverage. 934 Therefore, the court cal-
culated the set-off as if the insured had exhausted the limits of the
tortfeasor's coverage.
2. "Settlement Without Consent" Clause
In Guaranty County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kline 93 5 Kline was pre-
cluded from recovering under his underinsured motorist coverage because
he did not obtain the consent of Guaranty County Mutual to settle with
Fletcher. Kline had sued Fletcher for damages resulting from an automobile
collision. At the time of the accident, Kline carried uninsured/underinsured
motorist coverage with Guaranty County Mutual in the limits of $20,000 per
person and $40,000 per accident. Kline eventually settled the suit with
Fletcher for Fletcher's automobile liability policy limits of $20,000. As part
of the settlement, Kline released Fletcher from any further liability. Guar-
anty County Mutual did not consent to the settlement.
Later Kline sued Guaranty for underinsured motorist benefits under his
policy. In response, Guaranty asserted that Kline breached the policy's
"settlement without consent" clause and, therefore, Kline's settlement with
Fletcher discharged Guaranty of all liability under the terms of the policy.
After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Kline in the amount
of $10,000, plus attorney's fees. The court of appeals affirmed holding that
the "settlement without consent" exclusion in the insurance contract was
invalid. The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
and rendered judgment that Kline take nothing.
932. Stracener, 777 S.W.2d at 383.
933. Leal, 846 S.W.2d at 578.
934. Id. at 579.
935. 845 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1992).
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The supreme court noted that the insurance contract between Kline and
Guaranty stated that "[w]e do not provide Uninsured/Underinsured Motor-
ist coverage for any person ... if that person or legal representative settles
the claim without our consent. '936 Kline argued that this exclusion violated
his right to pursue benefits under his underinsured motorist policy, relying
on Stracener. The court held, however, that Stracener did not affect the
validity of the settlement clause because it is consistent with, and advances
the purpose of, article 5.06-1(6) of the Insurance Code.937 The court held
that to "deny the validity of this exclusion would be to repudiate the in-
surer's contractual subrogation rights against the negligent motorist respon-
sible for the insured's damages. '938
3. Miscellaneous
In Williams v. Allstate Insurance Co. 9 39 the court held that before a person
can recover under his or her underinsured motorist coverage, that person
must show that his or her injury resulted from actual, direct physical contact
with an underinsured vehicle. Mr. Williams alleged that he sustained inju-
ries when a piece of steel fell from an unidentified truck onto his car. All-
state, Mr. Williams' insurer, refused to pay under his underinsured motorist
coverage because his car did not come into direct contact with the truck.
The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of Allstate
based upon the language in article 5.06-1(2)(d) of the Texas Insurance Code
which requires actual physical contact between the underinsured vehicle and
the insured's vehicle. 94° Williams, relying upon State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Ins. Co. v. Matlock,941 argued that physical contact is not necessary
when there is an "uninterrupted chain of physical events" set in motion by
936. Kline, 845 S.W.2d at 811.
937. Id. at 811; see also Traylor v. Cascade Ins. Co., 836 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1992, no writ).
938. Kline, 845 S.W.2d at 811. On September 10, 1993, the supreme court granted writ in
Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, on the issue of whether insured must obtain insurer's con-
sent to settle in order to qualify for uninsured motorist coverage. See 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1257
(Sept. 10, 1993). Elizabeth Hernandez died in a car accident. She had underinsured motorist
insurance coverage under her parents' policy from Gulf Group Lloyds in the amount of
$100,000. Hernandez's parents settled all of her claims against the driver of the car for the
$25,000 policy limit of his insurance. Gulf Group then refused to pay any amount of underin-
sured motorist coverage, because the Hernandezes had not obtained Gulf Group's consent to
settle. The Hernandezes then sued Gulf Group.
The jury found in favor of the Hernandezes and the trial court rendered judgment for
$100,000, plus costs, interest, and attorney's fees. The court of appeals, relying on Kline, held
that the settlement without the insurer's consent barred the Hernandezes from recovering
under their own policy. Thus, the judgment was reversed and rendered. (The opinion was not
published.)
The points of error upon which the supreme court granted Hernandez's application for writ of
error asserted that reliance upon Kline was inappropriate because the facts of this case showed
that the violation of the consent-to-settle exclusion did not prejudice the insurance company's
ability to recover subrogation.
939. 849 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).
940. Id. at 860.




the underinsured vehicle that causes the injuries. The court held that Mat-
lock was effectively overruled when the Legislature amended article 5.06-1 to
include the physical contact requirement. 942
Williams next argued that there should be coverage because the truck had
indirect contact with his vehicle, citing Latham v. Mountain States Mutual
Casualty Co.943 In Latham, the court held that the actual physical contact
requirement was satisfied between car A and car C when car A struck car B
thereby propelling car B into car C. The court found Latham dissimilar to
the facts of this case because there was never any contact with the truck.
Thus, the court held either that there must be direct physical contact with
the other vehicle or that the uninsured vehicle must create an uninterrupted
chain of physical events between itself and another vehicle which ultimately
results in injury to the insured. 944
In Christian v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. 945 the wife and child of a
motorist who was killed in an automobile accident brought an action against
the motorist's underinsured motorist coverage carrier for the mental anguish
they suffered as bystanders to the accident. The limits on the underinsured
motorist coverage were $100,000/$300,000 and Charter Oak paid the Chris-
tians $100,000 for the wrongful death of Mr. Christian. The wife and child
claimed that they had separate injuries, requiring Charter Oak to pay them
each $100,000. The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor
of the insurer, holding that an action for wrongful death is one action, no
matter how many claimants are separately injured by the death. 946 Since
mental anguish is an element of damages for wrongful death and the Chris-
tians settled this claim, the court held that they had no additional claim
against the insurer.947
B. FAMILY-MEMBER EXCLUSION
The court, in deciding Sanford v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,948
became the third court of appeals to conclude that the family-member exclu-
sion (endorsement 575) violates the statutory public policy of Texas requir-
ing every driver to have liability insurance. Prior to Sanford, the Texas
Supreme Court granted writ in National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
v. Johnson,949 and on October 27, 1993, issued its opinion affirming the judg-
ment of the court of appeals that the family-member exclusion is invalid. 950
942. Williams, 849 S.W.2d at 860.
943. 482 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ refd n.r.e.).
944. Williams, 849 S.W.2d at 861.
945. 847 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1993, writ denied).
946. Id. at 460.
947. Id. at 461.
948. 845 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); see also National
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 829 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), aff'd, 37
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 75 (Oct. 27, 1993); Segal v. Southern County Mut. Ins. Co., 832 S.W.2d 617
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
949. 829 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), afl'd, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 75 (Oct. 27,
1993).
950. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 75 (Oct. 27, 1993).
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Randall Johnson, while driving his truck, rear-ended another automobile,
which resulted in injuries to his wife who was riding with him. Mrs. John-
son later filed suit against her husband alleging that his negligence caused
her injuries. Mr. Johnson forwarded the petition and citation to National
County and demanded a full and unconditional defense to the suit. National
County refused to provide an unconditional defense, but would provide a
defense subject to a reservation of rights to deny coverage and payment of
any judgment rendered against him. National County argued that a family-
member exclusion in its policy precluded coverage for this claim. Johnson
advised National County that he would not accept any reservation of rights
and then filed a declaratory judgment action requesting the court to declare
the rights and legal relations arising between the parties as a result of the
insurance policy. National County filed its counterclaim for declaratory re-
lief asking the court to determine whether the family-member exclusion is
valid under Texas law. The trial court found the family-member exclusion
invalid. It declared that the exclusion conflicts with the Safety Responsibil-
ity Act, enjoys no rational justification supporting its adoption by the State
Board of Insurance, contravenes the public policy of the State of Texas, and
does not in any way serve the interests of the people of Texas. Accordingly,
the trial court rendered judgment for Johnson and decreed that National
County was liable for his coverage and defense under the policy. The court
of appeals affirmed as did the supreme court.
The court determined that the policy behind the Texas Safety Responsibil-
ity Act is to protect all potential claimants from damages resulting from
automobile accidents. 9"1 This purpose is embodied in the Act's mandatory
requirement of liability insurance in at least the minimum amounts to cover
all sums which the insured may become legally obligated to pay. The court
held that the family-member exclusion is inconsistent with the purposes of
the Act in that it creates a situation in which an innocent victim is not al-
lowed to recover damages if the person at fault happens to be a family mem-
ber.952 The court further noted that the majority of jurisdictions with
mandatory insurance laws have held family member exclusions to be invalid
because they are contrary to public policy. 953
Justice Comyn concurred with the four-member plurality in the decision
that the family-member exclusion is invalid but only up to the statutorily
imposed minimum limit of automobile liability insurance. 954 Thus, Justice
Cornyn held that the insurer's liability should be fixed at the minimum limits
mandated by statute.955
951. Id. at 76.
952. Id. at 77.
953. Id.




C. NOTICE OF SUIT
In Cruz v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 916 Liberty Mutual issued an au-
tomobile policy to Metropolitan, which operated a taxicab company. Cruz
sued Metropolitan after one of its cabs struck the Cruzes' children. Before
Cruz filed suit, Liberty Mutual was sent a notice of this claim, but Liberty
Mutual did not respond. Cruz obtained a default judgment against Metro-
politan, which was forwarded to Liberty Mutual. Again, Liberty Mutual
did not respond. Metropolitan then assigned to Cruz its claims against Lib-
erty Mutual and this lawsuit was filed. The trial court granted a summary
judgment to Liberty Mutual on the grounds that Liberty Mutual was
prejudiced because it did not receive notice of the suit against Metropolitan
and that the policy had been canceled. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded for trial.
Liberty Mutual argued that it was prejudiced by the lack of notice because
it was unable to defend the lawsuit against Metropolitan. According to the
court of appeals, a fact question existed as to whether Liberty Mutual was
prejudiced by the lack of notice because there was evidence that Liberty Mu-
tual had always maintained that the policy had been canceled, thus indicat-
ing that even if it had received notice of the lawsuit, it would not have
provided a defense.957
The supreme court reversed and rendered judgment that Cruz take noth-
ing. According to the court, the Liberty Mutual policy required the insured
to notify the insurer if a lawsuit was brought against the insured. Liberty
Mutual, in order to avoid liability under the policy for lack of notice, must
show that it was prejudiced by the lack of notice. The court held that an
insurer that is not notified of suit against its insured until a default judgment
has become final, absent actual knowledge of the suit, is prejudiced as a mat-
ter of law. 958
IX. HEALTH, LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE
A. POLICY CONSTRUCTION/INTERPRETATION
1. Benefits After Policy Is Terminated
In Forbau v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.95 9 the court was faced with the
question of whether an insurer was required to pay benefits for an injury
sustained while the policy was in force but after the policy had terminated.
Amy Miller was severely injured in a car wreck, leaving her a permanently
disabled, spastic, quadriplegic in need of constant care. She was covered
under a health policy through her father's employer. Aetna provided the
coverage, but the employer terminated the contract with Aetna and named
956. 853 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-Texarkana), rev'd, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 276 (Dec. 8,
1993).
957. Id. at 716.
958. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cruz, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 276, 278 (Dec. 8, 1993).
959. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 345 (Jan. 5, 1994).
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Safeco as the successor. Aetna paid all of Amy's claims until the date its
coverage ended. Claims after that date were sent to Safeco. When Safeco
stopped paying, suit was brought on Amy's behalf against Aetna. Although
other causes of action were alleged, the only one that reached the jury was
breach of contract. The plaintiffs took the position that Aetna's policy cov-
ered all expenses for an injury sustained during the policy period. Aetna
asserted that its coverage only applied to charges incurred when the policy
was in effect. The jury found Aetna breached its contract, and the trial court
rendered judgment for Amy in the amount of $283,000 for past medical ex-
penses, $2.5 million future medical expenses, and $500,000 in attorney's fees.
The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment hold-
ing that the policy unambiguously supported Aetna's position that coverage
only extended to charges incurred while the policy was in effect. 960 The
supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
The court held that the interpretation of insurance contracts in Texas is
governed by the same rules as interpretation of other contracts. 961 The con-
tract must be considered as a whole to ascertain the agreement of the parties
and each part of the contract should be given effect. 962 As an example, the
court said that -when a contract provision makes a general statement of cov-
erage, and another provision specifically states the time limit for such cover-
age, the more specific provision will control.963
The operative language, in the opinion of the majority, was that Aetna
would pay for "covered medical expenses incurred during a calendar year
for treatment of a covered family member." There was also language in the
policy stating that it did not provide insurance for charges incurred while
the person was not a covered family member. According to the court, the
unambiguous language of the contract provided that Aetna's obligation to
pay benefits under the contract terminated upon the discontinuance of the
group policy, unless some other provision in the policy extended cover-
age.964 There was an extension of benefits for an additional year, but Forbau
sought coverage for treatment provided beyond this additional year. Ac-
cording to the court, the policy did not provide for coverage for medical
expenses incurred after the group policy was canceled. 965
The dissent argued however, that the policy was susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation and, thus, was ambiguous. 966 Accordingly,
the dissent noted that the policy should be construed in favor of coverage.
According to the dissent, the policy provided coverage for all medical ex-
penses resulting from an accident that occurred while coverage was in effect,
even though the expenses were incurred after the policy terminated. 967
960. 808 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991).





966. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 870-71.
967. Id. at 871.
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A case presenting the same issue of contract interpretation is Reynolds v.
Mid-South Insurance Co. 968 Mid-South issued a major medical health insur-
ance policy to Reynolds. Reynolds paid his first monthly premium on Feb-
ruary 1, 1987, but failed to pay the premium due on March 1, 1987. The
policy provided a grace period of thirty-one days for payment of premiums
and extended coverage until the end of the grace period. However, Reynolds
did not pay the March premium within the grace period and Mid-South
terminated coverage as of April 1, 1987. On April 7, 1987, Reynolds began
seeing a doctor because of a problem he was having with a kidney stone.
Around the middle of April of 1987, Reynolds attempted to pay the past due
premiums, but Mid-South refused to accept payment, and denied Reynolds'
claim for benefits.
Reynolds then filed suit to recover medical expenses he had incurred in
the treatment of the kidney stone. He alleged that, even though the expenses
were incurred after the grace period ended, there should be coverage since
the illness originated before the policy terminated. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Mid-South and Reynolds appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the policy did not cover ex-
penses for illnesses manifested before the end of the grace period but not
incurred during such time.969 The court reached its conclusion based on the
language of the policy, which stated that it would pay for incurred covered
expenses. The policy stated that a covered expense is considered incurred on
the date that the item of care, services, or supplies for which the claim is
made is furnished. Since the medical charges were not incurred until after
the grace period had expired, the court held that Reynolds could not recover
under the policy.9 70
2. Death Dividends
In Beaston v. State Farm Life Insurance Co.97 1 Heaton, an agent with
State Farm, sold Terri and David Beaston graduated-premium whole life
policies. The monthly payment on David Beaston's policy, due on Decem-
ber 28, 1983, was not paid. The thirty-one-day grace period ran from De-
cember 28, 1983, to January 28, 1984. On January 31, 1984, David Beaston
was killed in a one-car accident. When Terri Beaston called on State Farm
to pay the life insurance policy benefits, State Farm refused, contending that
David Beaston's policy had lapsed on January 28, three days before his
death.
Terri Beaston filed suit against State Farm and Heaton asserting claims
for breach of contract, violations of article 21.21, and the DTPA. The trial
court granted Beaston an instructed verdict that there was coverage at the
time of death and awarded the policy benefits of $250,000. The court of
appeals affirmed this portion of the judgment.
968. 836 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
969. Id. at 351.
970. Id.
971. 861 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ requested).
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State Farm argued that the trial court erred in its directed verdict estab-
lishing life insurance coverage at the time of David Beaston's death. State
Farm argued that when David Beaston died on January 31, 1984, there was
no coverage because the policy had lapsed due to nonpayment of the pre-
mium on January 28, 1984. Beaston's position at trial was that the policy
was ambiguous regarding dividends paid by the policy and could be read to
allow a prorated dividend at death to be applied to premiums in order to
extend coverage past the date of David Beaston's death. The trial court
ruled that the policy provisions regarding dividends were ambiguous and
construed the policy in favor of coverage. The court of appeals held that if a
policy provision is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, it is
ambiguous and the court must adopt the construction that favors cover-
age.972 Thus, the issue for the court of appeals was whether the policy could
be reasonably read to allow a prorated dividend at death that would have
been sufficient to pay the overdue premium. The key provisions were:
Dividend at Death. A dividend for the period from the start of the pol-
icy year to the Insured's death will be part of the proceeds.
Accumulations to Avoid Lapse. If a premium has not been paid by the
end of its grace period, any available dividend accumulations will be
used to pay all or part of that premium.
The evidence showed that State Farm declared dividends on this class of
policies. In fact, State Farm admitted that if the insurer had credited David
Beaston's policy with a dividend at death, the prorated amount would have
been more than enough to pay the overdue premium. Based on this evidence
and the policy language, the court held that the policy could reasonably re-
quire State Farm to apply a prorated dividend to David Beaston's policy,
which would have cured the lapse.973
The court noted that State Farm's interpretation of the policy was reason-
able. But, once it is determined that a policy is ambiguous, the court must
adopt the insured's interpretation, even if the insurer's interpretation is rea-
sonable, or even more reasonable than the one put forth by the insured. 974
The court, therefore, agreed with the trial court that the policy provisions
were ambiguous and construed the policy in favor of the insured.
3. Suicide Clause
The court in Payne v. Prudential Insurance Co. 975 was called upon to de-
termine the correct interpretation of a suicide clause in a life insurance pol-
icy. On October 1, 1984, Payne became covered under a group life insurance
policy issued by Prudential with death benefits in the amount of $150,000.
On April 1, 1985, Payne increased the amount of the death benefit to
$300,000, and then on October 1, 1989, he increased the amount payable to
972. Id. at 276
973. Id. at 277.
974. Id.




$500,000. Payne committed suicide on January 23, 1990. After a claim was
made under the life insurance policy, Prudential paid $300,000 in death ben-
efits but refused to pay the additional $200,000 that became effective on Oc-
tober 1, 1989. Prudential claimed that this increase was not payable because
Payne had committed suicide within one year from the effective date of the
increase. Prudential's refusal to pay the increase was based on the following
policy provision:
Suicide: The insurance does not cover loss of life of the Participant
which results from or is caused by suicide within one year from the date
he became a covered individual. The amount of any increase in insur-
ance with respect to a Participant will not be payable with respect to
any loss of life of the Participant which results from or is caused by
suicide within one year from the effective date of such insurance.
The trial court found this provision unambiguous and held that Pruden-
tial was not obligated to pay the $200,000 increase in the amount of death
benefits to Payne's estate. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judg-
ment for Payne's estate.
Payne's estate argued that the suicide clause excused the insurer from pay-
ing any increase in the amount of death benefits only if the insured commit-
ted suicide within one year of the date he initially became a covered
individual because the phrase "such insurance" in the suicide clause referred
to the total coverage under the insurance policy, not the increase in death
benefits. Because Payne's suicide happened more than a year after he ini-
tially became covered under the policy, Payne's estate claimed that Pruden-
tial was obligated to pay the $200,000 increase in death benefits.
Prudential, on the other hand, argued that the clear language of the policy
excused it from paying any increase in the amount of death benefits if the
insured committed suicide within one year of the date the increase became
effective.
The majority of the court held that the only reasonable interpretation of
the suicide clause was that advanced by Payne's estate.976 According to the
court, the interpretation suggested by Prudential would require the insertion
of a qualifying phrase and, therefore, violate the plain meaning rule of con-
tract construction. 977 The court further held that if the parties had intended
to excuse Prudential from paying any increase in the amount of death bene-
fits that became effective after the first year of coverage, it could have written
the suicide clause to read "such increase in insurance" or "such increase,"
rather than "such insurance. '978 The court, therefore, held that Prudential
was obligated, as a matter of law, to pay the $200,000 increase in death
benefits to Payne's estate.
976. Id., slip op. at 5.
977. Id.




In Bartlett v. American Republic Insurance Co. 979 the insurer denied a
claim for benefits relating to a radical mastectomy and radiation and chemo-
therapy treatment received by Carolyn Bartlett, claiming that her illness was
a preexisting condition. The Bartletts filed suit against American Republic
for breach of contract, a 12% penalty under article 3.62 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations
of the DTPA and article 21.21. The trial court granted American Repub-
lic's motion for summary judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment
against the Bartletts.
On February 1, 1988, the Bartletts applied for health insurance from
American Republic and a policy was issued effective April 1, 1988. On Feb-
ruary 24, 1988, Carolyn visited Dr. North, a plastic surgeon, about having
"scoop-out" procedure and breast augmentation to prevent the possibility of
breast cancer. Dr. North told Carolyn that she had a mass in her left breast
and recommended that she discuss the situation with another doctor.
Carolyn contacted Dr. Payne, her gynecologist, who recommended that she
wait until June 1988 to have further tests or treatment because her Decem-
ber 1987 mammogram had disclosed no irregularity. On June 2, 1988,
Carolyn underwent a mammogram, and Dr. Payne detected a malignant
cyst. Carolyn subsequently underwent a radical mastectomy and radiation
and chemotherapy treatment.
The court first faced the issue of whether the mass in Carolyn's left breast
was a preexisting condition. The policy defined "preexisting condition" as:
(A) the existence of symptoms which would cause an ordinarily pru-
dent person to seek diagnosis, care or treatment within a 5 year period
before the date coverage begins for a covered person; or
(B) a health condition for which medical advice was given or treat-
ment was recommended by or received from a doctor within a 5 year
period before the effective date of the coverage of a covered person.
The Bartletts argued that a material fact question existed as to Carolyn's
awareness of the nature of her condition prior to the effective date of the
policy. The court held, however, that her actual knowledge of the true na-
ture of her condition was immaterial since the definition of "preexisting con-
dition" did not require diagnosis of an illness as a prerequisite to the duty to
disclose a health condition. 980 Because it was undisputed that, before the
effective date of the policy, Dr. North discovered and informed Carolyn of
the mass in her left breast, the court concluded that Carolyn did have a
health condition prior to the effective date of the policy. 981
The court next concluded that Carolyn was given medical advice concern-
ing this health condition prior to the effective date of the policy because Dr.
North suggested that she consult another doctor, have a repeat mammogram
to determine whether a biopsy should be performed, and to have a biopsy if
979. 845 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).




necessary. 982 Even though Carolyn may not have been able to disclose that
she had breast cancer until after she had a mammogram in June 1988, the
court held that she knew before the effective date of the policy that she had a
health condition, a mass in her left breast, and that Dr. North had given
medical advice to consult another doctor for a mammogram to determine
whether a biopsy of the mass should be performed. The court concluded
that American Republic established, as a matter of law, that Carolyn had a
preexisting condition that was excluded from coverage. 98 3 Therefore, the
summary judgment on the Bartletts' breach of contract claims was proper.
B. ONE WHO MURDERS INSURED FORFEITS RIGHT TO
INSURANCE PROCEEDS
In Francis v. Marshall984 Francis appealed a summary judgment award-
ing insurance proceeds under his wife's life insurance policy to her mother.
Karen Francis was murdered by her husband, Douglas Francis. After his
conviction was final, the trial court awarded the life insurance proceeds to
Karen's mother, who was named the contingent beneficiary. Mr. Francis
argued that the summary judgment was improper because there was a fact
question as to whether he willfully caused his wife's death. The court held
that the element of willfulness was essential to his conviction for murder and
thus had been litigated.985 As such, Francis was barred by collateral estop-
pel from relitigating this issue. Because Francis murdered his wife, the court
held that he was prevented from financially benefiting from his wrong under
section 41 of the Texas Probate Code and article 21.23 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code.986
Francis next argued that the summary judgment was improper because
there was no evidence that he brought about his wife's death with the intent
of accelerating the due date of the insurance policy and collecting the insur-
ance proceeds. The court held that this did not have to be proven. The only
requirement under the Insurance and Probate Codes to nullify Francis's
right to the insurance proceeds is that he willfully caused the death of his
wife. 987
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. White 988
held that, under Texas law, a husband's interest in his wife's life insurance
policy is forfeited because of his conviction for murdering her.989 The hus-
band, however, argued that since the policy had been issued by Metropolitan
under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA), Texas
law could not be used to disqualify him from a federal statutory right. The
982. Id. at 347.
983. Id.
984. 841 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
985. Id. at 54.
986. Id.
987. Id.
988. 972 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1426 (1993).
989. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.23 (Vernon Supp. 1993). See also TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 41(D) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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husband argued that under the FEGLIA, insurance proceeds are payable to
an insured's widow or widower in the absence of a designated beneficiary.
Since the wife had not designated a beneficiary, the husband claimed entitle-
ment to the proceeds.
The court held that the FEGLIA should be interpreted consistent with
state terms defining domestic relations because they are primarily a matter of
state concern.990 The court also held that even if state law did not govern
the outcome of this case, the result would be the same because federal com-
mon law provides the same bar to recovery of life insurance proceeds by the
murderer of the insured. 991 Thus, the court affirmed the district court's
judgment awarding the insurance proceeds to the father of the deceased.
C. CONVERSION COVERAGE
In Schnabel v. Philadelphia American Life Insurance Co.992 the court de-
termined that Texas law requires group insurers to provide employees the
option of either continuing their group coverage or converting it to individ-
ual coverage if their eligibility from group coverage terminates. Schnabel
was covered under a group insurance policy provided by his employer,
which had a maximum lifetime benefit of $1 million for each covered person.
After Schnabel lost his job because of terminal illness, he elected to convert
his group coverage to individual coverage in accordance with article 3.51-6
of the Texas Insurance Code. 993 Schnabel completed a conversion applica-
tion and hand-delivered it to Philadelphia American along with the requisite
premium within thirty-one days of his last day of employment. In response,
Philadelphia American told Schnabel the application he used was an old one
and that he would have to complete a new application form. Because Schna-
bel did not return the new application, Philadelphia American denied his
application for conversion coverage. Schnabel filed suit seeking a declara-
tory judgment that he was entitled to an individual insurance policy provid-
ing insurance benefits in accordance with the application form he submitted
to Philadelphia American. Both parties filed motions for summary judg-
ment. The court granted Schnabel's and denied Philadelphia American's.
The court determined that Schnabel satisfied all of the requirements for
exercising his conversion privilege, rejecting Philadelphia American's argu-
ment that it did not have to provide conversion coverage because Schnabel
used the wrong application form.994 According to the Texas Insurance
Code, conversion coverage must be provided without evidence of insurability
if an application and payment of the first premium is made within thirty-one
days after termination. 995 The court found that Schnabel complied with
these requirements.
990. White, 972 F.2d at 124.
991. Id.
992. 795 F. Supp. 816, 820 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
993. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-6, § 1(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
994. Schnabel, 795 F. Supp. at 820.
995. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-6, § 1(d)(3)(A)(i) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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Philadelphia American then argued that even if Schnabel was entitled to
some conversion coverage, he was limited to $7,500 in maximum lifetime
benefits available under the conversion policy made available at the time he
submitted his application. Philadelphia American also argued that it had no
statutory or contractual duty to provide a minimum level of coverage under
the conversion policy. The court disagreed on both counts.
The court held that the Texas 'Insurance Code prescribed minimum stan-
dards for conversion policies by providing that the insurer's standards must
bear some reasonable relationship to the actual health care costs in the area
in which the insured lived at the time of conversion, and that the insurer's
standards must be filed with the commissioner of insurance prior to their use
in denying coverage.996 The court denied Philadelphia American's motion
for summary judgment because it failed to offer any summary judgment evi-
dence that its conversion policy, which provided maximum lifetime benefits
of $7,500, met either of these standards.
Philadelphia American next argued that the group policy obligated it only
to offer Schnabel the conversion contract that it customarily issued when he
attempted to convert in February of 1990. This conversion contract pro-
vided maximum lifetime benefits of $7,500. The group policy obligated Phil-
adelphia American to "issue an individual contract, in a form customarily
issued by it, with benefits not greater than the ... [Group] Contract." The
court held that this language was ambiguous because neither the terms and
conditions of the conversion policy were identified or described in a manner
to limit this promise to convert. 997 The court further held that because lan-
guage of an insurance contract is normally chosen by the insurer, when that
language is ambiguous, the court must adopt the construction urged by the
insured. 998 The court next held that the right of conversion is a right to
continue the basic coverage in another type of policy. Relying on Baker v.
Washington National Insurance Co. ,999 the court thus held that Philadelphia
American's unrestricted promise to issue a conversion policy created a con-
tractual duty to provide coverage no less advantageous than that provided in
the group policy. 1° ° °
After the court issued its order, Philadelphia American filed a motion to
amend the judgment, arguing that Texas law does not set minimum stan-
dards for conversion coverage.10° ° The court noted, however, that such
minimum standards are prescribed in 28 Texas Administrative Code
§ 3.3828, which provides that an insurer issuing group long-term care shall
provide a basis for continuation or conversion of coverage. o 2 This regula-
tion also provides that a "converted policy" means an individual policy of
996. Schnabel, 795 F. Supp. at 821. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-6, § 1(d)(3)(A)(ii)
(Vernon Supp. 1993).
997. Schnabel, 795 F. Supp. at 823.
998. Id.
999. 823 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1987).
1000. Schnabel, 795 F. Supp. at 823.
1001. Schnabel v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co., 807 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
1002. Id. at 1269-70.
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long-term care, insurance providing benefits identical to, or determined by
the board to be substantially equivalent to, or greater than, those provided
under the group policy from which conversion is made. 100 3
Philadelphia American also argued that Baker, the case on which this
court based its original decision, contravenes the Texas Insurance Code. In
Baker, the Fifth Circuit held that:
[I]f a company includes an undertaking to offer a conversion policy and
its promise is no more definite than that it will issue an undisclosed,
undefined form of conversion policy, it is bound to furnish at least one
that is no less advantageous to the insured than the coverage it agrees to
convert. 104
The court held that nothing in Baker contravenes the Texas Insurance
Code because article 3.51-6 of the Insurance Code requires the issuance of
conversion policies and the Administrative Code mandates that conversion
policies issued in Texas provide benefits that are no less advantageous than
those provided under the group policy from which conversion is made. 10 5
D. MISREPRESENTATION DEFENSE
In Garcia v. John Hancock Variable Life Insurance Co. 1006 the court
found that the "intent to deceive" component of a misrepresentation defense
is a question of fact and cannot be resolved by summary judgment. Carmen
Garcia, the beneficiary of her husband's life insurance policy, brought suit
against John Hancock to collect the proceeds under the policy. John Han-
cock did not pay the claim, contending that Alfredo Garcia misrepresented
his health when applying for the policy. John Hancock moved for summary
judgment on its affirmative defense of misrepresentation. John Hancock ar-
gued that Mr. Garcia intentionally misrepresented the state of his health in
obtaining the life insurance policy one year prior to his death. The trial
court granted summary judgment for John Hancock. The court of appeals
reversed.
The summary judgment evidence showed that Mr. Garcia represented on
two applications that he had never been treated for, and did not have, diabe-
tes. He also represented that: (1) he had not seen a doctor in five years; (2)
he was not taking any prescription drugs; (3) he had never experienced diz-
ziness; and (4) he did not smoke. However, Mr. Garcia had been diagnosed
with diabetes sixteen years before his application. He had visited a doctor,
was taking prescription medication for diabetes at the time the application
was made, had experienced dizziness, and did smoke.
According to the court, the insurer must plead and prove five elements in
order to establish the affirmative defense of misrepresentation:
(1) the making of a representation;
(2) the falsity of the representation;
1003. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3828 (West 1988).
1004. Baker, 823 F.2d at 159.
1005. Schnabel, 807 F. Supp. at 1270.
1006. 859 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested).
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(3) reliance on the misrepresentation by the insurer;
(4) the intent to deceive on the part of the insured in making the misrep-
resentation; and
(5) the materiality of the misrepresentation. 007
The court assumed that elements one, two, three, and five were established.
The court was thus faced with the issue of whether John Hancock estab-
lished, as a matter of law, that Mr. Garcia intended to deceive John
Hancock.
John Hancock argued that Mr. Garcia's "intent to deceive" was estab-
lished by the fact that he misrepresented his health on two applications made
within two weeks of each other. Both were completed near the time he was
being treated by a doctor and taking prescription medicine for diabetes.
However, the court likened the "intent to deceive" component of misrepre-
sentation to the "intent" component in an allegation of fraud.1oo8 The court
stated that it knew of no reported Texas case in which the element of fraudu-
lent intent had been proven, as a matter of law, in a summary judgment
proceeding.10 9 Similarly, the court observed that it would be rare to estab-
lish subjective intent as a matter of law.
In reaching its decision, the court relied on Flowers v. United Insurance
Co. of America 0 10 and Estate of Diggs v. Enterprise Life Insurance Co. 1011
Both courts refused to find the existence of an insured's "intent to deceive"
as a matter of law, even though the insureds knew of their poor health and
made misrepresentations on applications.101 2 The court thus concluded that
the fact that a person knows about his health problems and misrepresents his
health does not establish, as a matter of law, his "intent to deceive."' 0 13
This is a fact question to be resolved by a jury.
In Shelton v. Union Bankers Insurance Co.10 14 several months after
purchasing a health insurance policy from Union Bankers, Shelton under-
went hip replacement surgery. Union Bankers denied the claim, contending
that his hip necrosis was an undisclosed pre-existing condition not covered
by the policy. Union Bankers then attempted to reform the policy to elimi-
nate coverage for Shelton's hip condition. When Shelton refused to agree to
the reformation, Union Bankers canceled the policy, contending that
Shelton made a material misrepresentation when applying for insurance by
failing to disclose his condition on the application.
Because of Union Bankers' failure to pay the claim and cancellation of the
policy, Shelton sued for breach of contract, violations of the DTPA and In-
surance Code, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The
1007. Id. (quoting Mayes v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 S.W.2d 612, 6116 (Tex.
1980)).
1008. Garcia, 859 S.W.2d at 431.
1009. Id.
1010. 807 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
1011. 646 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1012. Flowers, 807 S.W.2d at 786; Diggs, 646 S.W.2d at 575-76.
1013. Garcia, 859 S.W.2d at 433.
1014. 853 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ granted).
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jury resolved all issues against Shelton except for finding that he did not
intend to deceive Union Bankers regarding his condition at the time he ap-
plied for the insurance. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded in part.
Shelton first argued that because the jury found that he did not intend to
deceive Union Bankers by misrepresenting his condition, the trial court
should have found, as a matter of law, that Union Bankers breached the
insurance contract by canceling the policy. Shelton contended that a mis-
representation must be made with intent to deceive before it may be grounds
for voiding an insurance policy. Union Bankers argued that the requirement
of intent to deceive applied only to life insurance policies. Health insurance
policies, argued Union Bankers, are governed by article 3.70-3 of the Insur-
ance Code, which allows a health insurance policy to be voided on the basis
of an unintentional misrepresentation within two years of the policy's
inception.
The court concluded that intent to deceive must be proven to void a
health insurance policy on the basis of a misrepresentation, rejecting Union
Bankers' argument.10 15 The court first looked to article 3.70-3(a)(2) of the
Texas Insurance Code, which provides that article 3.70-3 shall not be con-
strued as to affect any legal requirement for avoidance of a policy or denial
of the claim during the initial two-year period. The court interpreted this
language to incorporate the common law rule that fraud be proven to void a
health insurance policy.1016
The court then looked to General American Life Insurance Co. v. Marti-
nez, 10 17 where the court held that a material misrepresentation did not de-
feat recovery if made without intent to deceive. The policy involved in
Martinez was a disability policy, which this court held was a health insur-
ance policy.1018 The court then noted that the Martinez case was cited by
the Texas Supreme Court, in a life insurance case, when it held that an in-
surer must plead and prove intentional misrepresentation before it can void a
policy.1019 The court therefore concluded that because the jury found that
Shelton did not intend to deceive Union Bankers, Union Bankers breached
the insurance contract when it canceled the policy.1020
E. EVIDENCE
In McCraw v. Maris 10 21 the court held that evidence of a duplicate benefi-
ciary form was admissible in an action to determine whether the surviving
spouse or the surviving children were entitled to life insurance proceeds.
Donna Maris was an employee of the Department of Labor and insured
under a Federal Employee's Group Life Insurance policy. Under federal
1015. Id. at 591.
1016. Id.
1017. 149 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, writ dism'd judgm't cor.).
1018. Shelton, 853 S.W.2d at 592.
1019. See Clark v. National Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 200 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1947).
1020. Shelton, 853 S.W.2d at 592.
1021. 828 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1992).
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statute, the surviving spouse is entitled to the life insurance proceeds unless
the insured signs a written beneficiary designation form. Ms. Mars' chil-
dren filed this declaratory judgment action contending that she signed such a
form, although it was later lost. Jimmie Maris, Donna's estranged husband,
asserted he was entitled to the life insurance proceeds.
During the trial, there was evidence that Donna's habit was to complete
handwritten duplicate forms prior to typing the original form. The trial
court, however, excluded from evidence a duplicate beneficiary designation
form in Donna's handwriting that designated her children as beneficiaries.
The trial court ruled that Mr. Maris was entitled to the life insurance pro-
ceeds and the court of appeals affirmed. 1022 The supreme court reversed,
finding that the duplicate beneficiary designation form in Donna's handwrit-
ing was admissible. The court concluded that this form was not hearsay
because it was not offered to prove the truth of any matter asserted within it,
but only that it existed.1023 This form was offered to prove that Donna fol-
lowed her usual habit of typing and filing a form from the draft.
X. HOMEOWNERS' INSURANCE
A. POLICY INTERPRETATION
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Reed 10 24 the court held that the
business pursuit exclusion and exception thereto based on activities inciden-
tal to non-business pursuits in a homeowner's policy are ambiguous and
must be construed in favor of coverage. While at a daycare center operated
by the Reeds out of their home, Michael Ford crawled through an opening
in a fence that separated the play area from a pool and drowned. The Reeds
had a homeowner's policy issued by State Farm.
The Fords sued the Reeds in a wrongful death action and obtained a judg-
ment in the amount of $480,000. The Fords agreed not to execute on the
judgment against the Reeds in exchange for the Reeds' assignment of any
causes of action they might have against State Farm. The Reeds and Fords
then brought this action against State Farm alleging breach of contract,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Insur-
ance Code and DTPA. State Farm answered and counterclaimed for declar-
atory relief and moved for summary judgment on its claim for declaratory
relief. The Fords and Reeds counterclaimed for declaratory relief and filed
their own motion for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that
there was coverage under the policy, entered a judgment accordingly, and
ordered the coverage controversy severed so it could be appealed.
The policy issued to the Reeds by State Farm provided that State Farm
would pay all sums that the Reeds became legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages because of bodily injury. The policy also provided that there was no
1022. 837 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990).
1023. McCraw, 828 S.W.2d at 757.
1024. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1315, 1318 (Sept. 29, 1993).
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coverage for "any business pursuits of an Insured except activities therein
which are ordinarily incidental to non-business pursuits."
The court of appeals determined that the child's death occurred as a result
of a business pursuit because it happened while the Reeds were operating a
daycare service. 1 025 However, the court of appeals concluded that there was
coverage under the "ordinarily incidental" exception because one of the
causes of the child's death was the negligent failure to maintain the fence, an
activity ordinarily incidental to a non-business pursuit.10 26 The supreme
court affirmed.
The supreme court began its analysis by noting that a contract of insur-
ance is subject to the same rules of construction as other contracts. If the
policy is worded so that it can be given only one reasonable construction, it
will be enforced as written. However, if a contract of insurance is suscepti-
ble to more than one reasonable interpretation, the court must resolve the
uncertainty by adopting the construction most favorable to the insured. An
intent to exclude coverage, according to the court, must be expressed in clear
and unambiguous language.1027
The court noted that other jurisdictions have taken three different ap-
proaches to the question of whether child care in the home is excluded under
a homeowner's policy as a business pursuit or is an exception to this exclu-
sion because it is incidental to non-business pursuits. Some jurisdictions fo-
cus on the ongoing nature and profit aspect of the enterprise and hold that
child care for compensation is a business pursuit and is not ordinarily inci-
dental to non-business pursuits. According to the court, this approach has
been criticized because it focuses too much on the business nature of child
care and always renders the exception to the exclusion inapplicable.
Another approach is that child care is always ordinarily incidental to a
non-commercial pursuit. This approach has been criticized as too broad be-
cause the ordinary incident to non-business pursuit exception swallows the
business pursuits exclusion in the context of child care. The third approach
focuses on the type of activity that caused the injury and gives effect to the
exclusion when that activity is not ordinarily associated with the function of
child care.
After reviewing the different approaches, the court concluded that the ex-
clusion and exception are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpre-
tation, and thus are ambiguous. 0 28 Because the exclusion and the exception
do not clearly and unambiguously exclude coverage, the court held that it
must adopt the construction most favorable to the insured.10 29 Accordingly,
the court held that coverage existed under the policy for damages resulting
from the death Michael Ford. 0 30
1025. 826 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992), affid, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 1315 (Sept. 29, 1993).
1026. Id.






At issue in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. S.S. & G. W 10 31 was the
"intentional injury" exclusion. G.W. & S.S. had sex at G.W.'s house. G.W.
did not tell S.S. that he had genital herpes, and she contracted the disease.
S.S. demanded that G.W. compensate her for her damages. G.W., in turn,
notified State Farm, his homeowner insurer, of the claim and requested a
defense. State Farm agreed to investigate the claim and provide G.W. with
defense counsel but required that G.W. sign a non-waiver agreement. G.W.
rejected State Farm's offer of counsel and employed his own attorney. S.S.
filed suit against G.W. alleging that he negligently transmitted genital herpes
to her. G.W. agreed to a $1 million judgment in favor of S.S. She agreed not
to execute in return for an assignment of some of G.W.'s rights under the
insurance policy.
When State Farm learned of the judgment, it sought declaratory relief to
establish that the policy did not provide any coverage. G.W. and S.S. coun-
terclaimed, alleging that the policy covered the injury, and that State Farm
had adjusted the claim in bad faith. State Farm filed a motion for summary
judgment contending that S.S.'s claims fell within the intentional injury ex-
clusion in the policy and G.W. breached his duty to cooperate under the
policy by failing to notify State Farm of S.S.'s lawsuit and entering into an
agreed judgment without State Farm's knowledge. The trial court rendered
summary judgment in favor of State Farm on the specific ground that the
homeowner's policy did not, as a matter of law, provide coverage for any of
the claims asserted by S.S. in the underlying lawsuit. The trial court's sum-
mary judgment order did not address State Farm's claims that G.W.
breached his duty to cooperate. The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded, finding that State Farm failed to carry its burden to prove conclu-
sively that G.W. intended to cause injury to S.S.1032 The supreme court
affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
State Farm argued that, as a matter of law, the transmission of genital
herpes came within the "intentional injury exclusion" of G.W.'s home-
owner's policy. The court disagreed, holding that ordinarily whether an in-
sured intended harm or injury to result from an intentional act is a question
of fact. 10 33 The court held that an insured intends to injure or harm another
if he intends the consequences of his act, or believes that they are substan-
tially certain to follow. 0 34 In this case, while it was undisputed that G.W.
intentionally engaged in sexual intercourse without informing S.S. of his
condition, the summary judgment evidence did not indicate that G.W. acted
with intent to cause S.S. bodily injury. The summary judgment evidence
indicated that G.W. did not believe it was possible to transmit the disease
without an active lesion and failed to demonstrate that G.W. knew that en-
gaging in sexual intercourse with S.S. was substantially certain to result in
transmission of the disease to S.S. Consequently, the court concluded that
1031. 858 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1993).
1032. 808 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991), aftd, 858 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1993).




an issue of material fact existed whether G.W. knew at the time with sub-
stantial certainty that he would transmit herpes to S.S."°3
State Farm also argued that even if G.W. did not intend to injure S.S. by
his conduct, his intent to injure was inferred, as a matter of law, because this
case involved sexual misconduct. The court held, however, that the cases
relied on by State Farm usually involved situations of sexual misconduct
with-minors or forcible sex acts between adults. These cases were distin-
guishable because G.W. and S.S. were consenting adults. Thus, the court
refused to infer intent to injure, as a matter of law.10 36
State Farm next argued that the summary judgment should be affirmed on
the ground that G.W. breached his duty to cooperate. The court held, how-
ever, that because this ground was not specified in the trial court's summary
judgment order, it could not be considered on appeal. 1037
The issue before the court in Jerry v. Kentucky Central Insurance Co. 1038
was the meaning of the word "vacant," because the insurer denied coverage
for a loss claiming the home had been vacant for more than ninety days. In
November 1985, Mr. and Ms. Jerry moved to Utah but retained ownership
of their house in Harris County. In April 1986, Ms. Jerry returned to the
property and discovered that it had been broken into and vandalized. The
Jerrys submitted a theft claim to their insurer and received replacement
value for the furnishings. About six months later, Ms. Jerry's parents visited
the property and discovered it destroyed by fire. Kentucky Central denied
this claim and canceled the policy because the property had been vacated.
By the terms of the policy, the company was not liable if the house was
vacant for more than ninety days. The policy also provided, however, that a
"building in the course of construction shall not be deemed to be vacant."
The Jerrys then brought suit against Kentucky Central for breach of con-
tract, negligence, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and viola-
tions of article 21.21 and the DTPA. After a trial before the court, a take-
nothing judgment was entered in favor of Kentucky Central. The court of
appeals affirmed.
On appeal the Jerrys challenged the trial court's finding that the house
had been vacant and not under construction at the time of the fire. Initially,
the court held that the term "vacant" means "entire abandonment, deprived
of contents, empty, that is, without contents of substantial utility.' 01 39 The
evidence showed that when the Jerrys moved to Utah, they had cut off the
utilities and that the house was not occupied by anyone after that time. Fur-
thermore, there was evidence that everything of value left in the house was
taken by burglars even before the fire occurred. The court did note, how-
ever, that there was conflicting evidence on whether the items were replaced
in the house. There was some evidence that just prior to the fire, the house
1035. Id. at 379.
1036. Id. at 379-80.
1037. Id. at 380.
1038. 836 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
1039. Id. at 815.
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contained living room furniture, a sofa, wicker furniture, a bedroom suite,
and other items. There was other evidence, however, by the adjuster hired
by Kentucky Central that he found the home contained no refrigerator,
stove, pots and pans, or light meter. Also, he saw no evidence of furniture in
the master bedroom or living room, but saw an unburned mattress in the
yard, indicating to him that the house had been abandoned before the fire.
Additionally, Lamb testified that a neighbor had told him that the doors to
the house had been left open for months before the fire. The court of appeals
held that in light of this record, there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's finding that the house was vacant. ,o40
The Jerrys argued that the vacancy clause was suspended by the fact that
repairs were being made to the house. As previously mentioned, the policy
provided that a building in the course of construction shall not be deemed to
be vacant. The court held that construction, as used in the policy, meant
creation of a new structure rather than restoring something already in exist-
ence. 1041 The court, therefore, held that the house was not under construc-
tion merely because it was being repaired. 1 4 2 Accordingly, the court held
that there was no breach of contract by Kentucky Central and no liability
under the policy. 143
In Bonner v. United Services Automobile Ass'n I044 the insurer claimed
there was no coverage under a homeowner's policy because of the exclusion
for "any act or omission in connection with premises, other than as defined,
which are owned, rented or controlled by an Insured." USAA issued a
homeowner's policy to Gloria Padgett, the mother of Roger Padgett, which
covered a dwelling in Canyon Lake. Roger shot and killed his girlfriend,
Linda Tarrant, at an apartment the two shared in Houston. Bonner, as the
next friend of Tarrant's minor son, brought a wrongful death action against
Roger. A judgment was rendered against Roger in excess of USAA's policy
limits. USAA then filed a declaratory judgment action against Roger, as-
serting non-coverage because of two policy exclusions: the "in connection
with" exclusion and the "intentional injury" exclusion.
The jury found that Roger was a resident of his mother's household and
that Tarrant's death was "in connection with" premises owned, rented or
controlled by Roger in Houston. The jury, however, was unable to answer
whether Roger intentionally caused Tarrant's death. Based on this partial
verdict, the trial court entered judgment for USAA and Roger appealed.
The court, finding no Texas cases construing the "in connection with"
exclusion, held that it is susceptible of two reasonable constructions and thus
is ambiguous.'1 45 As such, the exclusion must be construed in favor of the
insured and against the insurer.1°46 Thus, the court concluded that for the
1040. Id.
1041. Id. at 816.
1042. Id.
1043. Id.
1044. 841 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).




exclusion to apply there must be some causal relationship between the act or
omission and the other premises owned, rented, or controlled by the in-
sured.'47 The court held that if the insurer had intended to exclude cover-
age for any act or omission occurring on other premises, the exclusion could
have been stated exactly in those words rather than "in connection with" the
other premises.10 8
The court next concluded that because there was some evidence that
Roger had intentionally caused the death of Tarrant, the case should be re-
manded for a new trial since the jury was deadlocked on this question.' ° 9
B. INSURABLE INTEREST
The issue of when a person has an insurable interest in property was the
subject of Jones v. Texas Pacific Indemnity Co. ' 050 The Joneses owned a
home insured by Texas Pacific. The policy listed the Joneses as the named
insured and Martin as the mortgagee. Martin foreclosed on the home after
the Joneses defaulted on their mortgage payments. Eleven days after the
foreclosure, while the Joneses remained in the house as tenants at sufferance,
the house burned. Texas Pacific paid the Joneses the policy limits for con-
tent loss and additional living expenses and paid Martin the dwelling's total
value.
The Joneses sued on the policy to collect for structural damage to the
house. Texas Pacific claimed that the Joneses were not the owners and,
therefore, not entitled to recover for structural damage under the policy.
Texas Pacific moved for summary judgment on this basis, which the trial
court granted. The court of appeals affirmed.
The Joneses argued on appeal that, although they no longer owned the
property, they still had an insurable interest and were entitled to the insur-
ance proceeds for damage to the structure. The court, while agreeing that it
is not necessary for a party to own property to have an insurable interest,
held that to have an insurable interest the Joneses had to prove that they
would sustain pecuniary loss from the destruction of the house or that they
would derive pecuniary benefit or advantage by the preservation and contin-
ued existence of the house. 05 The court further held that whether a person
has an insurable interest in property is a question of law, not fact. 05 2
The court noted that because the Joneses were tenants at sufferance after
the foreclosure and subject to immediate eviction, they had no future legal
interest in the dwelling, and diminished motive and opportunity to protect
the property. 0 53 The court held that the Joneses did not suffer any pecuni-
ary loss from the fire or receive any benefit from the dwelling. 05 4 Therefore,
1047. Id.
1048. Id.
1049. Id. at 508.
1050. 853 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
1051. Id. at 794.
1052. Id.




they had no insurable interest in the dwelling, and the trial court's summary
judgment was correct.
The Joneses next argued that Texas Pacific was estopped from refusing to
pay for structural damage because it paid their additional living expenses
under the dwelling coverages extended benefits. The court held, however,
that the Joneses waived any estoppel argument for failure to raise it at the
trial level. 1055
C. TOTAL Loss
The issue in State Farm Lloyds v. Mower, 10 56 involved the total loss of a
structure. In March 1986, Mower's home was involved in a serious fire.
Mower had homeowner's insurance with State Farm. The policy had dwell-
ing coverage of $175,000. First Federal, the mortgagee, was a loss payee on
the policy. After the fire, State Farm assigned Barnhill, an independent ad-
juster, to investigate the loss. Barnhill concluded that remnants could be
used in reconstructing the house - namely, the garage and the slab.
Although there were usable remnants, Barnhill believed that the cost of re-
constructing the house Would exceed the $175,000 policy limit. Based on
this belief, Barnhill recommended that State Farm's reserves be set at
$175,000. State Farm in accordance with Barnhill's recommendation, set
the reserve for Mower's claim at $175,000.
Soon after the fire, Mower requested bids to rebuild his home from
Hudnell, the original builder, and Stewart, a contractor specializing in re-
construction of homes damaged by fire. Hudnell submitted a bid of $88,000,
and Stewart bid about $86,000 to reconstruct the home, but Hudnell would
not guarantee the slab. Both estimates stated that the slab and garage rem-
nants would be used in the reconstruction. Based on these bids, State Farm
concluded that the loss was not total and offered to pay Mower $90,000.
Mower rejected this offer and submitted a counter-offer of $104,000, the pay-
off amount of the mortgage, which had been accelerated because Mower had
stopped making mortgage payments after the fire.
After Mower rejected State Farm's offer, State Farm notified First Federal
that it was offering $90,000 to pay the claim. First Federal informed Mower
that it intended to exercise its rights under the deed of trust to accept State
Farm's offer. Mower objected.
State Farm then filed an interpleader action to request instruction from
the court as to whom it should pay. Mower sued State Farm claiming that it
had breached its contract by not paying total loss benefits, and that it
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court ordered
separate trials on these issues. On the contract claim, the jury determined
that the house was a total loss. At the second trial, the jury determined that
State Farm breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by not paying
total loss benefits. The jury thus awarded Mower $50,000 for mental
1055. Id.
1056. No. 01-91-00216-CV, 1993 Tex. App. LEXIS 3253 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.],
Dec. 9, 1993, n.w.h.).
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anguish and $5 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded.
State Farm first argued that there was no evidence, or insufficient evi-
dence, to support the jury's finding that Mower's house was a total loss.
According to the court, the test for determining whether a building is a total
loss by fire depends on whether a reasonably prudent owner, desiring to re-
build, would have used the remnants for restoring the building. 10 57 The evi-
dence supporting the jury's verdict included Barnhill's determination that
the structure was a total loss when he initially inspected the house. Further-
more, a State Farm employee testified that if it had been his house, he would
have thought his house had burned down. The court also noted that
although Hudnell stated that he would use the original slab in his estimate to
rebuild, he would not guarantee the slab after the fire. The court found that
this was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of total loss. 10 58
State Farm next argued that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct
the jury that the garage and the slab were part of the structure covered by
the policy. The court held that such an instruction would not have helped
the jury to understand the meaning and effect of the law since no witness
testified that the policy did not cover the slab and the garage. 059
XI. LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. COVERAGE ISSUES
In CIGNA Insurance Co. of Texas v. Jones 1o60 the court was presented
with the issue of whether liability coverage should be extended to a liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) provider after the policy had been canceled but with-
out notice to the Texas Railroad Commission. Caravan, in order to obtain
and renew an LPG license, had to obtain liability insurance and file a certifi-
cate of insurance with the Commission. Once the certificate is filed, it need
not be renewed each time the license is renewed. The certificate can be can-
celed by the insurer giving written notice to the Commission of its intent to
cancel the policy.
Caravan initially had insurance with Aetna, which filed a certificate of
insurance with the Commission. INA (which later became CIGNA) eventu-
ally replaced the Aetna coverage, but it did not file a certificate with the
Commission. About a year after issuing its policy, INA canceled Caravan's
insurance for non-payment of premium. Neither INA nor Aetna, however,
had notified the Commission of the cancellation of Caravan's policy until
May 1988, about two years after cancellation. After the policy had been
canceled, however, Caravan's license was not renewed for failure to apply
timely for renewal. When Caravan finally applied for renewal, the Commis-
sion rejected this application because Caravan did not submit proof of insur-
1057. Id., slip op. at 4.
1058. Id., slip op. at 5.
1059. Id., slip op. at 8.
1060. 850 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
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ance. Thus, Caravan was instructed to cease operations that required an
LPG license.
After the insurance was canceled, Jones was injured because of Caravan's
negligence in furnishing LPG services to Jones. Jones sued Caravan and
obtained a judgment for $500,000 against Caravan. Jones then sought a de-
claratory judgment that CIGNA was liable on the policy under the certifi-
cate on file with the Commission at the time of his injuries. The trial court
determined that, because Aetna had not notified the Commission of the can-
cellation, the certificate of insurance on file with the Commission bound
CIGNA to cover Jones's loss. The court of appeals reversed and rendered
judgment for CIGNA.
The court found disturbing the gap allowed by the statute governing LPG
licensing that allows someone to retain a LPG license despite cancellation of
the mandatory insurance coverage. However, the court felt that such a
problem should be remedied by the legislature, not the courts. 061 The court
concluded that the insurer does not need to notify the Commission of its
intent to cancel insurance before such insurance is effectively canceled. 0 62
The statutory requirement of such notice is for the benefit of the Commis-
sion in its licensing procedures. Moreover, the court felt that Caravan
would have probably continued its activities even if the Commission had
canceled its license upon receiving notice of cancellation of the insurance,
seeing that Caravan continued its operations even after the Commission re-
jected its renewal application. 1063
In Ranger Insurance Company v. Mijne 1064 Potzner and Mijne died when
the plane they were operating crashed. Potzner had rented the plane from
Levelland Aviation, which had insurance through Ranger. The policy limit
was $100,000 per person, $300,000 per occurrence. The estates of both men
insisted that Ranger pay them each $100,000. Ranger claimed that the pol-
icy excluded coverage for renter pilots and offered to pay only $100,000.
After no settlement could be reached, Ranger interpleaded the $100,000.
The district court concluded that the policy covered both pilots and passen-
gers, but excluded renter pilots. Thus, it granted summary judgment for
Ranger. The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for Potzner.
The court of appeals disagreed with the district court's ruling that the
policy excluded coverage for bodily injury to renter pilots. The policy did
have a provision said "Your bodily injury and property damage coverage
does not protect ... [a]ny renter pilot." This provision, however, was found
under the section describing the persons "protected" by the policy, rather
than the things covered. According to the court, the term "protected" refers
to those insured under the policy; that is, those persons who are legally re-
quired to pay damages which Ranger must cover. 0 65 Thus, the court held,
1061. Id. at 690.
1062. Id. at 691.
1063. Id.
1064. 991 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1993).
1065. Id. at 244.
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the policy would not provide coverage if Mijne sued Potzner as a result of
the plane crash, but does cover the injuries suffered by renter pilots for
which Levelland is obligated to pay.1066
In Vesta Insurance Co. v. Amoco Production Co. 1067 Gonzales was seri-
ously injured at an Amoco plant while in the employ of Cantu Lease. At the
time, Gonzales was performing various oil field services that Cantu had con-
tracted to perform for Amoco. In this contract Cantu agreed to defend,
indemnify, and not hold Amoco and its insurers responsible for injuries to
Cantu's employees, regardless of Amoco's negligence. Vesta was the excess
liability insurer of Amoco. Under the terms of the insurance policy, Vesta
was only liable to Amoco for an "ultimate net loss" that exceeded $5 mil-
lion. "Ultimate net loss" was defined as the total sum that Amoco and its
insurers became obligated to pay because of personal injury claims.
Gonzales, as a result of his injuries, sued Amoco and eventually settled for
$6,215,000. Amoco paid $2,715,000 and Cantu's insurer paid $3,500,000.
Amoco, claiming that Cantu acted as its insurer, made a claim upon Vesta
that it reimburse Amoco $1,215,000, the portion of the settlement exceeding
$5 million. Vesta claimed that Cantu was an indemnitor, not an insurer, and
thus owed nothing to Amoco because its ultimate net loss was less than $5
million. Even so, Vesta agreed to "loan/advance" to Amoco about
$798,000, representing a portion of the settlement that exceeded $5 million.
The parties then agreed to resolve their dispute via this declaratory judgment
action.
This district court held that Vesta was obligated to Amoco under the ex-
cess policy. The court further held that Vesta was required to reimburse
Amoco for its attorney's fees incurred in defending Gonzales' lawsuit. The
Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment in Vesta's favor.
The issue determining coverage was whether Cantu was an insurer of
Amoco because, if it was, its contribution to the settlement would be consid-
ered part of Amoco's "ultimate net loss" as defined by the Vesta policy. The
court, giving three reasons, held that Cantu was not Amoco's insurer. First,
the court looked to the difference in the definitions of "insurance" and "in-
demnity." According to Black's Law Dictionary, "indemnity" means a
''contractual or equitable right under which the entire loss is shifted from a
tortfeasor who is only technically or passively at fault to another who is
primarily or actively responsible."' 10 68 "Insurance," on the other hand, is
defined as a "contract whereby, for a stipulated consideration, one party un-
dertakes to compensate the other for loss on a specified subject by specified
perils."10 69 From these definitions, the court concluded that there is a sub-
stantial distinction between a party bound by a contractual indemnity clause
and an insurer. 10 70 Second, the court looked to the definition of the "busi-
1066. Id.
1067. 986 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 80 (1993).
1068. Id. at 985 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 769 (6th ed. 1990)).
1069. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 802 (6th ed. 1990)).
1070. Id. at 986.
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ness of insurance" devised~by the Supreme Court and found that Cantu's
contract with Amoco did not include spreading and underwriting the risks
of Amoco. 10 7 1 The court then looked to Texas law and noted that there was
no evidence that Cantu complied with the statutory requirements for qualifi-
cations as an insurer or that any of Cantu's conduct fell within the definition
of the "business of insurance" found in article 1.14-1, § 2 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code. 0 72
Thus, the court held that one who only contractually agrees to indemnify
another is not an insurer of that person. 0 73 Because Cantu's payment was
not made as Amoco's insurer, Amoco's ultimate net loss was less than $5
million - the amount above which Vesta became liable.
The court next held that Vesta was entitled to reimbursement for the
"loan/advance" it had initially paid to Amoco under the policy. The court
reasoned that, based on the policy's subrogation clause, Vesta's coverage ap-
plied only to losses in excess of $5 million. Because Amoco had paid only
$2.7 million, Vesta was entitled to the recovery of funds it had improperly
paid out under the policy. The court dismissed Amoco's argument that
Vesta's right to subrogation did not accrue until Vesta paid under the insur-
ance policy. 10 74 The court reasoned that Amoco had already been indemni-
fied for $3.5 million by the contractor at the time Vesta made its
loan/advance to Amoco. Therefore, the court stated, as Amoco no longer
had a cause of action against the contractor, there was no cause of action to
which Vesta could be subrogated when it improperly advanced money under
the insurance policy.' 0 75
B. DUTY TO INDEMNIFY
In E.B. Smith Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 1076 the court
addressed the issue of the insurer's defense to payment for lack of reasonable
notice of the lawsuit against its insured. In March of 1986, Smith was sued
by Dettman. At the time, Smith had a comprehensive general liability pol-
icy issued by USF&G, but did not inform USF&G of the lawsuit until Janu-
ary of 1988. After USF&G refused to pay Smith's portion of the settlement
of the Dettman lawsuit, Smith filed this suit against USF&G. USF&G filed
a motion for summary judgment contending that, as a matter of law, Smith
failed to comply with the notice, terms, and conditions of the liability policy.
The policy required Smith to give notice of claims to USF&G "as soon as
practicable" rather than within a certain number of days. The trial court
granted the summary judgment in favor of USF&G and Smith appealed.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded.




1074. Id. at 987.
1075. Id.
1076. 850 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
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given to USF&G "as soon as practicable" was a condition precedent to lia-
bility.1 0 77 In the absence of waiver or other special circumstances, failure to
perform the condition constitutes an absolute defense to liability on the pol-
icy. 10 78 Thus, in order to be entitled to a summary judgment, USF&G had
to establish, as a matter of law, that Smith's notice was not "as soon as
practicable."
The court held that "as soon as practicable" means notice within a reason-
able time, which is determined by the facts and circumstances in each partic-
ular case.'0 79 The court noted that while twenty-two months may appear to
be late notice, USF&G had not presented evidence of when, or for what,
Smith was sued, nor any evidence of settlement. Thus, the court held that
USF&G had not presented sufficient facts to establish that the notice was
not given "as soon as practicable."' 08 0
In Audubon Indemnity Co. v. Patel 10 8 ' the court decided whether Audu-
bon had a duty to cover Patel under a commercial insurance policy covering
Patel's motel for damages suffered by a customer who was beaten by an
intruder. Dockens, the motel customer, had filed suit against Patel in state
court and Audubon responded with this declaratory judgment action. The
court determined that the assault and battery exclusion precludes any cover-
age arising out of the assault and battery committed on Dockens even if
Patel is found liable for negligence.1082
In P.G. Bell Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 1083 Bell sued
USF&G, after it obtained a judgment against USF&G's insured, for breach
of contract and the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for violations of
the DTPA. USF&G filed a motion for summary judgment contending that
Bell could not maintain any causes of action against USF&G because it did
not have a contract with Bell, it did not owe a duty of good faith and fair
dealing to Bell, the terms of the insurance policy were not complied with,
and the statute of limitations barred the claims. The trial court granted this
motion and rendered judgment in favor of USF&G. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded for trial.
USF&G argued that Bell could not maintain an action for breach of con-
tract because there was no contract between USF&G and Bell. However,
Bell was a third-party judgment creditor bound by the rights, duties, and
obligations of the insured under the terms and conditions of the contract
between the insurance company and the insured. The court, therefore, held
that once Bell acquired a default judgment against the insured for damages
done to property covered by the USF&G policy, Bell had a cause of action
against USF&G for payment of those damages up to the policy limits. 10 84




1081. 811 F. Supp. 264 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
1082. Id. at 265.
1083. 853 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
1084. Id. at 190.
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Bell next argued that the trial court erred by finding that the terms and
conditions of the insurance policy were not complied with. The policy re-
quired that before an action could be brought against USF&G, it had to
have notice of the accident giving rise to the claim. USF&G argued that
Superior failed to give it notice of the claim, and this failure to comply with
the policy's notice provision should be imputed to Bell. The court noted,
however, that the policy provided that failure to give notice of the action
would not bar liability under the policy unless it prejudiced USF&G. The
court held that an insured's failure to notify the insurer of a claim filed
against it by a third-party would not constitute prejudice to it unless that
notice was given after a default judgment was taken against the insured.108 5
The evidence showed that USF&G learned of Bell's claims against Superior
almost three years before trial. Bell, rather than Superior, sent USF&G a
copy of its petition and had its attorney discuss the case with USF&G.
USF&G argued that for notice to be sufficient, it had to be provided by
Superior, the insured. The court disagreed and held that notice of the occur-
rence or action need not come from the insured, but could come from the
injured party. 08 6 Therefore, there was a fact question of whether USF&G
was prejudiced by the timing of the notice.
Bell next argued that the trial court erred by ruling that the statute of
limitations barred its claims. Apparently, the trial court found that Bell's
claims accrued at the time USF&G refused to defend Superior. The court of
appeals disagreed, holding that Bell's claim did not accrue until Superior's
obligation to pay was finally determined at the time the default judgment
was taken against it. 10 87 The court relied on the policy provision that no
action would lie against the insurer unless, as a condition precedent thereto,
the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally deter-
mined by judgment against the insured after actual trial. Because Bell filed
its lawsuit within two years of securing the default judgment, the court held
that limitations did not bar this action.
C. BURDEN OF PROOF
In Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc. 1088 the court ad-
dressed the issue of proving the terms of an insurance policy when the actual
policy is missing. Vacuum Tanks (VTI) was sued to contribute to the clean-
up of pollution sites. Bituminous refused VTI's request for a defense because
it could not determine coverage under the policies it had issued to VTI as
none could be located. The district court declared that a defense was owed
based upon the coverage described in a specimen policy. The Fifth Circuit
reversed.
The court first cited the general proposition that the insured has the bur-
den to prove the terms of the contract in order to establish coverage under
1085. Id. at 191.
1086. Id. at 192.
1087. Id.
1088. 975 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1992).
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the policy. 10 89 Typically, this is done by introducing the policy into evi-
dence. If, as in this case, a policy cannot not be located, the insured can
resort to secondary evidence to prove the terms of the policy. 10 90 This alter-
native, according to the court, requires evidence of policy terms, not just
evidence of the existence of a policy. 10 91 The court determined that VTI
failed to prove the actual terms of the policy because the specimen policy
was introduced for the limited purpose of demonstrating the contents of Bi-
tuminous's file. 1092
In New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Martech USA, Inc. 1093 insurers of all-
risk marine policies sought a declaration that they had no liability to their
insured for equipment damage. The policies issued to Martech were effec-
tive from April 1986 to April 1988. In January 1988, Martech received un-
confirmed information that some of its equipment had been damaged.
Martech was instructed to prepare written documentation of the losses and
make a claim. About a year later Martech provided a report of its losses.
The claim was denied for lack of timely notice, lack of proof that the loss
occurred during the policy period, and various policy exclusions.
The district court, resorting to Texas rather than maritime law, placed the
burden on Martech to prove that the loss occurred during the policy period
and that the exclusions did not apply. Consequently the court granted sum-
mary judgment for the insurers. Martech appealed, arguing that the court
should have applied maritime law which places the burden on the insurer to
prove the applicability of policy exclusions.
The court of appeals held that it did not matter which law was applied
since under both federal maritime law and article 21.58 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code the burden is on the insurer to prove the applicability of policy
exclusions. 10 94 The question left for the court to decide was who has the
burden to prove that a loss occurred within the policy period. That is, is this
a matter of exclusion for the insurer to prove or a precondition to coverage
for the insured to prove. The court concluded that the insured must first
prove that the loss occurred during the policy period. If such is proven, the
burden then shifts to the insurer to prove any policy exclusion. 0 95 Martech
did not show when the loss occurred, only that it may have occurred during
the policy period. The court held that unconfirmed rumors of loss are insuf-
ficient to satisfy Martech's burden and thus affirmed the summary
judgment. 10 96
1089. Id. at 1132.
1090. Id.
1091. Id.
1092. Id. at 1133.
1093. 993 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1993).
1094. Id. at 1199.






1. What Is "Hail"?
In Commonwealth Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Downs'0 97 the issue was
whether the loss to Downs' horse-barn and covered arena was caused by
hail. A severe winter storm caused ice to accumulate on the roof of Downs'
covered horse arena, causing the roof to collapse and kill five horses belong-
ing to a tenant. On the proof of loss submitted to Commonwealth by
Downs, he described the loss as being caused by ice. The adjuster for Com-
monwealth determined that the loss was not a covered peril under the pol-
icy, and denied the claim.
Downs filed suit against Commonwealth seeking, inter alia, a declaratory
judgment that the collapse due to ice was covered by the policy. The jury
found in favor of Downs on all issues. The court then awarded Downs a
judgment of $200,000 for violations of the Insurance Code and breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, but denied him recovery under his causes
of action for breach of contract and DTPA violations. The court of appeals
reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment.
The court first addressed the issue of whether the cause of the property
damage was a covered peril under the terms of the insurance contract. The
policy provided coverage for losses caused by hail but excluded losses caused
by rain or snow. The policy did not mention ice or sleet, nor did it define the
term "hail." It was undisputed that the damage to the arena was caused by
an accumulation of ice. Downs, however, argued that the accumulated ice
was caused by ice pellets or sleet, which come within the commonly under-
stood definition of "hail." Commonwealth's position was that the ice pellets
did not come within the accepted definition of "hail," and therefore, there
was no coverage.
The court concluded that the policy was ambiguous because the term
"hail" is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction.10 98 As such,
the construction that most favors the insured must be adopted. The court
further held that extraneous evidence was properly introduced at trial to
determine the intended meaning of the term "hail" and whether the property
damage fell within the policy coverage.1099 The testimony revealed that the
property damage was caused either by ice, freezing rain, snow, or sleet, or a
combination of these weather conditions. Downs attempted to equate hail
with sleet or ice pellets. Because there was no evidence that the damage was
actually caused by hail, the court held that there was no evidence to support
the jury's finding that the weather conditions listed under the insurance pol-
icy were the dominant causes of the damage.' 11
Downs argued that sleet was included within the meaning of "hail," citing
1097. 853 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).
1098. Id. at 110.
1099. Id.
1100. Id. at 114.
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Evana Plantation v. Yorkshire Insurance Co. 1101 and Southall v. Farm Bu-
reau Mutual Insurance Co. 110 2 The court refused to adopt the reasoning of
these two cases, finding them distinguishable. One distinction was that the
policies in those cases specifically excluded ice from coverage for hail,
whereas there was no such exclusion in Downs' policy." 10 3 Furthermore, in
Southall there was undisputed testimony that "hail" includes sleet, and that
the sleet on the roof was small hail." 0 4 In this case, however, the court
noted that while all agreed that Downs' roof was damaged by an accumula-
tion, there were many conflicting opinions regarding whether the ice was
actually "hail."' 105
The court, while correctly stating that when a policy is ambiguous, the
interpretation favoring coverage must be adopted, 1o6 failed to abide by this
rule. The court held that the policy was ambiguous because "hail" was sus-
ceptible to more than one interpretation, but then refused to adopt the in-
sured's construction of the term so as to include ice pellets or sleet.1 07 This
was so, even though there was much testimony by experts, even those
brought by Commonwealth, that "hail" includes ice pellets and hard snow
(the dictionary definition).
2. Exclusion Based on Arson by Insured
In American General Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mclnnis Book Store, Inc. 1108
the Mclnnis Book Store, along with its contents, was destroyed by a fire.
Mclnnis Book Store's insurer, American General, refused to pay for the loss,
contending that the owner, Lynam, had intentionally set the fire because the
store was suffering financially. The Mclnnis Book Store then sued American
General for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, violations of article 21.21, and the DTPA. The contract claim was
severed and tried separately from the remaining claims. The jury found that
Lynam did not intentionally set the fire and that the store suffered compen-
sable losses of $143,000. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for
Mclnnis Book Store, including prejudgment interest and attorney's fees.
The court of appeals affirmed.
American General complained of jury prejudice due to the inclusion of
exhibits revealing that Lynam had been acquitted of arson. At the time the
exhibits were offered, the court admitted them into evidence on the condi-
tion that Mclnnis Book Store's attorney would delete the material referring
to the criminal trial. This was never done, however, and the exhibits were
given to the jury in their original form. The court concluded that, while it
1101. 58 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1952).
1102. 632 S.W.2d 420 (Ark. 1982).
1103. Commonwealth Lloyds, 853 S.W.2d at 111.
1104. Id.
1105. Id.
1106. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.
1991).
1107. Commonwealth Lloyds, 853 S.W.2d at 114.
1108. 860 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
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was the offering party's duty to ensure that the objectionable/inadmissible
material was excised, in this case American General could show no harm
because the exhibits were not viewed by the jury until after a verdict had
been reached." 10 9
The court upheld the jury's finding that Lynam did not intentionally set
the fire was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence. 11o The record revealed conflicting evidence and sharply disputed
testimony on this issue. The court, however, noted that reversal is only justi-
fied if the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponder-
ance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.""
Therefore, the court refused to reverse the jury verdict.
The court further held that the evidence supporting the jury's award of
damages was not so weak that the award of damages was unjust. 1' 2 The
evidence showed that the bookstore had an inventory of $70,000 at the time
of the fire and that damage to the inventory was $46,000. Damage to furni-
ture, computers, and other fixtures was assessed at $38,750. Damage to
leasehold improvements was $16,600. American General paid the lienholder
$38,000, leaving a $63,000 lost contents claim. Moreover, Lynam testified
that lost earnings were computed in accordance with the policy to be in
excess of $80,000 - the policy limit. The court found that this evidence
supported the jury findings of $63,000 in destroyed property and $80,000 in
lost earnings. ''13
Finally, the court held that McInnis Book Store was entitled to recover
attorney's fees. American General argued that TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 38.006 precluded the award of attorney's fees in this case.
The court held, however, that § 38.006 precludes the recovery of attorney's
fees only for claims against insurance companies that are allowed under
other statutes. Section 38.006 does not preclude the recovery of attorney's
fees in a breach of contract action against an insurance company because no
other statute authorizes such a recovery. 114
In The Travelers Companies v. Wolfe "' 5 Maryon Wolfe brought suit to
collect her share of the proceeds under a multi-peril policy. At a time when
Maryon and Ralph Wolfe were married they used community assets to begin
a business under the name of Computer Creations Unlimited. Ralph ob-
tained insurance for personal property through Travelers. This policy was
issued showing the named insured as Ralph T. Wolfe d/b/a Computer Cre-
ations Unlimited.
In 1985, the Wolfes incorporated their business as Computer Creations
Unlimited, Inc. with each of them owning 500 shares of stock. In January of
1986, Ralph renewed the insurance policy without changing the name of the
1109. Id. at 488-89.
1110. Id. at 489-90.
1111. Id. at 489.
1112. Id. at 490.
1113. Id.
1114. Id. at 491.
1115. 838 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
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insured. On November 30, 1986, the property at Computer Creations Un-
limited, Inc. was destroyed by fire. On March 23, 1987, Travelers denied the
claim stating that Computer Creations Unlimited, Inc. was not the named
insured and that the fire resulted from fraudulent, dishonest, or criminal acts
of Mr. Wolfe.
On May 18, 1987, Maryon and Ralph were divorced and their community
estate divided. Ralph was awarded all the corporate stock as his separate
property and Maryon retained all rights she had to file an insurance claim
for losses incurred as a result of the fire. Furthermore, it was provided that
the proceeds that Maryon might receive would be her sole and separate
property.
The jury found that the fire was started by Ralph and that Maryon neither
directly nor indirectly participated in the arson. The trial court rendered
judgment awarding Maryon about $54,000. The court of appeals affirmed.
Travelers, relying on Jones v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Corp.,1116
argued that Maryon could not recover under the policy for destroyed com-
munity property because Ralph willfully set fire to the property. The ration-
ale behind Jones was that any recovery by the innocent spouse of community
property would also benefit the wrongdoing spouse. This court held, how-
ever, that the Texas Supreme Court reexamined Jones in Kulubis v. Texas
Farm Bureau Underwriters Insurance Co. 1117 and allowed the innocent
spouse to recover insurance proceeds after her husband set fire to their
jointly owned mobile home. The court noted that in Kulubis, the mobile
home was not community property because it was a gift to both of them.
Therefore, their undivided one-half interest was the separate property of
each of them.
Travelers argued that since the property destroyed in this case was com-
munity, rather than separate property, Jones still controlled. Travelers re-
lied upon two cases out of the Fifth Circuit where the court refused to
extend Kulubis to allow an innocent spouse any recovery on a policy insur-
ing community property willfully destroyed by the other spouse.' 18 The
court noted, however, that the Fifth Circuit's decisions did not control the
outcome of this case since they were contrary to the statement of Texas law
as announced by the Texas Supreme Court. 1119 The court further noted that
in Kulubis, the supreme court stated that "[w]e are not to be understood as
holding that an innocent spouse is barred from recovering under an insur-
ance policy covering community property." '"120
In this case, the court held that Maryon was entitled to receive one-half of
the insurance proceeds for the loss occasioned by the fire since she had no
role in the fire. 12 1 Such recovery for Maryon would not benefit Ralph, the
1116. 250 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952, writ ref'd).
1117. 706 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1986).
1118. See Norman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1986); Webster v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 953 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1992).
1119. Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d at 712.
1120. Id. (citing Kulubis, 706 S.W.2d at 955).
1121. Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d at 712.
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wrongdoer, because the proceeds were her separate property by virtue of the
final divorce decree.
3. Conditions Precedent/Burden of Proof
In Love of God Holiness Temple Church v. Union Standard Insurance
Co. "1 22 the Love of God Holiness Temple Church sued Union Standard In-
surance Company after it denied the church's claim for water damage to its
building under Union Standard's insurance policy. The church also sought
damages for violations of article 21.21. The trial court granted Union Stan-
dard's motion for instructed verdict on the article 21.21 claim, and the jury
found that the church's damage was not caused by an event covered by the
policy. The trial court, therefore, rendered a take-nothing judgment. The
court of appeals affirmed.
The church argued that it was relieved from proving that the loss was
within the coverage of the policy because Union Standard failed to deny that
the church had complied with all conditions precedent, as alleged by the
church. The court recognized that a plaintiff who pleads that all conditions
precedent necessary to recovery have been fulfilled needs only to prove com-
pliance with those conditions precedent that are specifically denied by the
defendant.11 23 Conditions precedent include giving notice of a claim or loss,
the timely filing of a proof of loss, filing suit within a specified time, and
timely forwarding suit papers to a liability insurer, but not the promise of the
insurer to pay if a loss is covered by the general terms of the policy. 1 24 The
court, therefore, held that because the existence of coverage was an essential
element of the plaintiff's case, the church had the burden of pleading and
proving coverage. 125 The church did plead that the damage to its building
was caused by wind and hail, and thus covered by the policy. The church,
however, did not introduce any evidence to prove the same. In fact, Union
Standard presented evidence by three experts that the damage was not
caused by wind or hail. Because coverage was an essential element of the
church's cause of action, and because it failed to prove that element, the
court held that the church was not entitled to an instructed verdict. 1126
The church next argued that because Union Standard did not plead any
affirmative defenses, the trial court should not have allowed it to present
evidence on the issue of causation. The court held, however, that lack of
coverage was not an affirmative defense, but was an essential element of the
insured's case. 1127 Thus, Union Standard's general denial put in issue
whether there was coverage under the policy.
1122. 860 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ requested).
1123. Id. at 180.
1124. Id.






A. LIABILITY OF PRIMARY CARRIER TO EXCESS CARRIER FOR
JUDGMENTS IN EXCESS OF PRIMARY COVERAGE
In American Centennial Insurance Co. v. Canal Insurance Co. 1128 the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that an
excess carrier can maintain a Stowers cause of action against a primary car-
rier based on the theory of equitable subrogation. General Rent-A-Car was
sued for injuries and death allegedly resulting from a blow-out of a defective
tire on one of its rental cars. General had primary coverage through Canal
Insurance and excess coverage with First State Insurance and American
Centennial Insurance. Canal investigated and defended the suit, hiring the
firm of Giessel, Stone, Barker & Lyman to defend General. Because of al-
leged mishandling of the litigation by trial counsel, the excess insurers set-
tled for $3.7 million.
The two excess carriers, First State and American Centennial, then
brought suit against Canal, the law firm handling the defense, and two of the
firms attorneys for negligence, gross negligence, breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and violations of the DTPA and article 21.21 of the
Insurance Code. The trial court granted summary judgment, denying all
claims as barred by the statute of limitations and determined that the pri-
mary insurer and its counsel owed no duties to the excess carriers. The
court of appeals reversed the judgment as to Canal, but affirmed as to de-
fense counsel on the basis of statute of limitations. 1 29 The supreme court
affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The issue presented to the supreme court was whether an excess insurance
carrier has a cause of action against a primary carrier and trial counsel for
mishandling a claim. The court concluded that such a right does exist, but
only indirectly. According to the court, the insurer paying a loss under a
policy becomes equitably subrogated to any cause of action the insured may
have against a third-party responsible for the loss." 130 Because an insured
has a right to sue the primary carrier for a wrongful refusal to settle a claim
within the policy limits (the Stowers duty), the court held that an excess
carrier, because of equitable subrogation, can maintain the same action.13'
The policy behind allowing the excess carrier to bring the insured's Stow-
ers claim is to encourage fair and reasonable settlement of lawsuits. 1 32 If
the excess carrier had no remedy, the primary insurer would have less incen-
tive to settle within policy limits. The court also held that equitable subroga-
tion would prevent an unfair distribution of losses between primary and
excess insurers and would discourage primary carriers from gambling with
the excess carrier's money when potential judgments approached the pri-
1128. 843 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1992).
1129. 810 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991), afJdin part, rev'd in part, 843
S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1992).
1130. American Centennial, 843 S.W.2d at 482.
1131. Id. at 483.
1132. Id. at 482-83.
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mary insurer's policy limits. 113
The court held that the recognition of a cause of action for equitable sub-
rogation would not impose new or additional burdens on the primary carrier
because it already had a duty to protect the interest of the insured.11 34 The
court further clarified that it was not recognizing a direct duty running from
the primary to the excess insurer.'1 35 Because the excess carrier's cause of
action against the primary insurer is identical to the insured's, the court held
that it is also subject to any defenses asserted against an insured, including
the refusal to settle and the failure to cooperate. 1' 36 The court also noted
that it was not deciding whether the doctrine of equitable subrogation would
extend to permit an excess carrier to bring DTPA and Insurance Code ac-
tions against a primary insurer.137
The supreme court next determined that the court of appeals erred by
finding that the action against the attorneys was barred by the statute of
limitations." 138 The court of appeals held that the excess insurers' cause of
action accrued at the time of the alleged malpractice. The supreme court,
relying on Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins,'1 39 held that the statute of limita-
tions on a legal malpractice claim is tolled until all appeals on the underlying
claim are exhausted. 114 0
The court next concluded that an excess carrier is equitably subrogated to
an insured's cause of action against its counsel, because the attorney owes
the insured a duty of unqualified loyalty in providing the defense.1141 The
court held, however, that the excess insurer can enforce only those existing
duties counsel owes to the insured. The court felt that without equitable
subrogation, an attorney might escape the consequences of legal malpractice
because the insured would have little incentive to sue the attorney as long as
the judgment or settlement was within the excess carrier's policy limits. 1 42
Equitable subrogation would, therefore, allow the party actually harmed by
the legal malpractice (the excess carrier) to enforce the insured's right to
competent representation. The court once again stressed that it was not de-
ciding whether a malpractice claim could be assigned, but was solely decid-
ing that the doctrine of equitable subrogation allows an excess carrier to sue
in the place of the insured."1 43
Justice Hecht, joined by Chief Justice Phillips and Justices Gonzalez,
Cook, and Cornyn, authored a concurring opinion wherein they agreed that
an excess carrier could be equitably subrogated to an insured's rights against
a primary insurance carrier and counsel for negligently investigating, prepar-





1138. Id. at 483-84.
1139. 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991).
1140. American Centennial, 843 S.W.2d at 483-84.
1141. Id. at 484.
1142. Id. at 485.
1143. Id. at 485 n.6.
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ing to defend, trying, or settling a case brought against the insured. While
the majority did not decide whether any other causes of action were avail-
able to an excess carrier by subrogation, the concurring justices held that the
excess carrier's only cause of action was for negligence, and none under the
DTPA or Insurance Code. 1 44 The concurring justices also stated that the
primary carrier was entitled to assert any defense available against either the
insured or the excess carrier.
International Insurance Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc. 1145 is seemingly at
odds with American Centennial. In this case, the Dallas court held that the
insured and the primary insurance carrier do not have contractual or com-
mon law duty to the excess carrier to make reasonable attempts to settle a
claim or lawsuit within the primary insurance limits. 1146
Dresser was self-insured, retaining absolute and complete management
and control of the handling and defense of all claims and lawsuits made or
brought against it. Through a complicated arrangement, Fidelity and Casu-,
alty Co. had the appearance of a liability insurance carrier fronting as
Dresser's primary insurer. International provided excess insurance to
Dresser. International filed this action against Dresser and Fidelity seeking
a declaratory judgment that International was not obligated to pay a claim
that Dresser had submitted under its excess insurance policy. The claim
arose from a judgment entered against Dresser in a products liability lawsuit
(Snyder) that International's excess policy covered. International claimed
that it was excused from payment because Dresser and/or Fidelity had
breached alleged duties to International to settle the underlying lawsuit
within the limits of Fidelity's primary policy. The trial court granted
Dresser's and Fidelity's motion for partial summary judgment. Thereafter,
the trial court decided the remaining issues and entered a final judgment in
favor of Dresser and Fidelity except as to their claim for attorney's fees,
which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed.
Initially, International argued that by virtue of an agreement between
Dresser and International, Dresser had a duty to settle the Snyder case
within the limits of Fidelity's primary coverage. The court, however, re-
fused to interpret the agreement in such a way. When considered as a
whole, the agreement between Dresser and International (called "The Guid-
ing Principles for Insurers of Primary and Excess Coverage") did not impose
on Dresser a contractual duty to settle the Snyder case within primary lim-
its." 47 In fact, the Guiding Principles provided that the excess carrier must
refrain from coercive or collusive conduct designed to force settlement, and
that the excess carrier shall never make formal demand upon a primary in-
surer that the latter settle a claim within its policy limit.
International next argued that Dresser owed a common law duty to Inter-
national to make reasonable attempts to settle the Snyder lawsuit within pri-
1144. Id. at 486.
1145. 841 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
1146. International Ins., 841 S.W.2d at 445.
1147. Id- at 443.
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mary or self-insured limits. The court rejected this argument relying on
Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 1148 In Safeway
Stores the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the insured
owed an excess carrier any duty that would require an insured contemplat-
ing settlement to put the excess carrier's financial interest on at least an
equal footing with its own. 1 49 The court also noted that Safeway Stores had
been reaffirmed in California and continues to be cited with approval by
other courts outside California.1 150 International, however, did not cite a
case that recognized a cause of action by an excess insurer against its insured
for failing to settle a lawsuit below the threshold of the excess policy.
Furthermore, the court noted that International charged Dresser a
$900,000 premium based on its calculation of the probability that Dresser
might be exposed to a liability beyond the primary layer.'I"' International
knew that, in products liability claims, Dresser controlled its own defense
and settlement. Thus, the verdict in the Snyder case was precisely the risk
that International, as well as Dresser, contracted to insure. The court fur-
ther noted that one of the reasons excess insurance is purchased is to provide
a pool of money in the event that the decision is made to take the gamble of
litigating.1152 To accept International's argument would impose on Dresser
the financial risk of protecting excess insurers.
The court also rejected International's argument that Fidelity owed a duty
to International for the acts of Dresser since Fidelity assigned its contractual
obligations to control the investigation, defense, and settlement of products
liability lawsuits against Dresser to Dresser itself. 1 53 The court once again
made mention that International had full knowledge of the arrangement
whereby Dresser became a self-insurer handling all matters with respect to
claims and litigation. Thus, the court declined to impose upon Fidelity a
duty to take control of the Snyder lawsuit away from Dresser and settle it
against Dresser's will on terms favorable to International's interests. 154 In
fact, the court cited another case involving Dresser and Fidelity where it was
decided that Fidelity did not have a duty to settle a products liability claim
brought against Dresser since Dresser had exclusive control over such
claims. 1155
B. LIABILITY OF PRIMARY CARRIER TO INSURED FOR EXCESS
JUDGMENTS - STOWERS
In American Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Garcia 1156 Dr. Garcia sued
1148. 610 P.2d 1038 (Cal. 1980).
1149. International Ins., 841 S.W.2d at 444 (quoting Safeway Stores, 610 P.2d at 1043).
1150. International Ins., 841 S.W.2d at 444-45.
1151. Id. at 444.
1152. Id.
1153. Id. at 446.
1154. Id.
1155. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 789 F. Supp.
927 (N.D. Ill. 1992), rev'd, 4 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 1993).
1156. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 561 (March 9, 1994).
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one of his liability carriers for its failure to settle after he was sued in a
medical malpractice case by Cardenas. Garcia's treatment of Cardenas ex-
tended from 1980 through 1983, invoking liability policies issued by ICA
and APIE. Both insurers initially agreed to share equally the cost of defend-
ing Garcia and to allocate any settlement or verdict in proportion to the
amounts of their coverage. Five days before trial, APIE notified Garcia that
it would no longer provide coverage because the plaintiff's pleadings then on
file did not allege any acts of negligence occurring during APIE's policy
period. When the trial began five days later, Cardenas filed an amended
petition alleging acts of negligence occurring during APIE's coverage, but
APIE declined to reenter the case. That same day, Garcia and Cardenas
agreed to an assignment of Garcia's claims against the insurers, whereby
Cardenas agreed to look only to the proceeds of the insurance policies to
satisfy any judgment against Garcia. In a non-jury trial, the court rendered
judgment against Garcia in the amount of $2,235,483.30, plus interest and
costs.
While the medical malpractice cause was on appeal, Garcia sued ICA and
APIE, alleging negligence and mishandling his defense in the underlying
suit, breach of the insurance contracts by abandoning his defense and failing
to investigate, negotiate, and settle the suit, DTPA violations, Insurance
Code violations, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Before this case was tried, ICA paid $2 million
to Cardenas in return for a full release, and APIE paid $500,000 in exchange
for a continuance and an agreement that its liability would not exceed $2.5
million.
When the suit against APIE was tried, the jury found APIE was negli-
gent, acted with heedless and reckless disregard for Garcia's rights, commit-
ted unfair practices in the business of insurance, and committed
unconscionable conduct, which was done knowingly and was a proximate
cause of damages to Garcia. The jury found the failure to defend and pro-
vide coverage was a "false, misleading, and deceptive act or practice." The
jury also found ICA was negligent and allocated responsibility of eighty-four
percent (84%) to ICA and sixteen percent (16%) to APIE. Finally, the jury
awarded Garcia actual damages of $2,235,000 and additional and exemplary
damages of $250,000, along with attorney's fees of $820,500. The trial court
rendered judgment against APIE and a related company, APSG, jointly and
severally in the amount of $1,331,574. Among other things, the court of
appeals modified the trial court's judgment to increase the amount of the
judgment for Dr. Garcia and otherwise affirmed the trial court's
judgment.1157
When the Texas Supreme Court issued its first opinion in this case the sole
issue was whether the pretrial execution of a covenant not to execute be-
tween Cardenas and Garcia necessarily negated all of Garcia's damages
stemming from APIE's breach of its duty to defend and settle the medical




malpractice case. The court decided that it did not. About fourteen months
after its original decision the court issued an opinion on rehearing which did
not even reach this issue because it concluded that APIE did not breach its
Stowers duty.' 158 According to the court, the Stowers duty is not triggered
unless: "the claim against the insured is within the scope of coverage, the
demand is within the policy limits, and the terms of the demand are such
that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it, considering the likelihood
and the degree of the insured's potential exposure to an excess
judgment." 1159
In this case, the court determined that the limits of the APIE policy were
$500,000.1160 The court then concluded that because APIE had never been
given the opportunity to settle for $500,000 or less that it did not breach its
Stowers duty to settle. 16 1 The court thus felt that it did not need to decide
whether the covenant not to execute negated all of Garcia's damages.11 62
The dissent, led by Justice Hightower (who had authored the original ma-
jority opinion), however took on this issue and maintained that a covenant
not to execute would not negate an insured's damages. Justice Hightower
gave four reasons why a covenant not to execute would not preclude the
assignee of an insured from recovering damages, even those in excess of
those in policy limits, from the insurer.
First, the use of a covenant not to execute provides insurers a strong in-
centive to give due consideration to the interests of its insureds. 1163 Quoting
from Foremost County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Home Indemnity Co.,1 64 the
dissent wrote that where the insurer refuses to provide a defense, the insured
often can protect himself only with a covenant not to execute. 1165 Without
such a covenant, the insured would either have to pay the plaintiff enough to
settle the claim, or would have to incur defense costs himself, even though
the insurer is contractually responsible for payment of such costs. If a cove-
nant not to execute absolved the insurer of liability, the plaintiff would have
no incentive to enter into such a covenant. Furthermore, without the availa-
bility of such a covenant, there might be nothing to deter an insurer to give
due regard to its insured's interest.
Second, allowing recovery of the excess judgment despite the existence of
a covenant not to execute, deters insurers from breaching their duties. 1 66
1158. American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 561, 571 (March 9,
1994).
1159. Id. at 566.
1160. Garcia argued that because his treatment of Cardenas spanned three policy periods,
the limits of each policy should be stacked to afford $1,500,000 in coverage. The court would
not allow the policies to be stacked because they did not overlap and because the alleged injury
was indivisible. Thus, the maximum coverage provided to Garcia was $500,000. Garcia, 37
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 570-71.
1161. Id. at 571. The court also decided, with little or no analysis, that breach of the Stow-
ers duty is not a violation of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code or the DTPA.
1162. Id. at 561 n.l.
1163. Garcia, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 582 (Hightower, J., dissenting).
1164. 897 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1990).




Justice Hightower opined that an insurer would have little motivation to
fulfill its duties under the insurance contract if the insured's only remedy
was contract damages. In fact, if there was not recovery for the excess judg-
ment, there would be more of an incentive for the breach of the contract
than its performance.
The third reason listed by Justice Hightower is that covenants not to exe-
cute are supported by the public policy favoring settlements and minimizing
the insured's potential damages." 67 By using a covenant not to execute, an
insured is able to settle his dispute with another person by turning the in-
surer's wrongful conduct into a bargaining strength in dealing with the
claimant. Justice Hightower feels that it is better to allow an injured claim-
ant to collect from the party who engaged in false, misleading and deceptive
acts and caused those damages - the insurance company - rather than the
victim of those acts - the insured. 1 68
Fourth, the policy considerations supporting covenants not to execute in
the bad faith context are similar to those underlying the Stowers cause of
action. 1169 If an insurance company refuses to settle within the policy limits,
and a judgment is subsequently rendered in excess of the policy limits, the
insurer is liable for the amount of the judgment. Therefore, when the in-
sured assigns a Stowers claim to an injured claimant, a covenant not to exe-
cute does not eliminate damages for the insurer's failure to settle - it simply
shifts the burden of recovery for those damages from the insured to the in-
jured claimant. "170
The dissent also attacks the majority's statement that APIE never had the
opportunity to settle for its policy limits. According to Justice Hightower,
APIE "had every opportunity to attempt to settle for $500,000.00, but it
never made any attempts to facilitate settlement." ' 171 Justice Hightower felt
it was within the Stowers duty to require an insurer, upon being presented
with a settlement demand, even one greater than policy limits, to exercise
reasonable attempts to negotiate a settlement. 1 72 According to Justice
Hightower, APIE never evaluated the settlement value of the case or en-
gaged in reasonable negotiations to settle the matter. Thus, the dissent
would have affirmed the judgment against APIE.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Carter 1173 the court determined that an insur-
ance company is liable to its insured for any negligence of attorneys in con-
ducting the affairs of the insured with reference to litigation and/or claims
made against the insured. Allstate issued a policy of automobile liability
insurance to Johnston. Clinton, while driving Johnston's, car ran over and
severely injured Carter, a minor. Clinton had liability insurance through
National County Mutual, but was also covered by Johnston's Allstate policy
1167. Id. at 583.
1168. Id.
1169. Id.
1170. Id. at 584.
1171. Id. at 579.
1172. Id. at 580.
1173. 855 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), writ dism'd, 859 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1993).
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while driving Johnston's car. Without filing suit, the Carters agreed to settle
for the value of Clinton's coverage under the National County and Allstate
policies: $20,000 and $25,000 respectively. Allstate agreed. The parties
then filed a friendly suit to have the settlement approved by a court.
At the hearing to finalize the agreement, Allstate's attorneys added a pre-
viously undiscussed provision to the proposed settlement agreement requir-
ing the Carter's to indemnify Allstate, National County Mutual, Clinton,
and Johnston for all costs incurred by them in the litigation of any future
claims asserted against them arising from this accident. The Carters refused
to settle because of the indemnity provision. The Carters then nonsuited the
friendly action against Clinton and filed a personal injury suit against him.
Clinton was ultimately found liable for $2.825 million, and the Carters ac-
quired any cause of action Clinton would have against Allstate. The Carters
then brought a Stowers action against Allstate and its attorneys.
The parties filed stipulations agreeing that the sole issue to be considered
was Allstate's purported wrongdoing with regard to the settling of this case
prior to January 1, 1987. The parties further stipulated that should the jury
find Allstate guilty of wrongdoing, the insurance company would be liable
for the full $2.825 million judgment the Carters held against Clinton. The
jury found that Allstate was negligent in its failure to settle, failed to
promptly and equitably pay the claim when liability was reasonably clear,
and breached its good faith and fair dealing. The trial court thus entered
judgment against Allstate in favor of the Carters for $2.825 million. The
court of appeals affirmed.
On appeal Allstate argued that because the parties stipulated that only
those alleged wrongdoings committed by Allstate prior to January 1, 1987,
would be the subject of the lawsuit, the jury questions should have been so
restricted in time. The court held that because there was no evidence offered
of wrongdoing by Allstate after January 1, 1987, there was no error in sub-
mitting the case to the jury upon broad form questions. 1 74 In fact, all the
evidence regarding Allstate's failure to adequately represent its insured cen-
tered on the company's insistence on the indemnity language and the
aborted settlement attempt that occurred on May 30, 1986.
Allstate also complained about the trial court's instruction to the jury re-
garding the negligence of its attorneys as being redundant and unfairly prej-
udicial. The instruction read:
You are further instructed that when an insurance company hires attor-
neys, pursuant to an insurance contract, to represent an insured with
regard to such claims, then the insurance company is responsible for the
conduct of the attorneys. Therefore, the insurance company is liable to
the insured for any negligence of the attorneys conducting the affairs of
the insured with reference to the claims.' 175
The court found that the instruction was proper as it was substantially
similar to the jury instruction approved in Ranger County Mutual Insurance




Co. v. Guin. 117 6 The Guin instruction read:
[T]he insurance company is as responsible to the insured for the con-
duct of the sub-agent [attorney] with reference to the litigation as the
insurance company is for its own conduct. Therefore, the insurance
company is liable to the insured for damages caused to the insured, if
any, by the negligence, if any, of the sub-agent in conducting the affairs
on the insured with reference to litigation. 1
77
The court of appeals held that this instruction was proper because it ex-
plained that an agency relationship existed and then explained the extent of
that agency relationship to the jury. 1 78
XIV. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
A. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA)
1. How Far Does ERISA's Preemption Extend?
In District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade 1 179 the
Greater Washington Board of Trade, a nonprofit corporation that sponsors
health insurance coverage for its employees, filed this action seeking to en-
join the enforcement of a law enacted by the District of Columbia requiring
employers who provide health insurance for their employees to provide
equivalent health insurance coverage for injured employees eligible for work-
ers' compensation benefits on the ground that the law is preempted by ER-
ISA. The district court held that this law was not preempted because it also
relates to a workers' compensation plan, which is exempt from ERISA cov-
erage. The court of appeals reversed, holding that ERISA preempts a law
that relates to a covered plan regardless of whether the law also relates to an
exempt plan. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the court of appeals.
Initially, the Court held that the District of Columbia's law requiring em-
ployers to provide health insurance coverage at the same benefit level that
the employee had at the time the employee received, or was eligible to re-
ceive, workers' compensation benefits related to an ERISA plan, as it specifi-
cally referred to welfare benefit plans. Therefore, on that basis alone, the law
is preempted by ERISA and it makes no difference that the law also relates
to ERISA-exempt workers' compensation plans." 80 According to the
Court, the exemptions from ERISA coverage do not limit the preemptive
sweep of ERISA once it is determined that the law in question relates to a
covered plan.
In Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc. "s the Fifth Circuit held that Lou-
isiana wrongful death statute is preempted by ERISA. Florence Corcoran,
as an employee of South Central Bell Telephone Co., was a member of Bell's
1176. 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
1177. Id. at 658.
1178. Carter, 855 S.W.2d at 102.
1179. 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992).
1180. Id. at 583-84.
1181. 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
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Medical Assistance Plan, which provided medical benefits to its employees.
The Plan was administered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama.
Under a portion of the Plan known as the "Quality Care Program" (QCP),
participants had to obtain advance approval for overnight hospital admis-
sions in certain medical procedures, and had to obtain approval on a contin-
uing basis once they were admitted to a hospital, or plan benefits, to which
they were otherwise entitled, would be reduced. QCP was administered by
United Healthcare. United performed a form of cost containment services
known as utilization review.
In early 1989, Mrs. Corcoran became pregnant and as her delivery date
neared, her obstetrician, Dr. Collins, ordered her hospitalized so that he
could monitor the fetus around the clock. In accordance with the QCP por-
tion of the Plan, Dr. Collins sought precertification from United for Mrs.
Corcoran's hospital stay. Despite Dr. Collins' recommendation, United de-
termined that hospitalization was not necessary and, instead, authorized ten
hours per day of home nursing care. Mrs. Corcoran entered the hospital on
October 3, 1989, but because United had not precertified her stay, she re-
turned home on October 12. On October 25, during a period of time when
no nurse was on duty, the baby went into distress and died.
Mrs. Corcoran and her husband, Wayne, filed a wrongful death action in
Louisiana state court alleging that their unborn child died as a result of vari-
ous acts of negligence committed by Blue Cross and United. The case was
removed to federal court on the grounds that it was preempted by ERISA
and that there was complete diversity among the parties.
Shortly thereafter, Blue Cross and United moved for summary judgment
arguing that ERISA preempted the Corcorans' claims. The district court
granted the motion, holding that the ERISA preemption extended to this
wrongful death claim because the ERISA plan was the source of the rela-
tionship between the Corcorans and Blue Cross and United. The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed.
Relying on § 514(a) of ERISA, the court held that all state laws that re-
late to (have a connection with or reference to) employee benefit plans are
preempted by ERISA. 18 2 The most obvious class of preempted state laws
are those that are specifically designed to affect ERISA-governed employee
benefit plans. But, said the court, a law is not safe from preemption merely
because it does not target employee benefit plans." 18 3 The court did note
that some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law relates to
the Plan. Thus, run-of-the-mill state law claims are not preempted.' 184
The court next observed that the common law causes of action asserted by
the Corcorans are not that species of law specifically designed to affect ER-
1182. Id. at 1329.
1183. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (common law tort in contract
causes of action are preempted); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 68 (1992) (common law fraud in negligent misrepresentation claims are
preempted).
1184. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
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ISA plans since they are not premised on the existence of an ERISA plan.
Therefore, the court found it necessary to assess the significance of the effects
the Corcorans' claims would have upon the ERISA plan.
The Corcorans argued their claims would have no effect on the Plan since
they were based on United's erroneous medical decision that Mrs. Corcoran
require hospitalization during the last month of her pregnancy. The
Corcorans argued that ERISA should not preempt their claims because their
claims involved the exercise of traditional state authority and were based on
a law of general application, which, although it affects relations between
principal ERISA entities, is not designed to affect the ERISA relationship.
United, on the other hand, argued its decision concerning Mrs. Corcoran
was not primarily a medical decision, but instead was a decision made in its
capacity as a plan fiduciary about what benefits were authorized under the
Plan. Thus, the Corcorans were complaining about improper processing of a
claim for benefits due under the Plan, and ERISA would preempt all state
laws relating to these matters.
The Fifth Circuit, while agreeing with the Corcorans that United did
make medical decisions and gave medical advice, also held that this was
done in the context of making a determination about the availability of bene-
fits under the Plan. Accordingly, the court held that a Louisiana tort action
asserted by the Corcorans for the wrongful death of their child allegedly
resulting from United's erroneous medical decision was preempted by ER-
ISA." 8 5 The court noted the result of its decision to preempt a state law in
favor of ERISA, was to deny any remedy to the Corcorans for the death of
their child. The court held, however, that the lack of an ERISA remedy did
not preclude a state law from being preempted by this federal law.
The Corcorans, relying on Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit
Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc.,1 186 argued that the Louisiana
wrongful death statute should not be preempted by ERISA because it is a
state law involving the exercise of traditional state authority. The court re-
jected this argument since ERISA, itself makes no distinction between tradi-
tional or nontraditional nature of the state laws for purposes of preemption.
Furthermore, the fact that states traditionally have regulated in a particular
area has not stopped courts from applying the ERISA preemption to these
laws.' 187 Furthermore, the court held that since the wrongful death statute
affects relations among principal ERISA entities, and the purpose of the
Corcorans' lawsuit was to hold United liable for the actions it took in con-
nection with its duties under the Plan, the court saw no way around the
ERISA preemption." 188
In the alternative, the Corcorans argued that the damages they sought
were available as "other appropriate equitable relief' under ERISA
1185. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332.
1186. 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987).
1187. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1334. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133
(1990) (wrongful discharge action preempted); and Christopher, 950 F.2d at 1218 (fraud action
preempted).
1188. Corcoran. 965 F.2d at 1334.
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§ 502(a)(3). The Corcorans urged the court to engraft principles from the
law of trusts onto the enforcement scheme of ERISA and develop a federal
common law in fashioning "other appropriate equitable relief" as suggested
by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell.1189 Justice Brennan encouraged courts faced with
claims for extracontractual damages to determine, first, to what extent state
and federal trust and pension law provided for the recovery of damages be-
yond any benefits that had been withheld and, second, to consider whether
extracontractual relief would conflict with ERISA in any way.1 90 The goal
that Justice Brennan would allow for "other appropriate equitable relief"
was to make the plaintiff whole. United argued, on the other hand, that
"other appropriate equitable relief" is limited to only declaratory and injunc-
tive relief and does not include money damages.
The Fifth Circuit held that the characterization of equitable relief as en-
compassing damages necessary to make the plaintiff whole may be consistent
with the trust law principles that were incorporated into ERISA and that
guide its interpretation. The court also suggested that this view may be con-
sistent with the common law contract doctrine that assists in interpreting
ERISA. However, according to the court, the Corcorans sought a form of
extracontractual damages that is never awarded for breach of trust duties,
and is granted in only the most limited of circumstances for breach of con-
tract. The court, therefore, held that the emotional distress and mental
anguish damages sought by the Corcorans were not recoverable as "other
appropriate equitable relief" under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA. 1191
In reaching this conclusion, the court looked to the patient/physician re-
lationship to determine what types of extracontractual damages could be re-
covered for breach of trust duties and a breach of contract. The court noted
that patients and their physicians can enter into contracts, and physicians
may incur liability for breach. However, there can be no recovery against a
physician on a contractual theory unless there is an express agreement to
perform a particular service or to achieve a specific cure. Some courts have
allowed damages for emotional injury within the contemplation of the par-
ties when a physician breaches a contract with a patient.
The court held that there was not a true doctor/patient relationship be-
tween Mrs. Corcoran and United to support a contractual theory of recov-
ery. Furthermore, there was no express agreement for a particular service or
a particular result that served as a prerequisite as a contract-based
recovery. 192
The court also concluded that Mrs. Corcoran could not sue United for
breach of fiduciary duty since she was not in a doctor/patient relationship
with United. Furthermore, courts have not allowed patients to sue their
doctors under an independent breach of fiduciary duty theory. Therefore,
1189. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
1190. Id. at 157-58.
1191. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338.
1192. Id. at 1337.
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the court concluded that contract and trust principles would not allow the
Corcorans to recover the mental anguish damages they sought. 1193
The court concluded its opinion by stating that it was troubled by the
result it felt ERISA compelled since it left the Corcorans without a remedy.
According to the court, because of ERISA, there was an absence of liability
rules in this case, and, thus, no incentive for ERISA plans to utilize high
quality utilization review. If there is no accountability, the conduct is bound
to be substandard. The court also lamented that this result will increase the
tension between the Plan (which has an interest not to pay claims) and the
beneficiary (whose interest is payment), since there is no deterrence for in-
correct denials of coverage. The court concluded by calling for Congress to
reevaluate ERISA, since the courts are not allowed to alter the statute as
written by Congress.1 194
The issue in NGS American, Inc. v. Barnes 19 5 was whether article 21.07-6
of the Texas Insurance Code, as applied to third-party administrators of ER-
ISA-governed insurance plans, is preempted by ERISA. MASCO, a Michi-
gan corporation, established a self-funded employee benefit plan (MASCO
Plan), to provide medical and other benefits to its employees. The MASCO
Plan is an employee benefit plan within the meaning of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA). NGS, also a Michigan corporation, is
the third-party administrator of the MASCO Plan.
NGS and MASCO brought this suit to enjoin Barnes, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Texas, from enforcing article
21.07-6 of the Texas Insurance Code against NGS and MASCO. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of NGS and MASCO, hold-
ing that article 21.07-6, insofar as it relates to administrators of ERISA-
governed insurance plans, is preempted by ERISA and thus, cannot be en-
forced against NGS and MASCO. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
ERISA regulates employee benefit plans and preempts all state laws that
relate to employee benefit plans. ERISA, however, contains a savings clause
that provides that the ERISA preemption does not extend to state laws that
regulate insurance. The Commissioner argued that article 21.07-6 regulates
the business of insurance and is, therefore, not preempted by ERISA. The
court held that a statute must pass a two-prong test in order to fall within
the savings clause. First, the statute must meet the common sense definition
of an "insurance regulation." Second, the statute: (1) must spread the poli-
cyholder's risk; (2) must be an integral part of the policy relationship be-
tween the insurer and insured; and (3) must regulate the practices limited to
entities within the insurance industry. 1 9 6 The Commissioner argued that
article 21.07-6 regulates insurance by regulating the administrators of insur-
ance plans. The court held, however, that because the administrators per-
form no risk-bearing function, regulating them under article 21.07-6 does
1193. Id. at 1338.
1194. Id. at 1338-39.
1195. 998 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1993).
1196. Id. at 299.
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not spread risk among the policy holders. Therefore, article 21.07-6 does
not pass the test of regulating insurance under ERISA. 1197
The Commissioner next argued that article 21.07-6 does not relate to an
ERISA plan. The Commissioner argued that article 21.07-6 is a licensing
statute that applies to administrators regardless of whether they contract to
provide services to conventional insurance products or ERISA plans. The
court found that article 21.07-6 does far more than merely license adminis-
trators. This statute allows the Commissioner to review financial statements
of the administrator and all written agreements between the administrator
and various insurers and plans. It also requires the administrators to file an
annual report with the Commissioner and allows the Commissioner access
to the administrators' books and records for purposes of examination, audit,
and inspection. The court held that it was these burdens of compliance with
conflicting state regulations that Congress sought to eliminate by enacting
ERISA. Thus, according to the court, article 21.07-6 impermissibly relates
to NGS in its role as administrator for the MASCO Plan and to that extent,
the article is preempted by ERISA. 198
Thus, the court concluded that article 21.07-6 is preempted by ERISA as
it applies to third-party administrators of ERISA-governed insurance plans
in their capacity as third-party administrators of ERISA-governed insurance
plans.'" 99 The court noted that its holding does not preclude the Texas
Commissioner of Insurance from enforcing article 21.07-6 against third-
party administrators of non-ERISA-governed insurance plans, or against
third-party administrators of both ERISA and non-ERISA-governed plans
in their capacity as administrators of non-ERISA-governed plans.12°°
In Manahan v. Meyer 120 ' Thomas Manahan was covered by a group life
insurance policy issued to Haworth, Inc., his employer, by Safeco Life Insur-
ance Company. While hospitalized, two days before his death, Manahan
changed the beneficiary of the policy from his two minor children to his
fiancee, Meyer. Safeco paid the policy proceeds to Meyer.
Mr. Manahan's children sued Meyer, Haworth, and Safeco alleging that
the change in beneficiary was invalid because Manahan lacked mental capac-
ity and was unduly influenced by Meyer, and that Haworth acted with
Meyer to change the beneficiary, breached its fiduciary duty by failing to
investigate the change in beneficiary, and negligently processed the claim
and delivered the proceeds to Meyer. Alternatively, the children alleged a
cause of action under ERISA, claiming that they were beneficiaries seeking
the recovery of money from Haworth and Safeco that had been wrongfully
paid to Meyer.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Haworth and Safeco con-
cluding that ERISA preempted the children's claims. The claims against
1197. Id.
1198. Id. at 300.
1199. Id.
1200. Id.
1201. 862 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
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Meyer were tried and a jury found in favor of the children. The trial court
entered a judgment n.o.v. for Meyer based solely on ERISA preemption.
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.
Mr. Manahan's children first argued that neither Haworth nor Safeco
proved that the benefit plan was governed by ERISA. Before an employee
benefit plan is governed by ERISA, the employer must be engaged in activity
affecting interstate commerce. 120 2 According to the children's pleadings,
Haworth, a Michigan corporation with its home office in Michigan, bought
insurance from Safeco, whose home office is in Washington, to cover
Manahan and other Haworth employees working in Texas. Thus, the court
found that the children admitted that Haworth was engaged in interstate
commerce. 1203
Additionally, before ERISA applies, the employee benefit plan must meet
the definition found in ERISA as any plan, fund, or program established or
maintained for the purpose of providing its participants or their benefi-
ciaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death,
or unemployment.1 204 The children asserted in their pleadings that Ha-
worth furnished a group life insurance policy for its employees, that
Manahan was an employee of Haworth, that the Safeco group policy insured
his life, and that after Manahan's death, Haworth processed the claim and
the payment through its employee relations administrator. The court held
that the pleadings established an employee welfare benefit plan under
ERISA. 120 5
Mr. Manahan's children next argued that the summary judgment was im-
proper, even if there was an ERISA plan, because state and federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) of suits brought to
recover ERISA benefits. The court held, however, that the children's claims
did not fall within the scope of this section as they did not seek to recover
benefits under a plan, to enforce rights under a plan, or clarification of rights
to future benefits.1 20 6 Instead, their state law claims alleged improper ad-
ministration of an employee benefit plan, which is within the exclusive juris-
diction of the federal court. The court held that the allegations of improper
handling and processing of a claim for benefits is a matter of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction and thus, a summary judgment was proper. 120 7
The Manahan children next argued that their cause of action against
Safeco under Texas Insurance Code article 3.48 was not preempted by ER-
ISA because it regulates the business of insurance. Article 3.48 provides that
a life insurer, upon the death of the insured, and in the absence of receipt of
notice of an adverse claim to the proceeds, shall pay the proceeds to the
designated beneficiary and by doing so will be discharged from all liability
1202. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a).
1203. Manahan, 862 S.W.2d at 133.
1204. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l).
1205. Manahan, 862 S.W.2d at 133.




under the policy. 20 8 The court held that the claim under article 3.48 was
preempted by ERISA even assuming that article 3.48 regulates the business
of insurance because the ERISA savings clause cannot save from preemption
a state law that provides remedies not provided by ERISA. 120 9 The
Manahan children alleged that Safeco violated article 3.48 by paying Meyer
after receiving notice of an adverse claim. The court found that this cause of
action was one for improper claims processing and thus, preempted by
ERISA.1210
The court next turned to the state law claims against Meyer. The jury
found that Manahan lacked mental capacity to change the beneficiary and
that Meyer secured the change by undue influence. The jury awarded
$40,000 in exemplary damages. The trial court first granted judgment for
the Manahan children, but then granted a judgment n.o.v. on the basis that
the claim was preempted by ERISA. The Manahan children argued on ap-
peal that the claim did not relate to an employee benefit plan.
A law relates to an employee benefit plan if it has a connection or refer-
ence to such a plan. Typically the words "relate to" are construed expan-
sively, but some state laws may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law relates to
the plan.' 21 ' The Manahan children argued that their claim against Meyer
was wholly unrelated to ERISA or so remotely related that it was not pre-
empted. Meyer argued that the Manahan children's undue influence claim
directly related to an ERISA plan because it would determine the beneficiary
under an ERISA plan.
The court disagreed with Meyer, finding that the Manahan children's
claim would not change the beneficiary under the plan. 1212 The court fur-
ther held that this claim would not frustrate the Congressional objective of
preventing inconsistent state laws from regulating employee benefit
plans.121 3 According to the court, this case did not involve a state testamen-
tary law that varied from state to state. The court could find no state that
recognized changes in beneficiary designations made by mental incompe-
tence and none that recognized changes made by undue influence. The court
also determined that a judgment against Meyer would have no effect on the
plan, the employer, or the administrator. Thus, the court held that the claim
did not relate to an ERISA plan.
The court, therefore, reversed the judgment n.o.v. and rendered judgment
in accordance with the jury's verdict.
In Cook-Fort Worth Children's Medical Center v. Wal-Mart Associates
Group Health Plan 1214 Medical Center filed suit against Wal-Mart in state
court alleging various state causes of action, including violations of article
1208. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.48 (Vernon 1981).
1209. Manahan, 862 S.W.2d at 135.
1210. Id.
1211. Id.
1212. Id. at 136.
1213. Id.
1214. 823 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
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21.21 of the Insurance Code. Medical Center alleged that it provided serv-
ices to a dependent child of an ERISA plan participant based on Wal-Mart's
representations that the patient had insurance coverage. Once the patient
submitted the claims, however, Wal-Mart refused to pay the bills. After the
Medical Center filed suit, Wal-Mart removed to federal court contending
that ERISA preempted the Medical Center's claims. Medical Center then
filed a motion for remand, which the court granted.
The court held that removal is proper if a case falls within the original
federal question jurisdiction of the United States District Court. According
to the court, an action arises under federal law when a federal cause of ac-
tion completely preempts a state cause of action. The court held that Medi-
cal Center's claims did not come within the scope of a federal cause of action
under ERISA because Medical Center was not a participant or beneficiary of
an ERISA plan.1215 Therefore, the claims could not be recharacterized as
ERISA claims.
The court further explained that the requirement that the removed action
be within the scope of the federal cause of action means that, even when
federal law preempts state law, removal is not proper unless federal law also
supplants state law with a federal claim. The court held that ERISA did not
appear to provide Medical Center an alternative cause of action, and thus
Wal-Mart's assertion of preemption was defensive only and did not give rise
to federal jurisdiction. 12 16
2. Contract Interpretation/Standard of Review
In Gorman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America 12 17 the court addressed
the issue of whether the beneficiary of a life insurance policy was entitled to
benefits. After Dale Gorman was killed in a traffic accident, his wife,
Pamela, filed a claim with Life Insurance Company of North America
(LINA) to recover $250,000 in life insurance benefits. This life insurance
policy was provided to Dale Gorman as part of an employee benefit plan
provided by his employer, Tenneco. The policy provided coverage as long as
the employee was in "travel or sojourn" for the employer at the time of
death. LINA denied the claim, contending that Gorman was not in "travel
or sojourn," for his employer at time of his death. Pamela Gorman sued
Tenneco and LINA alleging breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, deceptive
trade practices, and violations of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. The
jury found that Dale Gorman was in "travel or sojourn" for Tenneco at the
time of his death, that Tenneco misrepresented material facts, that Tenneco
breached its fiduciary duty, and that LINA breached its duty of good faith
and fair dealing. Nevertheless, the trial court granted the defendants' mo-
tion for judgment n.o.v.
When this case originally went before the court of appeals, it was deter-
1215. Id. at 419.
1216. Id. at 420.
1217. 859 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
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mined that all of the claims were preempted by ERISA. 12 18 This decision
was appealed to the supreme court, which held that all of Gorman's claims
against Tenneco and all claims against LINA except for the breach of con-
tract claim were preempted by ERISA. 12 19 The supreme court further held
that there was some evidence to support the jury's finding that Dale Gorman
was in the "travel and sojourn" of Tenneco at the time of his death. The
supreme court then remanded the case to the court of appeals to review
LINA's point that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the
jury's finding that Gorman was in the "travel and sojourn" of Tenneco at the
time of his death.
LINA argued that while there may have been some evidence that Gorman
was in the "travel and sojourn" of Tenneco, this evidence was insufficient to
support the jury's finding. The evidence reviewed by the court revealed the
following: On the morning of the accident, Gorman attended a job-related
seminar in Houston. As he left the seminar at noon, several witnesses heard
him state that he had a meeting to attend at the Tenneco building and that
he would probably return to the seminar after the meeting. Gorman left the
meeting at the Tenneco building around 3:00 p.m. and told some people that
he needed to leave early to return to the seminar. As he left the office, he
informed two secretaries that he was returning to the seminar and in the
elevator remarked to another employee that his day was not yet over.
About 15 minutes after he left Tenneco, Gorman was killed at the corner
of Garrow and York. According to the court, the route that Gorman was
taking was a possible, though unlikely, route back to either the seminar or
his home. The more probable explanation was that Gorman was in route to
the offices of his former employer, Brown & Root. Gorman's supervisor
testified that Gorman had authority to go anywhere he felt useful for the
accomplishment of his tasks. There was also evidence that information
available at Brown & Root could have been helpful on Gorman's projects at
Tenneco.
The court held that this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's find-
ing that Dale Gorman was in the "travel and sojourn" of his employer.1220
Accordingly the court held that Pamela Gorman was entitled to recover the
$250,000 in insurance benefits from LINA. The court further held that
Gorman was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, which were proven at
trial to be $135,000. The court then remanded the case to the trial court for
a determination of whether Gorman was entitled to prejudgment interest.
The issue before the court in Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. v.
Moore1221 was the proper standard for reviewing benefits determinations
made by administrators of ERISA plans. Moore worked for Southern Farm
and she and her husband were covered under a group life policy. Mr. Moore
1218. See Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 752 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988), rev'd in part, 811 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 88 (1991).
1219. Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 88
(1991).
1220. Gorman, 859 S.W.2d at 388.
1221. 993 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1993).
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suffered a seizure because of a brain tumor while driving his van, resulting in
a crash causing his death. Southern Farm refused to pay under the policy
based on a policy exclusion that excluded from coverage a loss that results
from or is contributed to by a disease of the mind or body. Based on a jury
verdict, the district court rendered judgment for Moore. The Fifth Circuit
reversed and rendered judgment for Southern Farm.
The court first had to determine the appropriate standard of review. Rely-
ing on Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 1222 the court held that a de
novo review of the administrator's interpretation of the policy is appropriate
when the plan does not give the administrator discretionary authority to
interpret the plan terms.1 223 The court held, however, that an abuse of dis-
cretion review should be used when reviewing the administrator's factual
determinations. 224 Thus, the court would review the administrator's inter-
pretation of the policy de novo and determine whether administrator's fac-
tual determination of the cause of Mr. Moore's death amounted to an abuse
of discretion.
The court then concluded that in evaluating whether the administrator
abused his discretion in making the factual determination that the tumor
caused or contributed to Mr. Moore's death, the court could consider only
the evidence available to the administrator when he made his decision. 2 25
However, the court could consider other evidence, unavailable to the plan
administrator, when making a de novo review of his interpretation of the
policy exclusion. 1226
Moore argued that the policy exclusion precludes recovery only when the
disease or bodily infirmity is a concurring proximate cause of the loss. The
court held, however, that the clear language of the exclusion excluded a loss
contributed to by a disease or infirmity of the body even though the disease
or infirmity was not a proximate cause of the loss.1227 Because Mr. Moore's
death was caused or contributed to by the brain tumor, the court held that
the policy excluded coverage and judgment should be rendered for Southern
Farm.
3. Limitations
The issue in Hogan v. Kraft Foods 1228 was the statute of limitations appli-
cable to a claim under ERISA. Hogan was employed at Anderson Clayton
Foods from March 1948 to January 1984. On November 1, 1983, the trust-
ees of Anderson's pension plan purchased five annuity insurance policies
from Southwestern Life Insurance Co. to fund Hogan's accrued retirement
benefits. In February and March of 1985, Hogan requested that Southwest-
ern allow him to cash in or receive a lump sum payment on the five annuity
1222. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
1223. Southern Farm, 993 F.2d at 100.
1224. Id. at 101.
1225. Id. at 102.
1226. Id.
1227. Id. at 103.
1228. 969 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1992).
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policies. In March of 1985, Southwestern denied those requests. Hogan and
his wife then sued Southwestern claiming that Hogan was entitled to cash in
or receive a lump sum payment on the policies. Specifically, they alleged
violations of ERISA, contending that Southwestern had denied their rights
under the terms of the plan and had breached its fiduciary duties. The Ho-
gans also asserted various state law claims including violations of the DTPA
and article 21.21 of the Insurance Code.
The district court granted Southwestern's motion for summary judgment
holding that the ERISA claims were barred by the applicable statute of limi-
tations and that the state law claims were preempted by ERISA. On appeal,
the Hogans argued that their state law claims affected the pension in only a
tenuous or remote manner and were not preempted by ERISA. The court
held that all of Hogan's state law claims were based on Southwestern's re-
fusal to make a lump sum payment of benefits under the Employee Pension
Benefit Plan and thus, related to a benefit plan. Therefore, all of the state
claims were preempted by ERISA. 1229
Hogan next argued that his ERISA claims were not barred by the statute
of limitations. According to the court, "[a]n ERISA cause of action accrues
when a request for benefits is denied."' 1230 In this case, the requested lump
sum was denied in March of 1985, but suit was not filed until August 1989.
ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations for a claim to enforce plan
rights. The court applied the four-year Texas limitations statute governing
suits sounding in contract, reasoning that Hogan's claim was most analogous
to a breach of contract claim. 12 3' The court concluded that since suit had
not been filed within four years of the denial of the benefits, Hogan's ERISA
claim was barred by limitations.
Hogan next argued that his claim for benefits was governed by a six-year
statute of limitations provided in section 413 (a) of ERISA. This six-year
statute of limitations is available for cases of fraud or concealment. The
court held that to establish fraudulent concealment, a party must show that
the alleged wrongdoer had both actual knowledge that a wrong had oc-
curred and a fixed purpose to conceal the wrong from the injured party. 232
According to the court, the summary judgment did not raise a fact issue of
fraudulent concealment, and, therefore, the six-year statute of limitations
was not applicable.
B. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT (FEHBA)
In Burkey v. Government Employees Hospital Association 1233 Burkey, a
federal employee, alleged that GEHA breached its contractual obligation to
pay her son's medical bills. The district court rendered judgment for Burkey
under Louisiana law, which included amounts for the bills and damages and
1229. Id. at 144-45.
1230. Id. at 145.
1231. Id.
1232. Id.
1233. 983 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1993).
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attorney's fees for the unreasonable delay in paying. The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the judgment as to the medical bills, but reversed the judgment for
damages and attorney's fees.
The court held that Louisiana law should not have been applied to this
case because the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) 1234 pre-
empted state law.' 235 The FEHBA provides that:
The provisions of any contract under this chapter which relate to the
nature or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with re-
spect to benefits) shall superseded and preempt any State or local law,
or regulation issued thereunder, to the extent that such law or regula-
tion is inconsistent with such contractual provision. 1236
The court found that Burkey's claims related to the nature or extent of cov-
erage or benefits and related to the plan since they had a connection with or
refer to the plan. 123 7 The court further held that, like ERISA, the FEHBA
broadly preempts state law tort and contract claims for benefits. 238 Thus,
Burkey could recover only the medical expenses since the FEHBA does not
provide for the recovery of penalties or attorney's fees.
C. FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE ACT (FCIA)
In Brown v. Crop Hail Management, Inc. 1239 Brown was issued a crop
insurance policy by Landmark through its general agent, Crop Hail Manage-
ment. Landmark issued this policy under the auspices of a reinsurance con-
tract it maintained with the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC).
FCIC agreed to reimburse Landmark for claims covered by the reinsurance
contract. After Brown's claim for his lost his rice crop was denied, he filed
suit in state court against Landmark and Crop Hail Management. The
FCIC was never a party to the lawsuit. The defendants removed the case to
federal claiming that Brown's state law claims were preempted by the Fed-
eral Crop Insurance Act (FCIA).' 2 40 Brown filed a motion to remand,
which was denied by the court as it concluded that federal question jurisdic-
tion existed because of federal preemption.
The court initially concluded that the FCIA, by its provisions, preempts
all state law causes of action against either the FCIC or a FCIC reinsured
entity.' 24 1 According to the court, "section 1506(k) of the FCIA unequivo-
cally demonstrates Congress' intent that the FCIC not be subject to suits
grounded in state law unless the FCIC agrees to allow those suits.' 242
Brown argued, however, that he had not sued the FCIC. The court, relying
on a regulation promulgated by the USDA, 1243 held that even state actions
1234. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-14.
1235. Burkey, 983 F.2d at 660.
1236. 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1).
1237. Burkey, 983 F.2d at 660.
1238. Id.
1239. 813 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
1240. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-20.
1241. Brown, 813 F. Supp. at 526.
1242. Id. at 525.
1243. 7 C.F.R. § 400.352.
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against FCIC reinsured parties are preempted by federal law. 124 4
The court next considered whether the FCIA completely preempts state
law in this area and cited a three part test to resolve this issue. For complete
preemption, the FCIA must first create a "federal cause of action that re-
places and protects the same interests as the preempted state law causes of
action."' 245 The court noted that all of Brown's state causes of action arose
from the failure to pay his crop insurance claim. The court held the first
part of the test was met by section 1508(f) of the FCIA and 7 C.F.R.
§ 400.176(b) which gives the insured the right to sue the FCIC or the FCIC
reinsured company in federal court to recover benefits wrongfully
denied. 1246
The second part of the test is that the FCIA must provide a "jurisdictional
grant to federal courts to enforce the cause of action created" by the stat-
ute. 1247 The court held this test was met in section 1508(f) of the FCIA
which allows the cause of action to be brought in the federal district court of
the district in which the farm is located. 248 The court assumed that this
jurisdictional grant would also apply to actions brought against FCIC rein-
sured companies. 249
The final part of the test is that there must exist a clear congressional
intent to make the preempted state claims removable to federal court. 1250
The court concluded that this test was met by section 1508(f) both creating a
cause of action to take the place of the state law action and containing a
specific jurisdictional grant to the federal courts to decide such causes of
action.12 51 The court acknowledged that the FCIA does not extend to FCIC
reinsured companies, but found it inconceivable that suits against FCIC re-
insured companies would not be preempted as suits against the FCIC
would. 1252
Wilson v. United States Department of Agriculture1253 was an action
brought directly against the FCIC as well as the Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Service (ASCS) for benefits allegedly due under a crop
insurance policy. The district court dismissed the claim against the FCIC
for Wilson's failure to give timely notice of his crop loss. The Fifth Circuit
reversed.
In the spring of 1988 Wilson planted his rice crop. In May an inch of rain
fell, but a drought ensued thereafter and the seed did not germinate accord-
ing to schedule. In July torrential rains flooded the farm. Wilson then noti-
fied the insurance agent of some crop damage and adjusters from the FCIC
were sent out to inspect the loss. In August 1988, the FCIC agent prepared
1244. Brown, 813 F. Supp. at 525.





1250. Id. at 524, 526.
1251. Id. at 527.
1252. Id. at 528.
1253. 991 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1993).
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a loss form which stated that the rice crop was a total loss. The FCIC
claimed that Wilson's notice of loss did not meet the ten day requirement in
the FCIC's regulations. 1254 Wilson argued that he did not know that the
crop was a total loss until the FCIC made that determination in August and
thus his notice was timely.
The court noted that, according to the FCIC regulations, only the FCIC
has the authority to make determinations regarding the extent of crop loss.
Thus, the court suggested by a question that the ten day period for giving
notice of the loss should start to run from the time the FCIC makes the loss
determination. The court, consequently, decided that the Department of
Agriculture was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law that timely
notice was not given.1255
XV. INSURANCE AND ANTITRUST
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California 1256 the Court faced the issues
of whether foreign reinsurers were subject to the Sherman Act and what
constitutes a "boycott" for the purposes of § 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. Nineteen states, and many private plaintiffs, filed complaints alleging
that the defendants for domestic primary insurers, domestic companies that
sell reinsurance to domestic trade associations; a domestic reinsurance bro-
ker; and reinsurers based in London violated the Sherman Act by engaging
in various conspiracies aimed at forcing certain other primary insurers to
change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability in-
surance policies to conform with the policies that the defendant insurers
wanted to sell. After the actions were consolidated for litigation, the district
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. It held that the conduct
alleged fell within the grant of antitrust immunity contained in § 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act because it amounted to "business of insurance"
and was regulated by state law within the meaning of that section. The dis-
trict court also held that none of the conduct amounted to a "boycott"
within the meaning of § 3(b) exception to the grant of immunity. The dis-
trict court also dismissed the three claims that named only certain London-
based defendants, invoking international comity.
The court of appeals reversed. Although it held the conduct involved to
be "the business of insurance," it concluded that the defendants could not
claim McCarran-Ferguson antitrust immunity for two reasons. The foreign
reinsurers activities, the court of appeals reasoned, could not be regulated by
state law within the meaning of § 2(b) and thus, they did not fall within that
section's grant of immunity. Even if the conduct alleged fell within the
scope of § 2(b), it also fell within the § 3(b) exemption for "acts of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation." The court of appeals also concluded that the
principle of international comity was no bar to exercising Sherman Act
jurisdiction.
1254. 7 C.F.R. § 401.8(d)8.a.(4).
1255. Wilson, 991 F.2d at 1217.
1256. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
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The Sherman Act makes every contract, combination, or conspiracy in
unreasonable restraint of interstate or foreign commerce illegal. 257 The
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that the regulation of the insurance indus-
try is generally a matter for the states and that, "no act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance."'' 25 8 Section 2(b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, however, provides that the Sherman Act ap-
plies to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by state law and § 3(b) provides that nothing in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act shall render the Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement
to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimida-
tion.' 259 The plaintiffs in this case filed suit alleging that the defendants,
members of the insurance industry, conspired, in violation of § I of the Sher-
man Act, to restrict the terms of coverage of commercial general liability
(CGL) insurance available in the United States. Thus, the Court was faced
with the issue of whether the complaints alleged conduct falling within the
"boycott" exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act antitrust immunity.
According to the complaints, the object of the conspiracies was to force
certain primary insurers to change the terms of their standard CGL insur-
ance policies to conform with the policies the defendant insurers wanted to
sell. The defendants wanted four changes. First, they wanted the policies
changed from "occurrence" policies to "claims-made" policies, thereby obli-
gating the insurer to pay defendant for only those claims made during the
policy period. A "claims-made" policy is more advantageous for the insurer
because when the policy period ends without a claim having been made, the
insurer can be certain that the policy will not expose it to any further
liability.
Second, the defendants wanted the "claims-made" policy to have a "retro-
active date" provision that would further restrict coverage to claims based
on incidents that occurred after a certain date. Such a provision would elim-
inate the risk that an insurer, by issuing a claims-made policy, would assume
liability arising from incidents that occurred before the policy's effective
date, but remain undiscovered, or caused no immediate harm.
Third, the defendants wanted to eliminate "sudden and accidental" pollu-
tion coverage from the CGL insurance policies. Finally, the defendants
wanted legal defense costs to be counted against the stated policy limits. In
the past the CGL policies provided that the insurer would bear the legal cost
of defending covered claims against the insured without regard to the pol-
icy's stated limits of coverage.
The Court described how the defendants allegedly pressured the primary
insurers to make the changes. Most primary insurers rely on outside sup-
port services for the type of insurance coverage they want to sell. The Insur-
ance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), an association of approximately 1,400
1257. Id. at 2900; 15 U.S.C. § 1.
1258. Id. at 2900; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
1259. Id. at 2900-01; 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b).
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domestic property and casualty insurers, is the almost exclusive source of
support services in this country for CGL insurance. ISO develops standard
policy forms and files or lodges them with each state's insurance regulators;
most CGL insurance written in the United States uses these forms. For each
of its standard policy forms, ISO also supplies actuarial and rating informa-
tion. It collects, aggregates, interprets, and distributes data on the premiums
charged, claims filed and paid, and defense costs expended with respect to
each form. On the basis of this data it predicts future loss trends and calcu-
lates advisory premium rates. Most ISO members cannot afford to continue
to use a form if ISO withdraws the support services.
Another feature of the insurance industry that played a part in the alleged
conspiracy was reinsurance. Often primary insurers purchase insurance to
cover a portion of the risk they assume from the consumer. This reinsurance
protects the primary insurer from catastrophic loss, and allows the primary
insurer to sell more insurance than its own financial capacity might other-
wise permit. Insurers who sell reinsurance themselves often purchase insur-
ance to cover part of the risk they assume from the primary insurer. Such
"retrocessional reinsurance" does for reinsurers what reinsurance does for
primary insurers. Many of the defendants in this case are reinsurers or rein-
surance brokers.
According to the allegations defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company
objected to the 1984 CGL forms proposed by the ISO and desired an elimi-
nation of the, "occurrence form, a retroactive date provision on the claims
made form, elimination of sudden and accidental pollution coverage, and a
legal defense cost cap." Allstate Insurance also expressed its desire for a
retroactive date provision on the "claims-made" form. The ISO, however,
rejected the changes proposed by Hartford and Allstate.
Soon thereafter, Hartford persuaded General Reinsurance Corporation
(General Re), the largest American reinsurer, to take steps either to procure
desired changes in the ISO CGL forms, or failing that, to derail the entire
ISO CGL forms program. General Re took up the matter with its trade
association, RAA, which created a special committee that met and agreed to
boycott the 1984 ISO CGL forms unless a retroactive-date provision was
added to the claims-made form, and a pollution exclusion and defense cost
cap were added to both forms. RAA sent a letter to ISO announcing that its
members would not provide reinsurance coverages written on the 1984 CGL
forms. Hartford and General Re then enlisted a domestic reinsurance bro-
ker to give a speech to the ISO board of directors, in which he stated that no
reinsurers would break ranks to reinsure the 1984 ISO CGL forms.
The four primary insurer defendants - Hartford, Aetna, Cigna, and All-
state - also encouraged key actors in the London reinsurance market, an
important provider of reinsurance for North American risks, to withhold
reinsurance for coverages written on the 1984 ISO CGL forms. As a conse-
quence, many London based underwriters and reinsurance companies in-
formed ISO of their intention to withhold reinsurance on the 1984 forms.
1994] 1425
SMU LAW REVIEW
At least some of them told ISO that they would withhold reinsurance until
ISO incorporated all four desired changes into the ISO CGL forms.
The 1984 ISO CGL forms were eventually withdrawn from the market
place and replaced with forms containing the new provisions desired by the
defendants. After ISO received regulatory approval of the new forms in
most states where approval was needed, it eliminated its support services for
the old form, rendering it impossible for most ISO members to continue to
use the old forms.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that the Sherman Act applies to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
the state. The Court first considered whether the defendants were engaged
in the business of insurance and if so whether that business is regulated by
state law. The Court held that the phrase "the business of insurance," does
not refer to a single entity, but refers to a particular practice or activity, thus
not every activity of an insurance company will constitute the business of
insurance. 1 260
The Court then stated the three criteria that determined whether a partic-
ular practice is part of the business of insurance exempted from antitrust
laws: (1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a
policy holder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insured and the insurer; and (3) whether this prac-
tice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.' 261 The Court
agreed with the court of appeals that the defendants' conduct was within the
business of insurance.1262 The court of appeals held, however, that because
the domestic insurers acted in concert with foreign reinsurers, their activities
were not regulated by state law. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that
the domestic insurers did not give up the McCarran-Ferguson exemption
simply because they acted with foreign reinsurers who were not regulated by
state law. ' 263
Even if the defendant insurers' conduct was in the business of insurance
regulated by state law, the Sherman Act still could apply if they engaged in
agreements to boycott, acts of boycott, and coercion within the meaning of
§ 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Justice Scalia writing for the major-
ity of the Court on this issue, concluded that a "boycott" for purposes of
§ 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act occurs where, in order to coerce a
person into certain terms on one transaction, parties refuse to engage in
other, unrelated transactions with that person. 264 It is not a boycott, but
rather a concerted agreement to terms, where parties refuse to engage in a
particular transaction until the terms of that transaction are agreeable.
Under this definition of boycott, the Court held that it was not a boycott for
the reinsurers to refuse to reinsure coverages written on the ISO CGL forms
1260. Id. at 2901.
1261. Id.
1262. Id.
1263. Id. at 2903.
1264. Id. at 2912.
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until the desired changes were made because the terms of the primary cover-
ages were central elements of the reinsurance contract. 265 However, it
would be a boycott if the reinsurers threatened to withdraw entirely from the
business of reinsuring United States insurers who wrote on the occurrence
form. Thus, if the reinsurers withheld reinsurance on all CGL forms -
even forms having no objectionable terms - the Court held that might
amount to a boycott. 1266 The Court found that many of the allegations in
the complaints did describe conduct that could amount to a boycott and
held that the complaint should not have been dismissed.
The next issue of the Court to decide was whether the Sherman Act could
be applied to conduct of the London reinsurers. On this issue Justice Souter
wrote the opinion for the majority. The Court first held that it was well-
established that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that is meant to
produce, and did in fact produce, some substantial effect in the United
States. 12 67 Such conduct was alleged in this case because the reinsurers en-
gaged in unlawful conspiracies to effect the market for insurance in the
United States.
The London reinsurers argued that jurisdiction should have been declined
under the principle of international comity. They argued that application of
United States antitrust laws to the London reinsurance market would lead to
significant conflict with English law and policy. The Supreme Court found,
however, that the application of United States antitrust law would not signif-
icantly conflict with British law and policy because British law does not re-
quire the London reinsurers to act in a way prohibited by the law of the
United States. 1268 Furthermore, the Court could not find that compliance
with the laws of both countries was impossible. The Court, therefore, held
that there was no reason to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on the
grounds of international comity. 12 6 9
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS
In United States Department of the Treasury v. Fabe 1270 the Court was
asked to decide whether the Ohio statute governing the liquidation of insol-
vent insurance companies, the counterpart to article 21.28 of the Texas In-
surance Code, was preempted by federal law granting the United States first
priority with respect to a bankrupt debtor's obligations. The Court noted
that the Ohio statute would be preempted under exempt from preemption
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 127 1 According to the Court, the pur-
pose of McCarran-Ferguson is to allow the states to regulate the business of
1265. Id. at 2914.
1266. Id. at 2917.
1267. Id. at 2909.
1268. Id. at 2910.
1269.. Id. at 2911.
1270. 113 S. Ct. 2202 (1993).
1271. 15 U.S.C. § 1011-15.
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insurance. 1272 Thus, the only question for the Court was whether the Ohio
statute was enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of insur-
ance." 273 Relying on SEC v. National Securities, Inc. 1274 the Court held
that this phrase refers to statutes aimed at protecting or regulating, directly
or indirectly, the relationship between the insurance company and the in-
sured.1275 Finding the Ohio statute to be such a statute, the Court held that
the federal priority statute must yield to the Ohio statute to the extent the
Ohio statute furthers the interests of policyholders. 1276
The Treasury Department argued that the Ohio statute did not regulated
the business of insurance because it did not meet any of the three factors for
determining what constitutes the business of insurance as articulated in
Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno.1277 These three factors are: "1)
whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policy-
holder's risk; 2) whether the practice is an integral part of the policy rela-
tionship between the insurer and the insured; and 3) whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry."' 1278
The Court held that the Ohio statute did satisfy these three factors. Ac-
cording to the Court, the business of insurance is not confined to the writing
of insurance contracts, but extends to the actual performance of these con-
tracts. 1279 Thus, the Ohio statute, even though it does not prescribe the
terms of insurance contracts or set the premium rates, does regulate the busi-
ness of insurance because it is designed to carry out the enforcement of in-
surance contracts by ensuring the payment of policyholders' claims despite
the insurance company's intervening bankruptcy. 280
Moreover, the three factors set forth in Pireno were done so in the context
of determining what conduct was exempt from antitrust laws under the sec-
ond clause § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In this case, the Court
focused on the first clause of § 2(b) which commits laws "enacted ... for the
business of insurance" to the states.' 281 The Court, therefore, refused to
equate laws "enacted ... for the business of insurance" with the "business of
insurance" itself. 1282 Thus, the Court determined that the laws "enacted...
for the business of insurance" should not be so narrowly circumscribed as
the "business of insurance" which is exempt from antitrust laws. 128 3
The Court concluded that the preference accorded by the Ohio statute to
the expenses of administering the insolvency proceeding is reasonably neces-
sary to further the goal of protecting policyholders, since liquidation could
1272. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. at 2207.
1273. Id. at 2208.
1274. 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969).
1275. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. at 2208.
1276. Id.
1277. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
1278. Id. at 129.
1279. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. at 2209.
1280. Id.
1281. Id.
1282. Id. at 2209-10.
1283. Id. at 2209.
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not commence without payment of administrative costs. 1284 However, the
preferences conferred upon employees and other general creditors do not
escape preemption because their connection to the ultimate aim of insurance
is too tenuous. 285
The issue before the court in Latter v. Autry 1286 was whether an injured
person, who has received other insurance payments in excess of the
tortfeasor's policy limits, is entitled to recover from a guaranty fund when
the tortfeasor's insurer is in receivership. Latter, while at work, was struck
by a car driven by Kingham. Latter received over $41,000 from Liberty
Mutual, his employer's workers' compensation carrier. Kingham had an au-
tomobile policy with American Pacer which had a $20,000 per person per
accident limit. After American Pacer was placed in receivership, Latter filed
a proof of claim to recover the $20,000. The receiver denied the claim and
Latter filed this lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment to Au-
try, the receiver of American Pacer and the court of appeals affirmed.
Initially, the court noted that the lawsuit was governed by the Texas Prop-
erty and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Act, which devises a mechanism for
the payment of "covered claims" when insurers become insolvent. The
Guaranty Act's purpose is to provide the injured person the same recovery,
up to a ceiling of $100,000, he or she would have had if the insurer had
remained solvent. 128 7 If American Pacer were solvent, Latter could receive
up to the $20,000 policy limit. However, because Liberty Mutual paid over
$41,000 in workers' compensation benefits and medical expenses, it had a
subrogation lien on the $20,000. The Guaranty Act provides that a subroga-
tion lien in excess of the policy limits is excluded from the definition of a
covered claim and must be paid out of the insolvent insurer's assets rather
than the guaranty fund. 128 8 Thus, the court held that Latter's claim was in
reality a subrogation claim by Liberty Mutual and because it exceeded the
limits of the American Pacer policy, the claim was not payable out of the
guaranty fund. 28 9
In Bailey v. Brodhead 1290 the court addressed the issue of whether a per-
son must file a timely suit against the insured of an insurer in receivership
before he or she can file suit against the receiver for denying a claim. This
appeal actually involved two cases involving the same issue. In both cases
there was a person injured in a car accident by persons insured by National
County Mutual. Within two years of each accident National County Mu-
tual was placed in receivership due to insolvency. Neither of the injured
people filed suit against the tortfeasors; instead, they filed a claim with the
receiver within two years of the accident. The receiver denied both claims
and the injured persons filed suit against the receiver challenging the denials.
1284. Id. at 2212.
1285. Id.
1286. 853 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
1287. Id. at 838.
1288. Id.
1289. Id. at 839.
1290. 838 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
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These lawsuits were filed within ninety days of the denial but more than two
years after the accidents. The trial courts granted summary judgment for
the receiver in both cases, finding that the lawsuits were time-barred. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial.
The court noted that article 21.28 of the Insurance Code allows a receiver
to approve a claim only if the proof reasonably suggests that the claimant
would be able to obtain a judgment against the insured. 1291 This requires
the claimant, according to the court, to file a claim against the receiver
before limitations have run on the cause of action against the insured. 1292
Thus, it is the time at which the claim is made against the receiver, not when
suit is filed against the receiver, that a court must use to determine whether
an action is time-barred. 1293
The court further noted that article 21.28, while requiring a claim to be
made with the receiver before suing on such claim, does not require the
claimant to file a separate lawsuit against the insured.1294 Moreover, even if
suit is filed against the insured and a judgment obtained after the receiver-
ship has begun, that judgment is inadmissible in a later suit to prove the
insured's liability or the amount of damages. 1295 Thus, the court refused to
require the potentially useless act of suing the insured before suit can be
brought against the receiver.
In Pool v. Durish 1296 the court considered whether an injured person, who
had given a full and complete release to the insured, could pursue any recov-
ery from the receiver of the insolvent insurer. The Pools sued Maul for med-
ical malpractice, whose malpractice carrier later was placed in receivership.
After filing a claim with the receiver, the Pools settled with Maul. Although
the settlement agreement stated that the Pools could pursue the claim with
the receiver, it also stated that they agreed to a full, complete and final dis-
charge and release of Maul. The receiver rejected the Pools's claim on the
basis that they no longer had a viable cause of action against Maul. The
Pools then filed this lawsuit against the receiver. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the receiver and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court held that when a person releases an insured from liability no
cause of action is retained against the insurer because, of course, the in-
surer's contractual obligation is contingent on the insured's liability to the
other person. 1297 The Pools argued that this rule did not apply to them
because the settlement agreement expressly reserved their right to proceed
against the receiver. The insurmountable problem, however, was that the
Pools agreed to release Maul from any and all claims they might have
against him-unlike the cases relied on by the Pools where the injured per-
1291. Id. at 924.
1292. Id.
1293. Id.
1294. Id. at 925.
1295. Id.
1296. 848 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
1297. Id. at 723.
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sons did not give unconditional releases. 1298 Thus, according to the court,
the Pools retained no claim against Maul or against his insurer.1299
B. FIDELITY BONDS
In Texas Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 1300 Atlantic Rich-
field (ARCO) brought suit as the assignee of a fidelity bond issued to
Amarco Petroleum by Texas Pacific. The bond insured Amarco against em-
ployee dishonesty, which later occurred when Amarco's principals stole over
four million dollars worth of petroleum products, much of which belonged
to ARCO. The jury found that Texas Pacific breached the fidelity bond and
a judgment was rendered in favor of ARCO. Texas Pacific argued to the
court of appeals, as it did to the trial court, that ARCO was not the proper
plaintiff because the fidelity bond contained a provision prohibiting the as-
signment of Amarco's interest therein. The court held that the anti-assign-
ment clause should have been enforced as there was no showing by ARCO
that it was ambiguous, illegal, against public policy, or otherwise void.' 30 '
A refusal to enforce this provision would result in an impermissible enlarge-
ment of the bond by implication or construction beyond the actual terms of
the agreement. 30 2
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. FDIC 130 3 United States Fire sought
a declaration that a fidelity bond it had issued to protect Empire Savings and
Loan from employee fraud and dishonesty automatically terminated when
Empire was placed in supervision. The district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of United States Fire and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The bond
provided that it would automatically terminate "immediately upon the tak-
ing over of the Insured by a receiver or other liquidator or by State or Fed-
eral officials." The FDIC argued that this provision was contrary to public
policy, was ambiguous, and that a takeover did not occur. The Fifth Circuit
dismissed these arguments as each had been previously rejected by the court
in Sharp v. FSLIC.13°4 The court further held that a takeover did indeed
occur even though Empire placed itself under voluntary supervisory control
by the Texas Savings and Loan Commission. The court found that Empire,
in doing so, was prohibited from engaging in activities that are core func-
tions of a savings and loan. Since another entity assumed control or man-
agement of Empire, the court held that a takeover did occur. 305
In Matter of World Hospitality Ltd. 1306 Fidelity & Casualty issued a fidel-
ity bond to World to cover losses that result from dishonest or fraudulent
acts of World's employees. At a time when World was experiencing finan-
1298. Id.
1299. Id. at 724.
1300. 846 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
1301. Id. at 583.
1302. Id.
1303. 981 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
1304. 858 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1988).
1305. United State Fire Ins., 981 F.2d at 851.
1306. 983 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1993).
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cial problems, World made over fifty payments or transfers to Wohl,
World's chief executive officer and major shareholder. World also paid some
of Wohl's debts. World then filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee
then brought an action against Wohl and Fidelity alleging that Wohl made
fraudulent conveyances and that Fidelity should cover such losses. The
bankruptcy court held that the transfers were fraudulent conveyances but
found that Wohl was not an employee of World since it did not have the
power to control him. Consequently, the bankruptcy court held that Fidel-
ity was not liable under the bond. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The court noted that the bond covered only the dishonest acts of World's
employees, a term that was defined therein as one over whom World had the
right to govern and direct in the performance of his or her services. The
court determined that Wohl, as the majority shareholder, was not under the
control of World, but rather he controlled the corporation. 130 7 The court
explained that the acts of a person like Wohl, who owns a controlling inter-
est in the corporation, are treated as the acts of the corporation. Thus, to
allow the corporation to recover for the owner's fraudulent conduct would
allow the corporation to recover for its own fraudulent conduct. The bond,
however, was designed only to insure the corporation against the employees'
acts. 1308
C. SURETY BONDS
In Lawyers Surety Corp. v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc. 1309 the court addressed
the issue of whether a surety bond issued to a car dealer covered bad checks
as well as bad bank drafts. Don Lancaster, doing business as Lancaster Mo-
tors, posted a $25,000 bond before receiving a dealer's license in accordance
with statute. 1310 This bond was issued by Lawyers Surety. After the checks
Lancaster wrote to purchase a number of used cars from Royal Chevrolet
were returned for insufficient funds, Royal Chevrolet sued him and recov-
ered a judgment in excess of $25,000. Lawyers Surety refused to pay the
claim submitted by Royal Chevrolet claiming that it was a surety only for
Lancaster's bad bank drafts, not bad checks.
Royal Chevrolet then sued Lawyers Surety alleging violations of the
DTPA and the Insurance Code. At trial, the parties stipulated to $25,000 in
actual damages. The jury found in favor of Royal Chevrolet and the trial
court rendered judgment for Royal Chevrolet. The court of appeals
affirmed.
The statute requiring a car dealer to post a bond, provides that the bond
shall be:
approved as to form by the attorney general and shall be conditioned on
the applicant's payment of all valid bank drafts drawn by the applicant
1307. Id. at 652.
1308. Id.
1309. 847 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).
1310. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6686(a)(1-A)(vii) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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for the purchase of motor vehicles... 1311
Lawyers Surety argued that the term "bank draft" did not include a "check"
and, therefore, it was not liable for the judgment against Lancaster.
The court defined a "draft" as an instrument executed by one party in-
structing a second party to pay a certain amount to a third party.131 2 Ac-
cording to the court, a check is a draft that is payable on demand, while a
bank draft is a draft executed by a bank.131 3 Thus, the court held that a
bank draft under this statute should be interpreted to include checks. 1 314
Otherwise, a surety like Lawyers Surety would never be liable for a dealer
that regularly purchased automobiles with checks. The court noted that this
interpretation was consistent with a subsequent amendment to the statute
that conditions payment of claims on a bond on the purchasing dealer's pay-
ment of all valid bank drafts, including checks. 131 5
D. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE/ABUSE OF PROCESS/BUSINESS
DISPARAGEMENT/RICO
In re Burzynski 1316 was a mandamus proceeding brought to direct the
district court to reinstate all the claims Dr. Stanislaw Burzynski, the owner-
operator of Burzynski Research Institute (BRI), had brought against Aetna
Life Insurance Company. Burzynski had alleged that during the course of
an underlying lawsuit, Aetna and its attorneys committed various fraudulent
acts. BRI was engaged in the business of treating terminally ill cancer pa-
tients with a non-FDA approved treatment. BRI claimed the treatment was
covered by its patients' health insurance policies. However, in the mid-
1980's, Aetna allegedly began denying BRI patients' insurance claims to re-
duce its claims exposure. Following the death of a patient, Burzynski inter-
vened as plaintiff-assignee in a suit against Aetna for the reimbursement of
medical expenses.131 7  The underlying suit eventually ended in a summary
judgment for both sides.
Burzynski then brought this lawsuit contending that the following oc-
curred during the course of Burzynski I:
(1) Aetna filed a frivolous RICO claim against BRI;
(2) Aetna's attorneys sent a letter to thirty-five insurers urging them to
stop paying BRI claims because they were "worthless" and
"unreimburseable;"
(3) an Aetna consultant created Emprise, Inc. for the unstated purpose
of generating negative reviews of Burzynski's cancer treatment in order
to bolster Aetna's position in denying coverage for the treatment;
(4) Aetna filed false and misleading ex parte discovery motions in order
to get privileged claims information from other insurers;
1311. Id.




1316. 989 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1993).




(5) Aetna served frivolous subpoenas and notices of deposition on
third-party researchers in an effort to dissuade and intimidate them
from researching the type of treatment used by Burzynski; and
(6) Aetna gave false information to a United States Attorney in an ef-
fort to gain leverage in its litigation with Burzynski. 1318
Accordingly, Burzynski alleged causes of action against Aetna for tortious
interference with contract; tortious interference with prospective business re-
lations; abuse of process; business disparagement; a violation of the Texas
Insurance Code; a violation of the Illinois consumer fraud statute; and a
RICO violation. The district court dismissed the entire complaint on the
grounds that Texas law afforded an absolute privilege to communications
made in a court proceeding. Alternatively, the district court dismissed,
without prejudice, each cause of action under FED. R. Civ. P. § 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court rejected
Aetna's discovery privilege defense due to the possibility of Aetna's "ulte-
rior, malicious motives," and remanded for the reassessment of each of
Burzynski's causes of action. 1 319
On remand, the district court took no action on its prior dismissals with-
out prejudice, failed to call for answers by Aetna, and simply dismissed all of
Burzynski's causes of action. Burzynski petitioned for, and obtained, a writ
of mandamus to direct the district court to reinstate all claims and call for
answers thereto. The Fifth Circuit granted Burzynski's petition for rehear-
ing to examine the viability of each cause of action.
The court held that Burzynski had a valid claim for tortious interference
with contract; the requirements of which are "(1) a contract, (2) an inten-
tional act, calculated to cause damage to the plaintiff, that interferes with the
contract, and (3) proximate cause of actual damages to the plaintiff."' 13 20
The court reasoned that several BRI patients had insurance contracts with
various insurance companies to which Burzynski and BRI could be con-
strued as third-party beneficiaries. The letter sent by Aetna's attorneys to
the thirty-five insurers urging them to stop paying BRI claims suggested an
intent to cause damage to BRI. The fact that several insurers subsequently
ceased payments to BRI was sufficient to allege that Aetna proximately
caused BRI's financial injury. The district court, therefore, erred, said the
court, in dismissing Burzynski's action for tortious interference with
contract. 321
The court next held that Burzynski stated a valid claim for tortious inter-
ference with business relations; the elements of which are "(1) a reasonable
probability that the plaintiff would have gotten a contract, (2) malicious and
intentional action by the defendant that aborted the prospective business re-
lationship, and (3) actual harm to the plaintiff."'' 322 Burzynski sufficiently
pleaded that the letter by Aetna's attorneys to the thirty-five insurers may
1318. In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 737.
1319. See Burzynski v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1992).
1320. Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 738.
1321. Id. at 738-39.
1322. Id. at 739.
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have resulted in the denial of coverage to BRI patients and interfered with
the prospective business relations between BRI and the insurers. In addi-
tion, the pleadings sufficiently alleged proximate cause by Aetna and actual
damages to Burzynski.
However, the court held that Burzynski failed to plead a viable action for
abuse of process. Citing Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A. ,1323 the
court listed the requirements for abuse of process as (1) an illegal or im-
proper use of the process by the defendant; (2) an ulterior motive by the
defendant; and (3) damage to the plaintiff by the illegal act. 1324 The court
reasoned that Burzynski failed to state that Aetna illegally or improperly
used the process. Although Burzynski contended that the subpoenas and
notices of deposition to the researchers were used for intimidation, he failed
to show the existence of an improper use of the process after the issuance of
the discovery. Concluding that mere bad intentions were insufficient, as a
matter of law, to support a claim for abuse of process, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the claim with prejudice. 325
The court next held that Burzynski pleaded the necessary elements for a
business disparagement claim, which are "(1) publication of disparaging and
false words, (2) with malice, (3) which cause special damages, and (4) lack of
privilege."' 326 The court stated that the circumstances surrounding the let-
ter Aetna's attorneys mailed to the thirty-five insurers, urging that they
cease payment for BRI's "worthless" and "unreimburseable" claims, suffi-
ciently supported a claim for business disparagement. 327
Finally, the court held that Burzynski failed to properly plead a RICO
violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), (c), and (d). The court noted that
RICO claims require: ". . a person who engages in ... a pattern of racke-
teering activity,... connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or
control of an enterprise."' 1328 The court reasoned that Burzynski failed to
plead a "pattern" of acts by Aetna that constituted or threatened long-term
criminal activity. Specifically, the pleadings failed to state that Aetna's acts
amounted to, or threatened, continuing racketeering activity from either re-
peated conduct or past conduct projecting a threat of repetition into the
future. 329
The court noted that all of the alleged predicate acts took place as part of
the Burzynski I litigation, which had ended. In addition, the conduct did
not constitute or threaten long-term criminal activity. The court then rea-
soned that collectively Aetna, its attorneys, and its consultant, lacked the
continuity required for an "association in fact" enterprise.133 0 According to
1323. 766 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
1324. Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 739.
1325. Id. at 740.
1326. Id. (citing Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987)).
1327. Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 740.
1328. Id. at 741 (quoting Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 242
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989)).
1329. Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 742.
1330. Id. at 743.
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the court "two individuals who join together for the commission of one dis-
crete criminal offense have not created an 'association-in-fact' enterprise,
even if they commit two predicate acts during the commission of this offense,
because their relationship to one another has no continuity."' 1331 The court
concluded that, as pleaded, Aetna's alleged "association-in-fact" enterprise
lacked the requisite continuity under RICO. Burzynski, therefore, failed to
properly plead the statutory requirements of both a "pattern of racketeering
activity' and a RICO "enterprise." Accordingly, the court dismissed
Burzynski's RICO action without prejudice to allow for an amendment of
the pleadings. 1332
XV. INSURANCE CODE AMENDMENTS OF 1993
As part of its sunset legislation, the 1993 Legislature passed H.B. 1461
amending the Insurance Code. 1333 This piece of legislation restructured the
Department of Insurance in many ways, including the abolition of the three
member State Board of Insurance and centralizing its power in the Commis-
sioner of Insurance. With respect to private litigation, the Legislature made
several significant changes and refused to make other changes.
Article 21.21, § l(a) was amended to delete the reference to the federal
McCarran-Ferguson Act, thus eliminating the argument that the "business
of insurance" covered by article 21.21 is more limited than the expansive
definition in section 2(a) of article 1.14-1 would indicate.1334 Not only did it
delete the reference to McCarron-Ferguson in article 21.21, H.B. 1461 reen-
acted, with minor changes, the expansive definition of the insurance business
in article 1.14-1,1335 which includes claims handling 1336 along with virtually
every other kind of conduct. Moreover, prior to final passage of H.B. 1461,
the Legislature deleted an amendment added by the House that would have
precluded article 21.21 suits based on violations of Department of Insurance
regulations. 1337
The significance of H.B. 1461 is readily seen. Against the backdrop of
Vail, 133 8 which relied on the definition of the "insurance business" in article
1.14-1 to hold that claims settlement practices were within the "business of
insurance" in article 21.21, and the court of appeals' opinion in Watson v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 1339 which did likewise while recognizing the potential
application of the McCarran-Ferguson test, the Legislature has repealed the
1331. Id. (quoting Montesano v. Sea First Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir.
1987)).
1332. Burzynski, 989 F.2d at 744.
1333. H.B. 1461, § 20.17, page 400, line 27 through page 401, line 9. H.B. 1461 became law
on September 1, 1993 and appears as Chapter 685 in Vernon's Session Laws.
1334. This was the argument made by the insurer in Watson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 828 S.W.2d
423 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992), rev'd, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 408 (Jan. 12, 1994).
1335. H.B. 1461, § 3.031.
1336. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.14-1, § 2(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
1337. H.B. 1461 (Engrossed House version) Engrossed Rider No. 4
1338. Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).




reference to McCarran-Ferguson in article 21.21's "purpose" clause and re-
enacted the "insurance business" definition in article 1.14-1 without material
change. Only by actually inserting the style of the case into the statute itself
could the Legislature have more clearly evidenced its intent to adopt the Vail
holding that the "business of insurance" in article 21.21 is determined by the
definition of the "insurance business" in article 1. 14-1.1340 Because this defi-
nition specifically includes the "investigation or adjustment of claims or
losses" without distinguishing between "first-party" and "third-party," it
covers all claims or losses. Accordingly, when the definition is applied to
article 21.21 as Vail requires, it means that article 21.21 covers all claims or
losses. It also means that, if in the handling of any claim "[amny person...
[sustains] actual damages as a result of another's engaging" in unfair claims
settlement acts or practices as defined by the Insurance Code or regulation,
that person "may maintain an action against the person or persons engaging
in such acts or practices."1 34 1
Consistent with its clear intent to keep Vail intact, the Legislature rejected
an amendment passed by the House that, while not mentioning unfair claims
practices, would have insulated them from private suits. Stated simply, the
amendment precluded private suits based on conduct defined unfair by any
regulation. Obviously, this would prevent a suit based on conduct violating
the unfair claims settlement practices regulation. 1342 But it would also pre-
vent a suit based on the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act. 1343 Article
21.21-2 is actionable because the article 21.21 regulation prohibits conduct
defined as unfair by "other provisions of the Insurance Code .. ." 1344 By
eliminating suits based on a regulation, the amendment would have banned
all unfair claims settlement practices suits under article 21.21.1345
In light of the amendments that were offered but rejected, the amend-
ments that were made and the reenactment of portions of the Insurance
1340. See also Great Am. Ins, Co. v. North Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 850 S.W.2d 285,
288-89 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ requested) rejecting as "an illogical construction" the
insurer's argument that the definition of "insurance business" in article 1.14-1 did not apply to
the "business of insurance" in article 21.21. The insurer contended, among other things, that
"neither article refers to each other." Id. Though not mentioned by the court of appeals, this
is simply not true. The 1991 Legislature specifically incorporated into article 1.14-1 the defini-
tion of "person" in article 21.21. TEX. INS. CODE art. 1.14-1, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993)
(" 'person' shall mean that which is defined in Section 2(a), Article 21.21, of this code").
Moreover, article 1. 14-1 expressly authorizes the commissioner to initiate administrative pro-
ceedings whenever "a person or insurer ... has engaged in or is threatening to engage in an
unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice as defined by article
21.21 of this code or a rule or regulation promulgated under Article 21.21 of this code ... 
Id. § 3A(a). No better example exists of statutes in pari materia.
1341. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
1342. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.203 (West 1988).
1343. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
1344. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.3 (West 1988) (emphasis added).
1345. Because article 21.21 creates a special, statutory remedy, any repeal or amendment of
the remedy governs pending litigation. See La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes,
673 S.W.2d 558, 567 (Tex. 1984).
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Code, it seems clear that any effort to narrow the scope of article 21.21
causes of action by judicial "construction" of the statute should be
rejected. 1346
1346. "The deletion of a provision in a pending bill disclose[d] the legislative intent to reject
the proposal." Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804, 814 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Smith v.
Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616-17 (Tex. 1980)).
1438 [Vol. 47
